Abstract

When a jury awarded one million dollars in punitive damages to climatologist Michael Mann, in his defamation suit against writer Mark Steyn (who accused Mann of scientific fraud), it was newsworthy, even surprising, because opinions regarding scientific matters are rarely actionable. And yet it was not seen as a groundbreaking event in terms of legal doctrine, since the outcome was easily justifiable— Steyn’s accusation was provably false. However, even if the Constitutional contours of defamation law did not change, the Mann verdict has far-reaching implications for a major contemporary social phenomenon, namely the so-called crisis of expertise, a term identifying a distrust of consensus science by a large segment of our society. That phenomenon is but a part of the current polarization between left and right in the United States, and the Mann verdict sends a message to those who would casually encourage distrust of a credible scientist. Any such constructive move toward resolving the crisis of expertise could help reduce the dangerous effects of ignoring scientific expertise, whether with respect to healthcare or protection of the environment. Mann’s victory is, therefore, exemplary of a legal decision with benefits, albeit indirect (the benefits have little to do with free speech doctrine), for social progress. Courts do not purport to evaluate scientific truth, but when a court decides that a scientist was unfairly attacked for manipulating data, there is at least a suggestion that the work was sound, even though a scientific position can always be questioned on scientific grounds.

The crisis of expertise was caused, in part, by disinformation on the internet that raised doubts about credible science and scientists. When, in our polarized society, people seem to live in two different worlds, restoring trust in scientific institutions can seem almost impossible. And when judges appear to be politically polarized, law seems an unlikely ally to restore that trust. Mann’s victory, however, demonstrates that courts can help remove artificial controversies from the field of genuine scientific disagreements, and thereby begin to resolve the crisis of expertise. We should therefore recognize its benefits for science, scientists, and the citizenry in an age of disinformation.

ISSN

1049-0280

Publisher

University of Oregon School of Law

Keywords

Defamation, Fraud, Legal trials

Disciplines

Law | Litigation

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