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Third Circuit Review

SAVING PRIVATE REMEDIES: BELL v. CHESWICK GENERATING STATION ARMS PROPERTY OWNERS WITH A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ENERGY COMPANIES

LISABEL CHEONG*

“[T]he rights of persons, and the rights of property are the objects for the protection of which Government was instituted.”

I. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental rights to own and protect property are staples of the American dream. However, as countless industrial facilities continue to develop, air pollution increasingly infringes on citizens' rights to enjoy their private properties. In response to increased litigation arising from

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* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2011, Wake Forest University. This Casebrief is dedicated to my family for their constant love and support. Additionally, this Casebrief would not have been possible without the unwavering encouragement and advice of my friends. Lastly, a special thanks to the editors of the Villanova Law Review for their insight and suggestions during the writing process.

1. GARRETT WARSH HELDON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES MADISON 116 (2003) (quoting James Madison, fourth President of the United States, who asserted government was instituted to protect rights of persons and property).


such pollution, energy companies have increasingly argued that federal environmental laws preempt related state laws.\(^4\)

In the context of air pollution suits, polluters argue their compliance with comprehensive federal regulations under the Clean Air Act (CAA) shields them from liability under state law.\(^5\) This preemption defense is problematic in light of the limited right of recovery afforded to property owners under the CAA.\(^6\) Under the CAA, property owners are unable to seek damages if air pollution adversely impacts their property.\(^7\) The preservation of state common law claims is thus necessary to arm landowners with a means to protect their property interests.\(^8\) Accordingly, an analysis of whether the CAA preempts state common law is significant because state common law is the primary means by which plaintiffs may seek redress from polluters.\(^9\)

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\(^4\) See Third Circuit Finds Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt Toxic Tort in Pennsylvania—Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, PHILA. TOP INJURY LAWYER BLOG (Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter CAA Does Not Preempt Toxic Tort], http://www.philadelphia-topinjurylawyerblog.com/2013/09/third-circuit-finds-clean-air.html (stating that federal preemption has “become a popular way for large, powerful entities to try to avoid personal injury lawsuits”).

\(^5\) See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating defendant’s contention that “because the Plant was subject to comprehensive regulation under the [CAA], it owed no extra duty to the [plaintiffs] under state tort law”).

\(^6\) See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (e) (2012) (providing right to citizen suit enforcement but no right to compensatory damages except through common law); see also J.J. England, Saving Preemption in the Clean Air Act: Climate Change, State Common Law, and Plaintiffs Without a Remedy, 43 ENVTL. L. 701, 703 (2013) (noting that CAA “provides no means for an aggrieved party to seek compensatory damages from a polluter under any circumstances except through its savings clause”). Furthermore, England characterizes this CAA shortcoming as “a significant hole currently left unaddressed by Congress.” Id. (attributing CAA’s lack of remedial measure to Congressional silence).

\(^7\) See England, supra note 6, at 703 (recognizing that CAA does not provide for injured property owner to seek compensatory damages from polluter, except through savings clause). See generally Kathleen Roth, Note, A Landowners’ Remedy Laid to Waste: State Preemption of Private Nuisance Claims Against Regulated Pollution Sources, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 402–03 (1996) (discussing historical significance of private nuisance claim in cases of pollution damage).

\(^8\) See Roth, supra note 7, at 401–03 (discussing importance of preserving common law claims to ensure plaintiffs are afforded mode of redress).

\(^9\) See id. at 401, 420–22 (explaining that common law has traditionally been used to protect property owners and illustrating inadequacy of alternative remedies); see also England, supra note 6, at 703–04 (describing common law and its ability to provide relief: “it is foundational that courts have the ability to prevent harm from occurring through exercise of equitable powers and further ability to provide relief to aggrieved parties through their powers at law.”); Scott Gallisdorfer, Clean Air Act Preemption of State Common Law: Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 VA. L. REV. 131, 163–65 (2013) (stating one argument in favor of preserving common law nuisance actions: such remedies act as “flexible
This Casebrief asserts that the Third Circuit, in a case of first impression, correctly preserved common law remedies to protect private property interests by holding that the CAA does not preempt state common law. Part II of this Casebrief provides an overview of the CAA and its structure, including the model of cooperative federalism it employs and the two savings clauses it features. Part III explains and evaluates the Third Circuit’s decision in *Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station* and discusses other related circuit cases in light of Supreme Court precedent. Part IV analyzes the implications of the *Cheswick* holding for Third Circuit practitioners. Finally, Part V argues that the Third Circuit’s preemption ruling properly preserves landowners’ rights to recover damages caused by air pollution.

II. BACKGROUND

This section provides a general overview of the CAA and the preemption issues associated with its implementation. First, this section discusses the mechanics of the CAA. Second, it explains the preemption doctrine and the inconsistent applications various circuit courts have adopted. Finally, this section examines the preemption jurisprudence arising in the context of the CAA.

10. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s adoption of the proper approach to preemption in a CAA case, see *infra* notes 95–106, 151–54 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the CAA and the preemption doctrine, see *infra* notes 16–84 and accompanying text.
12. 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013).
13. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis and holding in *Cheswick*, see *infra* notes 85–138 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the practical ramifications for practitioners, including an explanation of the ramifications of the Third Circuit’s holding, see *infra* notes 139–57 and accompanying text.
15. For the argument that the Third Circuit applies a proper approach to protect property owners’ rights to seek redress from air pollution, see *infra* notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
16. For a general overview of the CAA and associated issues, see *infra* notes 17–84 and accompanying text.
17. For a brief overview of the CAA’s structure, see *infra* notes 20–43 and accompanying text.
18. For an overview of the preemption doctrine generally and its inconsistent application, see *infra* notes 44–67 and accompanying text.
19. For an overview of preemption jurisprudence in the context of the CAA, see *infra* notes 68–84 and accompanying text.
A. Pollution Solution: The Clean Air Act

Air pollution recognizes neither geographical nor political boundaries; thus, a joint effort by state and federal governments is necessary to regulate its adverse effects. 20 Although the CAA is a federal law, its cooperative federalism structure and savings clauses safeguard states’ rights. 21 Moreover, these distinct structural mechanisms reflect Congress’s intent to preserve state law remedies.

1. Two Halves of a Whole: The CAA’s Cooperative Federalism Structure

The twentieth century was marked by the rise of industry and urbanization of American cities. 22 Industrialization generated unprecedented levels of air pollution and eventually spurred congressional action to protect public health. 23 By 1963, Congress enacted the CAA, a comprehensive federal law that regulates air emissions and delegates its implementation to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 24 The CAA’s goal is “to protect . . . air resources . . . to promote the public health and welfare . . . .” 25

20. For a further discussion of the CAA’s cooperative federalism structure, see infra notes 21–32 and accompanying text.

21. For a further discussion of the CAA’s savings clauses, see infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text.

22. See Caroline Wick, Note, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station: Preserving the Cooperative Federalism Structure of the Clean Air Act, 27 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 109 (2013) (explaining that scientists, public, and government officials began to worry about air pollution in 1950s and 1960s); see also Frank P. Grad, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ch. 2, § 2.03 (Matthew Bender) (explaining increasing air pollution following World War II); England, supra note 6, at 703 (describing air pollution and climate change as causes for concern and using native village of Kivalina for illustration).

23. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2012) (explaining Congress’s finding “that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development . . . has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including . . . the deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation”); see also Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 90 (2001) (recounting history of environmental movement).


25. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (declaring purposes of CAA). The stated purposes of the CAA include:

1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population;
Under the CAA, state and local governments are responsible for pollution prevention and control, but the Act recognizes federal financial assistance and leadership as essential components to accomplishing these objectives. Through this cooperative federalism structure, the federal government develops baseline standards for states to individually implement and enforce. The EPA, on the other hand, is tasked with creating National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to create a uniform level of air quality across the country. After establishing such standards, the EPA delegates responsibility and authority for achieving NAAQS “attainment” to the states.

Specifically, states are required to create and submit to the EPA a State Implementation Plan (SIP), which details a plan for attainment, maintenance, and enforcement of NAAQS within the state. As such,

(2) to initiate and accelerate a national research and development program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution;
(3) to provide technical and financial assistance to State and local governments in connection with the development and execution of their air pollution prevention and control programs; and
(4) to encourage and assist the development and operation of regional air pollution prevention and control programs.

Id. § 7401(b) (listing CAA’s objectives).

26. See id. § 7401(a)(3)-(4) (recognizing federal financial support as “essential” to success of CAA).

27. See id. § 7410 (describing CAA’s implementation system); see also Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing CAA’s “cooperative federalism” structure); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (describing CAA as “experiment in cooperative federalism”); England, supra note 6, at 713–14 (explaining that “[b]ecause pollutants do not respect political boundaries,” CAA “contains several additional authorities that allow for cooperative interstate, regional, and international regulatory programs”).

28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (describing purpose of NAAQS). The CAA splits the country into various “air quality control regions” to facilitate compliance with the NAAQS. See id. § 7407(b) (describing air control regions). An air quality control region is considered to be in “attainment” if it satisfies the NAAQS for a given pollutant. See id. § 7409(b) (explaining when region satisfies NAAQS); see also Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“NAAQS must protect not only average healthy individuals, but also ‘sensitive citizens’—children, . . . people with asthma, emphysema, or other conditions rendering them particularly vulnerable to air pollution.” (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 10 (1970))); England, supra note 6, at 707 (“[T]he EPA Administrator [must] add pollutants to this list and promulgate [NAAQS] upon a finding that such pollutants ‘endanger [the] public health or welfare.’“ (third alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)));

29. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (explaining that air quality control region is considered to be in “attainment” if it satisfies the NAAQS for a given pollutant); see also id. § 7410 (detailing states’ responsibilities); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 1183, 1193 (1995) (discussing authority delegated to states).

30. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (explaining that decisions regarding how to meet NAAQS are left to individual states). All SIPs must be submitted to the EPA for approval, and once a SIP is approved, “its requirements become federal law and are fully enforceable in federal court.” Her Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 335 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing 42
states are given the freedom to set standards more stringent than those specified by federal requirements.\(^ {31}\) To enforce their standards, states require sources—facilities that emit pollution—to obtain a state-issued permit that limits the types and amounts of emissions that each permit holder is allowed to discharge.\(^ {32}\)

2. The Savings Clauses

The CAA features two savings clauses that preserve the rights of citizens to bring civil actions and states to set their own emissions standards.\(^ {33}\) First, the “citizen suit” provision permits the filing of civil suits “against any person . . . who is alleged to have violated . . . or to be in violation of . . . an emission standard or limitation” or “an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation . . . .”\(^ {34}\) In short, this savings clause enables property owners to bring suit if their property is adversely affected by air pollution.\(^ {35}\)

While the citizen suit provision authorizes private enforcement of the CAA, its remedies are limited to injunctive relief and recovery of litigation costs and attorney’s fees.\(^ {36}\) Notably, the citizen suit provision does not

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32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(a), (d)(1), 7661c(a) (detailing state implemented permit program).

33. See id. §§ 7604(a)(1), 7416 (establishing savings clauses); see also Roth, supra note 7, at 401 (asserting that Congress resolved preemption issues “by expressing its intent to save these causes of action or to preclude them in each environmental protection statute”).


35. See Wick, supra note 22, at 111 (arguing that legislative history of citizen suit provision illustrates Congressional intent to preserve citizens’ right to bring actions for pollution damages under common law).

36. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (lacking provision allowing for recovery of damages).
provide for recovery of damages.\(^{37}\) In fact, there is no provision within the CAA that allows an individual to seek compensation for actual harm caused by air pollution.\(^{38}\) Unfortunately, property owners who suffer extensive damage from air pollution find little relief by recovering litigation costs and attorney’s fees.\(^{39}\)

The other savings clause, entitled “Retention of State authority” (states’ rights savings clause), focuses on the rights of states.\(^{40}\) The provision specifies that “nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State . . . to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution . . . .”\(^{41}\) As a result, this savings clause preserves a state’s right to impose its own standards and illustrates the CAA’s cooperative federalism structure.\(^{42}\) In light of this provision, it is clear that Congress intended the CAA to impose minimum standards for emissions—a “regulatory floor, not a ceiling” on state emissions standards.\(^{43}\)

### B. Preemption: A Constitutional Doctrine Obscured by Hazy Application

#### 1. Preemption Generally

Preemption, a doctrine based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, holds that certain matters are of such national character that federal laws governing those matters take precedence over conflicting state laws.\(^{44}\) Thus, if a state passes a law that is inconsistent with federal law, the doctrine of preemption is triggered: federal law trumps and invalidates the conflicting state law.\(^{45}\) Congressional intent, however, is the threshold inquiry for every preemption issue.\(^{46}\) Preemption analyses begin with the

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\(^{37}\) See id. § 7604. For a brief overview of the CAA’s silence on damages, see infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.

\(^{38}\) See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (lacking provision to allow for recovery of damages).

\(^{39}\) See Roth, supra note 7, at 420 (explaining denial of common law nuisance claims “will also leave individual landowners without adequate remedies for harm caused by the polluter”).

\(^{40}\) See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (preserving state authority).

\(^{41}\) Id. (preserving states’ authority to set emissions standards).

\(^{42}\) See England, supra note 6, at 715 (stating legislative history of savings clause illustrates “it was intended to preserve traditional common law claims for pollution damages”).

\(^{43}\) See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that federal regulations set minimum standards and states are free to impose stricter standards).

\(^{44}\) See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .”).

\(^{45}\) See generally Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 1257, 1258–61 (2010) (providing overview of preemption doctrine); see also England, supra note 6, at 724 (illustrating supremacy clauses and explaining in detail two types of preemption: express and implied).

\(^{46}\) See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (asserting Congressional purpose is “‘ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case” (quoting Retail
assumption that the states’ historic police powers are not to be preempted by federal law absent a “clear and manifest” congressional intent.\footnote{Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 140–41 ("[T]he presumption against congressional intent to preempt state law has ‘particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States.’ . . . [A] court will read a statute that is ambiguous as to preemptive intent not to invoke preemption, particularly where any preemptive effect would disrupt the traditional balance between state and federal power.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008))).}

While the preemption doctrine appears straightforward, it has been described as “notoriously fuzzy” in its application.\footnote{See England, supra note 6, at 723 (describing preemption doctrine).} Indeed, “if there is any fixed principle in preemption doctrine, it is that courts will only grudgingly read preemptive intent into a federal statute.”\footnote{Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 140 (describing standard of review for preemption).} Accordingly, Supreme Court tests for determining if state law is preempted are inconsistent and “open-ended” and therefore susceptible to varied interpretations by district court judges.\footnote{See England, supra note 6, at 729 ("[T]he foundation of the Court’s preemption jurisprudence is on uncertain footing."). England attributes the uncertainty of preemption jurisprudence to the Court’s case-by-case analysis. See id. at 730–33 (providing in-depth discussion of Supreme Court’s uncertain stance on preemption).}

In 1987, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Clean Water Act (CWA) preempted state law in \textit{International Paper Co. v. Ouellette}.\footnote{479 U.S. 481, 483 (1987) (providing issue of case).} In \textit{Ouellette}, a Vermont resident sued the owner of a paper mill located across Lake Champlain in New York, alleging that the plant’s discharges were a nuisance.\footnote{See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 483 (stating facts); see also \textit{Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979)} (listing elements of nuisance claim).} The plaintiff brought a state common law claim under the laws of Vermont, the affected state, despite the fact that the polluting plant was in New York.\footnote{See id. at 484 (stating facts); see also \textit{Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (1979)} (listing elements of nuisance claim).} The Court explained that “[a]lthough Congress intended to dominate the field of pollution regulation, the [CWA’s] saving clause negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for state causes of action.”\footnote{See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 483 (stating plaintiff’s claim).} Underscoring the importance of the savings clause, the Court reasoned, “nothing in the [CWA] bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State.”\footnote{Id. at 492.} The \textit{Ouellette} Court definitively held that the CWA did not preempt a state common law nuisance suit, positioning its decision on the existence of the
CWA’s two savings clauses that preserve a citizen’s right to bring claims under common law or any other statute. Since 2000, the Supreme Court’s stance on preemption issues has been inconsistent. For example, in *Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.*, the Court held that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, which limits auto manufacturers’ choice of seatbelts to two options, does not preempt state tort suits. On the other hand, in *PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing*, the Court held that federal statutes and regulations promulgated under the Food and Drug Act do preempt state laws imposing the duty to change a drug’s label upon generic drug manufacturers. In *Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC*, the Court held that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act preempts all state-law design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers brought by plaintiffs seeking compensation for injury or death caused by a vaccine’s side effects. The Court, in *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, issued a holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California Supreme Court decision because it impeded “the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Finally, in *Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting*, the Supreme Court established that the Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) does not preempt Arizona’s unauthorized alien employment law because it “fits within the confines of IRCA’s savings clause and does not conflict with federal immigration law . . . .”

2. **Preemption and the CAA**

Co., the Court held that federal common law is fully displaced by the CAA.69 The Court expressly reserved the question of whether the CAA similarly preempts state common law claims.70 Yet, despite having issued six preemption opinions, the Court’s stance on preemption remains uncertain.71

Inconsistent treatment of CAA preemption has not been limited to the Supreme Court.72 Not surprisingly, courts have struggled to rule consistently on preemption cases.73 In 1989, the Sixth Circuit held that the CAA did not preempt plaintiffs from suing the City of Detroit under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA).74 In *Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit*,75 the plaintiffs initiated a suit against the City of Detroit under the MEPA over the proposed construction of a city-owned incinerator.76 In holding that the CAA did not preempt the state law, the court emphasized that the CAA’s savings clause, like those of the CWA, expressly preserves an ongoing role for the states in regulating air pollution.77

More recently, in 2010, the Fourth Circuit held in *North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority*78 that the CAA preempts state-law tort claims.79 The state of North Carolina brought a state-law public nuisance suit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency that owned and operated coal-fired power plants in Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky.80 The district court issued an injunction against four TVA plants, which imposed emissions standards that were stricter than those required by the CAA.81

69. Id. at 2531 (holding that CAA preempts federal common law).
70. See id. at 2540; see also England, supra note 6, at 723 (stating that district courts faced with CAA preemption issues have arrived at different results, “spanning the entire range from full preemption to non-preemption”).
71. See England, supra note 6, at 729–30 (describing lack of Supreme Court consistency in its 2011 preemption opinions).
72. Compare Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding CAA does not preempt state law), and *Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ont. v. City of Detroit*, 874 F.2d 332, 334 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding CAA did not preempt state law), with *North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth.*, 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding CAA preempts state law).
73. For cases illustrating inconsistent circuit court preemption opinions, see infra notes 120–30 and accompanying text.
74. See *Her Majesty the Queen*, 874 F.2d at 342 (finding that CAA “displaces state law only to the extent that state law is not as strict as emission limitations established in the federal statute”).
75. 874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989).
76. See id. at 333–34 (providing facts of case).
77. See id. at 342–45 (noting that plain language of CAA’s savings clause “clearly indicates that Congress did not wish to abolish state control”).
78. 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
79. See id. at 311–12 (holding CAA preempts state tort claims).
80. See id. at 296 (providing facts of case).
81. See id. (providing facts of case).
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, noting that the district court misapplied Ouellette, and held that the CAA preempts state law. Moreover, the court concluded that Ouellette’s holding regarding the CWA is applicable in a CAA action, particularly because of the striking similarities between the two acts. Subsequently, in 2013, the Third Circuit was given the opportunity to formulate its own approach to state preemption, “a matter of first impression” for the court.

III. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station: The Third Circuit Protects Property Owners’ Rights to Seek Redress from Air Pollution

The Third Circuit took a decisive stance in the preemption debate by holding that the CAA did not preempt state law. The unanimous ruling had the effect of preserving state-law tort claims and with it the rights of citizens to seek compensation for property damage caused by a facility’s pollution.

A. Narrative Analysis

In a matter of first impression for the Third Circuit, the Cheswick court correctly relied on Supreme Court precedent to give full effect to the CAA’s states rights’ savings clause.

1. Background: Facts and Procedure

In 2012, two women led a 1,500-member class action lawsuit against Cheswick Generating Station, GenOn Power Midwest, L.P. (GenOn), the owner of a 570-megawatt coal-fired power plant (Plant). The plaintiffs claimed that the Plant’s operation caused ash and other contaminants to settle on their property and sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages under three common law tort actions: nuisance, negligence and...
recklessness, and trespass. They argued that despite GenOn’s claims of operating within the law, the Plant was violating its permit, which prohibits it from emitting visible, or otherwise perceptible, contaminants outside of its own boundaries. In response, “GenOn argued that because the Plant was subject to comprehensive regulation under the [CAA], it owed no extra duty to the [property owners] under state tort law.”

Agreeing with GenOn, the district court granted its motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ tort claims “impermissibly encroach[ed] on and interfere[ed] with [the federal] regulatory scheme” and were thus preempted by the CAA. On appeal, the Third Circuit’s main issue was whether the CAA preempts state-law tort claims brought by private property owners against a source of pollution located in the same state as the property. Based on the plain language of the CAA’s savings clauses and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that the CAA does not preempt state-law tort claims.

2. **CAA Preemption Analysis**

The Third Circuit acknowledged that the Plant was extensively regulated and comprehensively overseen by both state and federal authorities under the CAA and that the facility’s permit specifically addresses odor and combustion residuals emissions. Consequently, the Third Circuit did not determine that the permit was controlling on the issue. Rather, the court looked to the states’ rights savings clause within the permit itself.

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89. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 315 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (detailing plaintiffs’ complaint: “property damage, the invasion by and inhalation of . . . odors, and the deposit of . . . particulate coal dust, including fly ash and particulates formed by gases and chemicals emitted by [the Plant]”); see also Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 192 (listing common law tort theories under which plaintiffs sought damages). The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief on the nuisance and trespass counts but admitted that such relief would only force GenOn to remove the debris and particulate that continuously falls upon the plaintiffs’ properties. Id. at 192–93.

90. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 191–92 (detailing specifics of GenOn’s Subchapter V permit for its Cheswick plant).

91. Id. at 189 (describing defendant’s argument).

92. Cheswick, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (ruling CAA preempted state law claims).


94. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 198 (“We see nothing in the [CAA] to indicate that Congress intended to preempt source state common law tort claims. . . . We will reverse the decision . . . .”). Contra Cheswick, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (“[T]o permit the common law claims would be inconsistent with the dictates of the [CAA].”).

95. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 191–92 (discussing regulation at Cheswick plant).

96. See id.
that preserved all rights and remedies under equity, common law, and statutory law.97

The Third Circuit, acknowledging that it was addressing preemption in the context of the CAA for the first time, based its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ouellette.98 The court explained that the CAA includes savings clauses similar to the CWA that provide the statutory basis to preserve the plaintiffs’ state common law claims.99 Further, the court emphasized the consistency with which other circuits have examined this issue and failed to find any meaningful distinction between the CWA and the CAA.100

In terms of policy considerations, the court refrained from addressing whether its ruling would open the floodgates to nuisance claims against facilities that may otherwise be in compliance with established state and federal emissions standards.101 The court also did not discuss whether its decision could result in a patchwork of inconsistent requirements.102 Instead, the Third Circuit emphasized that states have the ability to apply more stringent standards to pollution emitting facilities located within their jurisdiction.103 The court also approved state tort law as an acceptable means for imposing higher standards on an in-state facility.104

Lastly, the court rejected GenOn’s contention that the CAA’s comprehensive regulatory structure would be undermined if juries and courts set

97. See id. (focusing on savings clause in permit).
98. See id. at 195 (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 481).
99. See id. (comparing CWA and CAA and finding no material difference between their savings clauses and preemptive reach and thus holding that Ouellette controlled outcome); see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 328–29 (1981) (holding that CWA savings clauses are essentially identical to CAA counterparts).
100. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 195–96 (discussing other circuit courts’ failure to meaningfully distinguish between two acts and rejecting defendant’s attempt to distinguish CWA and CAA). The Third Circuit concluded that “GenOn’s argument hinges on its expansive reading of the [CWA]’s states’ rights savings clause, . . .”. Id. at 195 (analyzing defendant’s argument).
101. See id. at 197 (lacking discussion concerning effects of holding on increased litigation).
102. See id. (acknowledging possible tension between state nuisance laws and permit system but countering with argument that state nuisance laws are “relatively predictable” (quoting Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498–99)); see also Roth, supra note 7, at 423 (recognizing “need to balance the interests of private citizens with industry’s need for predictable liability”); Mark Delaquil & Richard Raile, Third Circuit Decision Finding No CAA Preemption of State Law Nuisance Creates Apparent Split with Fourth Circuit, BakerHostetler (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.environmentallawstrategy.com/2013/09/third-circuit-decision-finding-no-caa-preemption-of-state-law-nuisance-creates-apparent-split-with-fourth-circuit/ (“[T]he balancing of societal interests inherent in deciding nuisance claims may well preclude the certainty necessary for regulated entities to make business investments.”).
103. See Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 197–98 (emphasizing that CAA’s savings clause allows states to impose standards higher than those required by federal law).
104. See id. (concluding that state tort law is legitimate means to impose state standards).
emissions standards. The Third Circuit went on to note that the requirements of the CAA “served as a regulatory floor, not a ceiling,” and that states remain free to impose higher standards, enforceable under state tort law, on their own sources of pollution.

B. Critical Analysis

The Third Circuit’s reliance on *Ouellette*, a case that analyzed the CWA, shows the court’s willingness to use the Supreme Court’s analysis of the CWA to inform its analysis of the CAA. On the other hand, courts like the Fourth Circuit have failed to recognize and apply *Ouellette* to cases involving the CAA. Ultimately, in *Cheswick*, the Third Circuit reserved its judicial discretion to determine CAA preemption issues on a case-by-case basis.

1. Sister Acts: The CWA/CAA Analogy and Supreme Court Precedent

The *Cheswick* court properly relied on the Supreme Court’s analysis of preemption under the CWA in *Ouellette* to analyze preemption under the CAA. Indeed, the similarities between the CAA and CWA have led to the acts being called “sibling acts.” Both acts were passed in the 1970s, are “command-and-control” statutes, and are seminal environmental laws in the United States. Most importantly, both acts feature a cooperative

105. *See id.* at 197 (rejecting defendant’s argument by way of analogy: “’[the] Supreme Court addressed this precise problem’ in *Ouellette* . . . and rejected the very same concerns that [defendants] now raise.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting North Carolina *ex rel.* Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 301 (2010))).

106. *See id.* at 197–98 (rejecting GenOn’s argument that court’s holding may undermine regulatory scheme of CAA and explaining that CAA standards and requirements serve as baseline for emissions standards).

107. For a further discussion of the CWA/CAA analogy, see *infra* notes 110–19 and accompanying text.

108. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s approach, see *infra* notes 120–30 and accompanying text.

109. For a further discussion of the impact of the *Cheswick* decision, see *infra* notes 131–38 and accompanying text.


112. *See* England, *infra* note 6, at 726 (describing similarities between CWA and CAA); *see also* Adler, *infra* note 111, at 206 (examining similarities and differences between CWA and CAA). Adler asserts the statutes have differed significantly in their implementation. *See id.* at 207 (detailing differences in implementation methods). Command and control regulations directly regulate an
federalism structure and delegate significant authority and discretion to states to implement the statutes. Moreover, when Congress amended the CAA in 1990, it borrowed significant ideas from the CWA. Therefore, the Ouellette Court’s conclusion that “nothing in the [CWA] bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the laws of the source State” bears heavily in determining whether the CAA preempts state laws.

A textual comparison of the two savings clauses in the CAA and CWA reveals that the CWA’s states’ rights savings clause includes additional language: that nothing in the CWA shall “be construed as impairing or in any industry or activity by legislation that defines what is permitted and what is illegal, e.g. harmful pollution. See Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law, 20 COLO. LAW. 435, 435 (1991) (describing command and control regulations). The term “command and control” describes a regulatory structure that “impos[es] rigid standards of conduct . . . backed up by sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such standards . . . .” Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 659 (2012) (alterations in original) (quoting James E. Krier & Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental Law: The Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15 n.3 (1980)) (providing early definition of term). In the context of air pollution, command and control regulations “focus[ ] on preventing environmental problems by specifying how a company will manage a pollution-generating process.” Sophia Hamilton, When Scientific Palmers Make Policy: The Impact and Future of Cap-and-Trade in the United States, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 269, 313 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing how command and control regulations function in context of air pollution control); see also Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 152 (stating that both acts “feature nearly identical savings clauses contemplating preservation of independent forms of state regulation,” but also providing basis on which to distinguish two acts). The CWA’s primary savings clause contains additional language stating that nothing in the Act should “be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters . . . of such States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012). As Gallisdorfer points out, some commentators have suggested that the phrase “of such States” acts as a qualifier and limits the coverage of the savings clause to a state’s regulation of its own waters, thus driving the source and affected state law distinction articulated by the Supreme Court in Ouellette. See Gallisdorfer, supra note 9, at 152–53. “The [CAA], by contrast, lacks any such qualifier, perhaps indicating that this same distinction should not apply there.” Id. at 153.


114. See Adler, supra note 111, at 207–08 (illustrating close nexus between two acts).

115. Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 194–95 (quoting Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497) (internal quotation marks omitted) (relying heavily on Ouellette’s CWA preemption analysis to inform its analysis); see also England, supra note 6, at 715 n.106 (arguing that legislative history of CWA supports inference that Congress intended to preserve traditional common law claims for pollution damages). The Senate Report for the CWA demonstrates Congress intended for the savings clauses to “specificaly preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damage.” See id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746–47.
manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States.”116 The Third Circuit explained that the CAA lacked analogous language because “there are no such jurisdictional boundaries or rights which apply to the air.”117 The court reasoned that, “[i]f anything, the absence of any language regarding state boundaries” in the CAA’s states’ rights savings clause is indicative of Congress’s intent to afford more rights to the states.118 Moreover, Congress’s “failure even to hint at” its intention to eliminate private causes of action under state law belies any argument for preemption of state law.119

2. Parting Ways with the Fourth Circuit

The Third Circuit’s vision of preemption under the CAA, however, differs dramatically from the Fourth Circuit’s understanding of preemption.120 In North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Fourth Circuit held that a facility’s CAA permit preempts a state nuisance claim under North Carolina law.121 The Fourth Circuit suggested that subjecting permittees to a state-by-state “patchwork” of ambiguous nuisance laws is incompatible with the comprehensive regulatory framework of the CAA.122

The Fourth Circuit strategically characterized the CAA as a delicate regulatory system carefully crafted by “decades of thought by legislative bodies and agencies.”123 With this in mind, the court appointed itself as the defender of the CAA against “the vagaries of public nuisance doctrine” that threaten to “scuttle the extensive system of anti-pollution mandates that promote clean air in this country.”124

116. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (preserving states’ rights and jurisdiction with respect to waters of states); see also Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 195 (noting additional language in CWA’s states’ rights savings clause).
117. Cheswick, 734 F.3d at 195 (providing explanation for CWA’s additional language).
118. Id. (interpreting omitted language as indication that Congress intended to reserve state authority).
119. Id. at 198 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See Cooper, 615 F.3d at 310–12 (holding CAA preempts North Carolina state law).
122. See id. at 302 (asserting state specific nuisance laws are incompatible with CAA).
123. Id. at 298 (describing state that created CAA).
124. Id. (explaining policy consideration in holding that CAA preempted state law). Moreover, the court characterizes North Carolina’s suit in one short, but poignant statement: “Litigation that amounts to ‘nothing more than a collateral attack’ on the system, however, risks results that lack both clarity and legitimacy.” Id. at 301 (quoting Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 1993)) (characterizing plaintiff’s argument as attack on CAA). The court noted that “[i]t ill behooves the judiciary to set aside a congressionally sanctioned
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, adopted a “fundamentally different” approach.125 Two practitioners have noted that the Fourth Circuit adopted “a broader view of Ouellette’s holding, finding that nuisance law was an ‘ill-defined omnibus tort of last resort,’ and North Carolina’s lawsuit was an attempt ‘to replace’ the carefully crafted CAA regime with nuisance law’s ‘vague and indeterminate’ standards.”126 However, the Fourth Circuit’s shortcoming is more conspicuous: it ignores the Supreme Court’s assertion that nothing in the CWA—the CAA’s sister act—bars injured individuals from bringing a nuisance claim under state law.127

Ultimately, the court’s holding in Cheswick is limited to the Third Circuit, and the issue is far from settled.128 Other federal courts of appeals have not had the occasion to address whether the CAA preempts private state-law tort claims.129 Moreover, “the Third Circuit’s opinion is subject to discretionary appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.”130

3. Impact of Cheswick on the Third Circuit

The Third Circuit looked to the states’ rights savings clause contained in GenOn’s permit to preserve all rights and remedies under equity, common law, and statutory law.131 As such, the decision reserves judicial discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a facility’s permit preempts state tort claims.132 Additionally, just one month before the Third Circuit issued its Cheswick decision, the court issued another anti-scheme of many years’ duration . . . that reflects the extensive application of scientific expertise . . . .” Id. (explaining policy concerns).

125. See Delaquil & Raile, supra note 102 (explaining import of Third Circuit decision in context of liability).

126. Id. (quoting Cooper, 615 F.3d at 302) (asserting Fourth Circuit took broader approach to Ouellette than Third Circuit).

127. See Cooper, 615 F.3d at 301–04 (discussing Ouellette but lacking any mention of its recognition that CWA does not bar state-law nuisance claims).


129. See id. (noting Seventh Circuit, for example, has never addressed this state preemption issue).

130. Id. (emphasizing possibility of appeal).

131. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2013) (focusing on savings clause in permit).

polluter decision.\textsuperscript{133} In \textit{GenOn REMA, LLC v. EPA},\textsuperscript{134} GenOn’s Pennsylvania facility was generating high levels of sulfur dioxide emissions that traveled just across the Delaware River, a mere 500 feet away, to New Jersey.\textsuperscript{135} New Jersey filed a claim with the EPA, which issued a ruling requiring GenOn to decrease its emissions.\textsuperscript{136} GenOn argued that the EPA’s ruling was invalid because the ruling was arbitrary and capricious and the EPA lacked the authority to issue the ruling; however, the Third Circuit rejected both these claims.\textsuperscript{137} Given the Third Circuit’s pattern of issuing pro-plaintiff decisions, it appears “polluters will have a hard time arguing their way out of their dirty business . . . .”\textsuperscript{138}

IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THIRD CIRCUIT PRACTITIONERS

AFTER CHESWICK

This section explores several key points and practical implications for practitioners as a result of \textit{Cheswick}.\textsuperscript{139} First, this section explains that CAA compliance alone will not shield polluters from liability, because \textit{Cheswick} preserves state-law tort claims.\textsuperscript{140} Second, it recommends valuable litigation tips for regulated entities.\textsuperscript{141}

A. CAA Compliance Alone Will Not Shield Against Liability

The Third Circuit’s decision is significant for regulated entities because it questions the degree to which CAA compliance will shield them against liability for state common law violations.\textsuperscript{142} In light of \textit{Cheswick},

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{134} 722 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2013).
  \item \textsuperscript{135} See id. at 515–16 (providing facts of case).
  \item \textsuperscript{136} See id. at 516 (stating details of EPA’s ruling). The CAA “allows downwind states to petition the EPA for a finding that a source in an upwind state affects the petitioning state’s attainment or maintenance of NAAQS due to air pollution emanating from the source in the upwind state.” \textit{Id.} (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (2012)) (describing circumstances that allow states to petition EPA).
  \item \textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.} at 526 (“[W]e hold that the EPA’s action of promulgating the Portland Rule was neither an abuse of discretion nor arbitrary or capricious.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Khorasanee, supra note 133 (predicting Third Circuit’s recent EPA decisions do not bode well for future polluters).
  \item \textsuperscript{139} For a further discussion of practical implications of the \textit{Cheswick} decision, see infra notes 140–57 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} For a further discussion of what \textit{Cheswick} means for companies that own and operate pollution emitting sources, see infra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} For suggestions and litigation tips, see infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} See Delaquil & Raile, supra note 102 (explaining importance of Third Circuit decision in context of liability).
\end{itemize}
facilities with pollution-emitting sources may not shield themselves from civil liability by simply complying with federal law.\textsuperscript{143} The Third Circuit’s assurance that its decision is unlikely to trigger increased litigation is questionable; \textit{Cheswick} allows landowners to pursue state claims against power plants despite their compliance with state and federal regulations.\textsuperscript{144} Commentators note that because the Third Circuit is the first circuit to explicitly extend \textit{Ouellette} to private nuisance claims for air pollution, it may cause facilities to “become targets of a new wave of state tort actions from newly-emboldened neighbors.”\textsuperscript{145} Of particular note, just days after the \textit{Cheswick} decision, the “prevailing plaintiffs’ attorney filed a similar suit involving a different public utility in the same federal district.”\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, increased litigation is a palpable concern given America’s reputation as the most litigious country in the world.\textsuperscript{147}

**B. Litigation Tips for Regulated Entities**

Owners and operators of facilities within the Third Circuit—particularly electric, oil, and gas companies—should be cognizant of the potential increase in tort actions brought under local state law.\textsuperscript{148} Regulated entities should emphasize the significance of their “[CAA] compliance to a favorable merits determination.”\textsuperscript{149} At the very minimum, facilities

\textsuperscript{143.} See Sudhir Lay Burgaard, \textit{Third Circuit Finds the Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt State Common Law Claims}, MORGAN POLICH & PURDII LLP (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.mpplaw.com/files/Publication/987a9ef1-88b7-4361-8c8b-f2e01f42045/PublicationAttachment/8e542b00-459e-46ba-9700-f692f0988cb5/3rd_Circuit_Finds%20CAA-Does-Not-Preempt-%E2%80%93SLB.pdf; see also Belcher, \textit{supra} note 132 (explaining that facilities may be complying with their permit but that it will not “insulate them against environmental challenge”). But \textit{see} Brown v. Scioto Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that compliance with pollution permit issued under comprehensive regulatory scheme barred common law nuisance actions).


\textsuperscript{145.} \textit{Clean Air Act Does Not Preempt Property Owners’ State Law Tort Claims, Says Third Circuit in Case of First Impression}, CROWELL & MORING LLP (Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter \textit{Case of First Impression}], http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/All/Clean-Air-Act-Does-Not-Preempt-Property-Owners-State-Law-Tort-Claims-Says-Third-Circuit-in-Case-of-First-Impression; \textit{see also} Green, \textit{supra} note 144 (discussing possibility of increased litigation resulting from \textit{Cheswick}).

\textsuperscript{146.} \textit{Case of First Impression}, \textit{supra} note 145.


\textsuperscript{148.} \textit{See} Belcher, \textit{supra} note 132 (warning owners of pollution-emitting facilities to be aware of possible increase in litigation).

\textsuperscript{149.} Martel, \textit{supra} note 110 (noting importance of CAA compliance).
should negotiate their permits to include language that acknowledges the CAA permit shield provision, in order to protect from additional requirements where the facility is in compliance with permitted limits.150

The Cheswick ruling abolished the defense that CAA regulation and compliance shield facilities from incurring liability under state law.151 Despite the decision, however, other preemption-related defenses are available.152 For example, facilities could argue that state laws that regulate air emissions preempt common law tort claims, such as nuisance.153 Additionally, defendants may assert “fact-specific administrative law arguments, such as the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust available administrative review remedies for seeking more stringent emission limitations in the underlying permit.”154

Public relations efforts are also critical to proactively preventing an onslaught of litigation.155 Specifically, permit holders should consider strategies for reaching out to landowners in the vicinity of emissions-releasing facilities, because those owners are most likely to be impacted by emissions and therefore most likely to bring future tort claims.156 Reaching out to potential plaintiffs and resolving issues out of court may prevent costly litigation, for both parties.157

V. CONCLUSION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROACH APPROPRIATELY PROTECTS PROPERTY OWNERS’ RIGHTS TO SEEK REDRESS

Considering that common law claims have traditionally been the means to address legislative shortcomings, the Third Circuit’s approach in Cheswick appropriately takes steps to preserve property owners’ rights to recover damages caused by air pollution.158 If the Third Circuit had upheld the district court’s preemption finding, then it would have effectively barred attempts by property owners to assert their common law rights.159 One commentator notes that allowing defendants in CAA actions to in-

150. Belcher, supra note 132 (explaining what companies should negotiate in permit).
151. See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding case for further proceedings).
152. See Harrington, Kemp & Poland, supra note 128 (discussing importance of public relations as well).
153. See id. (suggesting alternative defense).
154. Id. (suggesting administrative law arguments for defense).
155. See id. (describing importance of public relations efforts).
156. See id. (discussing target audience for public relations efforts).
157. See id. (suggesting reaching out to potential plaintiffs).
158. See England, supra note 6, at 746 (explaining negative effect of allowing federal laws to preempt state laws).
159. See CAA Does Not Preempt Toxic Tort, supra note 4 (explaining significance of Third Circuit’s holding); see also Roth, supra note 7, at 404–07 (discussing permit shield provisions). Roth asserts that permit-shield provisions restrict individuals’ rights to protect their property interests and “create a gap in the scheme for environmental protection and unnecessarily harm private landowners.” Id. at 415 (discussing impact of permit-shield provisions).
voke a preemption defense “may deprive plaintiffs of a remedy needed to right a wrong, and it may further erode centuries-old precedent allowing common law air pollution claims involving traditional air pollutants to move forward—claims expressly preserved by CAA.”

In sum, the Third Circuit correctly held that the CAA does not preempt state common law actions, because its decision preserves the historic federal-state partnership that addresses “one of the most notorious types of public nuisance in modern experience.”


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