Constitutional Law - Due Process Clause - Where New Prosecution Is Initiated for Additional Criminal Activity Not Specified in an Original Indictment, Actual Vindictiveness Is the Proper Standard to Determine Whether Such Prosecutorial Conduct Is Constitutionally Permissible

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Recent Developments

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DUE PROCESS CLAUSE—WHERE NEW PROSECUTION IS INITIATED FOR ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL ACTIVITY NOT SPECIFIED IN AN ORIGINAL INDICTMENT, ACTUAL VINDICTIVENESS IS THE PROPER STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH PROSECUTIONAL CONDUCT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE.

United States v. Andrews (6th Cir. 1979)

On November 16, 1975, Tallice Andrews, Thurston Brooks, and Fannie Braswell were stopped and arrested for alleged narcotics and firearms offenses. A two-count indictment was returned on November 8, 1976, charging the three defendants with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and with unlawfully carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. On December 29, 1976, defendants Andrews and Brooks appeared before a United States magistrate to be arraigned and, pursuant to the government's request, were remanded without bail. These defendants successfully appealed the magistrate's ruling and both were admitted to bail on January 11, 1977. Two days later, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging all three individuals with offenses identical to the November, 1976 indictment except that a conspiracy count was added.


3. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). This section provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance . . . ." Id.


Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is to be committed therewith, ships, transports, or receives a firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

Id.

5. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The reasons underlying the government's request that no bail be set were that "Fannie Braswell had turned state's evidence, had been threatened, and had been placed in the federal witness protection program." Id. slip op. at 2 n.2.

6. Id. slip op. at 2.

7. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Section 846 states that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the
fendants Andrews and Brooks then filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the added charge, contending that it was obtained in retaliation for their exercise of the constitutional and statutory right to reasonable bail, and was, therefore, the product of unconstitutional prosecutorial conduct. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the conspiracy count.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that when additional charges are brought against a defendant subsequent to his assertion of some procedural right, such prosecutorial conduct violates due process only if the defendant can commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." Id. The substantive offense involved in the indictment for conspiracy was found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). For the text of § 841(a)(1), see note 3 supra.

8. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The eighth amendment proscribes the imposition of "[e]xcessive bail." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. As a corollary to this constitutional right, Congress has set forth the conditions upon which a judicial officer may impose bail in order to reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant for trial, as well as the factors that should influence the exercise of that discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a), (b) (1976). Furthermore, rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires that "eligibility for release prior to trial shall be in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3146." Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a).

9. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The thrust of the defendant's claim was that the additional charge should be stricken because it was the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Under the rule of Pearce and Blackledge, due process of law is violated when the prosecutorial decision to procure a superseding indictment is motivated, or appears to be motivated, by a desire to punish a defendant for exercising his legal rights. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 28; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723. For a detailed discussion of these two cases and the concept of prosecutorial vindictiveness, see notes 12-21 & 27-34 and accompanying text infra.

10. United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. 1235, 1244 (E.D. Mich. 1978) rev'd and remanded, United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Although the government was aware of all the facts necessary to obtain the conspiracy charge at the time of the November, 1976 indictment, it sought to justify the new charge as a combined result of the prosecutor's inexperience, a moratorium on the work of the grand jury, and vacation scheduling difficulties in the prosecutor's office. Id. at 1241. The government argued that but for these circumstances, it "would have presented the conspiracy evidence to the Grand Jury in mid-December prior to the time defendants filed their bond motion." Id. (footnote omitted). The district court determined that the prosecutor's failure to add the conspiracy count prior to the defendant's assertion of the right to bail was not malicious. Id. at 1243. Nevertheless, the district court reasoned that even the mere appearance of retaliatory vindictiveness violates due process of law since the apprehension of such conduct may deter a defendant from exercising his constitutional or statutory rights. Id. at 1240, citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The district court indicated that only two exceptions can prevent the application of this prophylactic rule by dispelling the appearance of vindictiveness: 1) where the essential elements of the increased offense did not exist at the time of the original indictment, and 2) where the government discovers new evidence of which it was excusably unaware at the time of the original charge. Id. at 1241. Since neither of these circumstances was present in the instant case, the district court concluded that the increase in charges did not satisfy the demands of the due process clause "in preserving unblemished the integrity of our criminal justice system." Id. at 1244.

11. The due process clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

The United States Supreme Court first examined the due process limitations on governmental retaliation for a defendant’s exercise of his legal rights in North Carolina v. Pearce. 14 In Pearce, defendant was convicted in a North Carolina court for assault with intent to commit rape, and was sentenced by the trial judge to a twelve to fifteen year prison term. 15 The defendant subsequently initiated a state post-conviction appeal which resulted in a reversal of his conviction. 16 After being convicted again upon retrial, he was sentenced by the same judge to a harsher term than had originally been imposed. 17 In a habeas corpus proceeding, the Supreme Court observed that it was repugnant to fundamental notions of fairness to penalize those who choose to exercise protected rights. 18 Thus, the Court held:

U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the fourteenth amendment states, “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

12. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 17-18 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). This holding comprises only part of Judge Green’s elaborately articulated standard for determining when prosecutorial conduct is unconstitutionally vindictive. Id. Judge Green distinguished the situation in which the prosecution adds new charges arising out of “criminal conduct relatively distinct from that underlying the original charge” from the situation where the prosecution adds new charges “for a different and distinct offense which was a different and distinct consequence of the same basic conduct underlying the original charge.” Id. Although in both instances the defendant must show actual vindictiveness, Judge Green concluded that in the first situation the prosecutor could rebut the defendant’s case by offering a plausible explanation for his conduct, whereas, in the second, he must offer facts which reasonably negate any inference of vindictive intent. Id. slip op. at 17-18. Judge Green also held that when the prosecution substitutes charges, thereby increasing the potential severity of the punishment to which the defendant is exposed, a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness is created which can be overcome only by a showing that intervening circumstances created a fact situation which did not exist at the time of the original indictment. Id. slip op. at 17. For a discussion of Judge Green’s development of this tripartite standard against which prosecutorial conduct is to be measured, see notes 57-71 and accompanying text infra.

13. For a discussion of the precedential value of the decision in Andrews, see note 55 infra.

14. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In a companion case to Pearce, Simpson v. Rice, the defendant pleaded guilty to four separate counts of second-degree burglary and was sentenced to serve a 10-year prison term. Id. at 714. After successfully attacking this conviction on the basis that he had been denied his constitutional right to counsel, the defendant was retried and convicted for three of the original counts, but received a 25-year sentence. Id.

15. Id. at 713.

16. Id.

17. Id. Although the second sentence was only an eight-year prison term, the parties stipulated that it amounted to a greater sentence when considered with the time Pearce had already served for his original sentence. Id.

18. Id. at 724, citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). The Pearce Court noted that the Supreme Court “has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review.” 395 U.S. at 724, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 484 U.S. 305 (1986). The Court also stated, however, that it is patently unconstitutional to “put a price on appeal” or to “impede open and equal access” once these avenues have been established. Id., quoting Worcester v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 370 F.2d 713, 714 (1st Cir. 1966) and Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1966).
Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentences he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. 19

As a prophylaxis against vindictiveness in the resentencing process, the Court required that, upon a showing by the defendant of the imposition of a harsher sentence, the government must show articulable reasons for any increase in punishment. 20 The Court specifically stated that “[t]hose reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing.” 21

The Supreme Court subsequently determined that not “all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal” violate due process. 22 For example, in Colten v. Kentucky, 23 the Court held that an increased penalty imposed by a different judge after a trial de novo is not unconstitutional since such a two-tiered trial arrangement does not feature the same potential for judicial vindictiveness as was present in Pearce. 24 Similarly, in Chaffin

The defendant in Pearce also advanced the argument that imposition of a harsher sentence upon retrial is proscribed by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 395 U.S. at 719. In rejecting this claim, the Court conceded that the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy essentially protect against: 1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; or 3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. at 717 & nn. 8-11, 721. Nonetheless, Justice Stewart’s majority opinion regarded as applicable the exception that the double jeopardy clause “imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who had succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside.” Id. at 720 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

19. 395 U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court further explained the nexus between the first part of this standard (actual vindictiveness) and the second part (apprehension of vindictiveness) as follows: “[T]he very threat inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to ‘chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.’” Id. at 724, quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).

20. 395 U.S. at 726.

21. Id. The Court also mandated that such factual information be made part of the record, in order that the justification for any increased sentence may be carefully examined on appeal. Id.


24. Id. at 116. In Colten, the defendant was convicted in an inferior state court for disorderly conduct and was fined $10. Id. at 108. Dissatisfied with the outcome, he exercised his
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v. Stynchcombe, the Supreme Court reasoned that under the circumstances of the case due process does not bar the imposition of a higher sentence by a different jury on retrial following reversal of a prior conviction.

The development of the concept of vindictiveness in judicial sentencing prompted inquiry into the possibility of similar impropriety in the exercise of a prosecutor's charging authority. The Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Perry interpreted the due process clause as extending protection to an accused against prosecutorial vindictiveness. In Blackledge, a North

statutory right to a trial de novo under Kentucky's two-tiered system for adjudicating certain criminal cases. Id. The new trial in a court of general criminal jurisdiction resulted in Colten's reconviction and an enhanced fine of $50. Id. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Colten argued that Kentucky's two-tiered trial de novo system was substantially comparable to the appellate remedy pursued in Pearce in that both "involve reconviction and resentencing, [and] provide the convicted defendant with the right to 'appeal.' " Id. at 115. Relying upon the fact that no evidence was shown which indicated why a de novo court would treat vindictively those who request a trial before it, the Supreme Court concluded that a trial de novo represents a "completely fresh determination" by a different court. Id. at 116-17.

26. Id. at 26. The petitioner in Chaffin was convicted on a charge of robbing by open force or violence and was sentenced by the jury to serve a 15-year prison term. Id. at 18. After obtaining a reversal of his conviction on the basis that an erroneous jury instruction was given by the trial judge, the petitioner was retried before a different judge and a new jury for the same offense. Id. at 18. After finding him guilty for a second time, the jury returned a life sentence. Id. Thereafter, the petitioner filed for habeas corpus relief, arguing that due process of law required that Pearce be extended to jury sentencing. Id. at 20. The Supreme Court observed that "the jury was not aware of the length of the sentence meted out by the former jury" nor was it "told that petitioner had been convicted and that his conviction had been overturned on collateral attack." Id. (footnote omitted). Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that Pearce was not controlling because there is no potential for abuse by a resentencing jury. Id. at 26, 28.
28. Id. at 28-29. Restraints on a prosecutor's charging power are a matter of special concern because the interface between prosecutorial vindictiveness and prosecutorial discretion is delicately drawn. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 21-22 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring). It is when a prosecutor's freedom to decide unilaterally whether to prosecute a suspect becomes contaminated with an element of punishment that legitimate discretionary power turns into impermissibly vindictive conduct. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-65 (1978).

One commentator has stated that there are two elements which generally influence a prosecutor's decision whether or not to prosecute: "practical factors" and "considerations specifically linked to particular offense categories." Abrams, Internal Policy: Griding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1971). The practical factors include: "the prosecutor's belief in the guilt of a suspect, the likelihood of a conviction, the possibility of obtaining the suspect's cooperation in other matters, the prosecutor's concern about his record for obtaining convictions, the influence of the law enforcement agents involved, and the general character of the offender." Id., citing F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision To Charge A Suspect With A Crime (1970); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion — A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 174 (1965). The considerations linked to particular offense categories which might influence prosecutorial discretion are: the community's opinion of a statute, the constitutional legitimacy of applying it to certain conduct, and the availability of alternative means of enforcement. Id. at 11, 15, 16.

Courts have generally refrained from interfering with the exercise of a prosecutor's charging discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1975); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Sweepston v. United

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Carolina prison inmate was charged and convicted for the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon.\textsuperscript{29} After the defendant filed an appeal for a trial de novo, the prosecutor obtained a superseding indictment charging him with felonious assault with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily harm.\textsuperscript{30} In a habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant argued that the felony indictment was invalid under \textit{Pearce}.\textsuperscript{31} Recognizing that the prosecution has a significant stake in deterring criminal defendants from appealing their convictions, and that it "has the means readily at hand to discourage such appeals by 'upping the ante,'" the Supreme Court found that the exercise of a prosecutor's charging authority poses a realistic opportunity for vindictiveness.\textsuperscript{32} The Court therefore concluded that due process of law requires application of the restrictions first articulated in \textit{Pearce} to prosecutorial decisions.\textsuperscript{33} Although it found no evidence of actual vindictive-
ness, the Blackledge Court held that the prosecutor’s conduct was unconstitutional since Pearce’s requirement that a defendant must be freed of any apprehension of vindictiveness remained unsatisfied.34

Lower courts have liberally applied Blackledge’s rule against prosecutorial vindictiveness to encompass circumstances not envisioned in that case. In United States v. Jamison,35 for instance, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that Blackledge was not restricted to the situation where a superseding indictment is obtained after a defendant pursues his post-conviction appellate remedies.36 Rather, the court held that Blackledge also required “restrictions on increased charges after mistrials.”37 In United States v.


34. 417 U.S. at 29. The Supreme Court thus determined that a defendant’s mere showing of an apprehension of vindictiveness, without proof of actual vindictiveness, is sufficient to violate due process of law. Id. See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1978). The Blackledge Court stated:

The rationale of our judgment in the Pearce case . . . was not grounded upon the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist. Rather, we emphasized that “since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation . . . .” 417 U.S. at 28, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725. The Blackledge Court indicated, however, that there were countervailing circumstances which the state might have shown to negate the defendant’s apprehension of vindictiveness. Id. at 29 n.7. The Court thought that if it was impossible to proceed on a more serious charge at the time of the original indictment (as where an assault victim subsequently dies), then there would be sufficient justification to sustain the prosecution’s second charge. Id., citing Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S. 442 (1912). Cf. United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (intervening events or new evidence of which the prosecution was excusably unaware at the time of the original indictment might also justify an increase in charges). The Blackledge Court’s exception is analogous to the one adopted in Pearce, where the Supreme Court held that there could be no finding of judicial vindictiveness if the sentencing judge could show sufficient justification for imposing a heavier sentence. 395 U.S. at 726. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.

It is interesting to note that the first application of Pearce-type restrictions to prosecutorial vindictiveness occurred just three weeks after the Pearce Court’s decision. See Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Iowa 1969). As in Blackledge, the defendant in Sefcheck was re prosecuted on a harsher charge for the same conduct after he successfully appealed his first conviction. Id. at 794. The district court stated that the Pearce principle applies equally to all state officials because fear that a prosecutor might vindictively increase a charge would unconstitutionally deter the exercise of a defendant’s rights as “effectively as fear of a vindictive increase in sentence by [a] court.” Id. at 795.

35. 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Jamison, the defendants were indicted for second degree murder and for carrying a dangerous weapon. Id. at 409. At their first trial, they moved for a mistrial on grounds of “ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. The trial judge declared a mistrial and the defendants were subsequently reindicted for first degree murder and for carrying a dangerous weapon. Id. At the second trial, the defendants were convicted on these increased charges. Id. at 410. Thereafter, the defendants appealed the validity of the second indictment, charging that Blackledge’s due process rule against fear of vindictiveness prohibits a charge increase following a successful defense request for a mistrial. Id.

36. Id. at 415.

37. Id. at 416. The court perceived no persuasive distinction “between attacks which defendants make on the fairness of criminal proceedings before and after they are complete.” Id.
DeMarco, the Ninth Circuit determined that even in a pretrial situation, if charges are added following a defendant's motion for change of venue, due process "is controlled by the teaching of Blackledge." In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, however, the Supreme Court excluded from the scope of Blackledge prosecutorial conduct occurring during the course of plea negotiations. In Bordenkircher, a defendant with two prior felony convictions was indicted on a felony charge for issuing a forged instrument. During plea negotiations, the prosecutor threatened that he would obtain a recidivist indictment with a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment if the defendant did not plead guilty. After the defendant rejected the prosecution's plea offer, he was reindicted on the more serious charge. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling "that the prosecutor's conduct during the bargaining negotiations had violated the principles of Blackledge v. Perry." The Bordenkircher Court's decision

Furthermore, the court stated that the administration of our criminal justice system would be seriously hampered if it permitted subsequent indictments after mistrials, but not after reversals, reasoning that such a distinction "would discourage defendants from seeking mistrials when error prejudicial to them has occurred, whereas mistrials in such cases may represent a significant saving of judicial resources." Id. at 1227. The prosecution in DeMarco appealed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging two individuals with making false statements to an IRS agent in California. Id. at 1225 n.1, citing United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1975). This indictment was procured after the defendants, who had previously been indicted in the District of Columbia for making false statements to an IRS agent, insisted on changing venue to the districts of their residence, Chicago and Los Angeles. 550 F.2d at 1226. The prosecution had been aware of facts upon which the second indictment was based before the first indictment was brought. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that it could perceive no substantial difference between the defendants' statutory right to change venue and Perry's right to a trial de novo in Blackledge. Id. at 1227. The court thus concluded that there was no basis upon which to prevent the application of Blackledge when, as here, the situation poses a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. Id.

The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977), also held that the absence of a formal, pretrial motion does not prevent assertion of a Blackledge claim. 557 F.2d at 645. There, an alien misdemeanant, who was initially charged with unlawful entry, was subsequently indicted on a felony charge covering the same act. Id. The second indictment was brought after the defendant's counsel indicated before a United States magistrate that no plea would be entered because of the later possibility of raising a suppression motion. Id. at 645-46. The court of appeals expressly stated that the failure to interpose a formal motion would not distinguish this case from Blackledge. Id. at 645.

41. Id. at 362.
42. Id. at 358.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 359.
45. Id. at 360. The Sixth Circuit had held that "if after plea negotiations fail, [a prosecutor] procures an indictment charging a more serious crime, a strong inference is created that the only reason for the more serious charges is vindictiveness." Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), noted in 7 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 703 (1977). The court reasoned that prosecutorial policy is already made when a defendant is indicted for less than all the possible offenses surrounding his criminal spree since "a discretionary determination [has been made] that the interests of the state are served by not seeking more serious charges." 547 F.2d at 44.
was based upon its express determination that plea bargaining is necessary to the administration of our criminal justice system, and that such bargaining is devoid of any "element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." The Court thus concluded that the prosecutor's decision to indict after unsuccessful negotiations represented "a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea bargaining process" and not a vindictive exercise of his discretionary power to initiate prosecution.

46. 434 U.S. at 361-62. The Supreme Court has dispelled any doubt as to the legitimacy of the plea bargaining process. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1961). The Court, however, has conditioned its approval on the requirement that a plea be voluntarily made with an "awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The underlying assumption which makes the negotiation of pleas constitutionally permissible is that properly advised defendants who are protected by certain procedural guarantees are "unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363, citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).

The importance of plea bargaining has been recently explained by the Supreme Court: "The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of plea bargaining as a questionable practice, see Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A. J. 621 (1976); Note, The Unconscionability of Plea Bargaining, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1387 (1970).

47. 434 U.S. at 363. The Court postulated several reasons why the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining lacks any element of punishment. Id. at 362-63. First, the prosecution and the defense in plea negotiations "arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power." Id. at 362, quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, "[p]lea bargaining flows from 'the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid trial." Id. at 363, quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). See note 46 supra.

48. 434 U.S. at 359. It is important to note that the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher did not foreclose the possibility of finding a Blackledge taint in the context of plea negotiations. Id. at 365. In the instant case, Hayes had been advised at the outset that if he did not accept the prosecution's plea agreement, a harsher charge would be brought. Id. at 358. Emphasizing this fact, the Supreme Court stated that its holding did not encompass the "situation where the prosecutor without notice [brings] an additional charge after plea negotiations relating only to the original indictment [have] ended with the defendant's insistence on pleading not guilty." Id. at 360. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Bordenkircher, see Note, 33 Ark. L. Rev. 211 (1979); Note, 24 Vill. L. Rev. 142 (1978).

It is also important to note that Blackledge has been deemed inapplicable where, after a guilty plea has been vacated on appeal, a defendant is reindicted on all charges originally waived pursuant to a plea agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975). Courts have considered this situation distinguishable from Blackledge "in terms of [the] crucial element of vindictiveness." Id. at 588. See also United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d at 1175. In Anderson, for example, an information was filed against the defendant charging him with armed robbery. 514 F.2d at 585 n.1. After plea negotiations, the prosecution dropped the original charge in return for Anderson's guilty plea to a lesser charge. Id. at 585 n.2. The defendant subsequently attacked the validity of his guilty plea for its failure to comply with rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 585. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Following vacation of the defendant's guilty plea by the court of appeals, the prosecution obtained a new indictment for the original armed robbery charge. 514 F.2d at 585. The majority reasoned that when an indictment is revived after a defendant's guilty plea is vacated, it is merely because the situation has "re-

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Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in *Bordenkircher*, lower courts had attempted to give ample latitude to the prosecutor's discretion to control the decision to prosecute. In *Hardwick v. Doolittle*, for example, the defendant was indicted for armed robbery and aggravated assault. After he entered a special plea of insanity and filed a petition for removal to the federal district court, the prosecution brought additional indictments on separate charges arising out of the same incident. In rejecting *Blackledge*’s vindictiveness analysis, the Fifth Circuit observed that *Blackledge* involved "the substitution of a more serious charge and not the making of a decision to initiate prosecution for [different] criminal activity." The court reasoned that if it were to adopt *Blackledge*'s two-pronged test in this context, the requirement against apprehension of vindictiveness would render the prosecutor's discretion meaningless in every case in which a defendant is initially indicted for less than all the violations his alleged spree of activity would permit." The Fifth Circuit therefore held
that a defendant must establish actual vindictiveness on the part of the prosecutor to satisfy a claim of unconstitutional conduct when a superseding indictment consists of added, rather than substituted, charges.\textsuperscript{54}

54. 558 F.2d at 302. The court specifically stated that, although the defendant's mere showing of added charges made out a prima facie case for finding prosecutorial vindictiveness, "the cause should be remedied to the district court to afford the prosecutor the opportunity to come forward with countervailing evidence." \textit{Id}. The court listed some of the explanations which might rebut a claim of actual vindictiveness, including "mistake or oversight in the initial action, a different approach to prosecutorial duty by a successor prosecutor, [and] public demand for prosecution on the additional crimes allegedly committed." \textit{Id}. at 301. It is important to distinguish these explanations from those which would be required to negate the mere apprehension of vindictiveness. See note 34 supra. The objective explanations just listed, which will offset an inference of actual vindictiveness, are insufficient to dispel the mere appearance of vindictiveness. See \textit{United States v. Andrews}, 449 F. Supp. at 1241, 1244.

The following year the Fifth Circuit restated \textit{Hardwick}'s underlying principle that "due process policy must be reconciled with the countervailing policy of allowing the prosecutor broad discretion to control the decision to prosecute." \textit{Jackson v. Walker}, 585 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1978). Jackson, a domestic worker for the Magee family, was arrested for her participation in an unsuccessful plan to kidnap the Magees' 10-month old baby. \textit{Id}. at 141. During the course of the kidnapping, Mrs. Magee was tied up and robbed. \textit{Id}. On August 21, 1973, Jackson was indicted for aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and conspiracy to kidnap. \textit{Id}. Five months after Jackson's conviction for aggravated kidnapping was overturned, she was reindicted on charges of aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary. \textit{Id}.

While the Fifth Circuit noted that \textit{Jackson} was factually distinguishable from \textit{Hardwick}, \textit{id}. at 145, it nevertheless concluded that, as in \textit{Hardwick}, only a determination of actual vindictiveness would justify an interference with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion under \textit{Blackledge}. \textit{Id}. at 148. The court emphasized that the test "[i]n deciding whether to require a showing of actual vindictiveness or merely a showing of reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness" should be the same threshold balancing test utilized in \textit{Hardwick}. \textit{Id}. at 145. See \textit{Hardwick} v. \textit{Doolittle}, 558 F.2d at 301. Specifically, "the court must weigh the need to give defendants freedom to decide whether to appeal against the need to give the prosecutors freedom to decide whether to prosecute." 585 F.2d at 145. Cf. \textit{Lovett v. Butterworth}, 610 F.2d 1002, 1007 (1st Cir. 1979) (apprehension of vindictiveness was sufficient to establish a due process violation since, under the circumstances of the case, a significant due process interest outweighed a minor prosecutorial interest). Applying its balancing test, the \textit{Jackson} court held that a "moderately weighty" prosecutorial interest prevailed against a "very limited" due process interest. 585 F.2d at 145-48. Thus, it remanded the action to the district court to examine the evidence in light of the actual vindictiveness standard. \textit{Id}. at 148.

Under the actual vindictiveness standard, a defendant establishes a prima facie case for a finding of vindictiveness by showing the imposition of increased charges. \textit{Id}. The prosecution may then rebut this prima facie evidence by proffering a neutral explanation to show that it did not, in fact, act vindictively. \textit{Id}. In distinction to this approach, if the balancing test required application of an appearance of vindictiveness standard, a defendant's showing of increased charges would be prima facie sufficient to establish a due process violation which could only be rebutted if the prosecution demonstrates the discovery of previously unavailable evidence. \textit{Id}. at 142-43, \textit{citing Blackledge v. Perry}, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).

Other courts, however, have expressed different views where a superseding indictment consists of added charges. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, dismissed a felony indictment for possession of marijuana filed shortly after a defendant moved for discharge of a cocaine complaint under the Speedy Trial Act. \textit{United States v. Groves}, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978). In \textit{Groves}, the prosecutor argued that \textit{Blackledge} should be distinguished because that case did not involve "different crimes relating to completely separate fact situations." \textit{Id}. at 454. Rejecting this contention, the court stated that it did not "regard the factual similarity/dissimilarity of the two charges dispositive on the question of vindictiveness." \textit{Id}. at 454. \textit{Accord}, \textit{United States v. DeMarco}, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977); \textit{United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval}, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977).
It was against this background that Judge Green began his analysis in *Andrews* by considering the proper standard for determining the constitutionality of conduct alleged to be vindictive. Judge Green turned first to the district court's holding that since the prosecutor's action in filing the superseding indictment appeared vindictive, *Blackledge* required dismissal of the conspiracy count despite the absence of any actual retaliatory motivation. After examining the district judge's "overall approach," Judge Green stated that the trial court erred in finding that the concept of "appearance of vindictiveness" was the standard to be applied in the instant case. According to Judge Green, the Supreme Court's "references in *Colten* and *Chaffin* to due process violations by purposeful punishment or penalization of a defendant in retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights" militated against applying a rule turning on the mere appearance of vindictiveness in this case.

Judge Green contended that the decision in *Bordenkircher* buttressed his view that apparent vindictiveness was an inappropriate standard for gauging prosecutorial conduct in the present factual context. While Judge Green conceded that *Bordenkircher* was distinguishable from the case sub

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55. Senior District Judge Green, sitting by designation, delivered the opinion of the court in which Circuit Judge Merritt joined and filed a separate opinion. Circuit Judge Keith dissented. Although Judge Merritt would severely limit the approach set forth by Judge Green, he would not disagree that, even in the pretrial and trial process, actual vindictiveness is patently unconstitutional whether old charges are increased or new charges added. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 19 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979); text accompanying note 72 infra. Therefore, Judge Merritt felt constrained to remand to the district court for redetermination in accordance with Judge Green's opinion since 1) he disagreed with Judge Keith's conclusion that the prosecutor's conduct in the instant case was unconstitutional, United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 25 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring), and 2) his double jeopardy-type analysis did not recognize the concept of appearance of vindictiveness which underlay Judge Keith's conclusion. *Id.* slip op. at 19 (Merritt, J., concurring) (by implication). See *id.* slip op. at 34 (Keith, J., dissenting). As a result, Judge Green's opinion for the court technically embodies a majority standard for subsequent cases despite its inconsistency with Judge Merritt's suggested view. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.


59. *Id.* slip op. at 5.

60. *Id.* slip op. at 7. Judge Green believed that the language used in those cases was not supportive of the *Pearce-Blackledge* rule which protects a defendant from the mere apprehension of vindictive behavior. *Id.* Judge Green explained that "in *Colten* the Supreme Court had spoken of due process being violated if an increased sentence was imposed 'as purposeful punishment', while in *Chaffin* the concept that a jury was highly unlikely to penalize a defendant for exercising a right of appeal was emphasized." *Id.* slip op. at 6-7 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Judge Green concluded that, notwithstanding the deterrent effect which a higher sentence on reconviction may have, the Supreme Court in both *Colten* and *Chaffin* was primarily concerned with whether or not vindictiveness actually played a discernible role in the resentencing process. *Id.* For a discussion of *Colten* and *Chaffin*, see notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.

judice since the "pivotal point" in the former case was that an increase in charges as part of the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining could not be considered vindictive, 62 he nevertheless found that Bordenkircher's treatment of Pearce and Blackledge was relevant. 63 Looking to Bordenkircher, Judge Green observed that "in its references to and quotation from Pearce and Blackledge the majority . . . did not refer to the broader aspects of those earlier rulings regarding the defendant's perception of the conduct in question—'apprehension of vindictiveness.'" 64 Rather, Judge Green determined that the Supreme Court alluded to the holdings in Pearce and Blackledge as "representing the 'imposition of penalty' upon a defendant." 65 Judge Green considered Bordenkircher's interpretation of Pearce and Blackledge to be "a clear indication to the trial courts that the doctrine developed in those rulings is to be confined to its intended scope." 66 With respect to the "intended scope" of the principles established in Pearce and Blackledge, Judge Green stated that in both cases "there was a substitution of charges—the same conduct on the part of the defendant was the basis for the diverse sentences imposed in Pearce and underly both the misdemeanor and felony charges in Blackledge." 67

Upon this foundation, Judge Green examined the facts of the instant case and concluded that the same conduct was not the basis for both the original indictment and the superseding indictment charging the conspiracy count. 68 Judge Green noted that because the district court had failed to observe this critical distinction between substituting charges and adding

62. Id. slip op. at 8. For a discussion of Bordenkircher, see notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra.


64. Id. slip op. at 9. In support of this assertion, Judge Green quoted the following passage from the Bordenkircher opinion:

This Court held in North Carolina v. Pearce that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial." The same principle was later applied [in Blackledge] to prohibit a prosecutor from reindicting a convicted misdemeanant on a felony charge after the defendant had invoked an appellate remedy, since in this situation there was also a "realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.'"

Id. slip op. at 8 (citations omitted), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 362.

65. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 8 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The portion of the Bordenkircher opinion to which Judge Green was referring stated:

The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction.

Id. slip op. at 8-9, (citations omitted), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363.


67. Id. (emphasis added).

68. Id. Judge Green acknowledged that the conspiracy count arose from the same total factual pattern as did the original narcotics and firearms offenses. Id. He nevertheless believed that the conspiracy charge was "a separate and distinct offense with elements different" from those offenses. Id. slip op. at 9. See notes 3-4 & 7 and accompanying text supra.
charges, it erroneously applied Blackledge's prophylactic rule.69 Relying primarily on decisions of other circuits,70 Judge Green held that only a showing of actual retaliatory motivation would justify invalidating added charges on the basis of prosecutorial vindictiveness.71

In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Merritt stated that although he concurred "in the result and much of the reasoning of Judge Green's opinion," he would limit the concept of appearance of vindictiveness to posttrial prosecutorial conduct.72 Judge Merritt justified this limitation on claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness upon two grounds: 1) that the principles announced in Pearce and Blackledge were simply attempts to prevent the undermining of double jeopardy values—values not implicated in this case;73

70. See United States v. Partyka, 561 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Hardwick, see notes 50-54 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Jackson, see note 54 supra.
71. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 16-18 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). Like the Fifth Circuit, Judge Green felt that where charges are added, the full extent of prosecutorial discretion has not been exercised. Id. slip op. at 11. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's approach regarding the addition of charges, see note 53 and accompanying text supra.

The following tripartite formulation constituted Judge Green's precise holding:

1) If the prosecution substitutes charges increasing the potential severity of the punishment to which the defendant is exposed, such substitution of charges creates a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness which can be overcome only by showing that intervening circumstances, of which the prosecution could not reasonably have been aware created a fact situation which did not exist at the time of the original indictment. Such a standard places primary emphasis on the apprehension of retaliatory motivation—the perception of the defendant.

If the prosecution adds new charges arising from criminal conduct relatively distinct from that underlying the original charge the defendant must show actual vindictiveness in the bringing of the added charges, although a prima facie case may be made out by the mere fact of the added charges if no plausible explanation is offered by the prosecution. This standard focuses on the intent of the prosecutor.

2) The addition of a new charge for a different and distinct offense which was a different and distinct consequence of the same basic conduct underlying the original charge would make out a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness, but such prima facie case would be subject to rebuttal by the prosecution offering evidence of facts which reasonably explain or justify the action taken and negate any inference of vindictiveness in fact. This standard takes into recognition both the perception of the defendant and the intent of the prosecutor, and if the trial court is not satisfied as to the plausibility or substantiality of the government's explanation the reasonable apprehension of vindictive motivation may be given controlling weight.


73. Id. slip op. at 19-21 (Merritt, J., concurring). Judge Merritt believed that since the Court in Pearce and Blackledge was unwilling to decide the problem of prosecutorial retaliation on double jeopardy grounds, it was "forced to conceptualize the problem more broadly under the due process clause" in order to remedy the wrongs involved. Id. slip op. at 20 (Merritt, J., concurring). See notes 18-31 supra. Judge Merritt concluded, however, that "the two cases fit much better the double jeopardy mold." United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 21 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring).
and 2) that the notion of prosecutorial vindictiveness is not only "inconsistent with the competitive, adversary nature of the pre-trial and trial process," but it is also unmanageable in this context. 74

Judge Keith dissented, criticizing Judges Green and Merritt for severely limiting Blackledge's "needed and vital control on prosecutorial discretion." 75 Insisting that his colleagues' finding that Bordenkircher limited Blackledge was untenable, 76 Judge Keith expressly rejected their abandonment of Blackledge's underlying concern with the appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 77 Nevertheless, Judge Keith recognized that a total bar against added charges on reindictment could "intrude deeply into prosecutorial discretion." 79 To resolve this difficulty, Judge Keith espoused "an overall balancing test" in which the need for prosecutorial discretion is weighed against the interest of a defendant in being free to assert his rights without the fear of retribution. 80

74. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 21-22 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Merritt, J., concurring). Judge Merritt explained that criminal adjudication by necessity demands the public prosecutor to assume an aggressive stance "contrary to the liberty interests of the accused." Id. slip op. at 22 (Merritt, J., concurring).

75. Id. slip op. at 21-22 (Merritt, J., concurring). To illustrate the unmanageability of the vindictiveness concept in the pretrial and trial process, Judge Merritt asked several troublesome questions:

Once a defendant has successfully asserted a particular legal right in the course of the criminal process, is a prosecutor guilty of unconstitutional vindictive conduct, which "chills" the exercise of the legal right asserted, each time the prosecutor thereafter takes a position contrary to the interests of the defendant? If not, why not, and what is the standard of measurement? What difference does it make that the prosecutor's conduct took place after rather than before the defendant asserted the right?

Id. slip op. at 22 (Merritt, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied by Judge Merritt).

76. Id. slip op. at 25 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith considered Bordenkircher's discussion of prosecutorial vindictiveness to be a product of the special factual situation present in that case. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Bordenkircher, see notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra. Instead of seizing upon the language of Bordenkircher to limit the principles stated in Pearce and Blackledge, Judge Keith would restrict Bordenkircher's holding to prosecutorial conduct during the plea bargaining process. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 37 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting).

77. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 39 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting). According to Judge Keith, his colleagues ignored the apprehension concept described in Pearce and Blackledge since their approach breaks down vindictiveness issues into three factual situations: 1) substitution of charges; 2) addition of charges in a crime spree situation; and 3) addition of charges for the same basic criminal acts. Id. slip op. at 38 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith explained that the latter two situations would occasion the mechanical application of a vindictiveness-in-fact test, and thus, completely forsake the efforts of Pearce and Blackledge to thwart any chill on the exercise of a defendant's rights. Id. slip op. at 38-39 (Keith, J., dissenting). See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra.


79. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 32-36 (Keith, J., dissenting). The balancing test proposed by Judge Keith would require a court to decide as a threshold matter whether a prosecutor's bringing of a heavier second indictment appears vindictive. Id. slip op. at 32 (Keith, J., dissenting). See also Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); note 54 supra. If the appearance of vindictiveness was present, the court would then balance in light of all the facts "the extent to which allowing the second indictment will chill defendant's exercise of the right in question with the extent to which forbidding the second indictment infringes on the prosecutor's charging author-
It is suggested that Judge Green's finding that, under the facts of this case, the court was not compelled to apply Blackledge's rule protecting defendants from the mere apprehension of vindictiveness is supported by precedent and backed by logic. As Judge Green insisted, Bordenkircher's recent interpretation of Pearce and Blackledge circumscribes the concept of appearance of vindictiveness. Furthermore, the Bordenkircher Court's refusal to establish a rule against vindictive prosecutorial behavior in the face of a new indictment admittedly obtained to deter the exercise of a defendant's right to trial implicated a balancing rationale not unlike Judge Green's approach in Andrews. It is therefore submitted that the Sixth Circuit's decision requiring the government merely to rebut a showing of actual vindictiveness, rather than to refute an allegation of apprehension of vindictiveness, is in consonance with the Bordenkircher Court's concern for the effective administration of criminal justice which demands broad prosecutorial discretion.

81. See notes 61-67 and accompanying text supra.
82. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 361 & n.7. The prosecutor in Bordenkircher "conceded that the indictment was influenced by his desire to induce a guilty plea." Id. at 361 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 364. The Supreme Court in Bordenkircher emphasized that although "confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable—and permissible—attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates . . . the negotiation of pleas." Id., quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 31. Judge Green's opinion did not expressly adopt an overall balancing test like that of the Fifth Circuit in Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978). United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 16-17 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). For a discussion of the Jackson v. Walker's balancing approach, see note 54 supra. However, the basic premise for his requiring a defendant to show actual vindictiveness in the bringing of added charges was a threshold determination that prosecutorial discretion in this situation deserves greater leeway than when charges are substituted. Id. slip op. at 17 n.13. See note 71 supra. See generally note 54 supra.
84. See 434 U.S. at 361-62, 365. This analysis is inconsistent with the view that Bordenkircher's holding limits its application to the particular facts of that case. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 37-38 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting). Clearly, Bordenkircher did hold that under the circumstances of that case there was no due process violation since the give-and-take of plea negotiation lacks any element of punishment. See notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra. Any view which would so narrowly interpret Bordenkircher, however, is fraught with difficulty; not only does it discount the Court's treatment of the competing interests of defendants and of the state in the sensitive area of executive prosecutorial power, but it also interprets vindictiveness issues as admitting to sterile categorization. See note 28 supra. In addition, three members of the Bordenkircher minority argued that the Court's opinion, "although purporting to rule narrowly (that is, on 'the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case,' . . .) is departing from, or at least restricting, the principles established in North Carolina v. Pearce." 434 U.S. at 365-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
It is further suggested that Judge Green's decision to limit *Blackledge* by applying only its actual vindictiveness standard in the situation of added charges is supported by logic. It is contended that Judge Green reasonably concluded that if *Blackledge*’s prophylactic rule were applied in cases involving *added* charges, the prosecutor’s prerogative to initiate prosecution for different criminal activities would be seriously undermined. Although a superseding indictment which contains added charges might appear vindictive, it is submitted that “a prosecutor should have greater latitude to augment charges when dealing with multiple criminal acts.” It is suggested that various characteristics of modern prosecutors’ offices indicate that such an increase in the number of charges after the first indictment may often be reasonably attributable to sheer inadvertence or mistake. If *Blackledge*’s prophylactic rule were applied in such situations, it would require that the additional charges be summarily dismissed due to their mere appearance of vindictiveness, unless the prosecution could show the discovery of previously

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86. See note 71 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of this rationale as set forth in *Hardwick* and *Jackson v. Walker*, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978), see notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.


88. See *Abrams*, supra note 28, at 2; *Noll*, supra note 28, at 702. The kinds of circumstances which may prevent a defendant’s initial indictment on charges for which he is plainly subject to prosecution are: 1) the lack of any central internal review of screening decisions; 2) high staff turnover; or 3) various prosecutors controlling different aspects of the same case. *Id.* One commentator has aptly described the background against which modern prosecutorial decisionmaking must be considered:

The modern prosecutor in a predominantly urban environment is no longer the individual district attorney who handles all aspects of a case himself. Rather, it is a large bureaucratic institution comprised of tens or sometimes hundreds of lawyers with an even larger supporting staff. In such offices, the individual lawyer is more like an assembly line worker, doing only specific tasks in relation to the product, i.e., the completed prosecution, than like the old fashioned shoemaker who made the whole shoe...

... At each [stage], a number of prosecutors may contemporaneously be performing the same function in different cases. These separate decision-makers may not be in direct communication with each other, and their decisions may not be subject to a central internal review.

*Abrams*, supra, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

It should be noted that the prosecution in *Andrews* explained that several nonvindictive factors coalesced to cause the additional conspiracy count to be sought two days after the defendants’ bond motion was decided. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 34 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979), quoting United States v. Andrews, 444 F. Supp. at 1241. The government argued that except for challenges to the validity of the composition of the grand jury which caused delays in its work, and except for scheduling difficulties in arranging vacations in the prosecutor’s office, it would have brought the additional conspiracy count prior to the time defendants were first arraigned and remanded without bail. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 34 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). The government also pointed out that its Assistant United States Attorney in this case was inexperienced and was not aware “that she should or could have sought a conspiracy indictment.” *Id.* slip op. at 3. See note 10 supra.
It is suggested that such a limitation on prosecutorial discretion would be a high price for society to pay if an accused, whose guilt was clear, could escape punishment merely because "fragmented" prosecutorial procedure caused him to be initially indicted for less than all the violations his criminal spree would permit. 90

Conversely, it is submitted that Judge Green appropriately decided to apply Blackledge's apparent vindictiveness standard to situations involving the substitution of charges. 91 Although broad prosecutorial discretion is essential to the functioning of the criminal justice system, 92 this policy must be reconciled with the due process limitation first established in North Carolina v. Pearce—namely, that defendants be free of any apprehension of retaliatory motivation on the part of the government. 93 It is suggested that

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89. For a discussion of those circumstances which will dispel the appearance of retaliatory vindictiveness, see note 34 supra. For a discussion of those explanations which will offset defendant's proof of actual vindictiveness, see note 54 supra. The burden of dispelling apparent vindictiveness is much heavier than the burden of offsetting actual vindictiveness since the explanations which will rebut the latter are insufficient to rebut the former. See note 54 supra.

90. By contrast, a number of Ninth Circuit decisions have applied Blackledge's prophylactic rule regardless of whether the superseding indictment contained additional charges for different and distinct criminal activities. See United States v. Groves, 450 F.2d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976). Although the broad ambit of prosecutorial discretion arguably protects society's interest in punishing criminals, the Ninth Circuit felt that a situation involving added charges was squarely within Blackledge. See cases cited supra. See also note 54 supra. The operative fact in Blackledge, and the one which the Ninth Circuit considered crucial in applying its rule protecting defendants from the appearance of vindictiveness, was that "the prosecution [had] knowledge of ... facts essential to the more serious charge at the time of the original indictment." Smaltz, Due Process Limitations on Prosecutorial Discretion in Recharging Defendants: Pearce to Blackledge to Bordenkircher, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 353, 357 (1979). See also United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d at 1226. Therefore, even though the second indictment may have involved different crimes relating to a completely separate fact situation, the Ninth Circuit would not disturb Blackledge's rule as long as the facts upon which the second indictment was brought were known before the first. Id.

If courts refuse to interpret Blackledge narrowly by limiting it to the substitution of more serious charges, it has been contended that overindicting could result. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 11 n.7 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). In Andrews, Judge Green stated that

prosecutors [might obtain] initial indictments containing every count the facts could conceivably sustain, for fear that a defendant's assertion of some protected right which the government would be required to oppose would create a virtually insurmountable obstacle to the obtaining of a superseding indictment adding counts to those initially set forth in an original indictment of reasonable scope.

Id. But see id. slip op. at 41 n.23 (Keith, J., dissenting). Of course, instead of being subject to the possible dilemma of overindicting, vindictiveness issues might be eliminated altogether if a "regime of full enforcement" of all laws was implemented. Noll, supra note 28, at 706. However, as one commentator has stated, "[s]uch a system would be enormously expensive, wasteful, cruel, and probably unworkable. There are now so many laws that it is impractical to try to enforce them all. If prosecutors could not drop or plead most cases, the criminal justice system would be overwhelmed." Id. (footnotes omitted).

91. See notes 12 & 71 supra.
92. See notes 85-90 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 14-21 and accompanying text supra.

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because this concept is most forceful, and its limitation on prosecutorial
discretion only minor, where there are substituted charges in question, it
is appropriate to fashion a rule requiring the government to bear the heavy
burden of offsetting a defendant's reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness
in this context.

Although Judge Green's unwillingness to follow Blackledge's rule pro-
tecting defendants from the mere apprehension of vindictiveness is sup-
ported by precedent and backed by logic, it is suggested that the standard
he set forth defers excessively to the discretionary interest of the prosecutor
in adding new charges. While Judge Green's systemization of vindictive-
ness issues represents a meaningful attempt to articulate guidelines that will
"maintain 'tolerable consistency' in discretionary prosecutorial decision-
making," it is submitted that such consistency should not be attained by a
total sacrifice of Blackledge's basic proscription against abusive prosecutorial
conduct which may chill the exercise of a defendant's rights. In all fact
situations involving the addition of charges, Judge Green would require a
determination of actual vindictiveness to establish a due process violation,
and would thus allow a prosecutor's explanations for the delay, such as inad-
vertence or mistake, to rebut the alleged vindictive intent in bringing the
second indictment. As suggested by the dissent, this mechanical willing-
ness to apply an actual vindictiveness test and to accept "glib prosecutorial

Green explained that a defendant's apprehension of vindictiveness is strongest where charges
are substituted since

[o]nce the judgment is made as to which penal statute is to be invoked the full extent of
prosecutorial discretion has been exercised.

Under [these] circumstances, absent an explanation encompassing factors unknown or
nonexistent at the time the original decision was made it could fairly be assumed that the
sole factor intervening between such decision and the shift to a more punitive position—
the defendant's exercise of a protected right—played a part in the determination. . .
The same cannot be said as regards addition of charges.

Id. slip op. at 11. Cf. id. slip op. at 33 (Keith, J., dissenting) (if a prosecutor augments charges,
as in Blackledge, the apprehension of retaliatory motivation is so great that almost no explana-
tion justifies it).

95. See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1978). See notes 49-54 and accom-
paining text supra.

(Keith, J., dissenting).

97. Abrams, supra note 28, at 7. The concept of protecting defendants from the mere "ap-
pearance of vindictiveness" is not only elusive, but it is also capable of arising in an endless
variety of circumstances. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 19-23 (6th Cir.
Thus, it is important that "each prosecutor . . . have some notion of the criteria that he and his
fellows are applying" to distinguish permissible from impermissible conduct in order to coordi-
nate decision-making in the prosecutorial system. See Abrams, supra note 28, at 7. In essence,
Judge Green's approach weighed the government's interest in having freedom to add charges
against a defendant's interest in being free of the apprehension of vindictiveness, and then
firmly fixed any balance struck. See United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 16-17
(6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979). See also note 83 and accompanying text supra.

98. For a discussion of the "chilling effect" which may result from prosecutorial misconduct,
see notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.

99. See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra. See also note 89 supra.
explanations for the seeking of heavier charges could make a mockery of Blackledge."  

Under Judge Green's approach, it is of no importance whether the subtleties of a specific factual context indicate that a prosecutor, who had knowledge of all the essential facts at the time of the first indictment, was retaliating by seeking a heavier second indictment. This approach needlessly relaxes the judiciary's vigilance against governmental retaliation by preventing a court from reconsidering equities where the circumstances of a particular case prove exceptional. Therefore, as the dissent insisted, it is submitted that a balancing test weighing all the circumstances would present a more appropriate standard to determine when there is a need to eliminate the appearance of vindictiveness. Not only is such a test consistent with Supreme Court precedent, but it is also submitted that the benefits to defendants as well as society militate in its favor.

In the wake of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Andrews, a defendant must show actual vindictiveness in order to bar additional counts in a superseding indictment on the basis of unconstitutional prosecutorial conduct. Thus, a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness will succeed only if, after defendant shows actual vindictiveness, the prosecution fails to offer either a plausible explanation for the actions it took or facts which negate any inference of actual retaliatory motivation.

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101. Id. slip op. at 39-40 (Keith, J., dissenting).
102. Id. In the case sub judice, the dissent maintained that there were several facts which mitigated against applying the more lenient standard of actual vindictiveness. Id. slip op. at 35-36 (Keith, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Keith considered how vigorously the prosecution opposed the defendant's release on bail. Id. slip op. at 35 (Keith, J., dissenting). See also id. slip op. at 2 n.2. In addition, he cited the timing of the addition of charges as a factor which made the prosecutor's conduct so apparently vindictive. Id. slip op. at 40 (Keith, J., dissenting).
103. See notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 100-02 and accompanying text supra.

The peculiar facts of this case are unique in that it is a rare instance where the balancing test results in the barring of additional charges brought before trial. In most such situations, the prosecutorial interest will be so strong and the appearance of vindictiveness so slight that the prosecutor would not be barred from bringing additional charges.

Id. Judge Keith also observed that the balancing test in cases of substituted charges would result in application of the stricter standard of apparent vindictiveness since a due process interest is strong in such a context while the government's independent-discretion interest is slight. Id. slip op. at 38 n.19 (Keith, J., dissenting). See generally note 53 supra.
106. See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 12 & 71 and accompanying text supra. In accordance with Judge Green's formulation, the standard which will apply in a given case depends on whether the added charges are relatively distinct or similar to the conduct underlying the original charge. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 17-18 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Judges Green and Merritt, however, will doubtless preclude all hope of predictability and consistency in vindictiveness cases within the Sixth Circuit. Fortunately, the uncertainty currently surrounding the standard to be applied in such cases can be dispelled since the Sixth Circuit has granted the government's motion for rehearing en banc.

Until the Supreme Court provides definitive guidance, the circuits will continue to be divided concerning the proper standard to be applied in the case of added charges. It is submitted that if a balancing approach similar to that advanced by Judge Keith is adopted by the Sixth Circuit, it could have a significant effect in influencing other circuits to establish reasonable limits for the concept of apparent vindictiveness. It is further submitted that the decision in Andrews has already set such a precedent for, notwithstanding the differences of the views in that case, each judge determined that the effective administration of criminal justice demands that prosecutors have ample latitude to control the decision to prosecute.

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108. See note 55 supra.
110. See note 80 and accompanying text supra. See also Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); note 54 supra.
111. United States v. Andrews, No. 78-5166, slip op. at 11 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979); id. slip op. at 23 (Merritt, J., concurring); id. slip op. at 32, 43 (Keith, J., dissenting).