Armed Reprisals during Intermediacy - A New Framework for Analysis in International Law

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COMMENTS

ARMED REPRISALS DURING INTERMEDIACY — A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

I. Introduction

Traditionally, the subject matter of international law has been analyzed according to a war-peace dichotomy.1 Whether the focus is on jurisdiction, commerce, treaties, recognition, sovereignty, boundaries, or the use of force, the approach has always been to set forth principles which describe the conduct of nations during either peacetime or wartime. But the conduct of states is not always amenable to this two-fold classification, and therefore, it is not surprising that enlightened thinkers2


The three states of international law — a state of peace, status mixtus and state of war — are abstractions on a level comparable to that of the fundamental principals of international law. . . . By reference to these, it is possible to divide the rules of international law into three categories: the rules of the law of peace, those pertaining to a status mixtus, and those governing states of war and neutrality.

Id.

2. Publicists are an important source of law in public international law. Historically, there have been few judicial determinations as compared with the common law system. Hence, there is a void of developed case law which is filled, in part, by the writings of experts. In a sense, international law treatises become a substitute for judicial opinions. G. Finch, The Sources of Modern International Law 30 (1937); Oppenheim, The Science of International Law 2 AM. J. INTL. L. 315 (1908). Article 38(4) of The Statute of the International Court of Justice also lists as one of the sources of law "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists:" I.C.J. Stat. art. 38, para. 4 (emphasis added).

The statement of Justice Gray in the Paquete Habana case suggests further the importance of publicists as a source of law. Mr. Justice Gray suggests:

1. Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.


The other sources of law recognized by Article 38 of The Statute of the International Court of Justice include: (1) international conventions; (2) international customs; (3) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) ex aequo et bono. The latter is a method of deciding questions according to a standard of fairness, justice, good conscience and equity. It is distinguished from equity in that ex aequo et bono lacks a well defined regime of legal principles; i.e., laches, "clean hands," and irreparable injury. Ex aequo et bono is even more flexible than equity in fashioning a remedy to a particular issue.

(270)
have suggested the recognition of a status between war and peace. This in-between status, known as intermediacy, status mixtus, or quasi-belligerency, more accurately reflects the way states actually conduct their affairs while, at the same time, avoiding the legal consequences of labeling an international conflict a war. If such a framework were used and nations became accustomed to status mixtus, the psychology of settling disputes might be altered. States might not be disappointed with partial solutions; rather, they might view such a settlement as not only feasible, but desirable as an alternative to open conflict. Hence, a lessening of international tensions might ensue. Admittedly, these objectives are utopian. At worst, we will be left with the present framework within which we are now operating. At best, we will be able to develop a new framework, permitting a realistic appraisal of the conduct of nations, and better structuring international expectations.

Intermediacy, according to Professor Jessup, has three basic characteristics: (1) a continuing relationship of “hostility and strain” between the states involved; (2) a conflict over issues so “fundamental and deep-rooted” that a solution to any one of them would not ease the strain; and (3) a desire by both nations not to go to war. Once it is established that intermediacy should be used as the relevant framework for analysis, it is then necessary to set forth principles of law which historically were employed only in the context of war or peace. Within status mixtus, there is a void of applicable law. This void is particularly noticeable with respect to armed reprisals. The question whether such acts of

4. Although it is submitted that the term “intermediacy” connotes a less violent relationship than “quasi-belligerency,” all three of these terms will be used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
5. See Jessup, supra note 3, at 100-01. Labeling a conflict a war has significant legal implications. The effects of war are:
a. To break off diplomatic and other non-hostile relations of the belligerent states.
b. To modify treaty relations of the belligerent states.
c. To modify the status of persons within the belligerent states.
d. To modify the status of property within the belligerent states.
e. To change the relations of belligerents and allies in accord with treaties of alliance.
f. To change the relations of belligerents and states not parties to the war.
g. To modify the relations of persons subject to the jurisdiction of states not parties to the war and the belligerents.

G. Wilson, Handbook of International Law 262 (3d ed. 1939). See also G. Schwarzenberger, supra note 1, at 63-106.
6. See Jessup, supra note 3, at 100-01.
7. Id.
8. Id. See also note 5 supra.
9. For purposes of this Comment, reprisals are also referred to as retaliatory acts, acts of self-help and acts of reprisals. This terminology may not be consistent with other publicists’ use of the word. Different authors have made distinctions that they feel are useful. For example, Hindmarsh states:

Public reprisals . . . may be defined as coercive measures taken by one state against another, without belligerent intent, in order to secure redress for, or
retaliation are permissible during such a period has not been addressed. Consequently, if international law permits reprisals during intermediacy, there are no guidelines as to how much and what kind of force may legally be employed. This Comment posits that armed reprisals are permissible during intermediacy and, in so doing, describes the quantity and quality of force which the international legal community should tolerate. A test is established by which the legality of reprisals can be judged. The test is applied to a particular example in a step-by-step fashion to better acquaint the reader with its intricacies; it is then reapplied to another situation to reaffirm its validity.

The initial phase of the analysis involves an examination of the origin of present-day reprisals, noting the permissible limits of private reprisals during ancient and medieval times. Having outlined the history of reprisals, the customary rule of armed reprisals is reviewed to test its adequacy as a framework for analysis in a status mixtus setting.10 The provisions of the United Nations Charter11 concerning reprisals are also examined for the same purpose. The issue addressed in that section is whether retaliatory acts of any kind are permitted under the Charter. Lastly, several proposals are set forth as to what the international law should be with respect to armed reprisals during intermediacy.

Throughout this Comment, reference will be made to the Beirut Airport raid conducted by Israel on December 28, 1968, against the Lebanese Government in retaliation for the destruction of an El Al airplane and prevent recurrence of acts or omissions which under international law constitute international delinquency.

A. HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE 58 (1933). Professor Hyde gives the word "reprisal" a more restrictive meaning:

For sake of clearness, and for the purpose of preserving solid distinctions of both historical and etymological worth, it is deemed wise to confine the use of the term "reprisal" to the act of taking or withholding of any form of property of a foreign State or its nationals, for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, reparation on account of the consequences of internationally illegal conduct for which redress has been refused.

II C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1662 (1945). Grover Clark makes a distinction between reprisal and retaliation:

Speaking exactly, the only common characteristic of acts of reprisal and acts of retaliation is the use of force; the two kinds of acts differ fundamentally in their purposes. Retaliation involves the use of force to inflict an injury in return for an injury inflicted; reprisal involves the use of force to secure compensation for a loss by the taking of property.


Other authors make other distinctions, see, e.g., II J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–7 (2d ed.1913). For the purposes of this Comment, such distinctions are not crucial to the analysis. What is important is that the commentator defines the way he will use the terms before he begins his analysis. See generally, Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 443 (1969) ; Jessup, supra note 3.

This Comment is addressing only the issue of whether and to what extent reprisals are permissible during intermediacy. The discussion of self-defense is necessary because the United Nations Charter does not mention armed reprisals; it speaks only in terms of self-defense.

the murder of an Israeli national by two Lebanese guerrillas two days earlier. This incident has been chosen as the initial example because it was an armed reprisal which occurred during a classic status mixtus relationship. Although there are other international relationships which can be characterized as quasi-belligerent, this one appears most noteworthy in light of a twenty-three year history of hostility over issues that are "fundamental and deep-rooted" — the existence of Israel as a state. Therefore, it seems appropriate to use the Beirut incident as the primary test of the thesis submitted herein.

After this step-by-step analysis, the proposed test will be examined again with respect to the reprisals undertaken by the United States against North Vietnam for the alleged wrongs committed during the Gulf of Tonkin incident. In that section, the analysis is restricted to the reprisal issue. Any discussion of the legality of that conflict in terms of international law, or its constitutionality in terms of municipal law, falls outside the purview of this Comment. The purpose of employing a second example is: (1) to insure a thorough examination of the theory set forth, and (2) to demonstrate that the test proposed has not been offered merely as a justification for the acts of one nation, namely Israel. It is the task of international law to describe the manner in which states do, in fact, conduct their affairs. At the same time, international law seeks to prescribe a course of conduct for states which will produce a minimal world order in which the states of the world can survive. In short, the second example is employed to bolster the validity of the theory set forth.

II. History

Long before the birth of the nation-state system, reprisals were undertaken by individuals, usually in pursuance of some property right.


The term "ledayeen," used to describe guerrillas operating in the Middle East, literally translated means "men of terror." The Al Fatah are the most prominent and largest group of Palestinian guerrillas. The Guerrilla Threat in the Middle East, Time, Dec. 13, 1968, at 29. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is, on the other hand, the most extreme group of guerrillas. A Voice of Extremism, Time, June 13, 1969, at 42. According to an interview between the PFLP leader, Dr. George Habash and Time correspondent, Lee Griggs, the purpose of this guerrilla group is to regain Palestine. Dr. Habash said that his group is totally opposed to any peaceful solution even if liberation takes ten to twenty years. Their aim is "a democratic, non-Zionist Palestine." Id.

13. Falk, supra note 9, at 434. Professor Falk states:

The situation in the Middle East is one of the quasi-belligerency in which there is an agreed ceasefire and a de facto situation of hostility that frequently results in intergovernmental violence.


15. Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 Cambridge L.J. 60, 61 (1924-26).
These specific or private reprisals can be traced to Biblical times when a man whose livestock was stolen or killed was permitted to recover up to five times his losses. A man whose wife was intentionally injured by another was permitted, in certain instances, to use physical force against the wrongdoer. In Athens, there was a law which allowed the relatives of an Athenian, slain in a foreign land or another city-state, which refused to punish or extradite the responsible party, to seize three citizens of that state and bring them before an Athenian court for retribution. However, it was not until the early Middle Ages, primarily in Europe, that the concept of private reprisals reached fruition. Beginning in the last quarter of the thirteenth century, private reprisals were considered legitimate only if perpetrated under letters of marque granted by the sovereign of the aggrieved party. Letters of marque authorized the individual to perform acts of self-help against the state directly or vicariously liable for the injury. As a matter of custom, the issuance of the letters was preceded by an unsuccessful request for redress upon the state of the alleged wrongdoer. Typically, the provocation was a theft of personal property, and the retaliation a seizure of goods from the countrymen of the wrongdoer, not necessarily the wrongdoer himself. Rarely were goods destroyed in the name of reprisal.

In order to obtain letters of marque from the issuing authority, the injured party had to show: (1) that an act violating one of his rights

16. Exodus 22:1 states:
If a man steals an ox or a sheep, and kills it or sells it, he shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep. He shall make restitution; if he has nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft. If the stolen beast is found alive in his possession, whether it is an ox or an ass or a sheep, he shall pay double."

This passage suggests that a disproportionate response was not only permitted but was commanded.

17. Exodus 21:22-25 states:
When men strive together and hurt a woman with child, so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt her shall be fined, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.

In contrast to the preceding passage, this passage suggests that only a proportionate response is permitted with respect to the quantity of force employed. In light of this provision and the provision with respect to stolen livestock, there seems to be no answer to the question whether disproportionate responses were permitted, and, if so, under what circumstances.

20. E. Colbert, Retaliation in International Law 15-50 (1948); A. Hindmarsh, Force in Peace: Force Short of War in International Relations 43-56 (1933); II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 138-39; Maccoby, supra note 15, at 61.
22. See Maccoby, supra note 15, at 60.
23. E. Colbert, supra note 20, at 47; Maccoby, supra note 15, at 60.
24. In England, the issuing authority for the letters of marque was the Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Chancellor whose duty it was to examine the facts before issuing the letters. In France, petitions for reprisal orders were submitted by the aggrieved party to the Parlement, and then were examined judicially. In the Italian cities, the judiciary handled all requests for these reprisal orders. See Maccoby, supra note 15, at 64.
had been committed,\textsuperscript{25} (2) that a named person or persons were responsible,\textsuperscript{26} and (3) that a request for reparations had been unsuccessful in the courts of the delinquent's country.\textsuperscript{27} If all these requisites were satisfied, the appropriate state authority would issue a written order permitting the injured party to seize property from the country of the bandit proportional in value to what had been stolen.\textsuperscript{28} In addition, the medieval reprisal doctrine required a cessation of seizures once the objective of the reprisal was accomplished.\textsuperscript{29} The goods that were seized were then brought before the sovereign or his representative for an accounting. Goods seized improperly or in excess of the claim would then be ordered returned by such authority.\textsuperscript{30} This procedure, though widespread, did not insure that the person undertaking the reprisal would not provoke open hostilities with the target state.\textsuperscript{31} During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, concern over the dangers of private reprisals increased, and rulers began to realize that the granting of \textit{lettres of marque} did not sufficiently control the outbreak of violence.\textsuperscript{32} Hence, a series of bilateral treaties were entered into, under which nations limited their power to grant reprisal orders against one another.\textsuperscript{33} Despite such efforts at control, hostilities did not cease because states, under the guise of private reprisals, began conducting reprisals to further their own interests. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, violent incidents of self-help purporting to be private acts, but which in fact were state-directed reprisals, were occurring throughout the European continent.\textsuperscript{34} Concurrently, states began to use armies instead of private citizens to further their interests.\textsuperscript{35} No longer was force limited merely to the seizure of private property, but instead, involved the destruction of property and the loss of life.\textsuperscript{36} It was not this increase in public (or state-directed) reprisals that caused the corresponding decrease in private reprisals. Rather, their unpopularity was due to more effective remedies for injured foreigners, and the desire by a growing community of mer-

\textsuperscript{25} E. Colbert, \textit{supra} note 20, at 15–50; Clark, \textit{supra} note 9, at 695–98.

\textsuperscript{26} Clark, \textit{supra} note 9, at 695–98.

\textsuperscript{27} In England this requirement was satisfied if \textit{lettres of requete} were sent out under the Privy Seal and disregarded. Clark, \textit{supra} note 9, at 695–98. \textit{See also} E. Colbert, \textit{supra} note 20, at 18, 42; Note, \textit{supra} note 12, at 108.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{See} E. Colbert, \textit{supra} note 20, at 20; Clark, \textit{supra} note 9, at 697; Maccoby, \textit{supra} note 15, at 63.

\textsuperscript{29} Clark, \textit{supra} note 9, at 697–98.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Id.} at 698.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{See generally} II L. Oppenheim, \textit{supra} note 18, at 138–39; 7 J. Moore's \textit{Digest of International Law} 137 (1906); Maccoby, \textit{supra} note 15, at 63.

\textsuperscript{32} Maccoby, \textit{supra} note 15, at 61, 63.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.} at 63 n.5. Spain and Scotland entered such a treaty in 1550; and Spain and France in 1489. Clark, \textit{supra} note 9, at 709–11.

\textsuperscript{34} E. Colbert, \textit{supra} note 20, at 47, 51.

\textsuperscript{35} Professor Oppenheim claims that this practice by which states had individuals undertake reprisals in their behalf occurred in the eighteenth century; Mr. Maccoby states that this practice occurred in the seventeenth century. \textit{Compare} II L. Oppenheim, \textit{supra} note 18, at 139, \textit{with} Maccoby, \textit{supra} note 15, at 64.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{See} pp. 276–77 \textit{infra}.  

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chants to facilitate and expand trade. Hence, there were fewer incidents of piracy on European waters. By the end of the eighteenth century, private reprisals were no longer recognized as a lawful sanction within the international arena.

Underlying medieval reprisals were several assumptions. The first such assumption was that the sovereign of an aggrieved national was obliged to make a remedy available, often in the form of permission to commit a reprisal. Although the sovereign was expected to grant such permission, he carefully controlled the amount and kind of force that was employed. The second assumption underlying these private reprisals was that the entire population of a state was deemed responsible for the acts of any of its citizens. An injury inflicted by a national of a state was deemed to have been committed by that state. The third assumption was that if the reprisal were preceded by the three requirements of customary international law — a prior illegal act, an identifiable guilty party, and a failure to obtain redress — then the reprisal was recognized as a legal act. Notwithstanding the importance of these assumptions, it is submitted that the critical aspect of these early reprisals was that the amount of force used in retaliation was commensurate with that used in the provocation. The reason for this proportionality was that sovereigns wanted to limit the outbreak of total war, and had the power to enforce this desire.

Throughout the centuries following the Middle Ages there were numerous instances of state-ordered armed reprisals. In 1740, Frederick II of Prussia, in retaliation for an alleged illegal arrest in Russia of a Prussian citizen, Baron de Stackelberg, seized two Russian subjects and detained them until Stackelberg was released. In 1847, Great Britain blockaded the coast of Greece and captured several Greek vessels in retaliation for the destruction, by Greek citizens and soldiers, of the home of Don Pacifico, an Englishman living in Athens. Perhaps the most famous reprisal was conducted by the colony of German Southwest Africa in 1914, when it inflicted severe property loss and personal injury during six different assaults upon the Portuguese colony of Angola in retaliation for a border incident in which three German officials were shot and two others interned. The incident erupted at the frontier post of Naulilaa, and was prompted by language difficulties occurring between

37. Maccoby, supra note 15, at 64.
38. Id.
40. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 723.
41. Id.
42. Note, supra note 12, at 114–16.
43. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 696.
44. II L. Oppenheim, supra, note 18, at 140.
45. Id. at 137–38.
Portugese guards and German officials who were attempting to import food supplies into German Southwest Africa.46 For purposes of this Comment, it is not necessary to further detail the history of public reprisals. International law is more concerned with broad principles which can be extracted from the customs of states.47 It is the failure of international law to prescribe principles regarding armed reprisals during intermediacy on which this Comment focuses.48 After the inadequacies of customary international law and the United Nations Charter provisions are highlighted, it will be easier to comprehend the need for a new framework for analysis — that of intermediacy.

III. The Customary Rule of Armed Reprisals

Public reprisals are injurious acts of self-help undertaken by one state against another, the latter having committed an international tort.49 For purposes of classification, positive reprisals — overt acts which would otherwise be illegal,50 are distinguished from negative reprisals — refusals to perform acts which are ordinarily obligatory.51 Broadly stated, the purposes of these retaliatory acts are: (1) to enforce obedience to international law by discouraging further illegal conduct;52 (2) to compel a change in policy by the delinquent state;53 and (3) to force a settlement at a dispute which resulted from a breach of international law by the delinquent state.54 It must be emphasized that these reprisals would normally be illegal acts under international law but for the commission of a prior offense which temporarily suspends the operation of international law until the objective of the reprisal is accomplished.55


47. For cases demonstrating the importance of custom as a source of international law where no other source of law exists, see generally North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1968] I.C.J. 30; Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (merits) [1960] I.C.J. 6; The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.

48. It is submitted that there is little, if any, discussion to date addressing the issue set forth herein; i.e., whether armed reprisals are permissible during intermediacy, and, if they are, the quantity and quality of force that can be employed by the retaliating state.

49. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 136.

50. Id.; Lenhoff, supra note 46, at 629.

51. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 140.

52. VI G. Hackworth, supra note 46, at 152. A reprisal is a legal act of redress to obtain satisfaction for an injury received after refusal to make redress has occurred.

53. See Note, supra note 12, at 116.

54. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 136.

55. Lenhoff, supra note 46, at 629.
Among the common illustrations\(^66\) of such reprisals are embargo,\(^57\) military occupation,\(^68\) naval bombardment,\(^59\) boycott,\(^60\) pacific blockade,\(^61\) and intervention.\(^62\) To focus more clearly on the scope of reprisals, it is helpful to distinguish them from two other related courses of action — retorsions and acts of war.

Retorsions are unfriendly, retaliatory acts undertaken by one state against another for the purpose of obtaining redress or cessation of similar offensive, but not illegal acts.\(^63\) Typical examples include tightening of passport restrictions, levying of high protective tariffs not guaranteed by treaty, and exclusion of foreigners from certain occupations.\(^64\) Although retorsions and the acts which precipitate them do not violate international law, neither do they foster friendly intercourse between states. The amount of force employed in a retorsion is usually commensurate with that used by the provoking state, although in many cases it is less.\(^65\) In addition, international law requires that retorsions cease when their objective has been accomplished.\(^66\) In short, retorsions attempt to persuade rather than coerce. This, however, is not the case with acts of war which are clearly distinguishable from retorsions and reprisals.

\(^56\) See generally II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 137-51.
\(^57\) VI G. Hackworth, supra note 46, at 152. An embargo is a special form of reprisal whereby the retaliating state seizes public or private property of the offending nation. G. Wilson, supra note 5, at 245. The term is sometimes used to refer to detention of ships in port for the purpose of compelling a delinquent to make reparation for the injury done. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 141.
\(^58\) VI G. Hackworth, supra note 46, at 152. Military occupation is more than merely invading another country; it is the temporary taking of another nation's territory for the purpose of holding it. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 434.
\(^59\) This is one way a nation may display force to insure observance of its rights. G. Wilson, supra note 5, at 249–50.
\(^60\) Id. at 246–47. Boycotts of trade were frequently undertaken to compel a foreign state to cease an objectionable policy. The United States in 1809 passed the Non Intercourse Act against British trade. 2 Stat. 528 (1815).
\(^61\) VI G. Hackworth, supra note 46, at 152. A pacific blockade is a method of isolating a country or ports without destroying peaceful relations. G. Wilson, supra note 5, at 247. It is a peaceful means of compelling a settlement of international disputes. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 144–45.
\(^62\) VI G. Hackworth, supra note 46, at 152; II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 150–51.
\[^{\text{[Intervention]}}\]^\[^{\text{Note 63}}\] consists in the dictatorial interference of a third State in a difference between two States, for the purpose of settling the difference in the way demanded by the intervening State.
\[^{\text{[Intervention]}}\]^\[^{\text{Note 64}}\] intervention may take the form of a communicated dictatorial demand for the settlement of a dispute. Id. It may also take the form of interference by force. Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 1961 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 187 (1962).
\(^63\) Lenhoff, supra note 46, at 629. The purpose of retorsions is to induce another state to change its actions or policies which, although not illegal under international law, are undesirable. Id. The acts in response to which the retorsions are made are unfriendly or discourteous but are not international delinquencies. W. Friedmann & O. Lissitzyn, supra note 1, at 880; II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 134, 136; L. Orfield & E. Re, supra note 46, at 909. Like reprisals, retorsions are not considered acts of war. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 132.
\(^64\) II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 134; G. Wilson, supra note 5, at 244.
\(^65\) Nor does the retorsion have to be the same kind of act as that of the provoking act, although it usually is similar. See II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 135; G. Wilson, supra note 5, at 243.
\(^66\) II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 135.
Thus are that war, it is precisely this intent to go to war that reprisals seek to prevent. Thus, stated graphically, reprisals fall somewhere between retorsions and acts of war with respect to the intent to inflict injury, the intensity of the force actually employed, and the risk of initiating more violent hostilities.

This area between retorsions and acts of war cannot remain unexplored and undefined for the present-day potential to enter into full scale hostilities is too great. To better understand the nature of an armed repraisal, it is necessary to go beyond the above definition and understand the customary rule of international law with respect to such an act of force. Once again, the purpose of explaining the customary rule is to test its adequacy for analysis of contemporary international problems.

67. Id. at 202. The ultimate objective of a war could be viewed in two respects, politically or militarily:
   (1) From the political point of view, the object is to obtain the end of a state.
   (2) From the military point of view, the object is to secure the submission of the enemy.
G. WILSON, supra note 5, at 255.
68. See text accompanying notes 102-08 infra. Any amount and any kind of force can be implemented in order to compel another state to settle the differences. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 133.
69. Id. Unlike retorsions and reprisals, the warring state is not required to cease the belligerent activity when a state has been compelled to conform to the desires of the victorious state. It may impose any conditions upon the vanquished state. Id.
70. M. McDougAL & F. FeliciANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 98 (1961).

Professor Kelsen disagrees, feeling that to fulfill the requirement for a "legal status of war" the intent to go to war is not enough; the actual use of armed force is also required:
A state of war in the true and full sense of the term is brought about only by acts of war, that is to say, by the use of armed force; and only such a state may be, but need not necessarily be, terminated by a peace treaty. Consequently war is a specific action, not a status. From the point of view of international law, the most important fact is the resort to war, and that means resort to an action, not resort to a status. Some writers consider the intention to make war, the animus belligerendi, of the state or states involved in war as essential. Animus belligerendi means the intention to wage war. But this can only be the intention to perform acts of war, that is to say, to use armed force, with all the consequences international law attaches to the use of armed force.
H. KELSEn, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1952).
71. See H. KELSEn, supra note 70, at 27.
72. If L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 202.
Unilateral acts of force performed by one State against another without a previous declaration of war may be a cause of the outbreak of war, but are not war in themselves, so long as they are not answered by similar hostile acts by the other side. Thus it comes about . . . acts of force performed by one State against another by way of reprisal . . . are not necessarily acts initiating war. Id. at 202-03.
A. Armed Reprisals During Peacetime Under the Customary Rule

Customary international law prescribes two prerequisites that must be satisfied before an armed reprisal can be perpetrated during peacetime. The first prerequisite is a prior violation of international law73 which by nature involves an interference with more than trivial rights or interests of the aggrieved state.74 An international delinquency75 occurs when any one or more of the following has been violated: (1) an international convention recognized by the opposing states;76 (2) a customary rule of international law applicable to the states involved;77 (3) a principle recognized by civilized nations;78 (4) a decision of an international tribunal to which both states were consenting parties;79 or (5) a bilateral treaty binding on both states.80 The only issue raised by this first requirement is whether there has in fact been a breach of international law. The analysis would simply involve an examination of the five criteria to decide if any one or more of them were satisfied. In short, there must be a prior illegal act to justify an armed reprisal.

Given that such an act occurs, the second prerequisite for legitimization of an armed reprisal is the absence of redress; that is, an unsuccessful demand by the injured state upon the offending state for cessation of the illegality or for redress or both.81 The purpose of this requirement is to delay the use of force until all avenues of achieving a peaceful solution are exhausted.82 Examples might include negotiation,83 arbitra-

73. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 137; Falk, supra note 9, at 430; Note, supra note 12, at 109. Whether or not an act is illegal may depend upon the existence of war or peace since reprisals are acceptable and allowable under customary international law only if the requirements of peace time or war time reprisals are fulfilled. See II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 143.
74. Note, supra note 12, at 114-15. Not every injurious act gives rise to a provocation. An act of a state injurious to another state is nevertheless not an international delinquency if committed neither wilfully and maliciously nor with culpable negligence. Therefore, an act of a state committed by right, or prompted by self-preservation in necessary self-defense, does not constitute an international delinquency, however injurious it may be to another state. I L. Oppenheim, International Law 311 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948).
75. A delinquency involves the violation by a state of an internationally recognized duty. I L. Oppenheim, supra note 74, at 307. It should be distinguished from discourteous or unfriendly acts since they "are not illegal and therefore not delinquent acts." Id.
76. Id. at 311-12. For example, the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits the use of armed force to recover contract debts or loans from other states. Id.
77. Id. at 313-14. Some rights that a state enjoys are derived from international law. For example, generally a state has a duty to refrain from restricting the flow of a river to other states. While a state has the right to use the river and is technically acting within its legal rights it may incur liability because its use was arbitrary. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 320.
80. Id. at 307.
81. See E. Colbert, supra note 20, at 72; II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 142; Falk, supra note 9, at 430; Note, supra note 12, at 113.
82. See Note, supra note 12, at 113.
83. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 136.
tion,84 good offices,85 conciliation,86 inquiry,87 or any other amicable means.88 Ideally, one or more of these are used prior to any retaliatory action so that a peaceful settlement may be reached. Even if the reprisal does occur, the time delay may render it milder than it would have been were it spontaneous. Specifically, the demand for redress involves three steps. The first entails informing the offending state of the wrong that it has perpetrated against the one aggrieved.89 Such a communication will probably include a demand for redress.90 The second step is the passage of a reasonable time during which the alleged wrongdoer is expected to answer.91 While there is no binding rule as to what is a reasonable time, it should depend upon the severity of the injury, prior relations between the states involved, their geographic location with respect to each other, and the practice of other states in like situations.92 In all likelihood, the decision as to what is a reasonable time will be made by the state seeking redress. The third step in satisfying the “no redress” requirement involves refusal or neglect by the offending state to make the requested reparations.88 Thus, if there is a proper communication to the provoking state, and the passage of a reasonable time within which no redress is made, the second requirement is satisfied. Combined with the first prerequisite of a prior illegal act, justifiable grounds for reprisal exist at this juncture.

Having established that an armed reprisal may legally be undertaken, customary international law then sets forth the manner in which the reprisal must be conducted. This involves two facets: (1) the target of the reprisal must be appropriate; and (2) the quantity and quality of force used must be within certain limits.

84. Westlake, Reprisals and War, 25 L.Q.R. 127, 135-37 (1909). It has been proposed that no reprisal should be undertaken against any state unless it refutes or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting arbitration, refuses to abide by the award. Id. at 136-37.
85. A state is said to offer “good offices” to another state when it tries to induce the disputing parties to negotiate between themselves, and to “mediate” when it enters the negotiations itself, but clearly each process merges with the other. J. Briely, The Law of Nations 373-76 (6th ed. 1963), cited in W. Friedmann & O. Lissitzyn, supra note 1, at 246; II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 9-10.
86. Conciliation is the process of settling a dispute by referring it to a commission of persons whose task it is to uncover the facts and make proposals for a settlement without having the binding character of an award or judgment. J. Briely, supra note 85, at 373-76, cited in W. Friedmann & O. Lissitzyn, supra note 1, at 248; II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 12-13.
87. Inquiry as a peaceful means of settling disputes is usually achieved by agreements which give to a commission the power to find facts and clarify issues in dispute. The famous Bryan Treaties are an example. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 7.
88. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 136.
89. E. Colbert, supra note 20, at 72, 75; II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 142; Note, supra note 12, at 109.
90. Note, supra note 12, at 113.
91. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 142-43; Note, supra note 12, at 113.
92. See generally Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard, 64 Am. J. Int'l L. 73, 87-89 (1970); Clark, supra note 9, at 695-96; Falk, supra note 9, at 431-35; Note, supra note 12, at 113-14.
93. Cf. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 142-43.
With respect to the first facet, the reprisal must be undertaken only against the entity responsible for the provocation.94 If the delinquency does not officially originate from the government, but rather from the territory which the government controls, the question arises whether responsibility can be imputed to the government. Phrased differently, there is a question of whether or not the person or persons who commit the original breach of international law can be considered agents of the government so that their acts are deemed to be the acts of the government.95 It is well settled that a state is liable for the activities of its nationals if it is capable of exercising control over them. This vicarious liability of the state flows from a well recognized duty upon the state to exercise reasonable care to prevent illegal acts emanating from its territory. If such acts do occur, the state has a further responsibility to either punish the wrongdoers or compel them to make retribution.96 Whether those individuals comply with their government’s demand has no significance for purposes of international law since they are not legal “persons” in international law.97 The conclusion to be drawn then is that states are responsible for the acts of their nationals if they (the states) knew or should have known of these activities and did not act to suppress them.98 If the state is responsible, anyone or anything belonging to it may, with two exceptions, be the target of a reprisal.99 Individuals of the delinquent state living abroad100 and public debts owed by the state are not considered permissible targets for reprisal.101

The second question with respect to the conduct of the actual reprisal involves the amount of force employed by the retaliating state. Generally, international law requires that the amount of force used during the reprisal must be proportional to that used during the provocation.102

However, this rule presents a major problem since proportionality is subject to at least four interpretations.103 The traditional view, an outgrowth of the law of private reprisals, is that the amount of damage inflicted

94. Falk, supra note 9, at 431; Note, supra note 12, at 109.
96. I L. Oppenheim, supra note 74, at 238–39; Note, supra note 12, at 111.
97. For a discussion of what entities are considered “legal persons” in international law, see W. FRIEDMANN & O. LISSITZYN, supra note 1, at 201–25.
98. See Note, supra note 12, at 110–11.
Ships sailing under its flag may be seized, treaties concluded with it may be suspended, part of its territory may be militarily occupied, goods belonging to it, or to its citizens, may be seized, and the like.

Id. at 139.
100. Id. at 140. This exception appears to apply strictly to “individuals enjoying privilege of extraterritoriality while abroad such as heads of states and diplomatic envoys.” Id.
101. Id. It is generally felt that public debts of a country are not appropriate objects of reprisal.
102. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 141; Note, supra note 12, at 114. Proportionality, as it is used in this Comment, is a term of art; it means a one-for-one relationship. This is contrary to its usual dictionary meaning which connotes any ratio, percentage or comparison.
103. Note, supra note 12, at 114–16.
during the response may not exceed the amount of damage inflicted during the initial injury.\textsuperscript{104} This view probably represents the most widely accepted international law rule. The second interpretation of proportionality suggests that the reprisal should not offend the norms of civilized society and should evidence a high regard for human existence.\textsuperscript{105} This interpretation seems to allow a disproportionate response with respect to the destruction of property so long as the reprisal is undertaken with regard for the lives of the citizens of the victim state. A third view of proportionality posits that the amount of force used in a reprisal should be less than that which would risk a full scale conflict.\textsuperscript{106} This view, like the preceding one, does not require strict proportionality. The only consideration is whether the reprisal would precipitate a war. While this permits a more flexible response by an aggrieved state, it also must be deemed unsatisfactory since it imposes no guidelines as to what amount of force international law should tolerate.\textsuperscript{107} The fourth interpretation of proportionality requires that the responding state employ only that amount of force that is necessary to accomplish its objective.\textsuperscript{108} Again, like the second and third views, this may or may not call for a strictly proportional response. If, in implementing a reprisal, a state uses more force than necessary to accomplish its objective, then the reprisal fails this particular test and is illegal. Whether the reprisal is legal, therefore, depends upon which of the four interpretations is used.

Two additional requirements pertaining to the amount of force employed during a reprisal must be noted. One is that the reprisal must cease immediately upon reparation by the delinquent state.\textsuperscript{109} The second is that a state, in conducting a reprisal, must not unreasonably interfere with the rights of third-party states.\textsuperscript{110} The effect of these two limitations is to place armed reprisals within certain boundaries beyond which they would be illegal and unjustifiable.

\textsuperscript{104} Falk, supra note 9, at 431. One authority cited for this "dollar-for-dollar, death-for-death" approach is the holding of the Special Arbitration Panel (Portugal-Germany) in the Naulilaa case. Although there is contrary authority which contends that Naulilaa does not stand for a strict proportionality rule, it at least stands for the proposition that reprisals must be in approximate proportion to the offense, and certainly cannot, in any case, be totally out of proportion to the acts which precipitate them. 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409 (1928). The tribunal stated, \textit{inter alia}, that the German aggression of October, November, and December, 1920, namely, attacking and destroying forts in Angola, lacked proportionality when compared to the killing of two German officials and internment of two others during a border incident, \textit{Id.} at 422. \textit{See also VI G. Hackworth, supra} note 46, at 154-55.


\textsuperscript{106} Note, supra note 12, at 114; Venezia, supra note 105, at 487.

\textsuperscript{107} This view would seem to permit an excessive amount of force to be used in response to a relatively minor infraction as long as war does not result. This results in placing little if any practicable limitation on the amount of force allowed in an armed reprisal.

\textsuperscript{108} Brownlie, supra note 62, at 231-32; Note, supra note 12, at 114.

\textsuperscript{109} II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 143.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{See generally}, II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 673-766.
B. Armed Reprisals During Wartime Under the Customary Rule

The purpose of armed reprisals during wartime is to compel obedience to the laws of war. Concomitantly, the duty of a warring nation to obey the laws of war depends upon whether the enemy adheres to similar conduct. If a nation violates the laws of war, the injured nation is justified in conducting a reprisal to compel the offending nation to refrain from such illegal acts. While proportionality is usually set forth as a requirement of a wartime reprisal, international law does permit the response to be different in kind from the provocation. Whereas in medieval times a seizure of goods was answered by a seizure of goods, such a requirement does not inure to the rules for armed reprisals during wartime. In reality, neither proportionality nor the similarity of the acts is the problem of wartime reprisals. The crux of the difficulty with respect to these reprisals is that their purpose will rarely, if ever, be accomplished, since no belligerent state is likely to accede to a request to cease illegal activities. Nor is it likely that a belligerent would compensate the injured state with which it is at war. One last, unrelated aspect of wartime reprisals, further distinguishing them from those committed during peacetime, is the lack of concern that such reprisals may substantially interfere with the rights of neutrals. In the final analysis, while international law addresses the problem of wartime reprisals, it is not as significant a concept as that of peacetime reprisals since states at war will be more concerned with their own national interests than with adherence to law.

IV. The Failure of the Customary Rule

It is submitted that the customary rule, pertaining to both war and peace, is inadequate to analyze armed reprisals during intermediacy. The wartime reprisal rule is not applicable to intermediacy situations in general, and to the Beirut incident in particular, because neither Israel nor Lebanon had the requisite animus belligerendi to properly label their relationship one of war. Since the customary rule of peacetime

111. The purpose of wartime retaliation is to force the other belligerent state to cease its illegal action and to equalize the position of the opposing nations by releasing one from adherence to the law which the other has violated. E. Colbert, supra note 20, at 2; II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 143; J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 354 (2d ed. 1959).

112. During the Second World War one example of a truly proportionate reprisal occurred. In response to the alleged binding and chaining of German prisoners taken in the Dieppe raid, Germany treated four thousand British prisoners in like manner. J. Stone, supra note 111, at 354 n.32.

113. Id. at 354-55.
114. Id. at 356.
115. Id. at 366.
116. See note 3 supra.
117. See note 71 supra.
118. See note 183 infra.
reprisals is used to analyze retaliations short of war, focus should be directed to those aspects of the peacetime rule which break down when applied to status mixtus. Those aspects concern: (1) the culpability of a government for a non-governmentally implemented provocation; (2) the necessity of requesting redress, and waiting a reasonable time before responding; and (3) the proportionality of the response. Examination of these three criteria demonstrates that the customary rule is too rigid to resolve the question whether international law should permit reprisals during intermediacy and, if permitted, what the limits of such a response should be.

A. Culpability

Addressing the question of a state's responsibility for a non-governmentally directed provocation, it must first be recognized that guerrilla warfare has become a means adopted by many national liberation groups to overthrow governments which they believe to be illegal or oppressive. Any inquiry, then, to be relevant to present day conditions, must focus upon whether responsibility for guerrilla attacks upon a neighboring state can be ascribed to the government which purports to be the international representative of those who committed the alleged international tort. Briefly stated, responsibility is a function of support. If support short of overt military or financial assistance does not render a state responsible, then Lebanon escapes liability in the present example even though (1) it permitted the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (the "Popular Front") to recruit and train commandos from refugee camps located within Lebanon; (2) it made available mass media through which propaganda was disseminated; and (3) it publicly applauded the Athens raid executed by those same guerrilla forces.

One recent discussion of the customary rule concluded that Lebanon was not responsible for the Athens raid since the link between the Lebanese Government and the Popular Front operating within its territory was too weak to impute liability to the former. Thus, according

119. In recent years there have been other international relationships that might conceivably be labeled status mixtus: North and South Korea, East and West Germany, China and Formosa, India and Pakistan, Nigeria and Biafra, the Soviet Union and China.

120. See generally R. DEBRAY, REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? 19 (B. Ortiz transl. 1967); HO CHI MINH ON REVOLUTION 224 (B. Fall ed. 1967).

121. There is indication that all of these activities were permitted by the Lebanese Government. See note 209 infra.

122. See Falk, supra note 9, at 420–21; note 210 infra.

123. Professor Falk concluded that the necessary link between the delinquency which precipitates the reprisal and the state from which it emanates was not present in the Athens provocation, and, therefore, Lebanon was not culpable. Falk, supra note 9, at 439. That conclusion is accepted here for the purpose of demonstrating that the customary rule is inadequate. If Professor Falk is correct then the analysis set forth follows logically. If professor Falk is mistaken and the necessary link was present fulfilling this element of the customary rule, the other elements attacked as inadequate are still present. Admittedly, the conclusion of Professor Falk is the
to that commentary, the customary peacetime rule imposes no legal obligation on a state to prevent guerrillas from committing extraterritorial acts of aggression, notwithstanding the failure of the government to intervene once it learned that an international delinquency was initiated from within its borders. Furthermore, it was found that the customary rule does not require the state to take steps necessary to prevent future delinquencies; only where the government overtly and directly supports the guerrillas, so as to make them agents of the government, will culpability inure to the state under the customary rule. However, during intermediacy, when states differ fundamentally over deep-rooted issues, a greater, not lesser, responsibility to control subversive elements should be imposed. Only then is there a chance of preventing more open and violent hostility. It should be noted that in the months following the Beirut raid, Lebanon took measures which, in fact, effectively controlled guerrilla activity. This indicates that the Lebanese Government probably had the capacity to so limit this subversive activity before the Athens raid. The conclusion that Lebanon had no duty to restrain the activities of the Popular Front, and was therefore not responsible for these activities, does not help structure expectations or reduce tensions between the states involved.

B. Request for Redress

The second aspect of the customary rule which poses serious obstacles to analyzing armed reprisals during status mixtus is the prohibition against an immediate response. As already noted, the customary rule requires the retaliating state to request redress and to wait a reasonable time during which the offending state may, and hopefully will, satisfy the request. It is submitted that such a request in the Middle East status mixtus would be futile, since there the provocations consisted of repeated acts; i.e., the continuous interference with Israeli air traffic. Such prior conduct would make it impracticable to require Israel to stand idly by and await further acts of provocation while presumably making diplomatic overtures. It was clear that there would be nothing gained by requesting redress. Evaluated realistically, even minor frictions between quasi-belligerent states may not be amenable to settlement by diplomatic gestures since requests for redress are not likely to be granted by a state which is in a status mixtus with the requesting state. Therefore, during intermediacy a state should be allowed to respond to an international tort immediately, without perfunctorily awaiting redress which no one

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same drawn herein — that a nexus did not exist between the breach of international law by the Popular Front and the government of Lebanon. Even if that conclusion is rejected, the inadequacy of the customary rule is proved.

124. See Jessup, supra note 3.
125. In an intermediacy situation, the fundamental issues that divide the nations pervade most of the ancillary issues. Id.
seriously considers will be forthcoming. In the context of the Beirut raid, Israel did not comply with the customary rule, but to hold it to such a standard does not comport with the realities of the situation.

C. Proportionality

The third aspect of the customary rule of reprisal which fails in a status mixtus situation is proportionality. Assuming, arguendo, that the traditional view of proportionality is that the injury inflicted during both the provocation and the retaliation must be equal or nearly equal, then the Beirut reprisal would be inconsistent with international law since the destruction of $43.8 million worth of property was certainly not equal to the destruction of one El Al airplane and the killing of one Israeli national. Yet, the use of a lesser amount of force would not have effectively deterred future acts of aggression — one object of a reprisal during status mixtus. The paradox is that a state acts illegally under the customary rule of armed reprisals, and yet, is forced to do so in order to accomplish its objective — the cessation of provoking acts in the future. Those provoking acts in the instant example were the work of not only Lebanese commandos but of other forces operating in the Arab sphere. It is submitted that due to the exigencies of the situation, international law should permit a greater quantum of force to be used during intermediacy than during peacetime. During intermediacy, hostility is more commonplace and becomes part of a state's expectations. Therefore, to induce a quasi-belligerent state to alter its course of conduct, it is necessary to use an amount of force which will exceed the target state's expectation of normal hostility, and impress upon it the determination of the responding state not to tolerate similar acts in the future. Hence, the traditional view of proportionality is too restrictive, and a broader, more pragmatic standard is needed.

If any of the other three views of proportionality are used, although probably not representative of the customary proportionality formulation, then a more forceful retaliation would be rendered legitimate, and this element of the traditional rule would be satisfied, although measured by another yardstick. In the final analysis, the three critical requirements

126. This test apparently was applied by one commentator in viewing the Beirut raid as disproportionate. Falk, supra note 9, at 433, 439–40. But see Note, supra note 12, at 114–16 (All four meanings of proportionality as outlined in the text, pp. 282–83 supra, must be considered in the test for proportionality. Note, supra note 12, at 115).
127. Falk, supra note 9, at 416, 439. According to Professor Falk, "[The Beirut attack] involved the destruction of what appeared to involve an excessive amount of property in an unusually spectacular and inflammatory fashion . . . ." This statement is unpersuasive because there has not yet been suggested a satisfactory method of putting a value on one man's life. It is not logical to compare the loss of one life with the destruction of one inanimate airplane, or even thirteen.
128. A discussion of these other views is set forth in section III of this Comment. See Falk, supra note 9, at 437–38 n.61.
of the customary rule of armed reprisals — a culpable state, an unsuccessful demand for redress and a proportional reprisal — would not be satisfied in a factual setting which, as demonstrated, would resist that conclusion. However, as set forth above, the customary rule is totally inadequate when used to gauge states' actions during status mixtus.

V. Armed Reprisals Under the United Nations Charter

Having examined the right of armed reprisal under the customary rule of international law, the next phase of analysis is to ascertain whether and to what extent the United Nations Charter has limited or abolished that right. It must be understood initially that the Charter attempted to create a structure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Toward this end, Article 2 of the Charter states in pertinent part:

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 129

The purposes of the United Nations to which the above provision makes reference include: the maintenance of international peace and security; the development of friendly relations between states; the achievement of international cooperation in solving economic, cultural, social and humanitarian problems; and, the creation of a center for harmonizing the actions of states to attain these ends. 130 While these objectives are relevant to the interpretation of the applicable Charter provisions, they should not be read as limiting the conduct of a state to the extent that the state's existence is threatened. Certainly, no discussion of armed reprisals can bypass the United Nations Charter; while the Charter is essential to our understanding of the right to implement such actions, it should not function as a straight-jacket to analysis.

The Charter makes no mention of armed reprisals. Therefore, to decide whether such acts are legal it is necessary to examine its provisions concerning self-defense, since that is the only use of force expressly allowed. In addition to Article 2, cited above, Article 51 sets forth the right of a state to use force in its own defense:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs

130. U.N. Charter art. 1.
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by the Members in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary to maintain or restore peace and security.131

The combined effect of Articles 2(3), 2(4) and 51, according to most commentators,132 is to render all use of force, except collective or individual self-defense, illegal.133 Under such an interpretation, the viability of the customary right of armed reprisals is highly questionable. Even the right of self-defense is circumscribed by requiring that an actual armed attack occur before such a right inures to the injured state. It further follows from this restrictive reading that the use of force in anticipation of an imminent attack is precluded, since an armed attack would not have preceded the prophylactic reaction of the threatened state. Opponents of this literal interpretation have advanced several cogent arguments;134 after their exposition, they will be applied to the context

133. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 232–33. See also II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 156.

[T]he Charter confines the right of armed self defense to the case of an armed attack as distinguished from various forms of unfriendly conduct falling short of an armed attack.

Id.

134. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 62, at 236. One commentator postulates that Article 2(4) leaves the traditional right of self-defense unimpaired; it extends to protect the existence of a state, its citizens and their property. It does not depend upon the occurrence of an armed attack upon the sovereign state. D. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 185–86 (1958).

Concerning other means of self-help Bowett writes:

The prohibition of the individual state's right to use or threaten force, coupled with the delegation to the Security Council of primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the agreement of individual members to accept the Council's decision brings about a situation in which self help may be prohibited whilst self-defense remains under Article 51.

Id. at 11.

The traditional international law rule concerning self-defense was expressed in the Caroline case. That case arose from the Canadian insurrection of 1837. The insurgents in Canada were receiving supplies from sympathizers on the American side of the border. The Caroline was a small steamship used by Americans at Buffalo and Black Rock, both on the American side. On December 29, 1837, while moored at Schlosser, also on the American side, with thirty-three Americans on board, the Caroline was attacked, destroyed by fire and set adrift over Niagara Falls. One American was killed, several were wounded, and only 23 of the 33 on board were accounted for. In 1841, an alleged participant in the raid, Alexander McLeod, was arrested and detained in New York. Lord Palmerston, as spokesman for the Canadian government, claimed responsibility for the incident, and justified it as a public act of force in self-defense by persons in the British service. In 1842, the two governments agreed on the principle that the requirements of self-defense might necessitate the use of force, but Secretary of State Webster stated that the necessity did not exist in this case. In a letter from Secretary Webster dated April 24, 1841,
of the Beirut raid to determine the ability of the United Nations Charter to deal effectively with reprisals during intermediacy.

It may be argued initially that each nation possesses an inherent right of self-defense which arises from natural law. That this right is inherent is expressly stated in Article 51. In essence, a state, simply because it is a state, has the right to take those measures it deems essential to its own preservation. Self-defense as a natural right is justified when certain national interests are threatened, peaceful settlement of a dispute is impossible, and the immediate use of force is absolutely necessary to maintain the status quo. Examples of vital national interests which warrant the use of force in self-defense include an interference with the territorial integrity of a state or a threat to the lives of its nationals at home or abroad. Additionally, a nation possesses the inherent right to protect its existence from threats that do not violate its territorial integrity. The assistance of subversive elements within

to Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington, which was later incorporated into a note to Lord Ashburton of Great Britain, he said that Great Britain must show: necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. This suggests that an actual undertaking must be in the offing in order to make the act of self-defense immediately necessary. See generally W. FRIEDMANN & O. LIABILITY, supra note 1, at 882; Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. Int'l L. 82 (1938); Note, supra note 12, at 119.

The action here is really that of anticipatory self-defense. There are other examples where the right of anticipatory self-defense was exercised against armed bands operating from a neighboring territory. See Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 712 (1958).

136. The question which follows is which interests must be threatened so as to allow self-defense.
138. The classical writers, however, failed to offer any guidance on the degree of injury necessary to justify resort to force as a matter of self-defense. The Spanish theorists, generally speaking, limited the right to protection of territory, nationals, and property, but Vattel extended it to the violation of any rights.

J. STONE, supra note 111, at 339.
137. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 266.
138. Id.; Note, supra note 12, at 119.
139. D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 29-41.
140. I. OPPENHEIM, supra note 74, at 309; Waldo, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Rec. Des Cours 466-67, 503 (1952); Note, supra note 12, at 118.
141. See D. BOWETT, supra note 134, at 43, 189. It should be recognized that the members of the United Nations have not in practice abandoned the right of anticipatory self-defense. Pakistan justified its invasion and occupation of Kashmir on the ground that it possessed the inherent right to exercise anticipatory self-defense. There had been in fact no actual attack on Pakistan by India. 5 U.N. SCOR, 464th meeting 7 (1951); U.N. Doc. S/PV464 (1951).

The British Government's position on articles 2 and 51 following its involvement in the Arab-Israeli War of 1956, was that Article 51 did not restrict the customary right of self-defense and that its involvement was justified as a measure to protect British nationals. Brownlie, supra note 62, at 236.

Finally, a number of the East European Treaties of Friendship and Mutual Assistance provide for the immediate aid in case of a renewal of aggression by Germany — it has been suggested that they indicate a readiness to resort to anticipatory self-defense. Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid, Poland and Czechoslovakia, March 10, 1947, art. 3, 25 U.N.T.S. 365.
the threatened state or the use of bacteriological warfare serve as two examples where the territorial integrity of a state need not necessarily be violated in order that the existence of the state or its political independence be threatened. Yet, a strict reading of Article 51 would not allow the victim of such aggression to forcefully respond.

To posit that the only right of self-defense is that defined by Article 51 is to hold that the United Nations conferred, rather than limited a natural right. However, it is undisputed that states possessed the inherent right of self-defense prior to their entrance into the United Nations. They possessed all of the natural rights that inure to an entity known as a state. Thus, according to some commentators, the Charter should be viewed as a limitation, not a grant of this natural right of self-defense. If Article 51 is viewed as such a limitation, then it does not follow that a state cannot act to protect vital national interests given certain exigent circumstances. Indeed, it would be a strange conclusion to say that a state, acting to protect its territorial integrity, political independence, or the lives of its nationals, is, by so doing, acting contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. If those purposes include the maintenance of international peace and security, as is expressly stated in the Charter, how can a state by protecting those interests mentioned act inconsistently with the Charter?

Another impracticality of a literal reading of the Charter is that it requires that an actual armed attack occur before a state can claim the right to defend itself. It is submitted that given the capability of


143. See Note, supra note 12, at 117.


145. Kelsen states that Article 51 applies only in the event of an armed attack therefore no other claim to self-defense may be presented even if the troops are poised on the borders. H. Kelsen, supra note 132, at 269; J. Stone, supra note 111, at 244; Wehberg, L'Interdiction der Recours a la Force, 78 Rec. Des. Cours 7, 70, 81 (1951).

146. D. Bowett, supra note 134, at 183. This commentator would permit the use of self-defense as an anticipatory measure against troops concentrated along the frontier. Id. at 244 n.8. See also Brownlie, supra note 65, at 239.

147. II L. Oppenheim, supra note 18, at 136. The Charter confines the right of armed self-defense to the case of an armed attack as distinguished from . . . various forms of unfriendly conduct falling short of armed attack.

Id.

Another commentator states:

But this article applies only in case of an armed attack. The right of self-defense must not be exercised in case of any other violation of the legally protected interests of a member.

H. Kelsen, supra note 132, at 269.
modern weaponry, it is unrealistic to expect a state to await an armed attack before responding with force. Such an attack could terminate the existence of a state. An examination of the Beirut raid within the framework of the law of the United Nations highlights the unreasonableness of a restrictive reading of the Charter.

VI. THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS RULE

An analysis of the Beirut raid under the Charter reveals two possible conclusions — either armed reprisals are prohibited under the Charter and the Beirut raid is illegal, or an inherent right of armed reprisal exists irrespective of the Charter when no peaceful alternative is available. Focusing on the first possible conclusion, most publicists have suggested that Article 2 abrogates the right to implement an armed reprisal since the only way to achieve a semblance of world order is to outlaw all use of force except the narrowly defined exceptions of Article 51. That all wars, defacto wars, and forceful measures short of war are illegal under the Charter seems to have been the official position of the United Nations when it censored Great Britain for its reprisal against Harib Yemen on March 28, 1964, in response to Yemeni support of the anti-colonial struggle in Aden. The rationale of that decision was that the members of the United Nations contracted with each other not to use...
force to achieve solutions to international controversies; the members, in relinquishing to the world organization their right to use force,\textsuperscript{156} sought to better achieve world order.\textsuperscript{157}

If the Beirut raid is classified as an armed reprisal, it would be illegal under this rationale irrespective of Lebanon's culpability.\textsuperscript{158} This would be so notwithstanding the possible conclusion that under customary international law it may have been a lawful response to the Athens provocation.\textsuperscript{159} Under the Charter requirements, Israel failed to follow the prescribed steps in settling international disputes: (1) peaceful diplomatic negotiation with Lebanon seeking redress for the injury inflicted by the guerrilla attack on its property; and (2) that route failing, the forwarding of a complaint to the Security Council whose decision would have been final.\textsuperscript{160} Since Israel failed to take these steps, the Security Council, following precedent,\textsuperscript{161} was compelled to unanimously condemn Israel for its attack on the Beirut airport.\textsuperscript{162}

\begin{itemize}
\item 156. See p. 288 \textit{supra}. Certain methods of coercion were preserved, namely, individual and collective self-defense. Economic reprisals may also be preserved as a permissible form of coercion; \textit{cf.} McDougal \& Feliciano, \textit{supra} note 46, at 1061.
\item 157. \textit{Id.} at 1063–64.
\item 158. Note, \textit{supra} note 12, at 127.
\item 159. Falk, \textit{supra} note 9, at 430 n.39.
\item As a technical matter, Charter Law is properly accorded priority over inconsistent rules of customary international law. Therefore, the clear rejection of the right of reprisal in U.N. practice seems to establish the general authority of this conclusion in positive international law.
\item \textit{Id.}
\item 160. Note, \textit{supra} note 12, at 127. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides:
\begin{flushleft}
The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.
\end{flushleft}
\begin{flushright}
\textit{U.N. Charter} art. 25.
\end{flushright}
\begin{itemize}
\item Article 39 provides the Security Council with the authority to make decisions.
\item The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, the breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
\end{itemize}
\begin{flushright}
\textit{U.N. Charter} art. 39.
\end{flushright}
\item 161. See notes 155 \textit{supra} \& 213 \textit{infra}, which indicate that the Security Council condemned Israel for its role in the El Samu reprisal and Britain for engaging in an armed reprisal in Yemen.
\item 162. On December 31, 1968, the Security Council adopted the following resolution stating that the United Nations:
\begin{itemize}
\item 1. Condemns Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;
\item 2. Considers that such premeditated acts of violence endanger the maintenance of peace;
\item 3. Issues a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions;
\item 4. Considers that Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel.
\end{itemize}
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Even assuming that the Beirut reprisal was an act of self-defense, preserved under Article 51, a strict reading of that section would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that Israel acted illegally since one prerequisite for a valid exercise of self-defense is the occurrence of an armed attack.\textsuperscript{163} While such an exercise of self-defense may on rare occasions be anticipatory, for example, where an armed attack is imminent, it may not be prophylactic.\textsuperscript{164} A state may prevent an aggressor from launching an attack, but it cannot expand the anticipatory attack beyond this limited purpose. Anticipatory self-defense will not justify attacking another state now for the purpose of deterring the target state from all future aggression. It justifies only preventing the implementation of an imminent aggressive act. For this reason, any attempt to justify an armed reprisal as a resort to anticipatory self-defense may be as fruitless as asserting the right to perpetrate an armed reprisal.

If resort to the United Nations is rendered ineffective by reason of a Security Council veto,\textsuperscript{165} or because that international organization has refused to redress similar wrongs in the past, then the state must have a paramount right to take those steps necessary to protect its existence.\textsuperscript{166}


\textsuperscript{164} Id.


\textsuperscript{166} Note, supra note 12, at 130.

When just and adequate redress is unavailable within the United Nations forum, then a Member State must have recourse to the traditional principles of self-help enunciated prior to the United Nations.

\textit{Id.}

In the Security Council meetings held to discuss the Lebanese charge of aggression against Israel, Mr. Rosenne of Israel stated:

The feeble excuses which came from Lebanon, from Beirut, will deceive no objective person. By its tolerance and connivance, Lebanon has once again ranged itself on the side of defiance of international law. It has thus continued both by omission and by commission, the policy enunciated by its Prime Minister
Such a right to self-preservation must be superior to the principles enunciated in the United Nations Charter. Professor Bowett suggests this same idea in stating:

On 16 February 1968, the official position of the Lebanese Government was then expressed by Mr. Abdalla el-Yafi in the Lebanese Parliament as follows — and on Israeli Radio Beirut: “We remain at war with Israel. Lebanon will remain faithful to the Khartoum decisions.” There is no need for me to repeat before this Security Council the trinity of negatives that constitutes the Khartoum decisions.

On 30 April 1968, Abdalla el-Yafi publicly pledged support to warfare by terror against Israel. He publicly encouraged Lebanese nationals to join terrorist organizations and promised them arms to fight Israel. That is the declared policy of the Government of Lebanon.

The Beirut daily Al-Yaum vividly described the official ceremony held on 30 April last when the Prime Minister took leave of fifty Lebanese citizens who had joined the El-Fatah terror organization, a representative of which thanked the Lebanese Government for its assistance.

The newspaper Al-Anwar of Beirut, of the same day added that the Prime Minister spoke enthusiastically in favour of the continuation of warfare by terror against Israel, and had instructed the Lebanese border guards to facilitate the movement of El-Fatah units.

To attack Israel is indeed an easy way to gain popularity, and the Arab leaders do not shun it. On 2 May 1968, the newspaper Al-Sayad reported extensively on the presence of the Prime Minister of Lebanon at the funeral of an El-Fatah man who had been killed in action, where armed El-Fatah men, dressed in camouflage uniforms and shooting into the air, were seen surrounding the Prime Minister.

On 8 May 1968, the Lebanese daily Al-Safa reported that “training centres for Lebanese young men who joined the fedayeen movement have been established in the town of Sidon.” In a statement made on 6 May, the Lebanese Prime Minister reiterated his Government’s support for terrorist warfare. The following night the first of a series of armed attacks was launched from Lebanese soil against an Israeli village, Manara.

Since then, the Government of Lebanon has not restrained itself either in its actions or in its threats against Israel. My delegation reported these and other incidents to the Security Council in its communications of 14 May 1968 and 15 June 1968. These notes stressed the grave dangers to the cease-fire created by these Lebanese provocations.

Those and other warnings were not needed. On 2 November 1968, the Prime Minister of Lebanon declared to the Kuwait newspaper Ar-Rai Al-Am that he did not believe in political solutions and that his Government would support the fedayeen since he considered their activities to be lawful. Later in the day he received a delegation and, according to Radio Beirut, repeated that statement. On 2 November 1968, Radio Baghdad quoted the Prime Minister as saying that what was taken by force would be recovered by force.

On 6 November 1968, the Permanent Representative of Israel forwarded again a complaint to the Security Council. He wrote:

“I am instructed to stress once more the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities to ensure scrupulous observance of the cease-fire and to prevent all armed action against or incursions into Israel from its territory, whether by regular or irregular forces. When the cease-fire is violated from the Lebanese side, Israel must reserve the right to take appropriate defensive measures.” (S/8891).

In this very month of December, Lebanon acted as host to an Arab regional conference, which vowed to continue terror warfare against Israel.

On 24 December 1968, a bare five days ago, the El-Fatah headquarters in Beirut published a warning to Christian pilgrims that they would be risking their lives by going to Bethlehem for Christmas. The New York Times of 25 December reported that the Arab terrorists had planned a dramatic act of violence to disrupt the holiday. According to the newspaper, only the vigilance of the Israeli defence forces prevented an infamous act of desecration.

The dastardly and murderous outrage of 26 December is thus the culmination of a long sustained and officially encouraged campaign. All through 1968
The right of self-defence is common to all systems of law. . . . As a legal concept its function and its scope may well vary with the degree of maturity attained by the system of the law in which it finds a place. In any immature system of law, where there is absent any centralized machinery for the enforcement of the law and the protection of the rights of individuals, or where such machinery is inefficacious or dilatory in securing those ends, the need to allow to the individuals whose rights are endangered by a breach of the law to protect their rights by their own action is obvious. 167

Until the nations of the world obtain meaningful solutions to their international problems, the United Nations will continue to be little more than a hope in which few states will place their trust. A state continually threatened and attacked by terrorist groups supported by belligerent neighboring states has no alternative 168 but to use force to protect its territorial

Lebanon, turning a deaf ear to Israeli’s appeals, has been playing an ever increasing role in the overall Arab belligerency against Israel. It was in Beirut that the major Arab terrorist organizations established their headquarters and set up their international networks. From this safe haven, and taking advantage of its activities, they mobilized their resources, built up their propaganda machine, planned and directed their murderous attacks launched against Israel villages and cities, the acts of sabotage, the planting of mines and boobytraps, and the hijacking of an Israeli airplane last July. They made no secret of their far-reaching and devilish plots and plans. All this is taking place on Lebanese soil, in Beirut, the very capital of that country, under the complacent eyes and ears of the Lebanese authorities. The Government’s responsibilities are clearly established. They are direct responsibilities, not vicarious ones.

The latest tragic and barbaric act in Athens has again brought to the Lebanese Government the cheap rewards of applause by a public opinion continuously whipped into senseless and blind hatred. The influential Lebanese newspaper El-Nahar, gloating over the murder, wrote on 28 December:

“The homeland of the Palestinian is the entire world — in Jerusalem, in Tel Aviv, in Los Angeles, in Rome and Athens. One day it will be in New York, Washington and London. For as long as the Palestinian is without a homeland, the entire world is his. His home is where the enemy is. . . . And New York, Washington and London or any other places might be the scene of the next Palestinian protest operation. The world will support or condemn, be happy or be afraid.”

. . . .

On 28 December 1968 a commando unit of the Israeli defence forces landed at Beirut airport and struck at a number of aircraft belonging to Arab airlines parked in the airport. There was no loss of life. Strict precautions were taken, as far as possible, to avoid damage to non-Arab aircraft. The action was directed solely against the base from which the terrorists had departed on the previous occasion.

This action was taken to uphold Israel’s basic right to free navigation in international skies. Its purpose was to show once again that Israel’s rights on land and sea and in the air cannot be jeopardized [sic] and trampled on with impunity. It is a reminder to friend and foe of the firm and unconditional commitment of the people and of the Government of Israel to protect its very existence, its territory and its lifelines, resolutely and unswervingly.

Without in any belittling the gravity of this terrorist warfare being conducted against Israel’s civil aircraft, wherever they might be, the complaint that we are discussing must also be seen in the broader context of the continuation by the Arab States, including Lebanon, of active belligerency and warfare against Israel through the instrumentality of irregular forces and organizations armed, trained, encouraged and financed by the Arab Governments, including the Government of Lebanon.

168. Falk, supra note 9, at 427.
December 1971] Comments 297

integrity and nationals.\textsuperscript{169} This was the position taken by Israel when one of its planes was destroyed and nationals killed during the Athens provocation.\textsuperscript{170} The purpose of such terrorist attacks — this was only one of many — is to continue the war lost in 1967\textsuperscript{171} and regain the territory surrendered during that short lived conflict.\textsuperscript{172} Israel felt that drastic measures were necessary to prevent recurrence of aggressive acts aimed at Israeli air traffic, since resort to the United Nations would not achieve their cessation.\textsuperscript{173} Israel's attempts to introduce evidence before the Security Council concerning Lebanon's culpability for the Athens raid were rebuffed,\textsuperscript{174} and the Council unanimously condemned the Beirut raid.\textsuperscript{175} However, the fact that the United Nations condemned Israel does not help answer the vital question raised in this Comment, namely, whether international law as altered by the United Nations Charter permits a

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\item 1. Diplomatic channels are closed because of a tradition of hostility;
\item 2. The United Nations has been ineffective to solve the Arab–Israeli situation; and
\item 3. The terrorists have avowedly expressed their purpose to be the total obliteration of Zionists.
\end{itemize}

\textit{Cf.} Falk, supra note 9, at 427.

\textsuperscript{170} See note 12 supra.

\textsuperscript{171} N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1968, at 2, col. 3. The Arabs are trying to do what they failed to do in 1967 in the Arab–Israeli war, but this time by committing acts of aggression against civilians. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{172} N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, col. 2.

\textsuperscript{173} Blum, supra note 92, at 102–03. Israel's position on why it failed to go before the United Nations was stated by Foreign Minister Eban:

I am sometimes asked . . . why did we not go to the Security Council after the Athens attack. Well, I would like to tell you what our decision-making process is. We did the exercise, we present our complaint. It is considered. It would have been rejected because they have Algeria and Pakistan and the Soviet Union and Hungary and even if you did not, you have the [Soviet] veto. What would be the effect of Israel complaining about her attack on her airlines, complaining to the highest international organ and being rebuffed? Would this not be interpreted as the legitimisation of the attack on the Israeli aircraft in the name of what is called the Palestine struggle? This is why we didn't go to the Security Council after the Algerian affair [of the hijacking of an El Al airliner in July 1968]. Because of the power structure we would have failed and then it would have been said that the international community approves the kidnapping of aircraft provided that the reason is the Palestinian reason.


\textsuperscript{174} The Soviet Union refused to consider the Israeli allegations against Lebanon while at the same time it was condemning Israel for aggression. U.N. Doc. S/PV 1460, at 13–15 (1968); U.N. Doc. S/PV1462 at 76 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Malik of the Soviet Union). Russia took this position despite its own definition of aggression in article 1(f) of the 1954 Russian Draft Definition of Aggression which stated that an aggressor is any state which offers "[s]upport to armed bands organized in its own territory which invade the territory of another [s]tate" or any state which refuses "on being requested by the invaded [s]tate, to take in its own territory any action within its power to deny such bands any aid or protection." Soviet Draft Resolution of October 18, 1954, A/C.6/L.332/Rev.1 reproduced in Note, supra note 12, at 123 n.88. Hungary and Pakistan also objected to the inclusion of the Athens incident on the Council agenda. U.N. Doc. S/PV1460 at 47 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Csatornay of Hungary); U.N. Doc. S/PV1461 at 37 (1968) (remarks of Mr. Shahi of Pakistan).

\textsuperscript{175} See note 162 supra.
state to undertake an armed reprisal during intermediacy. While the United Nations has itself stated that armed reprisals are prohibited, and this view is held by many commentators, it is posited that in a *status mixtus*, where a nation's vital interests are at stake, the right to conduct armed reprisals exists.176 Such a right, however, must be limited; an unrestricted right would lead to the total collapse of the United Nations.177 The purpose of the next section is to delineate the scope of this limited right.

VII. Armed Reprisals During Intermediacy

The failure of both customary international law and the United Nations to provide an adequate framework for evaluating armed reprisals during *status mixtus* reveals the need for a new standard by which such retaliatory acts can be judged. It is important to formulate such a standard by describing how states should act in a *status mixtus* relationship if international law is to structure expectations. The standard proposed is an attempt to confront a problem which international law has not as yet addressed.178 The standard is cognizant of the limitations placed upon the use of force by the United Nations Charter179 since that is the only existing world organization which could function to enforce international law and bring a semblance of world order to the international arena. By enunciating a standard for armed reprisals, it is hoped that states will be able to determine whether a contemplated armed reprisal would be

176. See D. O'Connell, supra note 149, at 338–39. In considering the extent to which the United Nations Charter today has limited the scope of self-defence one cannot ignore the effectiveness or otherwise of international machinery as a substitute for individual action; if the law is ineffective the primordial right of self-defense must reassert itself.

Id.

Israel's position on the Beirut raid was also expressed by Foreign Minister Abda Eban when he responded to the question whether Israel would alter its policy of retaliation because of the international outcry against the inflammatory use of force: We have no policy of retaliation. We have a policy of survival. If retaliation helps survival, we are for it. If someone could prove we could survive by giving Arab violence a free rein, then we would do so. But nobody has proved this. *The New York Times*, Jan. 10, 1969, at 28 (emphasis added).

It is submitted that when the machinery of the United Nations does not operate effectively to keep the peace under certain restricted instances the customary right of armed reprisal reasserts itself.

177. The problem with justifying one reprisal is that it raises the same justification issue for similar action by other states. International peace is certainly not fostered if resort to armed reprisals is unfettered by international restrictions. Thus we will attempt to confine the scope of permissible armed reprisals to an area of absolute necessity. This Comment also recognizes that armed reprisals should not be the rule but the exception to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and should be condemned when and if the United Nations becomes an effective organization.

178. Many contemporary writers have examined the broader question of whether armed reprisals are permitted under the United Nations Charter or whether the Charter has effectively precluded them. However, these studies are premised upon a relationship of peace between nations. Few writers have addressed themselves to a situation where the reprisal occurs during a state of intermediacy. See generally Falk, supra note 9.

179. See discussion of the limitations placed upon the use of force by the United Nations Charter at pp. 288–92 supra.
consistent with international law. The fundamental premise which pervades this analysis is that armed reprisals are an exception to the rule that force should not be used by a state to settle its disputes. Ineffective as the United Nations might be, its goal of peaceful solutions to international disputes should be the goal of all nations. Therefore, the standard used to judge the legality of armed reprisals during intermediacy should preclude the indiscriminate use of force. Yet, to be effective and realistic, it should be more flexible than the customary rule of peacetime reprisals. The Beirut raid will again be used as an example in order to realistically appraise the standard proposed.

By the proposed standard, an armed reprisal during intermediacy is justified only if all of the following requirements are fulfilled:

A. A status mixtus relationship truly exists between the state which perpetrates the armed reprisal and the state against which it is directed; and,

B. The armed reprisal is in response to a provocation which endangers the territorial integrity or the lives of the nationals of the retaliating state, or in any other way seriously jeopardizes its existence; and,

C. There is evidence indicating to a substantial certainty that a nexus exists between the provoking act and a government to which responsibility can be imputed; and,

D. Recourse to the United Nations has either been exhausted or would to a high degree of certainty prove ineffective to remedy the injury that has been inflicted; and,

E. The amount of force employed does not exceed that amount necessary to accomplish the objective of deterrence, and at the same time demonstrates a high regard for human life; and,

F. The reprisal is limited to appropriate targets having a reasonable relation to the deterrent objective.181

A. Intermediacy

Intermediacy is an absolute prerequisite to a justifiable armed reprisal under this analysis. As previously noted, intermediacy has three basic characteristics: (1) a continuing relationship of "hostility and strain;" (2) a conflict over issues so "fundamental and deep-rooted" that a solution to any one of them would not ease the strain; and (3) a desire by both nations not to go to war.182 With respect to the Arab-Israeli situa-

180. See pp. 292-98 supra for an analysis of the failure of the U.N. rule.
181. The basis for this intermediacy test can be found in a proposed rule for peace time reprisals submitted by Professor Falk. Falk, supra note 9, at 441-42.
182. Jessup, supra note 3, at 100-06. One political observer has commented: [Israel] is a small state surrounded by much larger Arab states, which have openly vowed to destroy it. They cannot do so by classical warfare. They have
tion, the initial question is whether there exists a state of intermediacy. Apparently, there is no official declaration of war between the Arab states and Israel because this would involve recognizing Israel as a state.

Such recognition is irreconcilable with the official Arab position that Israel does not legally exist as a state. Although no war exists, an objective analysis of Arab-Israeli relations compels the conclusion that those nations are not at peace. The Arab states have announced on numerous occasions that they view relations with Israel as continuously hostile. However, for purposes of analyzing the Beirut raid it is necessary to focus on Israel’s relationship vis-à-vis Lebanon since that relationship has been less hostile than Israel’s relations with the other Arab nations. If the requisite hostility does not exist between Israel and Lebanon, an armed reprisal committed by either of these states would necessarily be unjustifiable and hence illegal under this test. Arguably, Lebanon is part of the Arab world which has taken a position favoring guerrilla warfare as a means of regaining Palestine. The Beirut raid was directed against Arab-owned planes, not merely those owned by Lebanon, to deter the entire Arab bloc, of which Lebanon is an inextricable part, from supporting fedayeen activity. Thus, there is a continuing relationship of “hostility and strain” between Israel and Lebanon as well as between Israel and the other Arab states. Hence the first element is met. Secondly, there are “fundamental and deep-rooted” issues at the core of the Middle East controversy, the most important of which being the right of Israel to exist as a state. The Arabs contend that Israel was created contrary

tried open aggression and have been defeated and humiliated, so they have resorted to anarchy and guerrilla warfare.

The Arabs are exploding in their impotence. They have established their subversive headquarters in Amman. They avoid a major clash with the more modern, organized Israeli forces, but supply guerrillas with money, arms and technical aid. The Arabs think they can hijack airplanes, defy the rules of international commerce, and get away with it. Nasser thinks he can use the techniques of the Vietcong in Vietnam to restore the military balance he lost in the six-day war against the Israelis. And when one side resorts to the techniques of anarchy, as the Arabs have done against the Israelis, the whole community of nations has to think about the consequences.


183. D. Bowett, supra note 134, at 191. What Bowett wrote concerning the Arab-Israeli situation as it existed twenty years ago is applicable today: [N]either party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or required to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defense.

Id.

184. Rosenne, Directions for a Middle East Settlement — Some Underlying Legal Problems, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 44, 50 (1968).

185. A statement attributed to the Lebanese Prime Minister indicates that the armed effort of the Arab guerrillas was politically supported and approved by the Lebanese Government. Falk, supra note 9, at 421 n.18:

Fedayeen action is legitimate, and no one can condemn the fedayeen for what they are doing. Their aim is to retrieve their homeland and their plundered rights. Thus, I say, fedayeen action is legal.

Id.

186. See Rosenne, supra note 184, at 50–51.

187. Falk, supra note 9, at 431 n.42.
to the terms set by the United Nations for a Jewish state.\textsuperscript{188} Israel, on the other hand, claims that the land they now occupy is a re-embodiment of the Kingdoms of 933 to 722 and 168 to 83 B.C. "The two millennia of dispersion are dismissed as a parenthesis in history."\textsuperscript{189} Even if these two elements of intermediacy are satisfied, the real problem is with the third — that neither state desires to go to war. Although that is the official position of the states involved, both sides do seem willing to resort to force when necessary.\textsuperscript{190} The Arabs have been content since the 1967 conflict to achieve their goals through terroristic tactics. The Israeli Government resorted to violent use of force in the Six Day War, and since that time has adopted the use of armed reprisals to respond to guerrilla attacks.\textsuperscript{191}

B. Provocation

In order to be upheld, an armed reprisal during status mixtus must be in response to a prior international tort which endangers vital national interests. Those vital interests include the territorial integrity of the state,\textsuperscript{192} the lives of its nationals at home and abroad,\textsuperscript{193} and any other imminent threat to the existence of the state.\textsuperscript{194} A threat to any one of these interests supplies the requisite injury justifying the use of an armed reprisal. This requirement is an expansion of the customary international law rule since it permits an armed reprisal for any substantial threat to the existence of the state — a justification not present under the customary rule. Specifically, there need not be a direct intrusion or physical trespass into the territory of the retaliating state as was required under both the traditional rule and a literal reading of Article 51. This gives the intermediacy rule the added flexibility necessary to reflect the realities of such a situation.

The Athens raid fulfills the provocation requirement for two reasons: (1) an Israeli national was killed,\textsuperscript{195} and (2) the destruction of an El Al airplane, viewed as one of a series of attempts to destroy Israel’s airc

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\item \textsuperscript{188} O’Brien, supra note 14, at 693–95.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Marshall, Reflections on the Middle East, 11 Orbis 343, 346 (1967).
\item \textsuperscript{190} O’Brien, supra note 14, at 695–96.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{192} I. L. Oppenheim, supra note 74, at 255, 258–59.
\item \textsuperscript{193} D. Bowett, supra note 134, at 87–105; I. Brownlie, supra note 152, at 289–98; I. Oppenheim, supra note 74, at 256–57; Waldock, supra note 140, at 466–67, 503.
\item \textsuperscript{194} An example of such a threat is the installation of surface to surface missiles directed at the aggrieved state. This is a serious threat to the territorial integrity of this aggrieved state. Attacking the aircraft of a state is also considered a significant threat to the national interest. I. Brownlie, supra note 152, at 433. It should be noted that the mere loss of property owned by nationals abroad is not deemed a sufficient injury in itself to justify an armed reprisal. D. Bowett, supra note 134, at 111.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Falk, supra note 9, at 416. The killing of a national in itself is sufficient provocation when it is done deliberately, manifesting a policy of aggression directed against a state’s citizens abroad.
\end{itemize}
with the outside world, constitutes a threat to its national existence since Israel is surrounded on three sides by hostile states, making air traffic a principal means of maintaining a viable economy. Even though Israel's territorial integrity was not violated, a vital national interest was infringed. Thus, at this juncture, the Athens raid constitutes an adequate provocation to justify an armed reprisal.

While the customary rule of armed reprisals requires that a reasonable amount of time elapse prior to the retaliation during which all peaceful solutions must be exhausted, the intermediacy rule should not be so strict. During intermediacy, there is a continuing relationship of hostility. Thus, diplomatic overtures to a state to take decisive action would in all likelihood be ignored. Such was the case with Israeli warnings to the Arab nations with respect to fedayeen activity. Furthermore, if other means of self-help short of armed coercion are available to stop the illegal acts being perpetrated against the responding state, i.e., embargo, raising tariffs, or closing a frontier, then those means must be used. These economic sanctions are effective, however, only where the aggrieved state is in a position of economic superiority such that the offending state's economy is dependent upon the economy of the aggrieved. Intermediacy, by definition, suggests that the issues in controversy between the states involved are not likely to be settled peacefully. Therefore, the likelihood of settling the particular delinquency in question is slight. If such peaceful solution is possible, then it must be attempted prior to the commission of an armed reprisal.

During quasi-belligerency, an immediate armed reprisal should be permitted where there exists strong indicia that the provocation is only one of a series of international delinquencies. Admittedly, some time must elapse within which the culpable state can make redress. Where a series of international wrongs are involved, and the government controlling the territory from which they emanate remains silent, it will, in all probability, make no difference whether the injured state waits one day or one month for the injuring state to offer reparations. Therefore, it seems reasonable to allow an immediate response where a sufficient time has elapsed during which the culpable government could issue a policy statement regarding the provocation. It follows from this reasoning that the Israeli Government was justified in waiting only two days

196. Id. at 417-19.
197. Attacks upon a nation's aircraft have been considered a threat to a significant national interest that would justify an armed reprisal. I. BROWNLEE, supra note 152, at 433.
198. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 142, noted in Note, supra note 12, at 113.
199. II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 18, at 136.
200. Nevertheless, there must be a demand for redress either through diplomatic channels or by official government statements because this will impress upon the minds of the leaders of the delinquent country that it should take positive steps to rectify the situation. This is especially true where the nation plans to use a reprisal to compel the delinquent state to act. Id. at 142 n.6.
201. See notes 57, 60 & 61 supra.
before responding to the Athens incident. During this two day period, the Prime Minister of Lebanon not only condoned the Athens raid, but actually applauded it.\footnote{202}

C. Imputed Responsibility

As was stated with respect to the customary rule, an armed reprisal is valid only if directed toward the government responsible for the breach of international law. If the delictual conduct is directly attributable to the government, then, without further inquiry, the government is legally responsible and may be the object of an armed reprisal.\footnote{203} A more difficult question is presented where paramilitary organizations operating within the borders of a state are the perpetrators of the international injury. In order to retaliate against the state, there must be a nexus between the government and the groups responsible for the provocation.\footnote{204} This nexus is not established merely by demonstrating that the wrongdoers are citizens of the offending state.\footnote{205} However, it is established where the nationals proceed to commit a breach of international law at the direction or with the authorization, implicit or explicit, of their government, or where the government has failed to act to prevent the delinquency.\footnote{206} In such circumstances, the illegal acts may be imputed to the government. The government is as liable as if it conducted the action itself through its regular armed forces.\footnote{207} If, however, the State is incapable of controlling the activities of the guerrillas, then its failure to control them does not render it responsible.\footnote{208}

The Beirut raid was directed primarily against the Lebanese Government for what Israel believed to be its role in the Athens raid. The retaliation at Beirut meets this aspect of the intermediacy test only if Lebanon was, in fact, legally responsible. If Lebanon was responsible because it did not attempt to punish the wrongdoers or take steps to insure against the recurrence of similar delinquencies,\footnote{209} then it has violated its duty under international law to protect Israel against future

\footnote{202. See note 210 infra.}
\footnote{203. I L. Oppenheim, International Law 338 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1954); Note, supra note 12, at 110. Note that this is the eighth edition of the Oppenheim treatise.}
\footnote{204. Falk, supra note 9, at 441.}
\footnote{205. No state is absolutely responsible for international delicts committed by its nationals acting within its territory. I L. Oppenheim, supra note 203, at 337; Note, supra note 12, at 111.}
\footnote{206. I L. Oppenheim, supra note 203, at 228; Note, supra note 12, at 111. In addition to exercising reasonable care, if the illegal acts do occur, a duty to punish the wrongdoers exists. Id.}
\footnote{207. I L. Oppenheim, supra note 203, at 338; Note, supra note 12, at 111.}
\footnote{208. Note, supra note 12, at 112. In customary international law, some nations have been held responsible for acts over which they had no control. E. Colbert, supra note 20, at 67. However, where no ability to control is present, an armed reprisal against this nation is punitive, not deterrent in its effect. This violates the proportionality requirement. See pp. 305-06 infra.}
\footnote{209. Note, supra note 12, at 110.}
attacks. That Lebanon did not act to prevent the Athens raid has already been documented that it had the capacity to do so was clearly demonstrated in the months following the Beirut reprisal. During that time, the commandoes within Lebanon were silent. There were no subsequent raids against Israel and, in fact, no belligerent activity of any kind originating from Lebanese territory. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that prior to the Beirut reprisal the government of Lebanon had the capability to limit the fedayeen activity.

One further problem with imputing responsibility to a government is the perspective from which culpability is to be judged. If there is evidence which indicates to a substantial degree that there exists the requisite nexus between the breach of international law and the government allegedly responsible, then such a link may be inferred by the responding state for the purposes of this element of the test. The culpability requirement of this test was also an element of the customary rule.

D. The Unavailability of Remedies Under the United Nations

Any test which permits the use of force must be cognizant of the intent of the United Nations’ members in attempting to limit the use of force by the United Nations Charter. Ideally, the United Nations should be a forum in which all international disputes are settled, thereby eliminating the undesirable alternative of having each state act on its own initiative to enforce international law. However, there are at least two situations where reliance upon the United Nations for peaceful solution is impracticable. First, a state would not resort to the United Nations where there is a threat to this state’s national interests, and either (a) past experience in the United Nations has shown that no action will be forthcoming from that body or (b) one of the nations on the Security Council has aligned itself with the delinquent state and uses its veto power to block action against the aggressor state. Secondly, resort to the United Nations should not be required where that body is powerless to provide a remedy because the offender is not a member or not a state, and, therefore, not amenable to United Nations action.

210. See Falk, supra note 9, at 420–21. There is evidence that the Arab guerrillas are permitted to conduct all of these activities by the Lebanese Government. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, col. 4. See Note, supra note 12, at 111. Instead of condemning the Athens raid, the Lebanese Government applauded the raid as “legal and sacred.” N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § 4, at 1, col. 2.

211. See note 12 supra.

212. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.

213. J. Stone, No Peace — No War in the Middle East 4, 5 (1969). Too many members of the Security Council are politically committed to voting favorably for Arab causes. It was unlikely that any pro-Israeli resolution would be adopted since five out of the fifteen Members of the Security Council refuse “even to maintain diplomatic relations with her.” Id. at 4.

214. Blum, supra note 92, at 98; See also Yost, The Arab-Israeli War: How It Began, 46 Foreign Affairs 304 (1968). It should be noted that the Soviet Union vetoed a comparatively weak resolution that was pro-Israel and anti-Syrian, Id. at 304–05.

215. See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
The Beirut raid qualifies under the first exception. Israel had been censured previously for engaging in armed reprisals, and it was apparent to the Israeli Government that the United Nations would not act so as to protect Israeli interests. In addition, the Soviet Union, a member of the Security Council, was inextricably tied to the Arab cause, and would oppose any measure condemning the Arab states. This rationale does not address the question whether a right of reprisal exists in spite of Article 51 or whether the right is abrogated by that provision. Rather, it presumes the existence of a natural right to take those measures necessary for survival.

E. Proportionality

Once it is determined that the use of force is justifiable under the test, a further question remains, namely, the determination of the amount of force that may be employed by the responding state. The customary rule required that the reprisal be proportional, but as has been seen, that is subject to at least four different meanings. Proportionality, as used in an intermediacy context, means that amount of force necessary to deter future acts which threaten national interests of the responding state. The objective of the reprisal must be to compel a cessation of delictual conduct. If the amount of force used precipitates a war, then it is prima facie disproportionate. A further restriction on the use of force is that it must be exercised so as to evidence a high regard for human life, else it fails to meet this standard of proportionality. Finally, if there is no reasonable expectation on the part of the retaliating state that a reprisal will effectively deter future illegal conduct, then its purpose is to punish, and the reprisal would be considered illegal.

216. Israel was censured in 1966 by a 14–0 vote for conducting an armed reprisal against the Jordanian village of Es Samu in response to guerrilla raids along the border. O'Brien, supra note 14, at 699.
217. See note 214 supra.
218. For a discussion of the customary rules concerning proportionality, see notes 103 to 108 and accompanying text supra.
219. If the purpose of the reprisal is to protect a state from future attacks of this nature, a dollar-for-dollar limitation renders this purpose unachievable. It may take substantially more force to compel a state to assume its international duty. A senior Israeli military officer commented:

Replying on the basis of a wing for a wing and a propeller for a propeller was ruled out. This would not have carried the message. We had to make the point clearly.

220. See L. Orfield & E. Re, supra note 46, at 910.
221. Falk, supra note 9, at 441; Note, supra note 12, at 114.
222. When judging whether an expectation is reasonable it must be viewed from the position of the nation launching the reprisal rather than through an ad hoc determination. The capability of a nation to control elements within its border, the support given to it by these groups, the political statements issued by this government, the likelihood of provoking a war should be some of the relevant factors that bear upon the question of reasonable expectation.

223. Since the purpose is to deter, a reprisal that has punishment as its sole purpose fails to measure up to this purpose because it achieves only revenge. It does
The Beirut raid fulfills this requirement because it was executed humanely\textsuperscript{224} — neither civilians nor military personnel were injured in any manner. Its purpose was to deter Lebanese guerrilla activity by forcing the Lebanese Government to limit commando interference with significant Israeli national interests, namely, its air traffic\textsuperscript{225} and links with the outside world.

\section*{F. Appropriate Targets}

Having ascertained the amount of force permissible, it remains to delimit the type of targets against which an armed reprisal may be executed. This involves a preliminary determination of responsibility. Naturally, innocent states are not appropriate targets for retaliation, but if a government is directly or indirectly responsible for a breach of international law, then the state it represents is an appropriate target. Within such a state, the attack itself is appropriate if it: (1) communicates that the responding state is holding the offending state responsible, and (2) achieves the desired objective of deterrence. More specifically, some targets are more appropriate than others. Where the provocation is attributable to a group of guerrillas, as in the instant example, one appropriate target would be the base camps where these guerrillas train. These groups might be deterred and, in any event, would know that Israel was holding them responsible. However, this might not be an effective

\textsuperscript{224} Falk, \textit{supra} note 9, at 41; Note, \textit{supra} note 12, at 115.

\textsuperscript{225} Note, \textit{supra} note 12, at 114-15.
response for any one of several reasons: (1) the terrorists may be religiously motivated and a direct attack upon them would only intensify their hatred for the responding state; (2) the government may be responsible for aggression emanating from its territory and to punish the aggressors and not the government might be deemed by some publicists to be an unjust response; or (3) a direct attack upon the guerrillas may elicit more support for a movement which does not already have overwhelming popular support. While a direct response against the government will often cause that government to take the steps desired by the responding state, it may not be effective where the government is not able to control subversive elements. In such a situation, guerrilla training camps would be a more appropriate target.

A reprisal directed against civilians is inappropriate since this would be done more to punish than to deter future aggression. It has been stated above that the reprisal must show a high regard for human life. Concomitantly, it should also be noted that privately owned property may be a target for reprisal. The goal of using private property as a target would be to arouse public opinion. This in turn would put pressure on the government to limit guerrilla activity. Such a response might achieve the deterrence objective, but there may be a question as to whether it would satisfy the communicative objective. That is, the reprisal may not communicate to the offending state that it was being held responsible. Unless the communicative criterion is present, the target chosen is not appropriate.

The Beirut raid resulted in the destruction of $43.8 million worth of aircraft226 owned by private individuals, Arab corporations, intergovernmental corporations and foreign states.227 The attack upon both privately and governmentally owned property did communicate the reason for the response — that the Lebanese Government was being held responsible for the Athens attack, and had better limit the activities of the guerrillas operating from within its borders. Hence, this part of the test is satisfied. In conclusion, then, the Beirut raid meets the criteria established for a legal armed reprisal during intermediacy.

VIII. The Gulf of Tonkin — A Second Example

Having outlined a test for judging reprisals during intermediacy and having applied it to the Beirut reprisal, an additional reprisal, a response to the Gulf of Tonkin228 raid, will be examined to determine

226. Falk, supra note 9, at 415; N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § 4, at 1, cols. 2–3.
227. Lebanon did not own all of the aircraft destroyed; many were owned by other Arab governments in conjunction with foreign investors and governments such as the United States. Falk, supra note 9, at 415 n.1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § 4, at 1, cols. 2–3.

On August 2 the U.S. destroyer Maddox was attacked without provocation by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin... The United States thereupon warned the Hanoi regime of "grave consequences"
whether it was justifiable under this analysis. This reprisal occurred subsequent to two alleged attacks on American destroyers in “international waters” by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The provocation induced the United States Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, but neither this enactment, the political implications of that conflict, nor its constitutionality are apposite to the scope of this Comment.

A. Intermediacy

The United States, prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, was not in a state of war with North Vietnam, as the level of military involvement was insignificant and the American role was primarily advisory and financial. However, the relationship between North Vietnam and the United States prior to this reprisal could hardly be termed peaceful. On the contrary, it was one of continuing animosity and hostility. This hostility dates back to the American support for the French during their struggle with the Viet Minh. The issues that flow from this hostility are so “fundamental and deep-rooted” that even today, seven years after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, they have not been resolved. Ostensibly to prevent the spread of communism, the United States politically and militarily supported the South Vietnamese Government to the consternation of the North Vietnamese who maintain that the United States is supporting a violation of the Geneva Agreement which provides for the reunification of the South and the North. A further issue is the clash of ideologies — communism and democratic capitalism. It is submitted that these issues obstruct any hope of resolving ancillary issues such as

in the event of further military attacks on American forces. On August 4 [1964] the Maddox and another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, were again attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters. . . . The United States thereupon responded with air strikes against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their supporting facilities at various points on the coast of North Vietnam. The American action was limited and measured in proportion to the provocation which gave rise to it. It was an act of self-defense wholly consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter and an act of limited retaliation wholly consistent with the international law of reprisal. The single, most notable fact about the American action was its great restraint as an act of retaliation taken by a great power in response to the provocation of a small power.

229. North Vietnam is one of several nations that assert that its territorial waters extend to a twelve mile limit, whereas the United States has consistently maintained a policy that three miles is the maximum limit to territorial waters. In order to demonstrate its non recognition of the twelve mile limit, the United States ships “deliberately” sailed into this twelve mile area. However, the attack itself occurred when the destroyers were beyond the twelve mile limit. Id. at 18409.


232. See generally Ho Chi Minh on Revolution 216–17 (B. Fall ed. 1967).

233. Id. at 314.
release of prisoners of war, a single election in both North and South Vietnam, support for the guerrilla movement, or even a cease fire.

It appears that the sentiment of the American people was against any deeper involvement in Vietnam prior to the Gulf of Tonkin provocation, and that Congress did not intend, even by adopting the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution itself, to authorize unrestrained military action.

In addition, the North Vietnamese official position, at least as late as 1965, was that the struggle was still being waged by the National Front for Liberation rather than by North Vietnam. Thus, it is posited that during the period in which this reprisal took place, there was no requisite intent to go to war even though both states were taking indirect action; North Vietnam by supporting the guerrillas, and the United States by supporting the South Vietnamese. Therefore, the characteristics of intermediacy were present.

B. Provocation and the Responsibility of North Vietnam

The provocation, which consisted of an attack upon two American destroyers in international waters, was committed by torpedo boats in the service of North Vietnam. The question raised by this fact is whether responsibility may reasonably be imputed to the Government of North Vietnam for the actions of its naval contingent. Under international law, the acts of a government's military are directly imputed to that government. Additionally, in the interim period between the two attacks, the United States warned the North Vietnamese Government that subsequent acts of aggression would not be tolerated. Therefore, the North Vietnamese Government knowingly breached its international duty by not restraining an arm of its government from committing further acts of aggression.

Once it has been established that the provocation is attributable to the North Vietnamese Government, a further consideration remains with respect to whether or not the provocation was sufficient to induce an armed response; that is, whether or not the provocation was a violation of international law. In the instant example such a determination is dependent upon two factors: (1) whether the provocation endangered the territoriality or nationals of the retaliating state or was directed at an interest essential to its preservation; and (2) whether the provocation was justified under the circumstances. The attack by the North Vietnamese torpedo boats cannot be viewed as an isolated incident. Rather, it must be viewed in the entire panorama of hostility between North Vietnam and the United States. Thus, the continuous hostility between

235. Id. at 18456 (remarks of Senator Keating).
236. See Ho Chi Minh ON REVOLUTION 327–28 (B. Fall ed. 1967).
238. See note 228 supra.
the two nations and the supplying of guns and ammunition to the guer-
illas239 throughout Southeast Asia elevate such a provocation to a point
where a retaliation would not be an unreasonable or unwarranted re-
sponse. Further, the provoking attack was upon naval vessels, a violation
of the freedom of the seas, and it endangered American lives. Under
these circumstances, the provocation endangered vital national interests.240
However, if the two destroyers precipitated the attack by their own acts
of provocation, then it would follow that the attack by the North Vietnamese
was justified and no armed reprisal would have been warranted.

When the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was considered by Congress,
one opponent argued that these destroyers had, three days prior to the
act of provocation, supported a venture by the South Vietnamese Navy
which involved the shelling of two North Vietnamese islands. This, it
was submitted, could have been interpreted by the North Vietnamese as
an act of aggression to which they felt compelled to respond.241 The
continued presence of American ships in the vicinity of the two islands,
whether the ships were in international waters or within the territorial
waters of North Vietnam, raises the inference that the attacks were
responses to the American involvement in the bombardment of the two
islands, rather than wholly unprovoked attacks.242 The facts on this
issue are not sufficiently clear to make a conclusive determination. How-
ever, the facts do raise the point that a provocation, if justified, cannot
support an armed reprisal in response to it.

C. The Unavailability of Remedies Under the United Nations

If the provocation is sufficient, the right to implement a reprisal
arises only if there are no remedies in the United Nations, and all other
amicable means of settling the dispute have been exhausted. If the
response is purely an act of self-defense, it would be a permissible use
of force under Article 51 of the Charter. The reprisal against the naval
bases was an act of self-defense, yet, it was not merely an act to punish
North Vietnam for violation of its international obligations. It was an
attempt to accomplish a defensive purpose,243 i.e., the prevention of
future attacks on American ships. The United States could have sub-
mitted the dispute to the United Nations. However, it was not incon-

239. 110 Cong. Rec. 18408 (1964) (remarks of Senator Fulbright concerning
aggression already attributable to North Vietnam).
240. Id. at 18415 (remarks of Senator Stennis).
241. Id. at 18425 (remarks of Senator Morse).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 18399 (remarks of Senator Fulbright indicate that the United States
believed that this reprisal did not violate article 51 but was within the scope of
self-defense).
ceived that the Soviet Union would have vetoed any proposal to impose sanctions on North Vietnam. Therefore, because the exercise of the Soviet veto was more probable than not on an issue that was of vital concern to the United States, the United Nations did not present an adequate remedy. It became necessary, therefore, to protect certain paramount national interests through the use of an armed reprisal rather than resort to an ineffective remedy.

D. Proportionality and the Appropriateness of Targets

The final two aspects of the test, proportionality and appropriateness of targets, will be applied conjunctively. The reprisal was limited in the amount of force utilized\textsuperscript{244} and was perpetrated for the purpose of deterring future attacks of a similar nature. Thus, the complete or partial destruction of torpedo boats and bases would accomplish this deterrent purpose. Under the proposed test for proportionality, this reprisal would be proportional to the provocation, proportionality here meaning that amount of force necessary to accomplish the objective sought. In directing the reprisal strictly against the source of the provocation, the United States chose targets that would reasonably tend to accomplish the objective to deter. The reprisal communicated to North Vietnam that the United States was holding it directly responsible for the provocation (the communicative aspect), and that North Vietnam should take measures to control its military forces or similar reprisals would be implemented (the deterrent aspect). Here, the selected targets reasonably tended to accomplish the purpose of deterrence, and thus would be appropriate.\textsuperscript{245} In conclusion, this reprisal was a valid exercise of the use of deterrent force in intermediacy unless there was a justification for the provoking act.

IX. Conclusion

It is posited that a dichotomous approach to international law problems is unrealistic. States are not always either at war or at peace with other states. Oftentimes their relationships fall within the characteristics of intermediacy. If the relationship is labeled intermediacy, the legal consequences of calling it a war are avoided. Yet, the relationship is being described as it really exists — a relationship of fundamental and deep-rooted differences which preclude a peaceful settlement even if one of the differences is resolved. Given a relationship of intermediacy, it is hoped that states will realize that many disputes can only be partially solved. Every dispute does not result in either victory or defeat. It is this polarization of thinking that intermediacy counteracts. If states

\textsuperscript{244} Id.

\textsuperscript{245} Id. It is apparent from the legislative history of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that the reprisal was restricted to the torpedo boats and the facilities that directly supported them.
would accept this kind of approach to problems, it is likely that world tensions would be reduced.

Having established that intermediacy is a useful tool for analyzing international law problems, the specific issue addressed was whether armed reprisals are permissible during intermediacy. It is submitted that such retaliatory acts are permitted during intermediacy. In reaching this conclusion, the customary rule and the United Nations Charter provisions with respect to armed reprisals were examined to show that they do not provide a satisfactory solution to contemporary problems. One reason for their inadequacy is that they fail to recognize intermediacy as a relationship between states. Specifically, the customary rule sets up requirements so strict that an aggrieved state cannot respond with that amount of force necessary to insure its survival. Similarly, the United Nations Charter provisions require that a state suffer an actual armed attack before responding with force. According to most public international lawyers, that force, characterized as self-defense in the Charter, is not to be deemed an armed reprisal at all. The result of both rules is that a state may suffer devastating injury before it can act, within the bounds of international law, to protect its vital national interests.

A test has been set forth by which the legality of reprisals during intermediacy can be judged. The test requires (1) a \textit{status mixtus} relationship, (2) a provocation which endangers vital national interests, (3) a nexus between the delinquency and the state against which the reprisal is directed, (4) the unavailability of a remedy through the United Nations, (5) a proportional response, and (6) an appropriate target for the reprisal. If all of these elements are satisfied, the reprisal would be deemed legal. Both the Beirut raid and the United States response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident have been scrutinized under this test. Both have been found to be legal armed reprisals.

In essence, a new framework for analysis for a specific international law problem has been suggested. That framework has been used and, under it, a test established. That test has been applied to two factual settings to determine its validity. The question remaining is whether publicists and those who are concerned about public international law will use intermediacy as a framework for analyzing other international problems. Therefore, only in time can it be determined whether this framework better structures international expectations and enhances order in the international arena.

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