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Multilateralism and War: A Taxonomy of Institutional Functions

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THE dichotomy that emerged from the debate over the United States' invasion of Iraq, pitting multilateralism against unilateralism, has generally obscured more than it has enlightened about the law, rationales and effectiveness of multilateralism in war. This Article examines "security multilateralism" and concludes that, while the authority to address peace and security is, as a matter of international law, aggregated at the Security Council, the functions through which the United Nations works in support of that aggregated legal mandate are dispersed throughout the organization and affiliated bodies. Inquiries that seek to measure the effectiveness of U.N. security multilateralism against other multilateral or unilateral actors in armed conflict need to take this dispersal of functions into account.

This Article proposes a taxonomy of security multilateralism formed by these disaggregated functions: (1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention and (6) post-conflict administration. In this Article, the taxonomy is applied to three cases that represent the spectrum of legality of outside interventions in war: U.N. multilateral (East Timor); ad hoc, non-U.N. multilateral (Kosovo); and unilateral (Iraq). This comparative empirical examination reveals the ways in which U.N. multilateralism may be over-valued (e.g., the U.N.'s legitimating effect on outside military interventions), under-valued (e.g., the U.N.'s ability to assess threats and impose sanctions) or misconstrued (e.g., U.N. military operations may be no more or less multinational than a non-U.N. operation). The Article concludes with implications for reform of U.N. security functions and recommendations for how the taxonomy might be applied to future research.
From the beginning, America has sought international support for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained much support. There is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of many nations, and submitting to the objections of a few. America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.

Had we failed to act, Security Council resolutions on Iraq would have been revealed as empty threats, weakening the United Nations and encouraging defiance by dictators around the world. 1

INTRODUCTION

In the run up to invasion of Iraq in March 2003, opinion in the United States divided roughly into two camps: those who supported the invasion, regardless of whether it was sanctioned by the United Nations, and those who opposed the invasion unless it was sanctioned by the United Nations. The dichotomy pitted unilateralism against multilateralism. Either the United States would act regardless of legal support from the Security Council, or it would act only with legal support from the U.N. and as part of a multilateral operation with broad international support. 2 This divide between unilateralism and multilateralism marked the contours of the debate about the rationale for war, 3 the appropriate role of the U.N. in post-conflict reconstruction 4 and the internationalization of the troops on the ground. 5

2. A few voices tried to bridge the gap. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33 (arguing that war might be legitimate—even if illegal—if WMDs were found and Iraqi people welcomed U.S. occupation and post-conflict phase was internationalized). But see, Anne-Marie Slaughter, President’s Message, NewsL. (Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law) Apr. 2004 (concluding, one year after invasion that “the war was illegal and illegitimate”).
5. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, United States Puts a Spin on Coalition Numbers, Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 2003, at A29; see also Ivo Daadler, Bush’s Coalition Doesn’t Add Up Where It Counts, Newsday (N.Y.), Mar. 24, 2003, at A16 (criticizing Bush administration’s contention that war against Iraq has growing international support).
The unilateralists cited the rationales articulated in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy ("NSS") as support for a policy that seeks to pursue U.S. national interests aggressively—unconstrained by any pre-existing commitments under international agreements. The administration's early abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court were signals that the NSS would form the core of Bush administration policies and its relationship to multilateral institutions.

After the attacks of 9/11, some argued that the nature of the ongoing terrorist threats would demand a more multilateralist approach; and for a time, that appeared to happen. The United States sought and obtained Security Council authority for a range of measures to combat the global Al Qaeda terrorist network. These measures did not, however, signal a return to the broad multilateralism in security matters that had marked the 1990s.

Opposing arguments put forward by the multilateralists relied, in large part, on the legal requirement under the U.N. Charter that the use of force is prohibited, except where authorized by the Security Council or in self-defense. If the threat from the Iraqi regime was to be reduced or eliminated, it should be done with the imprimatur of the "international community," that is, through multilateral institutions.


The arguments of the unilateralists and multilateralists were largely normative and revolved around the question of what international law requires: Does the law permit the United States to act alone, or is the United States required to act only through some form of multilateral institution? Absent largely from the public debate was whether one or the form of intervention would be more effective in bringing about the shared goal of reducing threats to international peace and security. It is that question of effectiveness of the form of intervention to prevent, reduce or end war that this Article seeks to address.

International legal scholars have traditionally assumed that multilateralism, like law, matters. In contrast, realist international relations scholars traditionally argue that multilateralism, like law, does not matter, or at least that it does not matter much. In recent years, international law scholarship has begun to take a critical look at multilateralism from a variety of theoretical perspectives beyond legal doctrine. At the same time, rational institutionalists of international relations are moving closer to international law scholars in recognizing that while multilateralism cannot be accepted uncritically as promoting peace and the rule of law, it does alter the behavior of international actors. The challenge to international legal scholars has been how to prove or disprove the claim that multilateralism reduces incidents of war or limits war’s destructiveness. In order to be able to test the unilateralist rationales of those who tout “benign impe-

12. I use the term “shared” cautiously. The Bush administration’s stated rationale—at least at the time of the invasion—was justified on the threat Iraq posed as a result of its unlawful retention of banned weapons and ongoing weapons program. At the time of the invasion, the assumption that Iraq was, in fact, not fully complying with U.N. inspections requirements was shared by many of the individual and state opponents of the invasion.

13. By calling law “epiphenomenal,” realists allow themselves to concede that law may make a difference to international relations, but that difference is negligible. For a discussion of this difference, see infra notes 42, 46 and accompanying text.

Multilateralism and War: A Taxonomy of Institutional Functions

Multilateralism in war, or "security multilateralism," is the coordination of security relations among states according to the principles and legal norms governing the use of force. The power of the U.N. to address armed conflict and maintain just peace is, as a matter of Charter law, aggregated at the Security Council. But, the functions through which the U.N. organization works in support of that aggregated legal mandate are, however, dispersed and carried out by many bodies. These functions include: (1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention and (6) post-conflict administration. Empirical studies of security multilateralism should take into account the ways in which the U.N. has carried out these disaggregated functions, and the extent to which non-U.N. actors can carry out the same functions without U.N. participation. An overly narrow focus on decisions taken at the Council, acting in support of the military intervention function, ignores and risks marginalizing the importance and effectiveness of the other functions in addressing threats to international peace and security.

This Article examines two past conflicts—East Timor and Kosovo—and compares them with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Viewing these three conflicts through the taxonomy of these six institutional functions of multilateralism reveals useful information about how these dispersed functions are actually carried out.

This Article quite intentionally leaves aside the separate, but important, question of what the rules of multilateralism in armed conflict should be. The limited project here is to provide a framework for considering the relative effectiveness of different forms of addressing armed conflict in the three different contexts represented by East Timor, Kosovo and Iraq: U.N. multilateral, ad hoc multilateral and unilateral. I do not mean to minimize the important long-term systemic effects of the content of the international rules. Rather, I hope to inform debate over reform of the rules governing how and when armed force may be used by refining a tool with which to evaluate the effectiveness of different forms of institutional ac-

15. See Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire 5 (2004) (quoting Robert Kaplan's view that American imperialism can be viewed as "benign form of order"); see also Max Boot, The Case for American Empire, WKLY. STAND.-ARD, Oct. 15, 2001, at 27 (calling for expansion of goals and more assertive approach to implementing America's response to terrorism); Emily Eakin, Pax American—The Case for an American Empire, COLUM. ST., Apr. 7, 2002, at D1 (arguing America is not mere superpower or hegemon, but empire).

tion in armed conflict, even—or especially—those actions that are unlawful under the current rules. Further, my hope is that by providing a framework through which to draw on the empirical case studies being done by political scientists, international lawyers can become more informed about the context in which rulemaking takes place.

The project here is largely positive, describing the role of multilateral institutions in each case and the extent to which U.N. multilateralism differed from, or was more or less effective than, non-U.N. efforts. In each of these cases, arguments were put forward that participation by outside parties (unilateral, regional or U.N.-based) was justified under international legal norms. I do not intend to wade into those debates, except to the extent that those justifications included arguments based on efficacy of the form of intervention.\(^\text{17}\)

Part One of this Article examines accounts of multilateralism in international law and international relations and analyzes the historical and legal foundations of U.N. security multilateralism. It concludes that, while the legal authority over security multilateralism is aggregated at the Security Council, the functions of security multilateralism are dispersed throughout the U.N. and affiliated organizations and argues that these functions should be viewed as subordinate to the Council. Part Two presents the disaggregation of security multilateralism into a taxonomy of these dispersed functions: (1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention and (6) post-conflict administration. Part Three applies the taxonomy to the three armed conflicts that range along a continuum of legality from U.N. multilateral (East Timor) to non-U.N. multilateral (Kosovo) to unilateral (Iraq). Part Three examines these conflicts through the taxonomy of functions and makes some preliminary observations about security multilateralism that reveal the ways in which the U.N. has been overvalued (the U.N. may not have a strong legitimating effect on outside military interventions), under-valued (the U.N. may have effective capacity to assess threats and impose sanctions) or misconstrued (U.N. military interventions may be no more or less multinational than non-U.N. operations). The Article concludes with potential implications for reform of U.N. security functions and recommendations for how the taxonomy might be applied to future research.

I. Multilateralism in Armed Conflict

The terms “multilateral” and “unilateral” have become verbal hand grenades in the current discourse on international relations and war in the United States and Europe, and as such are tossed around with great imprecision by pundits and the popular press.\(^\text{18}\) One example is the way

\(^{17}\) For a discussion of the relative merits of UN and non-UN military interventions, see infra notes 285-314 and accompanying text.

in which even some prominent legal academics have been accused of near-zealotry in their promotion of multilateral solutions to international security problems.\(^{19}\) For international law skeptics in and out of the academy, "multilateralism" takes on almost pejorative overtones; representing anti-democratic decision making that allows outside states to "veto" actions taken to protect the United States' national interests.\(^{20}\) But the central claim of both unilateralists and multilateralists is that their approach will promote long-term stability and peace.

"Security multilateralism"\(^{21}\) is distinct from two other forms of security relationships between states: "security bilateralism" and "security unilateralism." Bilateralism refers to reciprocal arrangements between two states, generally understood to produce mutual benefits and rights and incur mutual obligations.\(^{22}\) Unilateralism generally refers to actions that

Complicating the discussion further, in Europe, multilateralism takes on a broader meaning that encompasses not only the process of transnational cooperation, but also the more "supranational" elements of centralized rule-making in the European Union. Multilateralism within Europe has been internalized as a legitimate means for legislating national policy. Because European states accept multilateralism as descriptive of both these accepted processes and norms, multilateralism is a less polarizing notion. See, e.g., Joachim Krause, Multilateralism: Behind European Views, Wash. Q., Spring 2004. Krause notes that the European view is not monolithic, but includes three strands—German, French and British—that see multilateralism and collective security respectively as: (1) a good in itself in that it promotes international law and diplomacy over war, (2) effective and necessary only insofar as it can be used to assert French interests or counteract the hegemon and (3) as an instrument to be used when practicable and effective, and to be ignored when not.

19. One example of the polemics involved with the mere use of the term "multilateral" was a discussion on the Charlie Rose show in December 2002, involving Harold Koh, Christopher Hitchens, David Rieff and Michael Walzer. See The Charlie Rose Show (PBS television broadcast Dec. 12, 2002). In a subsequent article about the experience, Hitchens noted that Koh "must have pronounced the words 'multilateral' or 'multilateralism' several dozen times." Christopher Hitchens, Multilateralism and Unilateralism: A Self-Canceling Complaint, Dec. 18, 2002, http://www.slate.com/id/2075659. In fact, Koh only used the term "multilateral" seven times. See The Charlie Rose Show, supra. Despite his inaccurate recall, Hitchens points out the self-canceling—at least in linguistic terms—complaint of those in the British labor party who in 2002 decried the Bush "regime change" policy not unwise per se, but unwise merely because it was "unilateral" and not "multilateral." To convert a policy that is "unilateral" (using the dictionary definition of "one-sided") into one that is "multilateral" ("many sided") would only require that the opponents of the policy join in. \textit{Id.}


21. I use the term "security multilateralism" to distinguish it from trade and economic multilateralism.

22. Over time, a large number of bilateral agreements, for example the web of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") may come to resemble a multilateral system, but are reflective of the bilateral dynamic. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: "A Work in Progress", 14 Nw. J. Int'l L.
affect the welfare and well being of one or more other states taken by one state alone and without prior coordination or cooperation with outside states. In the security context, unilateralism is frequently used to describe the use of aggressive force or other forms of "self-help" through violent means. Security multilateralism refers to the institutions and process of addressing armed conflict through cooperation and coordination of larger groups of states. Theories of why states cooperate with one another or coordinate their actions in the face of armed conflict help explain the rationales for existing multilateral security arrangements.

A. Systematizing Security Multilateralism

Efforts to systematize and evaluate security multilateralism have emerged along two separate tracks: normative and doctrinal explanations of the law governing international security multilateralism and explanations of U.N. multilateralism as a political phenomenon. The Security


23. See Pascal Boniface, The Specter of Unilateralism, WASH. Q. Summer 2001, 155, 158-59 (discussing U.S. unilateralism, unilateralist policies and European reaction to such policies). The Oxford English Dictionary defines "unilateral" as "the pursuit of a foreign policy without allies or irrespective of their views." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at http://www.oed.com (citing HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 1089 (1979)) ("From an early hostility to the American alliance with Japan... the Chinese leader soon came to view it as a guarantee of America’s interest in the Western Pacific and a rein on Japanese unilateralism.").

24. If a state acts alone in deploying force, but does so either with the approval of the U.N. Security Council or under the international rules governing self-defense, it is generally not considered "unilateral," as a normative matter, despite the fact that it is descriptively unilateral. For a further discussion, see infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text.

25. Cooperation is required where states refrain from actions that "would otherwise be in their immediate self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or long-term benefits." GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14, at 12. Coordination appears in interstate relations where "states receive higher payoffs if they engage in identical or symmetrical actions than if they do not." Id. The classic example of coordination is where a uniform solution to a technology problem is required (width of a railway gage, for example) but each state is indifferent to the outcome. Coordination in the security context is required for standardization of equipment and rules of engagement and other aspects of operations composed of troops from two or more nations.

Council is placed at the center of most legal analysis of security multilateralism because of the authority committed to the Council under the U.N. Charter. In most respects, these accounts analyze U.N. security multilateralism in its aggregate form, focusing on the decisions of the Council when it acts in its enforcement capacity. The role of the subordinate U.N. organs and related agencies in the area of armed conflict tends to be marginalized or minimized as a result. Nevertheless, these accounts of the rationales for multilateralism that can be included as a means of testing the relative effectiveness of multilateral and non-multilateral approaches.

1. **Legitimacy and Fairness**

The legitimacy and fairness school argues that the United Nations itself, through the law of the Charter, legitimates any action taken by the U.N. member states to regulate the use of force, including decisions to approve counter-force. According to Thomas Franck, the legal requirement of Council authorization in the case of all non-defensive use of force confers legitimacy, a legitimacy derived from the universality of membership of the United Nations and of the norms in the Charter. This legitimacy is therefore both procedural and substantive. Because membership is an expression of state sovereignty of the member state, that sovereignty confers on the collective group decisions of the U.N. the political legitimacy of each individual sovereign act. Each sovereign act in turn is the result of political accountability of each member state to its domestic con-

as well. Id. at 476. While these tracks have largely remained parallel, in recent years there have been increasing efforts to import the insights of international relations into legal scholarship. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, supra; Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Inter-Disciplinary Scholarship, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998).


28. See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (defining legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process").

29. Indeed, it is on the broad measure of universality that the U.N. has also improved upon the League structure. All states are members of the United Nations General Assembly and therefore have the right to participate in its core functions. All member states thus derive benefits from and incur obligations under each of the functions carried out in the area of peace and security. See THOMAS FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION 187 (1985) [hereinafter NATION AGAINST NATION] (discussing reciprocity between member states); see also THOMAS FRANCK, RECURSE TO FORCE (2002) [hereinafter RECURSE TO FORCE]; DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002) (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2002) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY]; Mariano-Forentina Cuellar, Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40 Stan. J. Int’l L. 211, 221 n.49 (2004) (discussing sovereignty-based collective security). Of course, not all member states are democratic or legitimate, which has created the so-called “democracy deficit” in the U.N. and other multilateral organizations.
stituencies, which further enhances the legitimacy of the U.N.'s actions.\textsuperscript{30} This perspective has been particularly valuable to understanding procedural norms, for example: the political nature of Council decision-making,\textsuperscript{31} efforts to reform voting procedures\textsuperscript{32} and expansion of Council membership.\textsuperscript{33}

Further, the U.N. facilitates collective action by permitting a group of nations to address security threats in a way each state could not do acting alone,\textsuperscript{34} conferring on the process a neutral character; it is at once the decision of all the international community and the decision of no state in particular.\textsuperscript{35} This neutrality, in turn, brings about better, more just results than those that would be achieved through non-neutral, unilateral or ad hoc self-help.\textsuperscript{36} The combination of legitimacy and neutrality carries long-

\begin{itemize}
\item 30. An alternative perspective views supranational power as less legitimate. See Michael Glennon, \textit{The United States, Democracy Hegemony, \& Accountability}, in \textit{Accountability}, supra note 29. Accountability of member state actions through transnational constituencies, including so-called "CNN legitimacy," plays a separate role from that of sovereign legitimacy. See, e.g., David Kennedy, \textit{Tom Franck and the Manhattan School}, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. \& Pol. 397 (2003). This rooting of legitimacy of the Council in domestic law is part of the larger effort in international law to explain legitimacy of international rule making as derived from integration with the domestic legal order, either directly or through transnational networks. See, e.g., \textit{Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order} 266-71 (2003) (arguing that sub-national governmental units can operate through transnational networks without giving up sovereignty); Harold Koh, \textit{Bringing International Law Home}, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623 (1998).

\item 31. For a general discussion of domestic political influences on Security Council member behavior, see \textit{Accountability}, supra note 29.


\item 33. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Roberts, \textit{United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and Its Aftermath}, 25 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. \& Pol. 593, 620 (1993). Other work focusing on the substantive norms of security multilateralism (i.e., the prohibition of the use of force and the exceptions thereto) has contributed to understanding whether the rules themselves have ongoing viability in light of the relative desuetude of the Council during the Cold War and the persistence of armed conflict throughout the same period. See Glennon, supra note 30.

\item 34. That is, the U.N. finances and delegates authority to international organizations with specialized expertise and ability to carry out certain missions in the context of war. The Military Committee was to be the ultimate military capacity of the international community. Absent the standing Military Committee, other organizations carry out specialized missions in the context of war. See, e.g., Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 325 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950). For a further discussion of taxonomy functions, see infra notes 137-94 and accompanying text.

\item 35. See \textit{Nation Against Nation}, supra note 29, at 99 (1985) (noting decision to make U.N. separate legal identity from its constituent states).

\item 36. One view is that the U.N. has been effective in not taking political sides, or at least that, when the U.N. does weigh in on one or another side of a dispute, it does so in the interest of peace and security and not in terms of political preferences. This view holds that because it represents the will of the international community, and because it embodies the central international human rights instruments and organs, any result obtained under the auspices of the U.N. will at
\end{itemize}
term systemic benefits by reinforcing the notion that rules, not pure power, govern the relations between states.

2. **Realism**

The realist view has traditionally rejected the importance of the norms and process governing Security Council enforcement mechanisms, just as it rejects international institutions generally.\(^{37}\) Instead, realists argue that U.N. enforcement mechanisms are at best a reflection of rational state action in an anarchical international system governed by power politics.\(^{38}\) The very composition of the Council, including the veto for the permanent five, reflects rational calculations by states aimed at aggrandizing power and maximizing security.\(^{39}\) More powerful states will access the Security Council when it serves their interest to do so and will disregard it when it does not.\(^{40}\) Less powerful states make similar calculations, allying with powerful states and joining institutions when the benefits outweigh the costs.\(^{41}\) To the extent that law exists, it is “epiphenomenal” to what really happens in the world system.\(^{42}\) Under this view, any multilateral mechanism aimed at providing for collective security is therefore not too different, in practice, from alliances that balance power and security.\(^{43}\)

least be more “just” than that obtained by “interested” third parties. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1998) [hereinafter FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].

37. The seminal realist work is HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1973), in which he sets out the thesis that “[i]nternational politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.” Id. at 27; see also Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 260 (1940).

38. To a rational state, collective security multilateralism would be assessed in policy terms in much the same way alliances were assessed. A state should enter into a multilateral security arrangement if the benefits to that state outweigh the costs. See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SECURITY 3 (1995) (arguing there is little value in international institutions and multilateralism has little impact on state behavior). Rationalism in the sphere of security relationships is complicated to a certain degree by distinctions between comparative and absolute gains and the problem of cheating. Id. at 13.

39. Kenneth Waltz amended Morgenthau’s view of states as motivated solely by the aggrandizement of power to include the “subdued optimism” of the belief that states are “motivated by the desire for security.” Mearsheimer, supra note 38, at 48 n.180; see also KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 126 (1979) (arguing security ranks top priority for states within anarchic system).

40. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 37, at 29 (“[States] may also try to further [the realization of power] through non-political means, such as technical co-operation with other nations of international organizations.”).

41. See Mearsheimer, supra note 38, at 3. This is how large and small states behave in all alliance-based actions.

42. Calling international law epiphenomenal “is a nice way of saying it is stupid.” David J. Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469, 473 (2001).

43. The history of the first forty-four years of the U.N. appears to vindicate this as a political theory supported by empirical evidence. Military force operating
Yet, strict realist assumptions about multilateralism fail adequately to explain cooperation and coordination among states in a range of security activities, including in areas where states quite clearly have acted against their own short and medium-term interests. 44 If powerful states act rationally in pursuit of aggrandizing their power, why do multilateral security institutions persist, even during a period (i.e., the Cold War) when some central institutions like the Security Council exercised their functions relatively infrequently? This requires an explanation that focuses less on formalist explanations of the legal rules of the Charter and more on the ways in which multilateral organizations operate as norm regimes. 45

3. Institutionalism

Institutionalism, which began as an offshoot of realism (that is, among international law skeptics), provides an account and definition of multilateralism that balances the competing views of realism and legal formalism and offers a more pragmatic approach to evaluating the behavior under the auspices of the U.N. was invoked only twenty times between 1945 and 1989. See Accountability, supra note 29, at 17, App. A (providing table of invocations of U.N. force for years 1989-2000). During that same time period, the world experienced approximately 100 incidents that could be categorized as armed conflicts that breached international peace. See Sec'y-Gen., Report of the Secretary-General on An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, ¶ 14, delivered to the members of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) (estimating over 100 conflicts, leaving twenty million dead between 1946 and 1989). Nonetheless, longitudinal models demonstrate a persistent decline in the global magnitude of armed conflict since it peaked in the early 1990s. See Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy 1 (2005). Broad conclusions regarding causation, as opposed to mere correlation, between the persistence of war and the existence of collective security mechanism can be misleading. See Cuellar, supra note 29, at 221 n.49 (arguing that "sovereignty-centered collective security" of U.N. has been marginal in addressing international security problems, while acknowledging that it would be "difficult to make statistically rigorous inferences about the precise impact of the United Nations or international law on the extent of global violent conflict").


45. See Robert O. Keohane, Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research, 45 Int'l L.J. 731, 737 (1990) (discussing institutionalists, rational institutionalists and neo-liberal institutionalists) [hereinafter An Agenda for Research]; see also Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in International Regimes 141, 153-54 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (arguing that regimes form and are necessary when at least one of following three conditions is met: absence of clear legal framework that imposes liability for action, imperfect information or high transaction costs). Institutionalists take law into account as important to some aspects of politics, but not to the core national interests. Institutions and regimes reduce transaction costs, stabilize expectations and allow "repeat playing" and cooperation in international affairs. See id. at 153-61 (discussing efficiencies that regimes provide).
of international institutions. The persistence of multilateral security institutions in defiance of both the classical realists who insist that institutions are "epiphenomenal," and those legal formalists who see international order as largely derived from neutral rules and process, required an alternative account; institutionalism bridged the gap.

The political scientist John Ruggie defines broad multilateralism as "the co-ordination of relations among three or more states according to a set of principles." Ruggie's definition built on an earlier description by Robert Keohane of multilateralism as "the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states." From an institutionalist perspective, it is the multilateral form of an institution which creates "robust and adaptive" characteristics that enhance durability and adaptability. It is this adaptability—not the formalism of the legal rules—that makes U.N. multilateralism generally, and U.N. security multilateralism specifically, enduring.

By adding the normative dimension to coordinated policies, Ruggie acknowledges that multilateral behavior is motivated by more than raw political preference on the part of the states, but includes a set of rules that govern the relationships of states entering into the multilateral arrangement. These rules are created by the participating states who agree to their implementation and enforcement through the multilateral arrangement itself. Security multilateralism has two dimensions: (1) cooperation and coordination function of participating in collective security and (2) the normative element, or the rules governing the use of force.

Security multilateralism thus includes the political processes of dispute resolution, including the use of force itself, and the law governing

46. See Multilateralism Matters, supra note 16, at 6 (contrasting multilateralism with bilateralism).

47. An Agenda for Research, supra note 45, at 731.

48. "[M]uch of the institutional inventiveness within multilateral arrangements today is coming from the institutions themselves, from platforms that arguably represent or at least speak for the collectivities at hand." Multilateralism Matters, supra note 16, at 6.

49. John Ikenberry is more specific in referring to the principles by which multilateral relationships are governed as "constraining rules." See Multilateralism Matters, supra note 16, at 3-47; G. John Ikenberry, Is American Multilateralism in Decline?, 1 Persp. in Pol. 533, 534 (2003), available at http://www.apsanet.org (citing An Agenda for Research, supra note 45; John Van Oudenaren, What is "Multilateral"?, 117 Pol'v Rev. 33, 33-47 (2003)) (distinguishing between multilateralism and other kinds of international relations).


51. Some international lawyers argue that the use of force cannot be construed as a legal process on the fundamental ground that violence is the opposite of war, but modern multilateralism contemplates the use of force on behalf of upholding law. See Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 40-44 (discussing expan-
those processes. Viewed from this perspective, multilateralism refers to a variety of international efforts to reduce or eliminate the threat of war: the use of the individuals, the U.N. or other multilateral organizations as mediators to the dispute; the use of non-coercive measures designed to prevent the exercise of violence in the first place; the use of force authorized under the authority of the United Nations Security Council; the use of force under the authority of non-U.N. multilateral organizations; and the joint deployment of military forces of different nations.

This institutionalist framework provides a useful starting point for examining the bases of the functions of U.N. security multilateralism in law and practice. The next two sections explain how the two elements of security multilateralism—cooperation and norm enforcement—developed in a way that is distinct from bilateralism or unilateralism and how these two strands form the core of the Security Council's role in maintaining peace and security. A close analysis of the Charter and U.N. practice demonstrates that the this aggregation of legal and, to some degree, political power at the Council was intentional, but was accompanied by a dispersal of supporting functions carried out in the General Assembly, other organs of the U.N. and affiliated organizations.

B. Pre-League of Nations Security Multilateralism

The path from unilateral, ad hoc coalitions to the security multilateralism of the U.N. illustrates how and why this combination of political and legal authority came to be aggregated at the Security Council and also why other functions of security multilateralism can be seen as subordinated to the central peace enforcement powers of the Council. Forms of security multilateralism have existed almost as long as wars and conflicts have been...
carried out. In the ancient world, multilateralism took the form of a balance of power system functioning among the city-states of ancient Greece, which transformed the states, all of relatively equal strength, into a greater world order. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, ending the Thirty Years War in Europe, marked the beginning, not only of the modern notion of statehood and sovereignty, but also of modern multilateralism, a process through which sovereigns interacted with one another. Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the great powers—Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France—rebuilt the international order at the Congress of Vienna, a system that “sought to forge a consensus on the issues confronting Europe and to pave the way for dealing with them on a multilateral basis.” After the Concert of Powers failed, it was replaced in the second half of the nineteenth century by a “striving for unilateral advantage checked only by external constraints, while bilateral alliance formation was raised to a new level of sophistication by Bis-

57. See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 20 (Simon & Schuster 1994) (suggesting that Europe faced two options after collapse of “medieval dream of the universal empire”: one country creates another empire or no states can become powerful enough to create another empire, in which case balance of power keeps most aggressive states “in check”).

58. See id. at 21 (providing examples of states that utilized balance of power systems successfully).

59. See id. at 65 (explaining how France became dominant in seventeenth century). At the same time, the notion of raison d’état became the central rationale in European diplomacy. See id. (discussing rise of raison d’état after Peace of Westphalia). But see Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles 502-08 (2002) (arguing instead that Peace of Westphalia represented beginning of constitutionalism).

60. See Kissinger, supra note 57, at 78-79, 88. The Congress in some senses was a precursor of the Helsinki Final Act: “[T]he results achieved at Vienna were inspired by a certain concept of international relations which excluded the use of force and which consequently represented a considerable advance on the highway robbery of the eighteenth century.” Bobbitt, supra note 59, at 164-65 (quoting Jacques Droz, Europe Between the Revolutions, 1815-1848 (1967)).

61. See Multilateralism Matters, supra note 16, at 18 n.53 (citing Henry Kissinger, A World Restored 5 (1964)) (noting that “Kissinger concentrates on the Congress system . . . which ended by about 1823” but contends that his own commentary would hold true for entire Concert system). This institutional framework proved viable for a generation and was, more or less, regarded by its participants as “legitimate,” a true “Concert of Powers,” as it became known after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. See Bobbitt, supra note 59, at 164, 166 (discussing legitimacy of Concert of Powers). But see id. at 539 (contending that Congress reflected constitutional response to these events).

62. The institutionalization of multilateral security under the Concert has been attributed to the threat of Napoleonic imperial ambitions and the threat that the French revolution posed to the very notion of dynastic rule, which brought diverse cultures and religions to the Concert—England’s liberal Protestantism on the one hand and conservative Catholic Austria and Orthodox Russia on the other. See Multilateralism Matters, supra note 16, at 18-19. The revolution of 1848 “shook the prevailing concept of legitimate political order from within, and the sense of international cohesion diverged sharply thereafter.” Id. at 580.
During the same period, on the economic side, free trade emerged, along with the gold standard, as the paradigms of nineteenth century multilateralism.

Security multilateralism was not like trade. There had been no coalescing principle of behavior comparable to Ricardian trade economics to govern interactions between states on the security side. States thus continued throughout the nineteenth century to rely on alliances as a means to express power and balance threats. Those alliances, however, failed to stop World War I and arguably hastened it. Only after World War I did the European powers begin to think of security as a common good, like economic wealth, indivisible and susceptible to public regulation through the application of principles to state behavior.

C. Security Multilateralism Under the League of Nations Covenant

The first formal use of the term “multilateral” to refer to a shift from alliances to some sort of rule-based system for regulating war was made in conjunction with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. But this form of multilateralism was not like trade. There had been no coalescing principle of behavior comparable to Ricardian trade economics to govern interactions between states on the security side. States thus continued throughout the nineteenth century to rely on alliances as a means to express power and balance threats. Those alliances, however, failed to stop World War I and arguably hastened it. Only after World War I did the European powers begin to think of security as a common good, like economic wealth, indivisible and susceptible to public regulation through the application of principles to state behavior.

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Multilateralism as collective security had been established in the Covenant of the League of Nations a decade earlier. "Collective security systems commit members to combined retaliation against any state, including a member of the system, that commits aggression against a member state." 67 "[A] threat against one is a threat against all" form of collective security differed from earlier alliances based on defense against threats and attacks external to the alliance states. 68 It thus formed the foundation for an understanding of peace and security as an indivisible common good.

The framers of the League of Nations intended this new collective security to supplant the power politics and the ad hoc alliances that led to World War I with predictability and a certain degree of transparency in the use of force. 69 They shared the radical hope that the League "would be a means of abolishing war from the earth and substituting the saner procedures of international conciliation." 70 Multilateral collective security through the League assumed rational action by state actors; the threat of collective action was to be viable and credible to such a degree that unilateral acts of aggression would be viewed as too costly. Article 11 of the League Covenant declared that "[a]ny war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League . . . ." 71 Article 10 provided that members would "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." 72 This multilateralism of collective security was manifested in the broad—but by no means universal—membership and the escalation of economic and political sanctions available to the member states prior to triggering the collective use of force. 73 By 1935, fifty-five nations, three-quarters of the nations in the world, were members of the League. 74 Notably absent, however, were Germany and Japan, both having withdrawn from the League in 1933, and the United States and Soviet Union, which had never joined.

68. See id. (contrasting collective security and alliance systems by noting that alliance systems directed efforts at states external to alliance).
69. See id. (explaining that League attempted to replace "European balances of power with the elements of a global collective security system"); see also JOYNER, supra note 66, at 163-64 (discussing uses of force permitted by Covenant).
70. EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (1982).
71. League of Nations Covenant art. 11.
72. Id. art. 10.
73. See Smith, supra note 67, at 82-83 (discussing Articles 12 through 15 of League Covenant, which permitted mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes, and Article 16, which permitted boycotts and embargo and recommendation of use of force "to protect the covenants of the League").
74. JOSEPH WHITAKER, AN ALMANAC FOR THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 175 (1935).
The League Covenant adopted the language of bilateral treaties requiring the exhaustion of non-military options such as arbitration to resolve disputes, which made war an option of last resort, but nonetheless an option. The Covenant also introduced the notion that parties should refrain from military action while the League was considering the dispute. It thus introduced the form of security multilateralism that we recognize today: one that contemplates an institutional role in the prevention of armed conflict in addition to codifying the presumption against the legality of war as the primary means of self-help, one characterized by procedural mechanisms (escalation of dispute resolution procedures) and by a set of norms (presumption against the use of force).

League multilateralism extended the basic principle of collective response within a security alliance to the entire world: external aggression against one state would trigger a response from the combined armed forces of the rest of the world. Why, then, despite some minor successes, did League multilateralism fail?

1. **League Failures**

The League’s failure to serve as an effective brake on military aggression has been attributed to textual flaws in the Covenant, lack of political will by its members and the notable absence of the Soviet Union and the United States in the organization. Members had no obligation to take military action in the event of triggering Article 10, although they were obligated to participate in the economic sanctions against violators of the

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75. See Smith, supra note 67, at 83; see also Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 58 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1963) (discussing sanctions under Article 16 if member went to war without authorization under Article 12, 13 or 15 of Covenant); Jonker, supra note 66, at 165 (articulating three clear goals of U.N. Charter: preservation of peace, protection of human rights and promotion of self-determination); Luard, supra note 70, at 13-14 (stating that under League’s Mandate System, former colonies and possessions of defeated powers were placed under general oversight of League, which set precedent for principle of accountability to international body). The formation and success of International Labour Organization had the effect of encouraging establishment of other specialized agencies.

76. See Brownlie, supra note 75, at 57 (discussing general purpose of Covenant).

77. See Luard, supra note 70, at 3-4 (describing League’s success in resolving frontier dispute between Sweden and Finland, defending sovereignty of Albania, securing withdrawal of Greek forces from Bulgaria in 1925 and resolving territorial dispute between Turkey and Iraq over Mosul).

78. For example, the requirement for unanimous adoption of sanctions and the failure to define precisely what kinds of force were prohibited as “resort to war.” See Fairness in International Law, supra note 36, at 257 (citing Brownlie, supra note 75, at 66).

79. See id. at 255 (discussing reasons for Covenant’s failure to prohibit war). Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 and the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939 signaled the collapse of the League and the interwar agreements. See Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 11 (providing reasons for failure of implementation of rules against participating in war).
Moreover, when those economic sanctions failed, the Council of the League was empowered merely to “recommend” military action. And despite the fact that such a recommendation carried no obligation to act, no military action was ever even recommended. Because members made decisions at the League on the basis of individual state interests and not violations of the norm of non-aggression, the period of the League saw more individual acts of aggression by one state against another than at any other time in the preceding century. The principle of multilateral collective security within an international institution broke down completely.

In contrast to the vision of its founders, the League turned out to be not a universalized version of a security alliance, but rather a non-universal organization lacking both the actual obligation of collective security and the means through which to enforce such an obligation. As a result, League members acted in their own individual interests rather than collectively on behalf of broader international security or in furtherance of international rules.

2. Interwar Arrangements

Nonetheless, a norm against aggressive war had taken root, strengthened by the conviction that the devastation of World War I could not be repeated. The small-group multilateral security treaties that were negotiated and signed during the interwar period reflected this normative dimension of the Covenant and, though limited in membership, set up procedures that reflected collective decision-making. The 1925 Locarno Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Britain and Italy, for example, included a provision under which the parties agreed not to attack or invade each other except where it was a collective action under the League Covenant or legitimate application of self-defense. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, which reached near-universal membership, established the pre-
sumption in international law against military action except in cases of self-defense. Together with the League Covenant, these treaties represented the ascendance of the norm prohibiting the use of force to promote international political aims. But, while the League and these treaties promoted the idea of non-violent dispute resolution, the failure of the League and these treaty systems to prevent World War II raised the question whether any international institution purporting to restrain state action according to law could ever succeed.

The failure of the League raised a core empirical question about multilateralism: Was World War II the result of the League’s failure to prevent it, or the result of the separate failures of the governments in the League to act to prevent war? This would prove to be a vexing question about the relevance of security multilateralism during the creation of the United Nations: Could any multilateral organization have prevented war? If the answer was no, why create one? The question has continuing salience today in examining the effectiveness of past security multilateralism in order to make recommendations for how security multilateralism should be applied in the future. The failure of the League to create an enforceable obligation of collective action in the face of aggression was specifically addressed in the text of the Charter.

D. Security Multilateralism Under the United Nations Charter

In drawing from the immediate lessons of the failures of the League period, the founders of the U.N. sought to meld two approaches to reducing the occurrence of war: (1) an international institution embodying the normative constraint against the use of force, coupled with an effective political mechanism for managing the escalation of disputes and the adoption of collective security measures; and (2) an internationalized version of the political and military alliance that defeated Germany and Japan.

four—Bolivia, El Salvador, Uruguay and Argentina—were parties to Kellogg-Briand Pact).

86. See LuARD, supra note 70, at 14.

87. The core of the empirical problem in security multilateralism is causation. Keohane has pointed this out in the contemporary context of international organizations, but the causation problem applies equally to historical examinations of the League’s role in World War II. See Keohane, supra note 45, at 731.

88. The problem of enforcement of the obligation to participate in collective security—putting teeth in the actual institution through the designation of armed forces to be at the disposal of the organization—was also addressed during the discussions at the San Francisco Conference. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36, at 258 (indicating “how and in what circumstances . . . Articles 42-47 [are] to be implemented”).

89. The original twenty-six states that met in January 1942 to declare themselves the United Nations were all allies against the Axis powers. See LuARD, supra note 70, at 17. The coordination of efforts among the Allies to create a United Nations continued up through the San Francisco Conference (including incorporating proposals at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta) with the aim of establishing the organization before the end of the war. Roosevelt told Congress, “[t]his time we
In essence, it was to be a “coalition of the willing” acting according to a set of rules.\(^9\) Article 2(4), which prohibits the unilateral, non-defensive use of force, has been described as the “legal cornerstone” to the rules governing the use of force under the Charter,\(^9\) and represents the central normative claim of the United Nations: Peace is preferable to war.\(^9\) But like the Covenant, the Charter codified important qualifications to that foundational prohibition. First, Article 51 permits states to employ force in self-defense, where that self-defense conforms to international law.\(^9\) Second,

shall not make the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to get the war over quickly, we work together to keep it from happening again.” \textsc{Luard, supra note 70, at 35-36.} Even among the former Allied Powers, however, the lessons learned from WWII were perceived differently. This may explain, in part, the deep divisions that would arise between Europe and the United States on the legality and legitimacy of the Iraq invasion of 2003. \textit{See, e.g.,} Jed Rubenfeld, \textit{Unilateralism and Constitutionalism,} 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971, 1984-92 (2004) (contrasting roots of American unilateralism with European multilateralism).

90. Thomas Franck notes that this modern term “coalition of the willing” has its root in the authorization of ad hoc participation in enforcement actions provided in Article 43 of the Charter. \textit{See Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 25.} For further discussion, see \textit{infra} notes 278, 290 and accompanying text.

91. \textit{See Joyner, supra note 66, at 165} (asserting fundamental intent of Article 2(4) is to prevent states from using force against “territorial integrity” or “political independence” of other states). Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.

92. Thomas Franck has called Article 2(4) the Lauterpachtian “ground norm,” that is, a reflection of Hersh Lauterpacht’s description of the “primordial duty of the law” that “there shall be no violence by states.” \textit{See Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 1, 20} (citing \textit{Hersh Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community} 64 (1933)).

The language of Article 2(4) has left room for interpreting what is meant by “force,” and whether it includes non-violent “force” such as extreme economic coercion. The majority view is that it refers only to armed force or military aggression. \textit{See Joyner, supra note 66, at 166} (noting that acts of economic aggression or cultural imperialism are not considered under rubric of “force”). This view was confirmed, for example, by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) defining “aggression” as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition.” \textit{Id.} (noting that threat to use force is not included in definition).

93. Article 51 states: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 51.
Article 42, permits the Security Council to authorize the use of force when it has determined that such force is necessary to restore peace and security. While the blanket prohibition and two qualifications outline the legal constraints on the use of armed force, the Charter also provides the legal basis for the coordination and cooperation of actions of member states necessary to manage broad security multilateralism.

1. **Coordination of Security Relations**

   a. Composition and Structure of the Council

   Because the U.N. was established to perfect the collective security mechanism that had failed in the League, the collective security provisions of the Charter took on a different shape from those of the Covenant. Chapter V provides that the U.N. Member States "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and agree that the Council "acts on their behalf." This explicitly informed the discussions at San Francisco. Thus, the collective security norm adopted in the Charter reflects the language of regional defense alliances. The challenge would be applying the norm in an institution with universal membership.

   94. Article 42 states:
   Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

   U.N. Charter art. 42.

   95. Franck refers to the difference between the League approach and the U.N. approach as a shift from collective self-defense to one of collective security. *See* Fairness in International Law, *supra* note 36, at 257, 259 (reciting transitional steps from League approach to sources of law providing foundation for Charter); *see also* Recourse to Force, *supra* note 29, at 2 (describing intent of Charter as initiating era in which war is prohibited as means of state policy but collective security is norm).

   96. The authority to maintain international peace and security and take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, rests with the Security Council under Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. *See* Nation Against Nation, *supra* note 29, at 161 ("The drafters of the UN Charter intended the Security Council to be the pivotal organ of the new international system they were devising."). U.N. Charter art. 24 (noting that Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" in accordance with provisions of Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII). Chapter XII, which addresses U.N. authority under the Trusteeship System created to govern former colonial possessions of the axis powers, is beyond the scope of this Article. This list of enumerated powers of the Council is not meant to be exclusive. *See* The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 448 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed.)
conferral of binding power on the Council to act on behalf of the entire membership is the keystone of all other multilateral security functions carried out by the Council and by other organs of the U.N. acting in support of those security functions. The membership, voting and decision-making structure reflect the historical compromise between the allied powers who wanted to concentrate all the executive powers of the U.N. in themselves, and the smaller states who wanted a broader base of participation in Council measures. The structure and power of the Council resulting from this compromise created a body that serves executive and quasi-legislative functions in international security. By demarcating the executive powers of the Council and the limited plenary powers of the General Assembly, and including specific provisions formalizing methods of communication between the two bodies, the founders corrected the earlier failure of the League Covenant to delineate political powers clearly.

b. Investigation and Dispute Resolution Powers

Unlike the League Covenant, the Charter places the dispute resolution procedures under the competence of the Security Council. Under

97. See U.N. Charter Commentary, supra note 96, at 450-52 (discussing history and practice of Council actions taken under Article 24). There is some dispute over the question whether, as a matter of international law, the Security Council acts on behalf of the Member States or on behalf of the United Nations. See id. at 448-49 (citing Degni-Segui, Article 24, in J.P. Cot & A. Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies 450 (2d. ed. 1991); D. Dicke & H.W. Rengeling, Die Sicherung des Weltfriedens durch die Vereinten Nationen—Ein Überblick über die Befugnisse der Wichtigsten Organe (1975); Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 280-84 (1964); 2 G. Dahm et al., Völkerrecht (1961)). This debate does not bear on how the Council carries out its powers.

98. U.N. Charter Commentary, supra note 96, at 443-44 (discussing compromise reached at San Francisco Conference).

99. Id. at 445; see also Alvarez, supra note 27, at 874 (describing counter-terrorism efforts at U.N. Security Council as examples of its “legislative” phase). The danger of too much legislative power is that the Council becomes vulnerable to “capture” by the hegemonic power. Id. at 883 (finding Council’s “legislative prowess” may render it vulnerable to “global hegemonic international law”).

100. See U.N. Charter Commentary, supra note 96, at 445 (asserting that primary responsibility for maintaining peace remains with Security Council, with secondary, co-responsibility placed with General Assembly).

101. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 2, arts. 34, 35.
Chapter VI, the Council is empowered to “investigate any dispute” which might “lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute” as part of its mandate to maintain international peace and security. 102 While the General Assembly has general plenary authority to discuss and pass resolutions relating to disputes, the Security Council effectively has the ability to preempt the Assembly by taking action on any matter. 103 This has practical significance in that the Council, as the U.N. organ empowered with the balance of political and enforcement power for the maintenance of peace and security, may take the lead in preventing and settling a dispute before it escalates to violent conflict. 104 The powers of the Council under this chapter are generally understood to include any measures up to, but not including, coercive action. 105

Another significant feature of the Council’s dispute resolution authority is its connection to Article 2(3), which provides that “[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endan-

102. Id. art. 34.

103. See id. art. 35 (limiting proceedings of General Assembly on any disputes to be subject to provisions of Articles 11 and 12 of Charter, requiring that Assembly refer threats to international peace and security to Council and prohibiting Assembly from making recommendations where Security Council has already taken action). But see U.N. Charter Commentary, supra note 96, at 445-46 (noting that one possible interpretation of Art. 24—as corroborated by Art. 11(2)—is that Assembly has no power in area of international security) (emphasis added).

104. See U.N. Charter Commentary, supra note 96, at 447. The U.N. Charter Commentary states that:

[P]lacing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on the Security Council means that the Security Council and the General Assembly have a parallel or concurrent competence with regard to dealing with questions of maintenance of peace, but that the Security Council possesses exclusive competence with regard to taking effective and binding action, especially enforcement measures.


105. See U.N. Charter Commentary, supra note 96, at 584 (recognizing that earlier practice of Council in area of dispute resolution left some doubt as to whether it was acting under its enforcement powers in way that could bind parties).
Like Article 2(4), Article 2(3) reflects the norm of non-violent dispute settlement established by the League. Its “detailed elaboration,” however, through Article 33, which empowers the Council to call upon the parties to settle their dispute by “peaceful means,” places dispute resolution at the heart of the Council’s functions. The “peaceful means” enumerated in Article 33 contemplate a range of dispute resolution activity: fact-finding, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration and the use of international tribunals.

c. Economic and Military Sanctions

Chapter VII, the most significant departure from the League Covenant, confers on the Council coercive enforcement power through the use of economic and military sanctions and, ultimately, the application of

106. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.

107. Id.

108. See id. art. 33; see also U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 583-85 (discussing relationship between two Articles).

109. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 588-91 (discussing procedures that constitute “peaceful means”). This list is illustrative, not exclusive, as Article 33 leaves open the option to pursue “other peaceful means.” Id. In practice, the Council has carried out these functions through both oversight and active participation in the dispute resolution procedures alongside the parties to the dispute. Articles 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 confer authority in the Council, in effect, to supervise dispute settlement of the parties. U.N. Charter arts. 36-38; see also U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 588-601 (discussing Article 34); id. at 598-601 (discussing Article 34); id. at 609-14 (discussing Article 35); id. at 616-27 (discussing Article 36); id. at 630-38 (discussing Article 37); id. at 644-48 (discussing Article 38).

110. Article 41 authorizes the Council to “decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions” and to “call upon [Member States] to apply such measures.” U.N. Charter art. 41; see also U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 736-37 (noting that Article 16 of League Covenant was precursor and partial model for Article 41). It thereby permits sanctions to be imposed and, in another departure from the League Covenant, enforced against all Member States. Among the illustrative list of measures capable of being taken under Article 41 are “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” U.N. Charter art. 41; see U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 740-45 (discussing other potential measures, including creation of international criminal tribunals and establishment of post-conflict administrative entities). Like all enumerated Chapter VII powers, the sanctions can be applied by the Council regardless of whether international law has been breached by the State against whom the measures are taken. See id. at 739 (“[Measures under Article 41] can be employed whenever this appears conducive to maintenance of international peace and security.”). Because they are not sanctions per se, the precise legal term is “enforcement measures,” which has been used by the U.N. and by international tribunals. Id. (citing sources). But because “sanctions” is the commonly applied term, it is useful in framing these measures as stopping short of actual use of force. See Christopher C. Joyner, United Nations Sanctions After Iraq: Looking Back to See Ahead, 4 CIV. J. INT’L L. 329, 330-33 (2003) (noting “sanctions” in context of U.N. action entails internationally legitimized forceful measures). For a further discussion of sanctions in the taxonomy, see infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
armed force, wherever the Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression . . .” 111 In practice, the requirement of determining a threat to international peace and security has led the Council to employ formal investigations—on its own or as supervisor of other U.N. bodies, including subsidiary organs of the General Assembly—in the service of its enforcement function. 112 In effect, all powers of the Security Council under Chapters V and VI serve Chapter VII enforcement powers whenever there is a threat to the peace. Additionally, unlike the League Covenant, an actual breach of law by a Member State is not a prerequisite to those enforcement powers. 113

d. Enforcement Through Military Means

Article 42 authorizes the Council to take military measures to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” 114 This decision to employ force under United Nations command, or authorize force by a Member State, group of Member States or a regional organization, may be taken whenever measures under Article 41 “would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate.” 115 The authorization of the use of armed force under Article 42 was adopted unanimously at the San Francisco Conference and is broadly considered one of the central improvements over the failed League system for enforcement of collective security. 116 Article 42 has also been invoked frequently and significantly in the post Cold-War period. 117

111. U.N. Charter art. 39. Chapter VII further permits that the Council “shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Id.

112. Further, this power has been understood to extend to internal conflicts, effectively extending the power of the Council to all armed conflict in whatever context it arises. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 723 (“While the concept of threat to the peace in Art. 39 may have originally referred mainly to threats of inter-state conflicts; the Security Council soon abandoned such a strict reading.”) (citation omitted).

113. See id. at 705 (distinguishing Chapter VII powers of Charter from collective action measures available under League Covenant, which were characterized as sanctions in response to breach of law).

114. U.N. Charter art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”).

115. Id.

116. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 751 (“While the League Council could merely recommend that States apply armed force against an aggressor, the newly created Security Council should, pursuant to Art. 42, be able to place troops at the disposal of the Security Council.”).

117. See, e.g., DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 168 (1999) (discussing Security Council’s delegation of its Chapter VII powers to Member States to use force in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia); Helmut Freudenschuss, Between Unilateralism and Collective Security: Authorizations of
Chapter VII provides for the creation of the Military Staff Committee, which, like much of the rest of the enforcement mechanisms of the Charter, immediately fell victim to the Cold War. The authors of the Charter did not contemplate that the Council would lapse into disuse almost from its inception. At the time of the drafting, creation of a formal, secondary role for the General Assembly in peace and security was considered and rejected, opposed forcefully by powerful states. 

Chapter VIII recognizes the legal personality of regional organizations that might also have the maintenance of peace and security as their mandate.

e. Uniting for Peace and Chapter 6 1/2

The drafters of the Charter did not contemplate that the Council would lapse into disuse almost from its inception. At the time of the drafting, creation of a formal, secondary role for the General Assembly in peace and security was considered and rejected, opposed forcefully by powerful states.

118. See U.N. Charter art. 45 (requiring that Member States make their air armed forces available for combined international enforcement actions); id. art. 46 (explaining that Military Staff Committee shall assist Security Council with plans for application of armed force); id. art. 47 (establishing Military Staff Committee to report to and be at disposal of Security Council); see also U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 768 ("Article 46 might well be the most obsolete of those provisions of Chapter VII which have been overtaken by historical events"); id. at 770 (noting that "Military Staff Committee has had no meaningful role to play in history of U.N. to date").

119. These provisions were originally intended to be effective only in the short or medium-term, as a bridge between the creation of the United Nations and the ultimate staffing of a permanent Military Committee that would carry out the Security Council enforcement measures under unitary United Nations command. Accordingly, Article 52 recognizes the authority of regional organizations and their role in pacific dispute settlement, and Article 53 empowers the Council to use "regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under [Security Council] authority." U.N. Charter arts. 52, 53. Thus regional organizations—generally collective security cooperatives with actual capacity to act—can lawfully employ force when either the Security Council has identified a threat to peace and security and uses the regional group to carry out the enforcement, or the regional organization has made a determination of a threat to peace and security and has requested permission from the Security Council to act. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 859-60 (articulating how Article 53 governs and limits "permissibility of enforcement measures by regional arrangements"). In the absence of a standing Military Committee, Article 53 has been invoked by regional organizations to justify their multilateral military interventions in disputes—even absent explicit Security Council authorization. Two prominent examples during the Cold War are the Organization of American States (OAS) intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1960 and the OAS naval blockade of Cuba in 1962. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 860-61 (noting this was first instance of extensive debate as to regional organizations' rights to enforcement).

120. See RECURS TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 31, 34-39 (stating that Big Powers agreed any member state could call General Assembly’s attention to conditions impairing its security or general welfare); see also NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 63-64 (noting General Assembly may make recommendations related to maintenance of collective security).
the United States. Article 11(2) of the Charter grants the General Assembly the power to make recommendations—not binding decisions—on "questions relating to the maintenance of . . . peace and security" except in instances where the "Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the . . . Charter." As the Council enforcement mechanisms fell into desuetude, however, the role of the Assembly was expanded through the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the creation of so-called "Chapter 6 1/2" peacekeeping operations.

Passed by the Assembly during the Korea crisis in 1950, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, established that, where the Council fails to exercise its authority (i.e., where it has been deadlocked by veto or threat of a veto) and where there is a vote of at least seven members of the Council, the Assembly may act to address threats to peace and security. The Assembly in fact did so—relying on the Uniting for Peace Resolution—in 1956 (the Suez crisis) and in 1960 (Congo). U.N. peacekeeping missions, the so-called "blue helmet" operations, developed alongside the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a way to deploy troops under U.N. auspices, but for limited, non-enforcement purposes. Despite being authorized in most cases by the Council, these operations stop short of deploying troops with authority to use force. They have also been established through resolutions that do not invoke Chapter VII. Thus the moniker Chapter 6 1/2 represents the legal authority for these missions—halfway between pacific dispute resolution and enforcement actions.

121. The United States viewed the Council's role in peace and security as political in function, with the General Assembly "concerned with the promotion of constructive solutions of international problems in the widest range of human relationships, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian." Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 32 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull).

122. U.N. Charter art. 11, para. 2, art. 12, para. 1.

123. See Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 32 (arguing General Assembly's ability to make recommendations allows it broader powers); U.N. Charter Commentary, supra note 96, at 262 (discussing lack of restrictions on General Assembly's recommendation power).


125. There is some controversy over whether the recommendations made by the Assembly can include enforcement actions of a Chapter VII type. See Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 37-38 (describing General Assembly actions in light of Security Council deadlocks). The question was largely mooted by the commencement of the practice of creating blue helmet operations, as in Suez and Congo.

126. See id. at 36 (discussing use of "Uniting for Peace" resolution to create international emergency force in Suez); id. at 37 (citing creation of the Congo force (ONUC)).

127. Blue helmets generally were lightly armed and operated under orders to use force only in self-defense. See Recourse to Force, supra note 29, at 39 (recognizing thirty-nine such operations in U.N.'s first fifty years).
The definition of peacekeeping that prevailed following the Suez crisis was "the stationing of U.N. military personnel, with the consent of warring states, to monitor cease-fires and dissuade violations through interposition between competing armies." Since that time, the term peacekeeping has come to encompass all consensual deployment of troops in conflict zones, or former conflict zones, under U.N. command, for the purpose of maintaining peace. A central tool for addressing peace and security therefore emerged as a hybrid practice—bridging Council authority in principle and Assembly authority in fact.

2. According to a Set of Principles

The Security Council is required to carry out its duties and exercise its authority "in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations," including the requirement that peace be reached "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law." Like the League Covenant, the U.N. Charter implicitly recognizes that the problem of peace and security has many causes and articulates the shared aspiration that peace and justice co-exist. The founding members laid out this duality of mission in the preamble: to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained." The Council's collective security
functions incorporate the economic and social norms enumerated in other parts of the Charter—from the aspirational norms set forth in the preamble to the centrality of human dignity in the provisions relating to upholding human rights and eliminating discrimination. Even where specific enumerated powers are conferred to the General Assembly, the incorporation of these normative requirements into the “peace and security” functions creates a symbiotic relationship between the Council and the other bodies and mechanisms of the U.N. organization. That relationship has been bolstered through U.N. practice. For example, the U.N. Human Rights Commission—founded in large part to support the Charter’s aspiration of placing respect for human dignity and rights at the center of international order—is both a producer of information that can be used by the Council (and by the General Assembly when acting in its peace and security role) and a means through which the Council monitors compliance with its binding obligations.

Enforcement decisions of the Council are the only decisions made by the U.N. that are binding on Member States. Thus, the Security Council is empowered to maintain international peace and security in a manner consistent with broad principles of international law and justice; all the other functions of the U.N. are legally subordinate to that purpose. By subor-
Multilateralism and War

The power of the United Nations to address armed conflict and maintain just peace can therefore be understood, as a matter of Charter law, to be aggregated at the Security Council. At the same time, the functions through which the U.N. organization works in support of that aggregated legal mandate are dispersed throughout the organization and are carried out by many bodies and affiliated organizations. These separate functions form a taxonomy of security multilateralism.

II. A TAXONOMY OF U.N. SECURITY MULTILATERALISM

Part I of this Article established that U.N. security multilateralism encompasses much more than the Article 42 decision to authorize the use of force to counter threats to international security. At the same time, those additional functions of security multilateralism derive their legal authority from, and exist at the service of, the enforcement and collective security mechanisms. The aggregate of these functions forms U.N. security multilateralism. In order to examine the empirical differences between outside actions taken under the U.N. enforcement mechanism and those in which the U.N. was not used, these broad functions need to be unbundled, or disaggregated, into functions that are susceptible to effective comparative case study.

Six distinct functions of security multilateralism find basis in both the Charter and in the practice of the U.N.: (1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention and (6) post-conflict administration. These functions derive directly powers of the Council. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 16, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (deferring power of International Criminal Court to commence or proceed with prosecution when Security Council has so requested under its Chapter VII authority).

136. Because even uses of force by regional organizations require Security Council authorization, it is fair to characterize all security multilateralism as encompassing these two normative dimensions. There is, however, general acknowledgment that consensual uses of force are permitted outside the Security Council context. For example, if a state invites another state to deploy peacekeepers to put down an internal uprising, it would be considered lawful. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 684 (detailing legal basis of such consensual peacekeeping in United Nations Charter).

137. Steven Ratner ascribes to his broader definition of peacekeeping ("second generation peacekeeping"), several of the functions that I include here as part of security multilateralism. The actual functions (administrative, mediation, political governance) have considerable overlap with the taxonomy here, and Ratner's own typology is extremely useful in understanding the ways in which past U.N. interventions have operated. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 41 tbl. 2.1 (describing functions performed by second generation peacekeeping mis-
from the legal authority of the Council to address threats to international peace and security, but are often carried out by non-Council bodies.\textsuperscript{138} Indeed, each of the discrete functions can be performed by non-U.N. organizations or by States operating entirely outside the formal security multilateral system.\textsuperscript{139} Because they can be performed—and historically have been performed—by actors and sub-groups separate from the U.N., this taxonomy offers a framework for measuring U.N. performance against non-U.N. performance. Disaggregating also permits closer examination of the extent to which the U.N. plays more (or less) of a role in those disputes that have been characterized as “unlawful” or contrary to the norms of the Charter.

Table 1.0 illustrates the taxonomy of security multilateralism along with the basis for categorizing actions taken in a particular conflict, the specific legal authority under the Charter or related legal instruments and the potential rationales of the functions emanating from theoretical accounts of multilateral behavior.\textsuperscript{140}

At the enforcement stage, the coordination/cooperation element of the U.N. and the application of the substantive norms are generally characterized as an “on-off switch”: the U.N. is involved in the conflict or it is not.\textsuperscript{141} The taxonomy illustrates that actual U.N. practice is more complex. The functions of the U.N. can more easily be understood as a continuum or series of functions, that, when disaggregated, present a clearer picture of what U.N. multilateralism is and how to evaluate its effectiveness. This disaggregation highlights the fact that arguments that characterize outside involvement in conflict as “unilateral” or “multilateral” frequently focus narrowly on the military intervention function—ignoring the extent to which other functions that are significant to addressing the threat are carried out multilaterally or unilaterally.

\textsuperscript{138} See, e.g., id. at 82, 86 tbl. 3.1 (describing peacekeeping roles played by Council, Assembly, Secretariat, other U.N. organs, regional organs, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media).

\textsuperscript{139} Functions can, of course, be contracted out to NGOs and other private entities. \textit{id.}

\textsuperscript{140} Legitimacy and fairness-based analysis can be expanded beyond the questions raised by the legal prohibition against non-defensive use of force to look, for example, at whether the U.N. assessment function in a particular case has promoted legitimacy and fairness. Institutionalist rationales based on overcoming collective action problems can be similarly measured. For a further discussion of these rationales, see infra note 152 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{141} See generally Higgins, \textit{supra} note 104 (discussing how Security Council applies principles of international law when settling disputes).
### Table 1.0: Taxonomy of Functions U.N. Security Multilateralism

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<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment</strong></td>
<td>Intelligence Cooperation Fact-finding bodies Inspection regimes Special rapporteurs</td>
<td>General Assembly Security Council HR committees UNHRC</td>
<td>Ch. IV. Arts. 10,11,13 Ch. VI. Art. 34 Ch. VII Art. 39 HR treaties Constituting treaties</td>
<td>Address collective action problem Deter and monitor rule violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Assistance</strong></td>
<td>Provision of food, shelter Refugee protection, relocation</td>
<td>General Assembly agencies (e.g., UNDP, UNHCR, WFP)</td>
<td>General Assembly Constituting treaties Ch. VI and Ch. VII</td>
<td>Foundational norm of human dignity Prevent, limit resource-based conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediation</strong></td>
<td>Traditional diplomacy Facilitation of negotiation Active mediation Adjudication Arbitration</td>
<td>Security Council &amp; Sec’y Gen. Special Representatives Ad hoc arrangements</td>
<td>Ch. VI. Arts. 33-38</td>
<td>Prevent conflict Promote pacific and welfare-enhancing solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions</strong></td>
<td>Provisional measures Economic and military sanctions Regional sanctions and boycotts</td>
<td>Security Council Special Sanctions committees</td>
<td>Ch. VII. Arts. 39-41</td>
<td>Address collective action problem Coercive measures to prevent war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Intervention</strong></td>
<td>Advisors Protective forces (maintain status quo during humanitarian operation) War fighting Peace-keeping</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
<td>Ch. VII. Arts. 42-43, 48 Ch. VIII Arts. 52-54</td>
<td>Prevent or end violation of other norms (humanitarian intervention) Enforce rules Restore peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Conflict Administration</strong></td>
<td>Policing Civil administration Judicial functions</td>
<td>Security Council General Assembly organs Ad hoc tribunals, ICC</td>
<td>Ch. VII Peace agreements ICC statute</td>
<td>Maintenance of peace and security Create pre-conditions for other norm</td>
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An additional advantage of the taxonomy is to inform normative discussions with broader facts about the cases. For example, these “disaggregated” functions can appear less threatening to the unilateralists or “sovereignists”\(^\text{142}\) who are focused solely on the decision to authorize force in response to a threat. Similarly, to strict multilateralists, it can shed


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light on those functions outside the Article 42 powers that are most susceptible to reform, i.e., those functions that temporally precede military intervention, but that are nonetheless essential to conflict resolution. More broadly, the taxonomy demonstrates the role of incremental steps; decisions and actions taken within each of the functions of the taxonomy can have significant impact on the degree to which threats to international security are adequately addressed.

Some initial caveats about the taxonomy are in order. The taxonomy classifications are not static events. Each function more or less reflects a phase in the escalation and de-escalation of armed conflict and the role of outside parties in the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. Several of the functions may substantially overlap with one another in any given case. Assessment, for example, generally occurs on an ongoing basis, initially providing information necessary to engage subsequent functions such as humanitarian assistance or economic sanctions and later providing rationales for the continuation or cessation of those functions. The taxonomy does not account for exogenous variables that might affect the performance of each function, such as budgets. The taxonomy may therefore be less suited to quantitative analyses of the functions and more suited to qualitative and descriptive case studies.

A significant danger in attempting to measure the success of outside interventions in conflict case studies lies in time measurement of the study. In the long run, what matters is sustainable peace. Here, the intent is to create a mechanism through which both short and medium-term effects of security multilateralism can be observed and evaluated—perhaps even in the context of ongoing cases (e.g., each of the cases examined here) and in the process add value to the project of institutional assessment.

The taxonomy helps address, but does not eliminate, the central challenge to empirical examination of multilateral institutions and war: causation. Quantitative work on the causes of war and the methods for limiting war has been taking place in the political science literature for some time. Much of that work comes out of important and useful systematic efforts to compile datasets amenable to quantitative analysis. Fewer international law studies have been done on the incidence of war as it relates

143. This is certainly the case in Kosovo, where the U.N. assessment continued throughout the pre- and post-intervention phases, even though the intervention itself was not carried out by the U.N. For a further discussion of Kosovo, see infra notes 233-55 and accompanying text.


145. The Correlates of War Project (and Correlates of War 2), The Conflict Data Project and Major Episodes of Political Violence Project, are the datasets on war that are most widely used, and contain variables to measure frequency, location and severity of conflicts. See Seybolt, supra note 144, at 82 n.9. They are set up to test hypotheses of war causation.
to international legal regimes and/or international institutions. As Robert Keohane has explained, the central problem of testing the hypothesis that the existence of international institutions causes more war is the problem of the null-set hypothesis. There is no alternative set of nation states interacting without the framework of U.N. multilateralism against which to test the current system. At best, therefore, quantitative studies reveal associative relationships, i.e., observations that conflict are more or less associated with the existence of certain institutions. These associative studies themselves can result in misleading conclusions.

In introducing the taxonomy I do not purport to overcome the problem of proving causation (nor do I intend to address causalities, beyond merely making preliminary observations from a limited set of data) or to avoid entirely the danger of over-ascribing the effects of institutions. Because the taxonomy categorizes the cases according to the functions that U.N. security multilateralism—under the law that created it—is intended to accomplish, it can be used to compare performance under discrete functions across the range of U.N., non-U.N. and unilateral cases. One way to begin that comparative analysis is to question whether the performance of that function was or was not successful in eliminating or reducing the threat to international security it was intended to address. The danger of using this as the measure of effectiveness is that it may become too reductivist, i.e., threats would be traced back to their root causes, and in each of the cases where violent force is ultimately used, the institutional function could be deemed ineffective. Nonetheless, it may be a useful starting point for testing the rationales of security multilateralism. When evaluating the intermediation function, for example, one clear measure of effectiveness is the success of the function at achieving pacific settlement.

146. For examples of recent efforts in legal literature, see William C. Bradford, *International Legal Regimes and the Incidence of Interstate War in the Twentieth Century: A Cursory Quantitative Assessment of the Associative Relationship*, 16 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 647, 723 (2001); Cuellar, *supra* note 29, at 220. Both of these studies acknowledge the limitations of being able to draw conclusive causal relationships between the incident of war and the existence of a legal regime or institution with authority to regulate that war.

147. See Keohane, *supra* note 45, at 738 (explaining that there is no institution-free baseline from which to measure impact of institutions on state capabilities).


149. But many of the functions within the taxonomy—for example, assessment and intermediation—are suitable for qualitative empirical examination based on the data available from case studies and from the United Nations itself.

150. Further, there is some literature demonstrating that resolution of interstate and intrastate conflict comes most appropriately at a time of ripeness, which often requires violence to erupt before the parties are amendable to solution. See generally I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (1989).
Thus, across cases, we should be able to make limited observations about whether intermediations emanating from core U.N. functions (e.g., U.N.-sponsored dispute resolution processes) are better than non-U.N. or unilateral efforts. The goal here is not quantitative analysis, but rather to raise questions that can be subject to further empirical testing in future case studies.

A. Assessment

Assessment describes the function of information gathering necessary to the process of determining threats to international peace and security. Threats have been understood broadly to include any aggressive use of force, resource and territorial conflicts, human rights problems that may rise to the level of conflict, ethnic tensions, weapons development, weapons deployment and terrorism.151 Subsidiary organs and committees of the General Assembly, including the U.N. Human Rights Commission and various committees set up under several of the international human rights treaties (e.g., the Human Rights Committee, the Torture Committee), are empowered to request direct reporting from states, appoint special rapporteurs to perform investigations and, in some instances, take testimony of states and individuals on issues relating to human rights and human security.152

Although not generally viewed as being in direct support of functions of the Security Council, these investigatory and reporting functions find their legal basis in Chapters V, VI and VII.153 These functions are important to furthering the general aims of the U.N. to prevent war and eliminate threats to international peace and security. In direct support of its powers, the Council also empowers the Secretary General to appoint special representatives who can engage in direct fact-finding missions.154 The


153. For a full discussion of these functions, see supra notes 18-137 and accompanying text.

Council can act on its own to establish specific fact-finding mechanisms, e.g., weapons inspections regimes. The Council is also the locus of direct state-to-state cooperation and, at times, the direct sharing of intelligence. While the Council is often put down as a "gab shop," the function of receiving and analyzing data on which it acts is among its most important roles.

All of these aspects of the assessment function in principle are designed to overcome—though clearly do not always solve—collective action problems by promoting cooperation and correcting asymmetries in information. By including representatives on the universal membership, e.g., through the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) organs, the assessment function may help promote legitimacy and fairness. Perceptions of fairness may in turn affect whether and what action the Council decides to take on an issue.

B. Intermediation

Intermediation describes any process of pacific (non-violent) intervention or intercession between parties aimed at resolving ongoing armed conflict or addressing the threat of conflict. In the context of international armed conflict (both inter-state and intra-state), intermediation has been used almost synonymously with mediation to describe, third-party efforts in dispute resolution. Here, the term is not used as a complete


156. For a discussion of the U.N.'s assessment of Iraq's weapons program, see infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.

157. See supra note 25 (discussing cooperation/coordination function of multilateral institutions).


159. Mediation and intermediation have been defined broadly as the action: "the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when . . . the former, the latter or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution"; the object: "any intermediary activity . . . undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior"; and/or the process: mediation is "the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs." Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation 13 (Jacob
synonym of mediation, but rather is intentionally more expansive. In armed conflict, both people and processes can act as intermediaries that resolve the dispute or affect positions of the parties. Neutrality and impartiality are sometimes, but not always, attributes of these efforts.

One type of intermediation process is traditional diplomacy, including the kind of multilateral diplomacy common to the U.N. system, and other multilateral security organizations such as Organization of American States (OAS) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as state-to-state or party-to-party bilateral diplomacy and negotiation.


One explanation of the interchangeability of terms mediation and intermediation is linguistic; the term “mediator” to refer to the person emerged later in domestic scholarship, whereas the notion of intermediaries, i.e. “go betweens” in the diplomatic and international context has been around for centuries and has existed in many cultures. See id. at 12 (discussing P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (1979)); see also Barbara Messing, El Salvador, in WORDS OVER WAR 167 (Melanie C. Greenberg et al. eds., 2000) (referring to U.N.-sponsored peace process in El Salvador as “intermediation”).

I also want to avoid confusion with the domestic literature on mediation, which defines mediation more narrowly. See, e.g., JAMES ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 196 (1987) (explaining mediation occurs when outside neutral third party helps others resolve dispute or plan transaction). See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Who Decides What? Rethinking the Grid of Mediator Orientations, Disp. Res. Mac., Winter 2003, at 22 (distinguishing domestic and international forms of mediation). In the international setting, mediation is distinguished from binding forms of third-party intervention such as arbitration and adjudication in that it is initiated upon the request of the disputants and leaves the ultimate decision-making power with them. See RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 159, at 12. Because state actors are subject to international adjudication and arbitration only where they consent, the rationale for considering mediation apart from arbitration and adjudication is weaker in the armed conflict context.


See William J. Bien, The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator, in WORDS OVER WAR, supra note 159, at 109, 129 (discussing Norwegian mediation of Oslo accords, which was viewed as effective because Norway was credible “neutral” in Israeli-Palestinian dispute). Non-neutrals also work, as the case of Richard Holdbrooke acting as forceful “peacemaker” at Dayton. See Melanie C. Greenberg & Margaret E. McGuinness, From Lisbon to Dayton: International Mediation and the Bosnia Crisis, in WORDS OVER WAR, supra note 159, at 35, 65 [herinafter From Lisbon to Dayton].

The Charter promotes traditional multilateral diplomacy in the General Assembly structure—sovereign equality measured by one state one vote—and the rotating membership among the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council. See U.N. Charter art. 18, para. 1 (providing each member of General Assembly is entitled to one vote); id. art. 23, para. 2 (describing system of non-permanent member election to Security Council). Regional organizations are similarly constituted to promote discussion and debate. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty art. 9, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (mandating parties are represented to implement treaty); OAS Charter art. 56,
Here again, the U.N.'s role as a venue and institutional focal point of diplomacy is of central importance. But in addition to traditional diplomacy, the Charter empowers the Council and Secretary General to appoint special representatives, and convene other ad hoc pacific dispute resolution efforts. The problem of the permanent veto during the Cold War contributed to the expansion of such ad hoc efforts at mediation and diplomatic resolution.

Intermediation may also occur when the parties themselves agree, either ex ante or in the course of a dispute, to submit the dispute to a neutral third party to adjudicate the dispute. While binding forms of third-party adjudication are understood in the domestic context to be distinct from mediation, I include them as part of the process and actors that make up pacific intermediation in the international context. The parties themselves may agree, for example, to binding arbitration or to seek an advisory court opinion, or they may be subject to a pre-commitment to binding adjudication by the International Court of Justice. The important distinction for the purposes of understanding security multilateralism is not

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164. See generally John H. Barton & Melanie C. Greenberg, Lessons of the Case Studies, in WORDS OVER WAR, supra note 159, at 343.
165. See, e.g., NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 68-69 (discussing Secretary General's role as mediator and guarantor); Kjell Skelsbaek & Gunnar Fermann, The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 159, at 75-101 (delineating Secretary-General's role in mediation).
166. See JOHN H. BARTON & JEAN KRASNO, INFORMAL AD HOC GROUPINGS OF STATES AND THE WORKINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 15-16 (2002), http://www.reformwatch.net/fitxers/61.pdf (discussing U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) Advisory Committee in context of Suez Crisis in 1956); id. at 22 (discussing Congo Advisory Committee in wake of serious tensions at Security Council over what should be done about crisis in Congo in August 1960); id. at 35 (explaining that Groups of Friends of Secretary-General formed around specific issue, keep close contact with Secretary-General, and support his efforts).
167. For a discussion of this distinction, see supra note 165.
168. See U.N. Charter art. 92 (establishing ICJ as principal judiciary of U.N.); id. art. 95 (allowing member of U.N. to seek justice elsewhere); id. art. 96 (authorizing ICJ to give advisory opinions); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59 (mandating that decisions of ICJ only has binding force between parties of particular case). To the extent the ICJ can provide definitive rulings on rights and obligations of parties to a dispute, and also say what international law requires in a certain context, it serves a useful function in promoting peaceful settlements of disputes.

between binding and non-binding means, but between pacific, consensual means of reaching peace and coercive and military means of addressing threats to the peace.

C. Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance refers to the range of activities by outside parties to a dispute to alleviate human suffering through direct aid and/or protective services. This is placed in the taxonomy because war always results in some element of human suffering for which mechanisms of multilateral humanitarian assistance will be triggered. Although it is not always the case that all human suffering is the result of war—see, for example, the tsunami disaster of 2004—humanitarian disasters have at times contributed to or exacerbated war. Thus, while there are many U.N. institutions that have evolved to address humanitarian needs generally, almost all of these institutions have been at one time or another placed into service in conflict situations. Because humanitarian assistance can take place before, during or after armed conflict, its position in the taxonomy does not reflect a rigid temporal classification. Indeed, it is the function that is most likely to overlap with each one of the other functions.

The functions of humanitarian assistance address all forms of human suffering around armed conflict, food, shelter, medical assistance, refugee protection and relocation, and in some instances, human rights protection. Almost all of these humanitarian functions are carried out under the authority of the General Assembly and its constituent organs. Non-governmental organizations can also be deployed under contract to Member States who commit relief money or under contract directly to General Assembly organizations. Humanitarian assistance has also been carried

169. See United Nations Foundation, http://www.unfoundation.org/donate/undp.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (providing information about U.N. Development Programme Tsunami Relief Fund). Additionally, providing relief to victims of the Asian tsunami was a priority at all levels of the U.N. family, including UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNDP and UNICEF.


172. See Larry Minear et al., Humanitarianism and War: Learning the Lessons from Recent Armed Conflicts (Occasional Paper Number 8) (1991), avail-
out under Chapter VII powers, particularly Article 39, although the Security Council has not always been explicit when referring to the authority under which it is acting. One prominent example is the creation of UNPROFOR to deliver aid to Bosnia in 1992. There, the determination of a threat to international peace and security led not to a military intervention to alter the balance of force on the battlefield, but rather to secure delivery of humanitarian assistance in the midst of the war. That humanitarian assistance mission, in turn, required member states to contribute troops dedicated to protect the delivery of assistance. The first U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is another example of the Council using Chapter VII powers in support of a humanitarian mission after determining that a threat to international peace or security existed.

D. Sanctions

Sanctions are non-violent, coercive, collective economic and political measures taken by the international community to affect the behavior of states or non-state parties that are threatening international peace and security. Sanctions are the first step in the escalating coercive measures

able at http://hwproject.tufts.edu/publications/electronic/e_op8.pdf (discussing challenges of humanitarian assistance in war zones). It is common, for example, for UNHCR to contract with NGOs such as International Rescue Committee to assist with its protection functions.

173. See Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson, Toward a Mixed System of Democratic Accountability, in ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 29, at 349, 354 (discussing Council’s failure to be explicit about when it is acting under Chapter VII and/or Article 39 powers).


176. See S.C. Res. 751, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992) (establishing U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)). This is not to suggest that only humanitarian crisis arising as a result of or in the midst of war can be carried out under Security Council authority. Some natural disasters may have a broad enough reach and impact to be considered threats to international security. See GA Res. 59/279, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/279 (Jan. 28, 2005) (noting in wake of Asian Tsunami that addressing natural disasters can “reduce risks to [local populations], their livelihoods, the social and economic infrastructure and environmental resources”).

177. See DANIEL DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX 2 (1999) (defining economic coercion as “the threat or act by a nation-state or coalition of nation-states, called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange with another nation-state, called the target, unless the targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political demand”). The exchange that is disrupted may include “trade sanctions, boycotts,
of the Security Council. Under Chapter VII, Article 41, the Security Council may take so-called "provisional measures," which include just about anything "not involving the use of armed force." These can include, for example, severing of diplomatic relations or other procedural sanctions aimed at isolating one of the parties to a dispute, or a state deemed to be a threat to peace and security. The intent is to limit or channel that state or party's engagement with the international community. These diplomatic sanctions can be effectively carried out by the broader U.N. membership through procedural sanctioning at the General Assembly or by international organizations affiliated with the United Nations. Under Chapter VIII, the Council can also endorse sanctions brought by regional organizations.

The more common form of sanctions is an economic and/or military embargo targeted at one or more of the parties to a conflict or the state threatening the peace. Examples of this include economic sanctions restricting a range of trade and investment. Military sanctions most commonly have come in the form of banning sales or transfers of weapons and materiel. The effectiveness of both economic and military embargoes has proved to be a rich area of empirical study in the political science literature. The legal literature has also looked at the fairness and legitimacy of sanctions, examining, for example, whether sanctions aimed at states are effective at hurting governments and their leadership or whether they have the unintended consequence of doing more harm to individuals (e.g., innocent civilians) who have no power to effect change in policy.

aid suspensions, freezing of financial assets, or the manipulation of tariff rates." Id. at 3.

178. See U.N. Charter art. 41, para. 1 (mandating Security Council has right to decide what measures besides armed force should be used to enforce its decisions).


180. For a discussion of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iraq, see supra notes 177-79 and infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.


182. See generally Drezner, supra note 177.

183. The 1991 UNSC arms embargo against all the states making up the former Republic of Yugoslavia, for example, may have had the effect of locking in military advantage for the JNA. See, e.g., From Lisbon to Dayton, supra note 162, at 47-51 (discussing Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia that would reward "Serbs with more land than they had had before war, meaning ethnic cleansing would have been rewarded . . ."). See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83 (2002) (discussing sanctions in context of response to terrorism); Robert W. McGee, Legal Ethics, Business Ethics and International Trade: Some Neglected Issues, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 109 (2002) (discussing ethics of economic sanctions).
Military intervention describes any outside use of force to address threats to international peace and security. This is the most controversial function in the taxonomy. Whereas some of the other functions find authority in multiple provisions of the Charter and within constituting treaties of subsidiary organs, the authority to use force—collectively and on behalf of advancing the underlying norms of the organization—rests in one place: Chapter VII, Article 42 specifically empowers the Security Council—upon consideration that non-military measures taken under the same Chapter have proven ineffective—to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

The Security Council has exercised that power in a number of ways—to include advisory functions, protective functions, actual war fighting and pure post-conflict peacekeeping. Many of the rationales for unified U.N. command that were discussed at San Francisco—collective security, burden-sharing and enhanced capacity—went untested as they were premised on the existence of the permanent Military Committee.

Blue helmet peacekeeping operations are somewhat more complicated. In some instances, U.N. deployments that are referred to as peacekeeping take place when there is no peace to make, i.e., they are attempts at either conflict prevention or at forcing parties to the table, more peacemaking than peacekeeping. Where peacekeeping serves solely a policing function and where there is a peace to keep, e.g., after the signing of a peace agreement, transfer of sovereignty from a prior regime to a new government or an interim security force while the state rebuilds capacity after the devastation of war, these are not considered interventions within the meaning of the taxonomy. There is a difficulty here: there are many instances where the line between the conflict and post-conflict phases is not clear. Nonetheless, military intervention here in-

184. See U.N. Charter art. 42, para. 1 (providing these actions may include demonstrations, blockades and other operations); see also supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.

185. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 766-75 (discussing Articles 45, 46 and 47).

186. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 16-21 (describing definitional differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking and describing all U.N. “blue-helmet” peacekeeping missions). For further discussion, see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.

187. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 20 (“UNOSOM I, deployed to supervise a cease-fire among Somali clans after the country’s government collapsed, proved powerless against them.”). The UNOSOM I and II missions were criticized for precisely this error in mission—peace enforcement cannot be carried out effectively where conflict still rages. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing UNOSOM Missions).

188. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address Aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript/index.html (declaring that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended”). President Bush was subsequently criticized for this statement being prema-
cludes any action where troops are deployed, regardless of the offensive or defensive nature of the rules of engagement governing that deployment.

Included within the function of military intervention are deployments in which the U.N. does not take action itself, but rather provides implicit or explicit approval of defensive uses of force that meet the requirements of Article 51. Also included are actions that are taken by regional organizations under Article 53. Thus comparative examinations of different types of military interventions would include comparing blue helmet operations under explicit U.N. military command and actions taken by coalitions with explicit U.N. authority with those multilateral actions taken under Article 53 authority, multilateral actions with no U.N. authority and interventions completely outside of any multilateral organization and for which there is no U.N. authority, i.e., ad hoc and purely unilateral uses of force.

F. Post-Conflict Administration

Post-conflict administration encompasses all non-military measures taken by outside parties—through occupation or at the invitation of the affected state—after the end of hostilities to secure the peace. Security Council authority under Chapter VII includes all measures to restore peace and security, which has permitted the U.N. to perform the full range of governmental functions in a post-conflict context. It has become the norm in peace agreements to include provisions governing post-conflict administration or transitional authority to bridge the period from conflict to autonomous, peaceful governance. Many of these post-conflict arrangements reflect the successful historical experiences of the Allies in post-war Germany and Japan. They also reflect some of the history of the League Mandates after World War I. Thus, post-conflict administration.


191. See League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. 5. (establishing procedure for mandates). The Mandates carried with them the normative requirement that the mandate powers promote human rights and the rule of law within the mandate territories. The Covenant provides:

The Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or
tion melds ideas of state or nation-building with the protection of human rights norms and broad notions of democratic statehood.  

Borrowing from those historical traditions, post-conflict administration has come to encompass almost all dimensions of internal governance, from providing public utilities, to holding elections, to policing, to establishing or re-establishing functioning judiciaries. The capacities needed to carry out these tasks are distinct from those required at the military intervention stage.

III. Evaluating Performance Under the Taxonomy

Having established that the bases and rationales for U.N. security multilateralism and introducing a taxonomy of the functions of security multilateralism, this section turns to three illustrative cases: East Timor, Kosovo and Iraq. In each case, the facts are summarized and a description of how the functions were carried out is presented in table form.

Figure 1 illustrates where each of the three cases falls on a continuum of legality of outside intervention in armed conflict, ranging from U.N. multilateral (most lawful) to unilateral (least lawful). While not a perfect representation of the possible forms of outside intervention into conflict, the continuum describes the most common legal characterization of these three cases. A focus on the legality of the decision to deploy force in an effort to resolve the underlying threat to peace and security tells us military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory.

Id.

192. Indeed, the danger is that an outside power, including the U.N., engaging in governmental functions of a sovereign state may engender feelings of neocolonialism. The push for democratic norms can act to ameliorate these concerns. See, e.g., Peter Galbraith, The United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), 97 Am. Soc’y Int’l. L. Proc. 210 (2003) (describing challenges of balancing governmental responsibility in post-colonial setting).

193. See, e.g., New U.N. Peacekeeping, supra note 52, at 169-88 (describing U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia’s (UNTAC) role in post-conflict Cambodia including civil and judicial administration, oversight of elements of national budget, establishment and monitoring of elections, promotion of human rights, economic reconstruction and education); Fox, supra note 189, at 201-29 (describing range of U.S. activities in administering Iraq through Coalition Provisional Authority).

194. I distinguish here between prosecution of war and post-conflict policing. Where large-scale violence continues, however, it is often difficult to draw the line between conflict and post-conflict and between civilian policing and military or paramilitary deployments. Where formal peace agreements have been put in place, however, or, as in the case of Iraq, a formal transfer of sovereignty has been made with the approval of the United Nations (shifting legal status from one of occupation to post-occupation) a line can be drawn that provides a useful, if imperfect, distinction between conflict and post-conflict. That is what I have tried to do in the taxonomy.

195. For example, it does not account for unilateral interventions that can more accurately be called "unilateral plus," i.e., two or more states acting outside either U.N. or regional multilateral authority.
little about what institutional factors contributed to making outside involvement in a conflict effective. By broadening the view of these three conflicts to include the range of disaggregated multilateral security functions, the taxonomy is designed to overcome any over-emphasis on the institutional decision at the military intervention stage and any corresponding under-emphasis or marginalization of the other functions.

**Figure 1: Forms of Outside Intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.N. Multilateral</th>
<th>Non-U.N. Multilateral</th>
<th>Unilateral</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Again, this study does not intend to address the question of whether the decision to apply outside force in each of the cases was correct as a normative matter. Nevertheless, normative analyses underlying conclusions about the legality of these cases is helpful in testing the rationales for outside involvement in each case. These cases were chosen precisely because, at least from a formalist perspective focused *solely* on the question of Council enforcement powers, only one, East Timor, *should* have taken place under the law. An understanding of the arguments about legality and illegality is important to drawing conclusions about future reforms, but it is not necessary to the more limited project of understanding the comparative effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral efforts.

In addition to representing points along the continuum of international "legality," these cases were chosen to be an illustrative sub-set of potential cases. This sub-set permits qualitative empirical examination of a range of cases across one discrete functional dimension. 196 Each also represents a non-consent based outside intervention into armed conflict. 197 In each case, the full range of functions in the taxonomy played a role.

A. U.N. Security Multilateralism: The Case of East Timor

The U.N. intervention in the transition to independence in East Timor in 1999 is often described as a paradigm of U.N. security multilateralism. Tables 2.0-2.4 illustrate how the functions of assessment,
intermediation, sanctions and post-conflict administration were carried out in that case. The military intervention data are contained in Table 2.0. A brief summary of the facts of the case follows.

**Table 2.0: East Timor: Assessment Function**

                                                                 | 1994: Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions  
                                                                 | 1999: Commission on Human Rights Special Session  
                                                                 | 1999: Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, Torture, and Violence against women conduct joint fact-finding mission |
|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS**                        | Res. 3485 (1975)                                                   
                                                                 | Res. 31/53 (1976)                                                  
                                                                 | Res. 32/34 (1977)                                                  
                                                                 | Res. 33/39 (1978)                                                  
                                                                 | Res. 34/40 (1979)                                                  
                                                                 | Res. 35/27 (1980)                                                  
                                                                 | Res. 36/50 (1981)                                                  
                                                                 | Res. 37/30 (1982)¹⁹⁹                                              |


### Table 2.1: East Timor: Intermediation Function


| U.N. Special Representatives | Sergio Vieira de Mello, Sec. Gen. special rep. |

### Table 2.2: East Timor: Sanctions Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Sanctions</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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201. Other unilateral actions against Indonesia include: 1991, U.S. Senate and House members adopt declaration on East Timor for incorporation into Foreign Relations Authorization Act calling for suspension of military training program funds for Indonesian government; 1995, European Parliament condemns continuing military oppression in East Timor and calls on international community (especially the EU member states) to halt arms sales to Indonesia; 1996, European Parliament again condemns the illegal occupation of East Timor and calls for EU member states to halt military assistance and arms sales to Indonesia.
Table 2.3: East Timor: Post-Conflict Administration^202

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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>UNTAET National Consultative Council (NCC), East Timorese National Council, Transitional Cabinet^203</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOVERNING AUTHORITY</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLICING</td>
<td>U.N. Civilian Police</td>
<td>U.N. Civilian Police (CivPol)</td>
<td>Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL)^204</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUDICIAL STRUCTURES</td>
<td>Transitional Judicial Service Commission (recruitment and training of judges)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POST-CONFLICT/ HR ENFORCEMENT</td>
<td>Mixed panels—international and East Timorese judges; Special Department for Prosecution of Serious Crimes; Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) Ad hoc court in Jakarta Community Reconciliation Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELECTIONS</td>
<td>Popular consultation on offer of special autonomy from Indonesia</td>
<td>Constituent Assembly—elected 08/2001 President—elected 04/2002</td>
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203. The Transitional Cabinet is comprised of five Timorese and four internationals under chairmanship of the Transitional Administrator.

204. PNTL received advice and training from the U.N. Civilian Police.
Table 2.4: East Timor: Humanitarian Assistance (Post-Conflict)\textsuperscript{205}

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FOOD</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HEALTH</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 1999: First WHO team arrives in East Timor (medical and health assessment mission)</td>
<td>2000: East Timor Interim Health Authority (IHA) is established; works in conjunction with U.N. agencies.\textsuperscript{206}</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>REFUGEES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1999: UNHCR becomes operational in East Timor; provides assistance to IDPs.\textsuperscript{207}</td>
<td>Oct. 1999: MOU between UNHCR and Indonesia allows access to refugee population from East Timor and provides assurance of security of UNHCR staff.</td>
<td>Jan. 2003: UNHCR declares cessation clause for East Timorese refugees.\textsuperscript{208}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{206} See East Timor Update, supra note 205, at 3 (Mar. 15, 2000) (discussing how IHA is composed of sixteen East Timorese and nine international staff and has recently been established). IHA works with U.N. agencies and NGO health-care providers:

[R]ebuilding and rehabilitation [of] healthcare facilities; re-establishing basic health services throughout the country; ensuring the supply of essential drugs and immunization services; providing training and support for East Timorese health personnel; maintaining communicable disease surveillance and improving disease prevention and control; re-establishing the country’s laboratory services; and ensuring adequate maternal and child health services.\textsuperscript{209}


\textsuperscript{208} See U.N. Refugee Agency, East Timorese Refugee Saga Comes to an End, Dec. 30, 2002, at 2, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/textis/vtx/print?tbl=NEWS&id=3e1060c84 (describing how “cessation clause” is declared for refugees once it is determined that they no longer have credible fear of persecution upon return to their home countries and they no longer need international protection).
Oct. 1999: repatriation program begins; Mass Information Campaigns—designed to encourage people to return. Reconciliation activities at border and support to CAVR. Shelter Project—provides construction materials and technical guidance. ICRC and IRC deal with child refugee issues. IOM—assists in returns from West Timor.

**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

2000: UNTAET receives grants from Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET) for emergency infrastructure rehabilitation and water supply and sanitation rehabilitation.209 UNDP mobilizes and coordinates financial and technical resources, identifies strategic development issues and capacity-building.210

2003: UNDP moves to improving the socio-economic conditions of the population.

**East Timor Summary.** In January 1999, representatives of the governments of Portugal and Indonesia began a series of talks under U.N. auspices to negotiate the future of East Timor, a former colony of Portugal that had been occupied by Indonesia since 1975.211 The government of Indonesia proposed “special autonomy,” which would allow East Timor to form its own government with legislative, executive and judicial powers.

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209. See generally Trust Fund for East Timor (TFET): East Timor Rehabilitation and Development, Progress Report, Donors’ Council Meeting, Lisbon, Portugal, June 21-23, 2000 available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/EastTimor/Trust_Fund/default.asp#contents (describing rehabilitation projects and strategies for assistance). TFET is a trust fund that is administered by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The World Bank is the trustee of TFET. Donors include: Portugal, Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, Finland, United States, Ireland, New Zealand, Italy, the European Commission and the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund. Grants were made to UNTAET for projects that were co-managed by UNTAET and ADB.


with Indonesia retaining military control. 212 Portugal made its acceptance of the proposal contingent on a "popular consultation" process whereby the people of East Timor would be given the chance to vote to accept Indonesia's offer of special autonomy or instead claim total independence. 213 The U.N. was enlisted to present the autonomy plan to the people of East Timor and to organize and conduct the popular consultation. 214 

In May 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan signed the Modalities and Security Agreements, thereby committing the U.N. to the implementation of the popular consultation. 215 On June 11, the Security Council passed Resolution 1246, establishing the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) in order to prepare, carry out and monitor the election. 216 The Council stressed that the maintenance of security, to ensure both the integrity of the ballot and the safety of election workers and observers, was the responsibility of the Indonesian government; it did not specifically invoke its enforcement powers under Chapter VII. 217 

In the time leading up to the August election, pro-Indonesian militias carried out a campaign of violence and intimidation against the citizens of East Timor that prompted Annan to delay the registration and the vote for a number of weeks. 218 Despite the violence, ninety-five percent of registered voters participated in the consultation, with a majority voting in favor of independence. 219 Violence against the East Timorese by pro-Indonesian militias increased immediately following the election. Reports, some based on direct fact-finding carried out by the Council, 220 estimated

212. See Jennifer Toole, A False Sense of Security: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Organization and Conduct Mission in East Timor, 16 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 199, 214 (2000) (describing how under Indonesia's autonomy proposal, East Timor could conduct its own elections and create its own law so long as it was in compliance with Indonesian law).

213. See id. at 214-15 ("Portugal agreed to accept the proposal so long as the people of East Timor could be consulted, by secret ballot, as to whether they wished to accept Indonesian autonomy or pursue independence.").

214. See id. at 215 (explaining how Portugal and Indonesia requested help from U.N. on presenting proposal to East Timorese people).

215. See id. ("The Secretary General immediately signed the Modalities and Security Agreements, expressing the U.N.'s commitment to organize and conduct the consultation.").

216. See id. (describing how UNAMET registered 451,792 voters in two months).


218. See Toole, supra note 212, at 216 (detailing how militia beat and tortured East Timorese people and burned property to ground).


that more than 200,000 East Timorese were forced from their homes as a result of the unrest. On September 15, the Council expressly invoked its authority under Chapter VII to pass Resolution 1264 which authorized the deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a multinational force under Australian military command, to East Timor with the mandate to "restore peace and security." On October 25, with INTERFET on the ground in East Timor, the Council created the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was to assume interim governorship over East Timor and oversee the transition toward independence. The mandate of UNTAET was broad civil governance.

Sergio Vieira de Mello was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Transitional Administrator in November. Among his first official acts was the creation of the National Consultative Council (NCC) and the Transitional Judicial Service Commission, both aimed at increasing East Timorese political participation during the transition. De Mello also signed a UNTAET regulation making Indonesian law the applicable law in the territory. The early work of UNTAET was consumed with the transition of security responsibilities from INTERFET, persistent militia incursions into East Timor, the integration of East Timorese into civil service and administrative positions within the gov-

221. See Toole, supra note 212, at 216-17 (noting approximate number of East Timorese driven from their homes).

222. See S.C. Res. 1264, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999); East Timor Chronology, supra note 211 (noting INTERFET was placed under unified command structure lead by Australia).


224. The Resolution reads that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following elements:

(a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
(b) To establish an effective administration;
(c) To assist in the development of civil and social services;
(d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;
(e) To support capacity-building for self-government; [and]
(f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

Id. ¶ 2; see also Galbraith, supra note 192.

225. See East Timor Chronology, supra note 211 (noting date of SRSG's appointment).

226. The NCC was a joint East Timorese-UNTAET advisory body charged with review of UNTAET regulations, while the Transitional Judicial Service Commission was charged with the recruitment and training of judges. See Beauvais, supra note 202, at 1120, 1153 (describing functions).

227. This regulation defined the applicable law as "the laws applied in East Timor prior to 25 October 1999" insofar as they do not conflict with internationally recognized human rights standards." See id. at 1151 (quoting Reg. No. 1999/1, On the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor, ¶ 3.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (Nov. 27, 1999)).
ernment and responses to the humanitarian disaster resulting from the violence following the popular consultation.\textsuperscript{228} Within two years, UNTAET had succeeded in turning over much of the governing functions—including judicial functions—to the East Timorese.

On May 20, 2002, after more than two years of U.N. administration, East Timor gained independence as the “Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.” Three days earlier, the Council had passed Resolution 1410, establishing the post-independence U.N. Mission to Support East Timor (UNMISET) with a two-year mandate. Like UNTAET, it was headed by a SRSG. Its mandate, however, was not actual governance, but to “provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor; to provide interim law enforcement and public [s]ecurity and to assist in developing the East Timor Police Service” and contribute to the maintenance of external and internal security of Timor-Leste.\textsuperscript{229} Civilian policing and peacekeeping were therefore a large part of the UMISET mandate; 1,250 civilian police and 5,000 military troops were assigned to the initial mission. After several extensions of the mandate, UNMISET was replaced in May 2005 by a U.N. Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which is mandated through Council resolution to continue advising the East Timor government on civilian administrative institution building and police and military matters. Its current mandate expires May 2006.\textsuperscript{230}

\section*{B. Non-U.N. Security Multilateralism: The Case of Kosovo}

Kosovo has been characterized as the paradigmatic non-U.N. multilateral intervention.\textsuperscript{231} The controversial doctrine of humanitarian interventionism—outside use of force based on human rights violations internal to a sovereign state, even where those violations do not rise to the level of threats of international peace and security—has also been widely explored through the Kosovo case.\textsuperscript{232} While this Article does not address the merits of the doctrine of humanitarian interventionism, the form of intervention in Kosovo, i.e., a NATO-led multilateral intervention, provides an example

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{228} See East Timor Chronology, supra note 211.
\item \textsuperscript{231} See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo, 22 Hum. Rts. Q. 57, 57 (2000) (noting that NATO use of force in Kosovo was inconsistent with express terms of Charter and Security Council practice); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 12 (1999) (stating that NATO airstrikes breached Charter).
\end{itemize}
of a technically unlawful regional effort at multilateralism against which to measure U.N. multilateral and purely unilateral efforts. Tables 4.1-4.5 categorize the elements of the Kosovo case into the taxonomy.

### Table 3.1: Kosovo: Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence Gathering</th>
<th>NATO United States, European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fact-Finding Bodies</td>
<td>NATO ICTY Investigators OSCE; EC/EU Monitoring Body</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.2: Kosovo: Intermediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ad Hoc Groups, Facilitated Negotiations</th>
<th>Contact Group (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France and Russia) NATO Sec'y Gen. Rambouillet Talks (Feb. 6, 1999-Feb. 23, 1999) Paris Talks (Mar. 15, 1999-Mar. 18, 1999)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Council</td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1160; S.C. Res. 1199 (supporting recommendations of Contact Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>FRY case against Belgium (dismissed without reaching merits in 2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.3: Kosovo Humanitarian Assistance

| European Union                          | Post-Conflict (under UNMIK)\\
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>KFOR securing delivery of aid post-conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Assembly Agencies</td>
<td>UNHCR (refugee protection, return and resettlement); UNDP; Others operating under the UNMIK mandate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.4: Kosovo Sanctions

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1160 (1997) FRY economic embargo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Regional Sanctions                     | EC arms embargo (1991)\\
|                                        | EC economic sanctions (1998)\\
|                                        | Contact Group (plus Canada and Japan) (1998)                                         |
TABLE 3.5: KOSOVO POST-CONFLICT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JUNE 1999 – PRESENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policing</strong></td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1244 (establishing UNMIK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Administration</strong></td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institution Building/Democratization</strong></td>
<td>OSCE (democracy programs); EU (economic reconstruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Reconstruction</strong></td>
<td>EU, under UNMIK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kosovo Summary. The conflict in Kosovo emerged following the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which had begun in 1991 with declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, and later Bosnia and Macedonia.233 War broke out immediately following the Croatian and Slovenian declarations, and engulfed Bosnia for most of 1992-1995. Although the problem in Kosovo was recognized by the international community as among the tinderboxes that could further inflame the Balkans, the Kosovo problem was left out of the U.S./EU sponsored peace negotiations over Bosnia, and was not addressed in the 1995 Dayton accords.234

Kosovo had been a fully autonomous republic within the Republic of Serbia until 1989, when then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo’s autonomy.235 In the following years, ethnic Albanians, who made up more than eighty percent of the Kosovar population, were relegated to a second tier society, while the minority Serbs filled all the key positions in government, education and other public and private employ-

233. For a discussion of the origins of the conflict, see CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at 207.

234. For a further discussion of Dayton agreement, see supra note 190 and accompanying text. One exception to this was the December 1992 warning from the U.S. administration to Milosevic that “[i]n the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.” CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at 207 (quoting David Binder, Bush Warns Serbs Not to Widen War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at A6). Another exception which would have effect in the post-conflict period was the territorial jurisdiction of the ICTY, which included all territories of the FRY. See Statute of the International Tribunal art. 8, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192.

235. This status gave it powers similar to the constituent republics (e.g., Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia). See CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at 207; Parul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role of Justice in the Former Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo for Coercive Appeasement?, 35 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L L. 219, 236-37 (2003).
In 1991, the Kosovar Albanians declared their independence, secretly elected a president (Ibrahim Rugova) and created a parallel set of institutions, all of which went unrecognized by Belgrade and most of the outside world. During these years, Belgrade kept a tight grip on Kosovo, while also prosecuting the war in Bosnia.

In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as the military arm of Albanian separatism, engaging in sporadic attacks against Serb officials in Kosovo. The Serbs responded with more repression of student and other ethnic movements in the region. In fall 1997, violence between Serb authorities and the KLA escalated. Violence escalated further the next spring after dozens of Albanian separatists were killed by Serbian police. The Security Council responded by passing Resolution 1160, invoking its enforcement powers under Chapter VII to condemn the excessive force of the Serbian police and the terrorist actions of the KLA, and to impose sanctions in the form of an arms embargo. The Council expressed support for a peaceful solution taking into account broad legal principles of territorial integrity and respect for autonomy of the Kosovar Albanians.

As fighting between the KLA and Serbian police and military continued, the U.S.-led “Contact Group” (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) served as an intermediary in peace discussions between Milosevic and Rugova. The talks foundered in May 1998. In June, the Contact Group joined by Canada and Japan applied additional sanctions against the FRY.

Intense fighting between the KLA and Serbs continued throughout the summer, resulting in thousands of Albanian villagers being driven into the hills, and the discovery of atrocities being carried out on both sides. On September 23, the Council again invoked its Chapter VII powers when it adopted Resolution 1199, in which the Council formally determined that the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to international peace and security. The resolution called for a ceasefire, for actions to improve the humanitarian situation and demanded that the FRY implement the Contact Group statement of June 1998: “(a) cease all action by security forces; (b) enable effective monitoring by the EC Monitoring Mission; (c) facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies; and (d) 'make rapid progress' towards finding a political solution.”


238. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at 208. Most of the actual shuttle diplomacy was carried out by U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke.


240. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at 208; S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 239.
text of the resolution noted that the Council would “consider further action and additional measures to maintain and restore peace and stability in the regions,” it was deliberately ambiguous and stopped short of a threat of military intervention in large part to placate Russian concerns.241

Two massacres of Kosovar Albanians by Serbian forces apparently resulted in the hardening of United States and NATO resolve to intervene. In the face of Milosevic’s defiance of the earlier Council resolutions, the United States called on NATO to act, implying that the legal basis of such action rested in the prior Council Resolutions.242 On October 15, 1998, NATO’s political arm, the North Atlantic Council, voted to order an air campaign in the FRY, with a delayed trigger of ninety-seven hours, in order to give last-minute diplomatic efforts time to work. Two days later, the FRY agreed to a NATO air verification mission over Kosovo and further agreed to an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) verification mission to Kosovo, which included FRY assurances that it would comply with Resolutions 1160 and 1199. These agreements were then explicitly endorsed by the Council in Resolution 1203, passed October 24.243 That Resolution, however, stopped short of authorizing NATO, under Article 53 of the Charter, to act in support of the Council’s authority to enforce peace and security.244

Intermediation efforts continued at Rambouillet from February 6 to February 23 of 1999 and again in Paris from March 15 to March 18, but an agreement was not reached. The FRY rejected provisions that would have enabled NATO total freedom of movement throughout the FRY and required a referendum on Kosovo independence within three years.245 After last-ditch ultimatums failed to get Milosevic to agree to the terms of the Rambouillet agreement, the NATO bombing campaign began on March 24, 1999. The air campaign ceased on June 10, 1999.

On the day of the first air strikes, the Council met in an emergency session, with Russia, China, Belarus and India indicating that they opposed the NATO action as a violation of the Charter. Those who supported the action failed to present a cogent ground for why it might be lawful,246 but a draft resolution demanding an end to the air strikes was nonetheless


242. See id.


244. Nevertheless, the United States viewed the Resolution as giving NATO the green light to act. See id. at 210 n.335.

245. See id. at 210-11 (describing provisions that FRY rejected).

246. The United States, Canada and France tried to fashion a legal rationale, stressing that the FRY was in violation of the two prior Council Resolutions, 1199 and 1203. See id. at 211.
defeated, twelve votes to three. During the remainder of the bombing campaign, the U.N. was involved in only one substantive issue relating to Kosovo: a resolution on May 14 regarding refugee assistance.

In the midst of the NATO bombing, the FRY sought adjudication of the legality of the intervention by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The FRY sued Belgium, one of the few NATO countries that had agreed to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, arguing that the NATO air campaign was a violation of the laws of war—both the jus ad bellum, governing when a State could go to war and the jus in bello, governing how war can be carried out. The FRY’s application to the court was rejected on jurisdictional grounds; there was thus no adjudication of the lawfulness of the intervention.

When the bombing stopped on June 10, the Council adopted Resolution 1244, establishing the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK, like the UNTAET mandate that came in East Timor a few months later, had a broad mandate to establish transitional governance and maintain security in Kosovo. The four “pillars” of the UNMIK mission were organized as follows: (1) Police and Justice, under the U.N.; (2) Civil Administration, under the U.N.; (3) Democratization and Institution Building, led by the OSCE; and (4) Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union. Bernard Kouchner was appointed head of UNMIK and Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and he retained ultimate authority over all four pillars. Part of the UNMIK resolution approved the deployment of NATO troops under Kosovo Force (KFOR) to secure Kosovo.

The UNMIK mission was occupied with rebuilding a judicial structure, while also cooperating with investigations into atrocities by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The broad

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247. Only Russia, China and Namibia supported the resolution. See id. at 213.
249. See Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.) (Req. for Provisional Measures) (Order of June 2, 1999), 38 I.L.M. 950.
250. The ICJ declined the relief sought but remained seized of the question. See id. ¶ 51.
253. He left office in January 2001; four subsequent SRSGs have rotated through the job. Currently, Søren Jessen-Petersen holds the position. See Information Sheet, supra note 252.
254. 50,000 NATO troops made up the first KFOR deployment. KFOR had initial responsibility for all policing. In 2001, civilian policing was transferred to UNMIK. See Tables 3.1-3.5 and sources.
mandate of the UNMIK occupation continues in force today. As of this writing, KFOR remains on the ground providing multinational peacekeeping.255

C. Unilateralism: The Case of Iraq

The 2003 U.S.-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq is included in this illustrative comparative examination as the case in which the U.N. did not explicitly authorize the intervention; indeed, it is broadly viewed—even by members of the U.S. administration that carried it out—as illegal.256 The United States made clear its intention to act with or without U.N. authority on the ground that the Iraqi regime represented a threat to international peace and, more specifically, a threat to U.S. national security. In sharp contrast to the U.S.-led coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, the 2003 invasion did not enjoy wide support around the world; to the contrary, many of the closest allies of the United States opposed the use of force.257 Tables 5.1-5.5 illustrate the Iraq conflict through the taxonomy of functions. Following is a summary of the facts.


256. The purpose of this discussion is not to resolve the debate over whether the invasion may have been technically legal on the basis of the Council resolutions governing the coalition ceasefire with Iraq in 1991. For present purposes of this Article, I am accepting that the basis of the invasion was the threat posed by the Iraqi government on the basis of its possession of WMD (biological and chemical weapons) in violation of certain prior Security Council resolutions. For the Bush administration’s ex post justification of the legality on the basis of the prior resolutions, see Taft & Buchwald, supra note 11. Kofi Annan in an interview declared the invasion to be illegal and a violation of the Charter. See Interview by Owen Bennett-Jones, BBC World Service with Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661640.stm.

257. Richard Perle, who had been an advisor to the Bush administration, has also stated that the war was illegal. See Oliver Burkeman & Julian Borger, War Critics Astonished as U.S. Hawk Admits Invasion Was Illegal, GUARDIAN, Nov. 19, 2003. Perle was a member of the Defense Policy Board advising the U.S. Department of Defense. See id.
TABLE 4.1: IRAQ ASSESSMENT FUNCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTELLIGENCE</td>
<td>U.S. covert operations in Iraq</td>
<td>United States and British government intelligence estimates that Iraq still stockpiling WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>Iraq Liberation Act (United States enacts a regime change policy) (Oct. 31, 1998)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States works with Iraqi opposition groups (INC, the INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI and the MCM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACT-FINDING</td>
<td>S.C. Res. 687 (report on steps taken to facilitate return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq)</td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1511 (requests United States to report on efforts and progress U.N. election support fact-finding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.C. Res. 986 (establishes review of &quot;Oil for Food&quot; Program)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1284 (fact-finding on humanitarian issues)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSPECTION</td>
<td>S.C. Res. 687 (triggers ongoing inspections; Iraq must provide a list of all weapons of mass destruction in its possession)</td>
<td>IAEA and UNSCOM reports pursuant to 687 (May 1991-Apr. 2004); UNSCOM reports pursuant to S.C. Res. 1205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Iraq Humanitarian Assistance Function\textsuperscript{259}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.C. Res. 688 (humanitarian issues); Res. 986 (establishes “Oil for Food” Program); S.C. Res. 1111, 1143, 1210, 1242, 1280, 1281, 1302, 1330, 1352, 1360, 1382, 1409, 1443 (1997-2002 extensions of Oil for Food program) U.S. Exec. Order creates Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, within the Department of Defense (Jan. 20, 2003)</td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1472 (restarted Oil for Food Program); S.C. Res. 1476 (recalls previous res. pertaining to humanitarian aid); S.C. Res. 1500 creates U.N. Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) S.C. Res. 1511 (authorizes U.N. aid to Iraq under U.S. supervision); Oil-for-Food program ends (Nov. 21, 2003)</td>
<td>Range of U.N. development programs administered through UNAMI (mission extended in August 2004); Direct U.S. government assistance programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Iraq Sanctions Function\textsuperscript{261}

|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|


\textsuperscript{260} These include the full “alphabet soup” of U.N. agencies: ESCWA, FAO, ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFEM, UNOPS, WFP, WHO. See S.C. Res. 1546, \textit{supra} note 188 (extending UNAMI mandate).

### Table 4.4: Iraq Post-Conflict Administration Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>MNF and CPA carry out policing with Iraqi support</td>
<td>NATO pledge aid for training MNF train Iraqi police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraqi government takes over most civilian policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>CPA established Apr. 15, 2003</td>
<td>CPA withdraws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1483 (affirms sovereignty of Iraq and recognizes United States and United Kingdom as occupiers)</td>
<td>Sovereign Iraq government institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.-Appointed Interim Iraqi Council</td>
<td>Res. 1546 (recognizes legitimacy of interim Iraqi government and calls on U.N. members to support it)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.C. Res. 1511 (recognizing interim Iraqi government)</td>
<td>National Assembly elected Aug. 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.N. lends election-planning support (Brahimi)</td>
<td>Council was sworn in (Sept. 1, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq Governing Council (July 2003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iyad Allawi designated prime minister of Iraqi interim government (May 28, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>Iraqi Special Tribunal established</td>
<td>Interim government takes over Baathist detention and trials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interim Constitution</td>
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</table>

**Iraq Summary.** The U.S.-led coalition that rolled back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in less than two months in early 1991 had been expressly authorized by the Council under Resolution 678. Following that military action, Iraq agreed to a ceasefire that was codified in Council Resolution 686. What followed over the next twelve years was a series of Council resolutions taken under its Chapter VII enforcement powers to: extend economic sanctions, demarcate a final border with Kuwait and create a weapons inspections and reporting regime (UNSCOM); demand disclosure of WMD programs (Res. 707); report IAEA and UNSCOM assessments (Res. 715, Res. 1051); establish the “oil-for-food” program to limit prior embargoes (Res. 986, 1111, 1143, 1210 and 1242); condemn

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262. See KATZMAN, supra note 258, at 18-19; Iraq Crisis—Timeline, supra note 258.


Iraq for ongoing violations (Res. 1134, 1137); condemn Iraq for halting UNSCOM inspections (Res. 1205); and create a monitoring, verification and inspection commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM (Res. 1284). In December 1998 and again in September 2001, United States and British forces undertook sustained targeted air strikes against strategic Iraqi targets, on both of these occasions, the use of force was justified on the grounds of Iraq's ongoing violations of Council resolutions, though no separate Council resolution was obtained for those actions. Notwithstanding the attacks, Iraq refused to readmit U.N.-mandated weapons inspectors whom it had expelled in 1998.

Following the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attack on the United States, the Bush administration made clear that containment of the Saddam Hussein regime was not enough; if Iraq continued to defy Council resolutions on WMDs, military force should be deployed. The United States described the Iraqi regime as "a grave and growing danger" in January 2002, and began an open campaign to win support for "regime change" in Iraq.267 In his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2002, President Bush challenged the U.N. to hold Iraq accountable for its violations of the series of Council resolutions passed after the first Gulf War. Bush made clear that the United States would work with the U.N. on the threat to peace and security posed by Iraq. But he also underscored that the United States would act unilaterally if the U.N. failed to follow the U.S. position.268 Notably, Secretary General Kofi Annan also challenged Iraq to meet its obligations under the "mandatory resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter... for the sake of world order."269 In response, Iraq denied that it possessed chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, insisted that it had complied with Resolution 687, but nonetheless agreed to readmit the weapons inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA.

Despite Iraq's readmission of the inspectors, the United States and United Kingdom pushed for a resolution at the Council that should Iraq provide false information to the U.N. or fail to allow full access and coop-
eralation with inspectors, such actions would be a material breach of Iraq’s obligations under the prior resolutions. Further, the United States wanted the resolution to explicitly authorize the member states (i.e., the United States) to “use all necessary means . . . to restore international peace and security in the area.”270 Other members of the Council opposed the proposal, and instead, they pushed for a resolution that would strengthen the inspection regime but would stop short of authorizing force. France, in particular, wanted the Council to meet for a second resolution to authorize force in the event Iraq failed to comply with the new terms. Resolution 1441, adopted under Chapter VII authority on November 8, 2002, was the compromise. The Resolution noted that Iraq was in “material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions” but concluded that Iraq would “face serious consequences” if it failed to meet the terms set by the Council.271

UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002, and on December 7, 2002 Iraq delivered its report on the extent of its past and present WMD programs. In their reports to the Council in January 2003, the chiefs of the two inspections regimes noted that, while there was no evidence to support claims that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons program and that they could not confirm that prohibited weapons remained in Iraq, Iraq had not fully accounted for all their WMD-related activities and had not fully complied with the inspections procedures required in the earlier resolutions.272 Despite these mixed reports, the United States seized on the reports as evidence that Iraq was not meeting U.N. requirements and began troop deployments to the Gulf and Kuwait. On February 5, 2003, with U.S. and U.K. troops amassing on the Iraqi border with Kuwait and carriers and battleships moving into position, the Council met to discuss Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 1441 and hear evidence presented by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell intended to prove that Iraq possessed prohibited weapons and was undermining the inspections regime. The United States requested that the Council pass a second resolution expressly authorizing force. When the United States and United Kingdom failed to garner enough support to carry a majority (even absent a veto), they abandoned efforts to secure a second resolu-


In the meantime, however, the United States secured commitments to participate in military operations from its "coalition of the willing," which, in addition to the United Kingdom, included Australia, Poland, Spain and Italy.274

U.S. forces began the attack on Iraq on March 19, 2003. Ground forces entered Iraqi territory on March 20, and by April 9, coalition forces led by the United States had taken control of Baghdad. President Bush announced the end of major combat engagements on April 14, 2003, and put in place the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"), which would serve as an occupation government.275 While many in the U.S. administration opposed any role for the U.N. or for any countries that were not part of the coalition in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq, President Bush announced in April that the U.N. would have a "vital role" to play in Iraq's postwar reconstruction.276

Acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003, lifting the economic sanctions on Iraq, recognizing the United States and United Kingdom as occupying forces under international law and establishing a U.N. mission in Iraq that would work with the CPA on governance and reconstruction issues.277 Kofi Annan appointed Sergio Vieira de Mello, who had led the successful UNTAET effort in East Timor, to be Special Representative in Iraq and head the U.N. presence there until a permanent U.N. mission could be established.278

On August 14, 2003, the Council passed Resolution 1550, establishing the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). On August 19, a car bomb was detonated in front of the building housing the U.N. mission, killing de Mello and 14 other U.N. officials. The U.N. immediately withdrew its mission and did not return a permanent staff presence in Iraq until February 2004.


274. For an analysis of additional states contributing troops, see Table 5.1.

275. See Fox, supra note 189.


Full sovereignty was transferred to Iraq on June 16, 2004 and was subsequently recognized by Council Resolution 1546.\textsuperscript{279} Elections were held in January 2005. The United States continues its military occupation, on the basis of an agreement with the Iraqi government, with over 150,000 troops deployed as of this writing, and maintains a large civilian diplomatic and aid presence that continues many aspects of the CPA and works closely with the Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{280} The U.N., by contrast, maintains only a few dozen officials in Iraq, and operates a range of programs in Iraq out of other offices in the region.\textsuperscript{281}

D. Preliminary Observations

An examination of the case data reveals some interesting preliminary observations about how the functions of security multilateralism are carried out by the U.N. (East Timor), by other multilateral organizations (Kosovo) and by states acting alone or in ad hoc coalitions (Iraq). These cases also demonstrate that the labels “multilateral” and “unilateral” are not descriptive of what actually happens on the ground. These observations serve as potential hypotheses for future empirical studies.

1. No Case Is Purely Multilateral or Purely Unilateral

The most significant observation drawn from the three cases is that, despite varying degrees of compliance with international law at the military interventions stage, in all of the cases the full range of U.N. security multilateralism functions played an important role. That is, by drawing out the timeline to include assessment, humanitarian assistance and mediation in all the cases, the U.N. role looms large. Indeed, the U.N. played a much larger and more sustained ongoing role in the pre-military intervention phase in the case of Iraq (the most “unilateral” military intervention) than in East Timor or Kosovo. That may be accounted for by the fact that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was in many ways connected to the 1991 war against Iraq and to the restrictions placed on Iraq as a condition of the 1991 ceasefire (no-fly zones, inspections regimes). Nonetheless, in looking at how the U.N. performed those functions, particularly the assessment and sanctions functions, the result is mixed. The U.N. did quite well in maintaining the sanctions regime despite the scandals surrounding the


oil-for-food program; what the coalition forces discovered, or failed to discover, about the Iraqi weapons program and the capacity of Iraq to pose a military threat in essence confirmed the results of the joint UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections. On the other hand, the U.N. human rights assessment mechanisms failed to capture the full extent of human rights atrocities committed by the Iraqi regime.282

The most important observation about Iraq is that, despite the unilateral or ad hoc nature of the military intervention phase, Iraq was a core focus of the Council's enforcement powers for over a decade. During that same period, there was no other state—at least no state that was not inflamed in civil war—that received the same level of attention or was subject to more economic sanctions, political oversight or outside intervention than Iraq. Further, Iraq demonstrates that while the military intervention was overwhelmingly (ninety percent) a U.S. operation, it did include troops from a larger number of states than either East Timor or Kosovo. The picture that emerges from the disaggregated Iraq case is therefore more mixed than the narrow view of whether the military intervention itself was multilateral.

East Timor, in contrast, reveals that what is viewed as paradigmatically multilateral has been largely affected by bilateral (East Timor/Indonesia; East Timor/Portugal) relations with the former occupying powers and regional participation in the post-independence phase. One example of this is the failure of Indonesia to fully cooperate in prosecution of Indonesians responsible for atrocities committed during the violence of 1999. On the peacekeeping side, the "universality" of U.N. security multilateralism is in little evidence in the case of East Timor. Troops have been contributed to the UNTAET and UMISET military missions largely from states in the region (Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Philippines, New Zealand, Bangladesh) and from the former colonial power, Portugal. In terms of post-conflict justice, the U.N. has failed in East Timor to establish an international tribunal to prosecute atrocities committed by the Indonesian government.283

Kosovo, by contrast, appears to be the most internationalized in terms of the post-conflict prosecution of war crimes as marked by its broad cooperation with the ICTY. For example, Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj resigned his position after he was indicted by the ICTY for his

282. This was largely due to the ability of the Iraqi regime to block efforts to send U.N. human rights investigators into Iraq. See, e.g., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., IRAQ'S LEGACY OF TERROR: MAss GRAvES 2-3 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/pdf/iraq_mass_graves.pdf (describing post-invasion unearthing of over 270 mass graves with remains of over 400,000 people, and noting inability of U.N. and human rights NGOs to gain access to these sites during Saddam Hussein regime).

actions as commander of the KLA.\textsuperscript{284} Thus, Kosovo appears, along the measure of multilateralism as conforming to a set of universally recognized principles of justice, to be somewhat more "multilateral" than East Timor.

2. Whether the Military Intervention Phase Is U.N. or Non-U.N. Has Little Bearing on the Form and Composition of the Military Operation

Table 5.0: Comparing Military Intervention in the Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Conflict Phase (dates)</th>
<th>East Timor</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Ad hoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of States</td>
<td>INTERFET: 22</td>
<td>UNTAET: 28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead State</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops committed by lead/ (as percentage of total)</td>
<td>INTERFET: 5,500 (65) UNTAET: 1,667 (23) (as of Mar. 2000)</td>
<td>23,208 sorties (62)</td>
<td>423,998 (90.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other states troop commitments/ (as percentage of total)</td>
<td>UNTAET: Thailand 912 (12) Portugal 750 (10) Jordan 705 (9.8) N.Z. 650 (9.2) Philippines 620 (8) Bangladesh 530 (7) All Others (21)</td>
<td>France 2,414 (6) U.K. 1950 (5) N.D. 1252 (3) Italy 1081 (2.9) Germany 636 (1.7) Others (19.4)</td>
<td>U.K. 40,906 (8.75) Others (1.15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The legitimacy and fairness rationales for collective military action under U.N. auspices might suggest that U.N. operations are more likely to attract broader participation in and diversity of troop deployment than


286. See East Timor Update, supra note 285. Other States and the number of troops they contributed are: Bolivia, 2; Brazil, 57; Canada, 150; Chile, 25; Denmark, 4; Egypt, 75; Fiji, 180; France, 3; Ireland, 33; Kenya, 200; Malaysia, 20; Nepal, 4; Norway, 4; Pakistan, 130; Russia, 2; Singapore, 20; S. Korea, 400; Sweden, 2; U.K., 4; Uruguay, 5; United States, 3.


unilateral or regional efforts. These cases appear to refute that hypothesis. Table 6.0 illustrates this point. The pure U.N. operation, East Timor, went through three different military command structures—U.N., Australian and back to U.N. Kosovo remained a NATO command operation throughout. Iraq was and remains a U.S. command operation. As measured by the number of states contributing troops, the NATO operation was the least diverse, East Timor the second most diverse and Iraq the most diverse. But measured in terms of burden sharing, Kosovo was the most diverse, that is, the burden of troop coverage was more equally dispersed among the contributing states. The INTERFET operation in East Timor was also somewhat more dominated by the leading troop contributor (65% Australian) than Kosovo was by the United States (62%). Iraq was the most dominated by the leading troop-contributing state, with 90.1% of the troops contributed by the United States.

There is little or no evidence to suggest that the troop command structure and deployments for Kosovo and Iraq would have been any different had the Security Council authorized those two operations. In Kosovo, NATO was in the best position to be effective in the military intervention phase, for many of the same military reasons that NATO took the lead in the only military intervention that proved ultimately successful in Bosnia. In fact, NATO, under U.S. leadership, was also key to the intermediation phase, in that only the threat of NATO intervention was a credible coercive tool to get Milosevic to the negotiating table. Even if the Council had expressly authorized the intervention, the form of the military intervention phase would not have been any different; it would have been a NATO operation and thus under NATO rules of engagement.

Similarly, all evidence suggests that the Iraq operation would have been substantially similar in composition to the 1991 intervention, with the United States taking the lead and the United Kingdom serving as second coalition partner. Had they supported the 2003 invasion, France and Germany may have contributed some troops and funding, but it would not have made a material difference on the overall numbers.

289. Of course, the United States counted very small troop contributions in the total number of states participating in the coalition, and included troops in non-combat roles.

290. The fact that Kosovo was an air campaign makes comparisons with ground operations or mixed ground/air operations difficult. Sorties were chosen as a data point to reflect a rough measure of diversity and state participation. See Table 5.0.

291. Had they supported the 2003 invasion, France and Germany may have contributed some troops and funding, but it would not have made a material difference on the overall numbers.

292. Indeed, diversity of nationalities of troops at the military intervention and post-conflict stages can be problematic. See, e.g., Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, Multinational Land Force Interoperability: Meeting the Challenge of Different Cultural Backgrounds in Chapter VI Peace Support Operations, J. CONFLICT STUD., Spring 2003, at 60.
these "coalitions of the willing" that are observed in all cases appear to be exactly what was contemplated by the Charter. 293

3. Control of the Military Intervention Phase May Determine Control in the Post-Conflict Peacekeeping and Policing

These cases further demonstrate that there is a certain degree of "path dependence" in military interventions. 294 Once troops are on the ground to prosecute the war or bring about peace, they are likely to stay on the ground in much the same form. Kosovo is a somewhat unique case because the military intervention phase was carried out as an air campaign. Across the three cases, however, the form of the military intervention affected the form of the post-conflict peacekeeping phase. East Timor began as a U.N. operation, and continued as a U.N. operation post-conflict. Kosovo began as a NATO operation, and remained a NATO peacekeeping operation, albeit operating next to a U.N. civilian authority. In East Timor, between the conflict phase and the post-conflict phase, the number of troop-contributing states was reduced from twenty-eight to sixteen. Australia remained, however, the leading troop contributor.

This has important implications for planning future interventions, particularly where the military intervention, as in Kosovo and Iraq, was forcibly resisted by one or more of the parties to the underlying conflict. The party objecting to the presence of the outside interveners will likely continue to object to the presence of those same outside interveners post-conflict. Where neutral, disinterested parties serve as police and peacekeepers, there may be less resistance to implementation of the peace, but the path dependence problem suggests that a change in participants is difficult to achieve. 295

293. For a discussion of multilateralism in armed conflict, see supra notes 18-136 and accompanying text.

294. Path dependence originated in the economics literature to describe the process whereby even seemingly insignificant historical events can "lock in" or affect future outcomes. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in and History, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1995).

295. A good example of effective neutral peacekeepers is the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Mission, which operates under a unique, non-U.N. mandate to monitor Egyptian and Israeli compliance with the 1978 Camp David Accords. See Camp David Accords (Sept. 17, 1978), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive_Index/The_Camp_David_Accords.html.
### Table 5.1: Post-Conflict Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post Conflict Dates</th>
<th>East Timor</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post Confl...</strong></td>
<td>May 2002-Present</td>
<td>June 1999-Present</td>
<td>June 2004-Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source of Post...</strong></td>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>KFOR UNMIK</td>
<td>MNF in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command Structure</strong></td>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>KFOR: NATO</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total # of States</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lead Military and other Troops Committed</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Percent of Overall Presence)</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aust.</strong></td>
<td>881 (19)</td>
<td>5,400 (14)</td>
<td>148,000 (84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td>650 (14)</td>
<td>4,700 (12)</td>
<td>10,000 (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td>647 (14)</td>
<td>3,900 (10)</td>
<td>1,970 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N.Z.</strong></td>
<td>614 (13)</td>
<td>3,300 (8.6)</td>
<td>298 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thailand</strong></td>
<td>498 (11)</td>
<td>881 (19)</td>
<td>1,587 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S. Korea</strong></td>
<td>347 (9)</td>
<td>1,359 (1.9)</td>
<td>ND (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>148,000 (84)</td>
<td>1405 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


297. Contributions as of 31 October 2002. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor available at [http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/675/89/IMG/N0267589.pdf?OpenElement](http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/675/89/IMG/N0267589.pdf). As reported by the Secretary-General, other states include: Bangladesh, 7; Bolivia, 2; Brazil, 86; Denmark, 4; Egypt, 2; Fiji, 188; Ireland, 4; Kenya, 2; Malaysia, 36; Mozambique, 2; Nepal, 13; Pakistan, 127; Philippines, 64; Russian Federation, 2; Singapore, 225; Slovakia, 36; Sweden, 2; Turkey, 2; Uruguay, 3; Yugoslavia, 3.

298. Other states include: Argentina, 113; Austria, 480; Azerbaijan, 34; Belgium, 700; Bulgaria, 50; Canada, 50; Czech Republic, 200; Denmark, 700; Estonia, 50; Georgia, 34; Greece, 1,500; Hungary, 322; Iceland, 50; Ireland, 104; Jordan, 100; Latvia, 50; Lithuania, 50; Luxembourg, 50; Morocco, 400; Netherlands, 550; Norway, 900; Poland, 750; Portugal, 329; Slovakia, 40; Spain, 1,100; Sweden, 750; Switzerland, 154; Turkey, 948; Ukraine, 300; United Arab Emirates, 1,100. Steve Bowman, *Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress (July 8, 2003), available at [http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB10027.pdf](http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB10027.pdf).

299. Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, March 2003; June 2003; September 2003, available at [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep03.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep03.html). Other states include: Argentina, 139-147; Austria, 39-44; Bangladesh, 74-84; Belgium, 1; Bulgaria, 86-99; Cameroon, 20; Canada, 10-22; Czech Republic, 9-16; Denmark, 26-29; Egypt, 60-66; Fiji, 31-34; Finland, 23-34; France, 78-87; Ghana, 31-84; Greece, 18-20; Hungary, 5; Iceland, 1; Italy, 54-58; Kenya, 44; Kyrgyzstan, 4; Lithuania, 8-9; Malawi, 17-21; Malaysia, 17-46; Mauritius, 5; Nepal, 36-38; Nigeria, 26-86; Norway, 19-27; Pakistan, 182-194; Philippines, 61-62; Poland, 122-124; Portugal, 15-20; Romania, 175-183; Russian Federation, 118-126; Senegal, 16; Slovenia, 15; Spain, 11-128; Sweden, 40-42; Switzerland, 9-11; Tunisia, 4-6; Turkey, 161-165; U.K., 128-133; Ukraine, 185-193; Zambia, 6-31; Zimbabwe, 37-64.

Iraq is most striking in this regard. There, the "post-conflict" phase is ongoing, and includes major military actions by the U.S.-led Multinational Forces ("MNF") against a violent and active insurgency.\textsuperscript{301} The initial reason why the United States failed to "internationalize" the post-invasion phase was political opposition within the United States, fueled by bitterness over France and Germany's successful blocking of the second Council resolution that would have authorized U.S. action. Practical considerations of command structure, familiarity with the theater of operations and troop rotation and training have also played into the decision to keep the troops who prosecuted the military intervention on for the peacekeeping and policing phase. The level of post-invasion violence—at times more fierce than the initial battles that secured the occupation—has also left even prior coalition partners with little domestic support for troop deployments\textsuperscript{302} and weakening domestic support in the United States.\textsuperscript{303} This opposition, ironically, has come at the phase of the intervention that has been at least formally legitimated by Security Council resolution.\textsuperscript{304}


Each of the cases demonstrates that the legitimacy and fairness rationale for preferring U.N. security multilateralism is vulnerable.\textsuperscript{305} The cases further demonstrate that the process of securing a Security Council resolution—even one adopted under Chapter VII enforcement powers—may not confer automatic legitimacy. At the same time, those functions that were performed outside the U.N. and without U.N. authority did not automatically become "illegitimate."

In the case of Kosovo, an international commission of jurists has concluded that the NATO bombing campaign was illegal but legitimate, on the grounds of near-universality of support, the humanitarian values at

\textsuperscript{301} See O’Hanlon & Lins de Alburquerque, supra note 285, at 15 (estimating strength of insurgency in Iraq as growing 5,000 in November 2004 to 15,000-20,000 in June 2005).

\textsuperscript{302} For an example of this, see Spain and the United Kingdom.


\textsuperscript{304} Of course, many of those who opposed the 2003 invasion as illegal do not view ex post endorsements of the occupation as conferring any additional legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{305} I use legitimacy to mean the creation of a process and result that is viewed as neutral and fair. For a discussion of fairness and legitimacy in multilateralism, see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
stake and the fact that a multilateral organization grounded in its own normative principles carried out the intervention.\textsuperscript{306} In effect, many of the same scholars who ground the legitimacy of the aggregation of the Council's binding authority to decide questions of security multilateralism in the fairness and neutrality that the law confers found themselves arguing that this kind of legitimacy could be conferred outside of the Council context.

First, legitimacy in Kosovo is conferred by NATO itself, a security multilateral organization that follows Ruggie's multilateralism definition: three or more states coordinating their actions according to a set of principles. For NATO, the principles around which the actions of the members are coordinated are identical to the U.N., save one—universality.\textsuperscript{307} Because its membership is non-universal, it cannot be said to gain legitimacy from membership.\textsuperscript{308} On the other hand, the fact that democratic governance was a pre-requisite to membership arguably lends NATO a kind of political legitimacy absent in the universal membership of the U.N.\textsuperscript{309} Second, legitimacy was conferred by the broad support of world opinion behind the intervention, even with three votes at the Council going against it. Third, the prior and subsequent involvement of the U.N. lent it legitimacy. Setting aside the argument that Resolution 1203 could be construed as conferring formal legality on the NATO action after the fact,\textsuperscript{310}

\textsuperscript{306} See Kosovo Report, Independent International Commission on Kosovo (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm. Other observers have reached the same conclusion, and international law scholars have struggled to find a way to argue that, because it was legitimate, it reflected a new, emerging norm in international law. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 828 (1999).

\textsuperscript{307} The North Atlantic Charter borrowed liberally from the U.N. Charter in those portions governing the collective security relationship. As Ruggie notes: There was a direct path from the negotiations over Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, endorsing an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, to the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty. The same cast of characters who negotiated the U.N. provision at San Francisco, Gladwyn Jebb on the British side and Senator Arthur Vandenberg on the American side, also sought to ensure that the North Atlantic Treaty would be compatible with it. That accomplishment allowed the United States to operate "within the Charter, but outside the [Soviet] veto," as the Senator liked to say. What is more, Article 51 was not drafted with a future NATO in mind; it was instigated by the Latin Americans to allow for a Latin American regional security organization that was beyond the reach of a U.S. veto in the U.N. Security Council. Multilateralism Matters, supra note 16, at 589 (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{308} Indeed, it was, prior to the post Cold War enlargement program, intentionally limited to the United States, Canada and the Western European states as a working alliance to balance the threat of the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{309} See, e.g., Helene Sjursen, On the Identity of NATO, 80(4) Int'l Aff. 687-703 (July 2004).

\textsuperscript{310} This is an argument that has no basis in the text of Article 53, which does not contemplate ex post legalization of regional efforts.
legitimacy and legality, as the Commission concluded, may derive from sources outside the Charter.

Kosovo demonstrates that the "legitimacy-enhancing" rationale of current U.N. security multilateralism may be over-valued. From these cases one can observe that actual effectiveness in rolling back the threat to peace and security results in legitimacy—perhaps even more so than legitimacy or perceptions of legitimacy results in effectiveness. Here, the effectiveness of the NATO air campaign led to the later Council resolutions and the willingness of the U.N. to take up the lead in the post-conflict phase.\(^{311}\) This stands in stark contrast to Iraq, where uncertainty about the nature of the ongoing threat to peace and security and the significant instability following the initial military phase led to a reluctance of further international involvement.

In East Timor, the initial intervention, the elections and the transition to independence were all successful and welcomed internationally. The presence of the U.N. in each of these processes conferred a legitimacy that outside powers acting alone (e.g., the United States as close ally of the former colonial government) could not have done. But the U.N. operation came under fire as it grew from a necessary intervention to supervise the transition to nation building and judicial institution building. The longer any outside post-conflict administration plays a role in core aspects of civil society such as judicial processes, the more the outside actor appears to lose legitimacy. This appears to be the case, as in East Timor, even where the post-conflict operation is founded on broadly supported Security Council resolutions that ground the U.N. civil administration in the law of the Charter. Similarly, in Kosovo six years on, with Kosovo remaining under international administration and violence between Serbs and Albanians on the rise, legitimacy of the NATO peacekeeping and U.N. civilian mission is being questioned.\(^{312}\)

In Iraq, the converse is observed. The decision of the United States to intervene without U.N. authority has gained some degree of legitimacy following the Iraqi elections of January 2005 and the adoption of the new

\(^{311}\) One way to illustrate this point is through this counter-factual: NATO begins a bombing campaign against Belgrade and Yugoslav targets in Kosovo. Things go terribly wrong. Blocks of civilian housing are destroyed in Belgrade and bombings wipe out civilians on the ground in Kosovo indiscriminately. Rather than rally to remove Milosevic, Yugoslav public opinion is hardened against NATO and the United States. Even the Kosovar Albanians begin to question the campaign. Would the U.N. have authorized further NATO activities under a Chapter VII resolution? Would the international commission have concluded that the action was "illegal" but "legitimate"? The answer to those questions is undoubtedly no.

\(^{312}\) See Nicholas Wood, Ambitious Experiment Leads Kosovo to a Crossroads, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 2005, at A3 (noting criticism that "the very presence of the United Nations mission, past a certain point, delayed the maturing of Kosovo’s own governing bodies").
Iraqi Constitution by popular referendum in October 2005. Though at the time of this writing the legitimacy was fragile and contingent on a number of factors (including, for example, the ability of the Iraqi Special Tribunal to provide fair and impartial trials of Saddam Hussein and former members of his government for crimes committed during the Baathist regime), this legitimacy was founded not in the procedural neutrality of the decision to invade (which was decidedly not a neutral decision) but in the ability of the intervention to create substantive legitimacy. Success, it seems, not only breeds success, but in the case of international security, breeds legitimacy. In other words, legitimacy is not fixed at the point of Council authorization under its enforcement powers, but is itself a function of the effectiveness of the intervention.

5. The U.N. Has Comparative Advantage in Assessment, Sanctions and Civil Administration

As the debate in early 2005 over whether and how much to intervene in the Darfur demonstrates, the Security Council process is not particularly well-suited to the deployment of force in response to fast-moving crises. Only when an interested state or group of states brings its own strategic interests and a commitment to contribute troops to the workings of the Council, does it tend to act. This problem can be traced directly to the failure to establish a military committee as originally envisioned in the Charter as well as the mixed political-legal nature of Council decision-making. As the cases of Kosovo and Iraq demonstrate, military interventions by ad hoc coalitions can be more effective in carrying out immediate aims (the capitulation of Milosevic, ousting of the Hussein regime) because those interventions take place under unified command structures among states that already cooperate militarily. Similarly, the INTERFET operation in East Timor was, for all purposes, an Australian military operation.

The U.N., however, has capacity and competence in other areas, particularly assessment, sanctions and post-conflict peacekeeping, policing and administration. This suggests that even where agreement on the rules governing military intervention may be difficult to reach, efforts should be made to improve and strengthen these functions at the U.N.

313. This sense of legitimacy can be evidenced in public statements made by Germany and France following the election.


315. For a discussion of a military committee, see supra notes 34 and 119.

Iraq demonstrates, for example, that sustained oversight by the Council of inspections and assessment regimes can result in relatively accurate fact-finding. In East Timor, the U.N. was extraordinarily successful at assessing human rights violations, humanitarian needs and the modalities for carrying out the election. Kosovo demonstrates that, when an effective regional organization has the capacity to act in assessing threats, the U.N. can usefully piggy-back on those efforts. Sanctions against Iraq were more or less effective in shutting down certain military capacity. The same can be said in Kosovo, although there, the embargoes had the effect of locking in disparities of military capacity between the parties.

In post-conflict administration, the U.N. has done well in securing initial transitions to peace (East Timor and Kosovo), in supporting reconstruction of civil society (East Timor and Kosovo) and in running elections (East Timor, Kosovo and a supporting role in Iraq). One reason why the U.N. may be better at post-conflict civil operations than an ad hoc coalition is rooted in both operational capacity and the legitimacy rationale; those affected by war see the U.N., more or less, as a neutral actor in the reconstruction process.

IV. Conclusion

The taxonomy assists in understanding and analyzing the functions of multilateralism in war and demonstrates that the functions through which the U.N. organization works in support of that aggregated legal mandate are dispersed and carried out by many bodies. It therefore presents a way to overcome the problem of over-inclusiveness of data and over-ascription of causation and sets out a framework for comparative empirical examination of multilateralism in armed conflicts. International lawyers can benefit from deeper engagement with empirical work that assesses the relative competencies of institutions and actors (unilateral and multilateral) within each of the functions. In that regard, this study is intended to raise observations that can serve as testable hypotheses. It also raises additional questions. How, for example, have the institutional functions represented in the taxonomy been carried out in different types of conflicts, e.g., wars of secession, civil conflict and wars of independence? How can the taxonomy be used in the context of non-state threats to international peace and security, e.g., terrorism and organized crime?

The place to start answering these and other questions is through a function-by-function examination, done against the backdrop of the centrality of legal and normative authority of the Council. From the point of view of reforming the rules and laws of the security multilateralism, em-

317. Additional research on the rules and processes governing intelligence collection and cooperation would be useful in this regard.

318. See Dobbins, supra note 316, at xxx (noting that U.N. “has an ability to compensate, to some degree at least, for its ‘hard’ power deficit with ‘soft’ power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality,” whereas United States does not have those advantages when it carries out military mandates).
phasis in future research should be on how, precisely, each of the functions performs against the measure of preventing or shortening wars. In the areas I have identified where the Council's aggregated authority and ability to marshal diverse actors within the U.N.—assessment, sanctions and post-conflict civil administration—future studies aimed at analyzing these functions across a larger set of cases would be useful in identifying problems with either the norms or practice of the U.N.