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THE HOUSE THAT TAXPAYERS BUILT: EXPLORING THE RISE IN PUBLICLY FUNDED BASEBALL STADIUMS FROM 1953 THROUGH THE PRESENT*

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Sixty years ago, Cleveland Municipal Stadium was the only publicly funded Major League Baseball ("MLB") stadium in the United States.¹ Today, however, most MLB teams play in publicly funded stadiums.² Local governments pay on average between seventy and eighty percent of the costs of new stadium construction.³ In addition, local governments often subsidize the costs of roads and infrastructure that surround these new stadiums.⁴

This imbalance in the relationship between MLB and the American city has emerged as a result of MLB's successful monopo-
lization of the premier, professional baseball market.\textsuperscript{5} Thus, if a particular host city refuses to build its MLB team a new stadium, the team's owners could credibly threaten to move to another city, thus depriving the non-subsidizing city of any access to premier, professional baseball.\textsuperscript{6}

This Article explains how MLB club-owners use their control over the market for premier, professional baseball to demand free public stadiums. Part I of this Article explains how the United States has moved from having just one publicly funded MLB stadium (pre-1950s) to having over twenty-five publicly funded stadiums (present). Part II shows how, in recent years, MLB club-owners have continued to demand more money from their host cities and how host cities generally succumb to MLB club-owners' demands.

\section{The History of Publicly Funded Baseball Stadiums}

\subsection{A "Brave" New World: Milwaukee Decides to Build a Stadium for a Team to Be Named Later}

Although the Cleveland Indians played their Sunday afternoon games at Municipal Stadium beginning in 1932, the era of publicly

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{5} See id. at 37; see also \textsc{Michael Leeds \& Peter Von Allmen}, \textit{The Economics of Sports} 111-12, 154-55 (2d ed. 2005); \textsc{Rodney Fort}, \textit{Direct Democracy and the Stadium Mess}, \textit{in Sports, Jobs \& Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums} 149-50 (Roger G. Noll \& Andrew Zimbalist eds. 1997); \textsc{Rodney Fort}, \textit{Sports Economics} 140 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter \textit{Sports Economics}]; \textit{Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S.952 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 11 (1999) (statement of Andrew Zimbalist)]; \textsc{Andrew Zimbalist}, \textit{May the Best Team Win: Baseball Economics and Public Policy} 123-24 (Brookings Institution 2003); \textsc{Marc Edelman \& C. Keith Harrison}, \textit{Analyzing the WNBA's Mandatory Age/Education Policy from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective: Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape}, \textit{3 NW. J. L. \& Soc. POL'Y} 1, 23, 77 (2008) (indicating that even certain other sports leagues such as the WNBA may at times act as monopolists).
\item \textsuperscript{6} See \textit{Sports and the City, supra} note 2, at 37, 68; \textsc{Leeds \& von Allmen, supra} note 5, at 141; \textsc{James Quirk \& Rodney D. Fort}, \textit{Hard Ball: The Abuse of Power in Pro Sports Teams} 6 (Princeton University Press 1999) [hereinafter \textit{Hard Ball}]; see also \textsc{Marc Edelman}, \textit{How to Curb Professional Sports' Bargaining Power Vis-\-à-\-Vis the American City}, \textit{2 VA. SPORTS \& ENT. L.J.} 280, 280 (2003) [hereinafter \textit{How to Curb}].
\end{itemize}

The mayors of American cities are confronted with a prisoner's dilemma of sorts. If no mayor succumbs to the demands of a franchise shopping for a new home then the team will stay where they are. This, however, is unlikely to happen because if Mayor A is not willing to pay the price, Mayor B may think it is advantageous to open up the city's wallet. Then to protect his or her interest, Mayor A often ends up paying the demanded price.

\textit{How to Curb, supra}, at 280.
funded baseball stadiums truly began in the early 1950s. Around that time, rapid changes in demographics (primarily Americans moving westward) and the advent of new technologies (particularly airplanes and the television) resulted in increased demands for American cities to host MLB teams. MLB, however, decided not to expand into new markets to meet this demand.

Frustrated by the inability to secure a MLB team, the city of Milwaukee decided in 1950 to build a public, multipurpose stadium even though it did not yet have a team to play there. Upon breaking ground on this stadium, city officials immediately offered use of the stadium, free of rent, to any MLB club-owner that would agree to move their team to the Brew City.

After numerous MLB club-owners rejected Milwaukee's offer, on March 13, 1953, Braves owner Lou Perini announced plans to move his team from Boston to Milwaukee. This move marked the first time since the signing of the Major League Agreement in 1903 that a MLB team relocated. It also marked the true start to MLB's public stadium era.

B. If You Build It, They Will Come: Other Cities Follow Milwaukee's Lead in Wooing MLB Teams

The Braves' move to Milwaukee was both daring and unprecedented. It also paid immediate dividends. Not only did Perini's team receive free use of a new stadium, but the Braves also enjoyed a new and vibrant fan base. During their first season in Milwaukee, the Braves sold 1.8 million tickets — more than six times as

8. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 285 (noting that the demand for MLB teams grew as people moved west and technology increased).
9. See id.
10. See id. (noting that Milwaukee built a multi-purpose stadium without having any professional sports teams to play in it).
11. See id.
13. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 285-86.
14. See id.
16. For a further discussion about how the Braves' move paid immediate dividends, see infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
17. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286.
During each of the next four years, the Braves performed even better—enjoying annual attendance figures that each season exceeded two million fans.\textsuperscript{19}

Other MLB club-owners took notice of the Braves’ success in Milwaukee and began to pursue their own plans to enter new markets in exchange for free stadiums.\textsuperscript{20} On September 28, 1953, the St. Louis Browns (a team that actually had moved to St. Louis from Milwaukee in 1902) relocated to Baltimore, where they became known as the Orioles.\textsuperscript{21} Then, the following year, the Athletics left a shared market in Philadelphia for a new home in Kansas City.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1958, both the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Giants decided to make even more drastic moves—leaving behind their established markets in the New York City boroughs in favor of new and emerging markets in California.\textsuperscript{23} Specifically, the Dodgers moved to Los Angeles in exchange for the promise of prime real estate.\textsuperscript{24} Meanwhile, the Giants went to San Francisco with the hope of landing a new, publicly financed stadium, which the city eventually built and named Candlestick Park.\textsuperscript{25}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 18. Id.
  \item 20. \textit{See} How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286-87.
  \item 22. \textit{See} Oakland Athletics, Athletics Timeline, http://oakland.athletics.mlb.com/oak/history/timeline3.jsp (last visited May 11, 2009). Upon accepting Kansas City’s offer to host their team, the Athletics announced that they would play their games at Municipal Stadium—a stadium that was initially built in 1923 for both a Negro League team and minor league baseball team, but which city officials promised to substantially renovate in time for the MLB season. \textit{See} K.C. Municipal Stadium: Ballparks of Baseball, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/past/KCMunicipal.htm (last visited May 6, 2009).
  \item 23. \textit{See} How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286-87.
  \item 24. \textit{See} id. (noting that the Brooklyn Dodgers left New York City in return for premier real estate in Los Angeles).
\end{itemize}
C. Show Me the Money: MLB Clubs Begin to Demand Subsidies from their Current Host Cities

As each of these five MLB teams thrived in their new markets, other cities began to request MLB teams as well; however, MLB club-owners decided not to expand into these markets. Through expanding into new markets would have allowed the existing MLB club-owners to obtain lucrative franchise fees from new ownership groups, not expanding proved to be even more profitable because it allowed the existing club-owners to extort huge subsidies from their current host communities, which feared that if they did not pay these subsidies, they would lose their teams to other cities that were willing to pay them.

From a MLB club-owner’s standpoint, the only real risk of not expanding was that it opened the door for an entirely new baseball league to form in these untapped markets. Indeed, in 1959, New York lawyer William Shea and former Dodgers general manager Branch Rickey announced plans to launch a rival baseball league, which they planned to call the Continental League, and which would have placed teams in New York City to replace the Dodgers and Giants, as well as in other cities that had recently been denied expansion teams. However, ultimately, in August of 1960, it was agreed that the Continental League would not launch subject to MLB’s promise to expand its total number of teams from sixteen to twenty-four. Since then, due to the high fixed costs of launching


29. See Sports Economics, supra note 5, at 134.

30. See Jerold J. Duquette, Regulating the National Pastime: Baseball and Antitrust 53-54 (Praeger Publishers 1999); James P. Quirk & Rodney D. Fort, Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports 479-87 (Princeton University Press 1997) [hereinafter Pay Dirt] (explaining that MLB added eight new teams in the years from 1962-69, with new teams beginning play in New York City; Houston; San Diego; Montreal; Los Angeles; Washington, D.C.; Seattle and Kansas City); Sports Economics, supra note 5, at 134, 148 (discussing how leaving viable locations without teams increases the risk of new leagues forming).
a new league, no other group has put forth a serious proposal to compete directly against MLB.\textsuperscript{31}

II. PUBLICLY FUNDED BASEBALL STADIUMS TODAY

Since MLB's last wide-scale expansion in the 1960s,\textsuperscript{32} a new series of on-hold cities have emerged seeking to acquire MLB teams.\textsuperscript{33} These cities include Charlotte, NC; Las Vegas, NV; Norfolk, VA; and Portland, OR.\textsuperscript{34} Consequently, much like in 1960, the demand to host a MLB team today is once again far greater than the supply of teams. Hence, American cities continue to fund on average between seventy and eighty percent of the costs of new MLB stadiums.\textsuperscript{35}

As compared to the 1960s, however, the American city today has even less bargaining power in terms of negotiating stadium agreements.\textsuperscript{36} One example of how the American city is worse off today is that cities today pay a far greater total dollar amount in subsidies, even after accounting for inflation.\textsuperscript{37} For instance, the most expensive MLB stadium built or refurbished prior to 1968, the Houston Astrodome, cost taxpayers just $38,000.\textsuperscript{38} By contrast, the Washington Nationals' new, publicly funded stadium, which

\textsuperscript{31.} See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 286 (noting that there is a very low likelihood of a new, startup professional baseball league competing against MLB given the high fixed costs of entry).


\textsuperscript{33.} See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 290.


\textsuperscript{35.} See, e.g., Michael Cunningham, Stadium Deal Just Doesn't Make Sense: Money Could Be Used on Much More Important Priorities, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 2008, at 1C (evaluating stadium subsidy percentages since 1992); see also ZIMBALIST, supra note 5, at 96 tbl.1 (detailing expenditures on new sports facilities for professional teams by decade); SPORTS ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 338 (finding that from 2000 to 2006 the median public contribution for a new sports stadium was sixty-three percent, and noting that this figure is skewed downward because it includes the San Francisco Giants' nearly privately financed stadium).

\textsuperscript{36.} For a further discussion about the American city's bargaining power, see infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{38.} See PAY DIRT, supra note 30, at 161-63.
opened in April 2008, cost taxpayers an astounding $611 million.\(^{39}\) Meanwhile, the Seattle Mariners’ new ballpark, Safeco Field, which opened in 1999, cost taxpayers $372 million.\(^{40}\) Also, the Florida Marlins’ proposed new ballpark, which is under construction and expected to open in 2012, will cost taxpayers an estimated $357 million.\(^{41}\)

In addition to the increasing total cost that most MLB cities are paying toward building new ballparks, MLB club-owners have also begun to negotiate for themselves a greater share of the revenues derived from these ballparks – including revenues derived from off-season events such as concerts, and from the sale of stadium naming rights. For instance, a covenant in Miami-Dade County’s recent agreement to build a new ballpark for the Florida Marlins will provide the Marlins ownership group with one hundred percent of the proceeds from the new stadium’s naming rights and non-baseball related revenues, even though the Marlins club-owners are paying less than thirty percent of the ballpark construction costs.\(^{42}\)

Finally, MLB club-owners are no longer even willing to share publicly funded stadiums with National Football League (“NFL”) teams; instead, they are demanding that their host cities build separate stadiums for baseball and football.\(^{43}\) Thus, over the past two decades, most cities with both MLB and NFL teams have obtained separate publicly funded stadiums, almost always located within a few blocks of one another.\(^{44}\) Whereas as many as twenty MLB teams shared their stadiums with local NFL teams in 1989, only three


\(^{41}\) *Sports and the City*, supra note 2, at 35.

\(^{42}\) *Id.* at 45.


\(^{44}\) *See How to Curb*, supra note 6, at 286 (commenting that cities have moved away from multi-purpose stadiums and now most MLB teams have individual stadiums).
MLB teams do so today (the Florida Marlins, Minnesota Twins and Oakland Athletics). By 2012, this number is expected to drop down to one, as both the city of Minneapolis and Miami-Dade County are in the process of building new baseball-only stadiums.

III. CONCLUSION

Even before American cities began to publicly fund baseball stadiums, owning a MLB team was considered to be a very lucrative investment. Historically teams such as the New York Yankees have earned a rate of return double that of a diversified investment portfolio. In addition, teams such as the Brooklyn Dodgers have turned a profit on the sale of their franchise even during America's darkest financial periods such as the Great Depression.

Today, in an era in which most cities provide their MLB club-owners with publicly funded stadiums and increasingly luxurious ones at that, MLB club-owners are financially doing better than ever – thus, calling into doubt any fair market need for subsidies.

The Great Recession of 2008-09 has wiped out more than fifty percent of the common American’s savings, left the nation with an unemployment rate that exceeds 8.5%, and left states such as California on the brink of bankruptcy. In this economic climate, pro-


47. See Sports and the City, supra note 2, at 45-46.

48. See SPORTS ECONOMICS, supra note 5, at 1-2 (showing that since 1915 owning the New York Yankees has provided, on average, twice as large a rate of return as owning a diversified portfolio).

49. See How to Curb, supra note 6, at 285 (noting that the Brooklyn Dodgers franchise value upon sale increased from $200,000 in 1912 to $4,200,000 in 1950).

50. See California City Moves Closer to Bankruptcy Filing, BLOOMBERG.COM, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajxCNoS2DEzE (last visited May 1, 2009) (noting the causes of possible bankruptcy in California); see also Socio-Economics History Blog, California Economy Near Collapse – Pension Funds Close to Bankruptcy, http://socioeconomyhistory.wordpress.com/2009/02/02/california-economy-near-collapse-pension-funds-close-to-bankruptcy/ (last visited May 1, 2009). Nonetheless, MLB club-owners such as Jeffrey Loria of the Florida Marlins have spent recent months continuing to push forward with their demands for new publicly financed ballparks, and communities such as Miami-Dade County have continued to succumb to baseball club-owners' stadium demands. See Sports and the City, supra note 2, at 35-37; see also Brian Hamacher & Todd Wright, Play Ball! Marlins...
viding public subsidies to already wealthy MLB club-owners seems all the more controversial.

U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (former R-PA), in his 1999 testimony before Congress, described the way in which MLB club-owners use their monopoly power to obtain stadium subsidies as "legalized extortion." 51 While this is a strong claim, there is an element of truth to it: American cities would not subsidize sports stadiums if not for the monopolist control that MLB has over the total supply of professional baseball teams.

Thus, now is the time to change the relationship between Major League Baseball and the American city into something more palatable to the local taxpayer. Either the U.S. government must curb the monopoly power of MLB as exercised by its club-owners to obtain publicly funded stadiums, or it must pass a bill to protect American taxpayers from inequitable stadium financing arrangements.

In either event, some action is needed to better align the benefits and burdens of building new MLB stadiums. Otherwise, America's national pastime may begin to lose its pristine image in the eyes of many taxpayers and fans. And, once lost, the glory of Major League Baseball might disappear forever.

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