Puff, Puff, Tax: Internal Revenue Code Section 280E Penalizes State-Sanctioned Marijuana Companies and Undermines the Ability-To-Pay Principle

Joseph E. Thomas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr

Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss2/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
2021]

PUFF, PUFF, TAX: INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 280E PENALIZES STATE-SANCTIONED MARIJUANA COMPANIES AND UNDERMINES THE ABILITY-TO-PAY PRINCIPLE

JOSEPH E. THOMAS*

I. HASHING IT OUT: AN INTRODUCTION

Picture this: you go into business selling floral arrangements. You rent a small storefront, hire employees, and advertise the store. You purchase flowers in bulk, and your employees prepare the flowers for the retail floor. The employees inspect the flowers and remove any they cannot sell. They trim the leaves, stems, and thorns, arrange bouquets, and package them for sale. Your business is a hit, and in one year your store brings in $1 million in sales! When you file your federal taxes, you exclude the cost of the flowers and deduct rent, employee salaries, and advertising costs from the $1 million in sales and pay taxes on the remaining balance.¹

Now picture this: the following year, instead of floral arrangements, you sell marijuana flower (legally, under state law, of course).² Similarly, you purchase the marijuana in bulk, and your employees inspect the marijuana and reject any unsuitable buds. They trim the marijuana, package it, and label it before it reaches the retail floor. Your marijuana business is

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.F.A. in Acting, 2013, California Institute of the Arts. I dedicate this Comment to the memory of my mother, Joanne Thomas. Thanks to Professor Jane Voegle, Professor Leslie Book, and Professor Orli Oren-Kolbinger for their thoughtful critiques. Lastly, I would like to recognize my entire family for their unwavering love. And above all, thanks to God, without whom my existence would be fruitless.

¹ In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) reduced the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21%. See H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, at 343 (2017). To avoid double taxation of profits (i.e., once at the corporate level, and again when the profit is distributed to shareholders), many businesses are structured as pass-through entities, such as a limited liability company (LLC) or an S-Corp. See Forming a Corporation, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/forming-a-corporation [https://perma.cc/9WY6-799T] (last updated Mar. 12, 2021). Pass-through entities avoid double taxation because income “passes through” to the owner who reports it on their personal tax return. See generally Topic No. 407 Business Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc407 [https://perma.cc/3B9J-2A2M] (last updated Mar. 5, 2021) (explaining various ways businesses may be taxed). Addressing equitable concerns surrounding the tax rate reduction for corporations, the TCJA also enacted a temporary 20% business deduction for qualifying pass-through entities. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, at 205–24.

² Marijuana flower, also commonly referred to as “buds,” are part of the marijuana plant people can smoke. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 179 (2018).
also a hit and brings in $1 million in sales. When you file your taxes this year, however, you may exclude only the cost of the marijuana from your sales. The ordinary and necessary business deductions you took last year for rent, employee salaries, and advertising are disallowed by section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) because you “trafficked” marijuana.\(^3\) As a result, your tax bill is significantly higher than in the previous year.

To add insult to injury, you might not even have enough profit to pay the taxes due. Assume your cost for the marijuana was $300,000. If the cost to rent the storefront was $200,000, employee salaries totaled $300,000, and advertising cost $100,000, you would have a $100,000 profit.\(^4\) But because section 280E disallows all of your deductions, you will be taxed as if you had a $700,000 profit.\(^5\) Applying a 21% corporate income tax rate, you would owe $147,000 in federal income tax that year.\(^6\) Having already paid your landlord, employees, and advertiser, your actual $100,000 profit would fall $47,000 short, not including state income taxes that your business would also owe. Had you instead continued to sell flower arrangements, you would be permitted to deduct your business expenses and would owe only $21,000 in federal income tax.

Section 280E results in an oppressive tax burden that unfairly penalizes marijuana companies. The provision certainly cuts against the longstanding principle that income tax should coincide with a taxpayer’s ability to pay, regardless of whether section 280E is a prohibited penalty.\(^7\) Such is the plight of marijuana companies which, on one hand, operate legally under state law, and on the other hand, traffic in illegal controlled substances under federal law.\(^8\)

---

3. Section 280E provides:
   No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is conducted.


4. $1,000,000 (gross receipts) - $300,000 (cost of goods sold) - $200,000 (rent) - $300,000 (salaries) - $100,000 (advertising) = $100,000 actual profit.

5. $1,000,000 (gross receipts) - $300,000 (cost of goods sold) = $700,000 taxable income when section 280E applies.


7. For a further discussion of the ability-to-pay principle, see infra notes 26–43 and accompanying text.

Marijuana companies provide societal benefits, such as jobs and tax revenue. Additionally, patients with chronic conditions rely on medical marijuana to manage their symptoms. Congress should amend section 280E to exclude marijuana companies that operate legally under state law. Otherwise, legitimate marijuana companies may be taxed out of business, which would strengthen the illegal drug trade. Part II of this Comment provides background on federal income taxation and tax policy, including the history of section 280E. Part III discusses case law arising from two marijuana dispensaries challenging section 280E. Part IV critiques the Tax Court’s holdings in favor of section 280E and Congress’s failure to amend the outdated code section. Lastly, Part V discusses how states and citizens would be negatively impacted by the continued enforcement of section 280E.

II. THAT’S GROW BIZ: A CANNABIS-INFUSED LESSON ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress to “lay and collect taxes.” Additionally, the Sixteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to “lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived.” To calculate taxes due, a business owner begins by computing the business’s gross receipts, which generally equals the total amount the business received from sales. The business owner then excludes the cost of goods sold from gross receipts to determine the business’s gross income. Typically, business owners can subsequently deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses from gross income to arrive at their taxable income. Lastly, the taxpayer multiplies taxable income by

appears as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act. See id. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Schedule I drugs have a high potential for abuse and have no currently accepted medical use. See id. Other Schedule I drugs include heroin, LSD, ecstasy, and peyote. See id.

9. For a further discussion of the benefits marijuana companies provide in communities where marijuana has been legalized, see infra notes 188–99 and accompanying text.

10. For a list of medical conditions that qualify for medical marijuana treatment, see infra note 198 and accompanying text.


12. U.S. Const. amend. XVI (emphasis added).

13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.993-6 (1977). Gross receipts also include gross income recognized from other sources, such as the furnishing of services, or the sale of any property that is not part of the ordinary course of business. Id. § 1.993-6(a)(2).


15. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2018) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . .”).
the applicable tax rate to ascertain how much income tax is due. The following is a discussion on the “ability-to-pay” tax principle that has shaped the United States tax system, adjustments that businesses make to gross income when determining their taxable income, and the history of section 280E since its enactment.

A. Harvesting the Green: Congress’s Power to Tax

Before Congress can exercise its taxation powers, it must first consider what constitutes “income.” Various policies and principles have influenced the way Congress taxes income, but only the ability-to-pay principle has withstood the test of time.

1. What Exactly Is Income?

Congress’s Sixteenth Amendment authority to collect taxes on “incomes” has been the basis of numerous legal controversies. For example, what qualifies as income? Does having income require a finding that the taxpayer realized gain or profit? In Eisner v. Macomber, the Supreme Court defined income as “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.” In tax, gain is recognized to the extent that a seller’s amount realized exceeds the seller’s adjusted basis in the property sold. To illustrate: if A purchases a car for $5,000, A’s basis in the car is $5,000. If A then sells the car to B for $6,000, A’s amount realized is $6,000, which exceeds A’s basis in the car by $1,000. Therefore, A recognizes a gain of $1,000.

Nearly three decades after Eisner, the Supreme Court held in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. that Eisner’s definition of income “was not

17. For a further discussion regarding the definition of “income,” see infra Section II.A.1.
18. For a further discussion of the ability-to-pay principle, see infra Section II.A.2.
19. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (determining whether pro rata stock dividend could be taxed as “income” under the Sixteenth Amendment); see also Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (determining whether punitive damages awarded in lawsuit was income for tax purposes).
21. Id. at 207 (emphasis added) (quoting Stratton’s Indep., Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
22. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2018). Amount realized is the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property received in an exchange of property. Id. § 1001(b). Basis, which is sometimes referred to as cost basis, is equal to what the seller originally paid to obtain ownership of the property. Id. § 1012(a). Basis can sometimes be adjusted upward or downward, however, the mechanics of adjusted basis are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally id. § 1016.
meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.”24 The Court’s broadening of *Eisner* seems to give Congress unbridled power to classify any income as gross income, yet, whether “gain” is an essential ingredient of “income” is still up for debate.25

2. *Ability-To-Pay Tax Principle*

For over a century, policymakers have recognized that taxation should correspond to a taxpayer’s ability to pay.26 The ability-to-pay principle is a fundamental standard of equitable taxation, and it is reflected in our progressive individual and corporate income tax system.27 A progressive system taxes individuals on the amount of income they earn.28 As a taxpayer’s income increases, they are taxed at a higher rate.29

Although no universally accepted measure of a taxpayer’s ability to pay exists, a logical and objective approach considers the net income of
the taxpayer.30 Income represents an individual’s earning power, and net income corresponds with how much income is at the taxpayer’s disposal after “costs of subsistence” are deducted from gross income.31 Congress would not accurately measure a taxpayer’s ability to pay if it instead measured taxes by the amount of property the taxpayer holds.32 Property is often encumbered by debts, so the fair market value of property is a poor indication of taxable capacity.33 For property ownership to fairly reflect ability to pay, the taxing body would need to apply complicated adjustments for each taxpayer.34 The administration of such a tax would be impracticable.35 Likewise, a tax based on consumption alone (i.e., sales tax) would inequitably favor upper income groups.36 Low-income groups spend nearly all of their income to meet their basic needs, while upper income groups comparatively spend a smaller proportion of their income and are able to divert a considerable amount of their income to savings.37 Thus, low-income groups would bear a greater relative tax burden than

30. See Alfred G. Buchler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243, 243 (1946) (“Attempts have been made to measure ability in terms of the pain or sacrifice caused by taxation, others have resorted to such objective tests as net income, property, or consumer expenditures . . .”).


32. See Buchler, supra note 30, at 250 (recognizing shortcomings in methods of measuring taxable income). In addition to income tax, some states also impose ad valorem taxes on tangible personal property such as vehicles. See Garrett Watson, States Should Continue to Reform Taxes on Tangible Personal Property, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/tangible-personal-property-tax/ [https://perma.cc/9HJ3-AV7H] (providing overview of state taxes imposed on personal property). State and local taxation is beyond the scope of this Comment.

33. See Buchler, supra note 30, at 250 (summarizing complications with taxing personal property).

34. See id. at 251 (considering administrative burden of federal tax on personal property).

35. See id. For the past couple of decades, the severely underfunded IRS has struggled to collect unpaid taxes, issue timely refunds, and perform adequate customer service. Sarah Skidmore Sell, Underfunded IRS Struggles to Send Refunds, Answer Calls, Associated Press News (Jan. 8, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/aad7a3baaaf338272e157bae07668ed43 [https://perma.cc/L66C-VRJT]. The already overburdened IRS would likely experience great difficulty administering a federal tax on personal property, let alone one with complex adjustments to satisfy the ability-to-pay principle. See id.

36. Buchler, supra note 30, at 250. A consumption tax does not tax returns from capital investments, such as dividends or gains from the sale of stock. See Who Bears the Burden of a National Retail Sales Tax?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/who-bears-burden-national-retail-sales-tax [https://perma.cc/38HX-T9TJ] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021) (summarizing consumption tax). “[I]ncome from capital makes up a larger portion of the total income of high-income households.” Id. Thus, a tax system based purely on consumption would unjustly benefit high-income households, while low-income households would carry a disproportional tax burden. See id.

37. See Buchler, supra note 30, at 250.
those in upper income groups. Indeed, the ability of an individual to pay taxes can best be measured by net income from all sources after taking into account the taxpayer’s economic obligations.

Individuals and businesses are not entirely governed by the same tax code provisions, so the ability-to-pay principle faces different considerations when taxing business entities. In the case of corporate taxation, where profits are taxed initially at the corporate level and again when dividends are distributed to shareholders, taxation on the basis of profit alone is inequitable. Instead, the rate of the corporation’s return would be a more accurate and fair representation of its ability to pay. Taxation according to rates of return, however, requires significantly more administrative resources from both the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and is therefore highly impracticable.

B. Trimming the Buds: Tax Deductions and Exclusions

Businesses make numerous adjustments while “trimming” their gross income to determine their taxable income. In most instances, Congress can exercise “legislative grace” to allow or deny deductions from gross income. In contrast, deducting Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) is constitutionally mandated and cannot be disallowed by Congress. The method for calculating COGS differs between businesses that manufacture and produce goods, and businesses that merely resell goods.

38. See id.
39. See id. at 243–44 (concluding that net income is the most accurate measure of taxpayers’ ability to pay). This Comment argues section 280E disregards the ability-to-pay principle because by disallowing all deductions, it ignores net income and instead taxes marijuana companies on an amount that more closely resembles gross income. See supra Part I. As illustrated by the hypothetical in Part I, when a marijuana business is taxed on some measure of income other than net income, the business might not have the ability to pay its taxes after meeting its other economic obligations. See id.
41. See Buehler, supra note 30, at 255–56 (acknowledging shortcomings of ability-to-pay principle in corporate taxation).
42. See id. at 255.
43. See id. at 256 (acknowledging administrative burden of corporate tax based on rate of return). Unlike corporations, pass-through entities avoid ability-to-pay inequity because the owner of a pass-through entity is taxed at the same progressive income rates as individual wage earners. For a further discussion about ordinary income brackets, see supra note 28. For a further discussion of the taxation of pass-through entities, see supra note 1.
44. For a further discussion of Congress’s ability to allow or deny deductions, see infra Section II.B.1.
45. For a further discussion of COGS, see infra Section II.B.2.
46. For a further discussion of various ways businesses calculate COGS, see infra Section II.B.3.
1. **Ordinary and Necessary Business Deductions and Legislative Grace**

Generally, taxpayers who carry on a trade or business may deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses from gross income under section 162 of the IRC. Common business expenses include employee salaries, rental payments for retail or storage space, advertising, and travel expenses. Even taxpayers who own and operate illegal enterprises may take ordinary and necessary business deductions, unless specifically forbidden by statute. Absent a statute disallowing deductions, the Supreme Court has prohibited section 162 deductions in circumstances where the deductions would frustrate public policy. Additionally, a taxpayer cannot deduct fines or penalties incurred by violating a federal or state statute. Congress eventually codified these public policy concerns in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The amended section 162 forbids deductions for illegal payments such as bribes or kickbacks, amounts paid to lobby politicians, and payments of fines or penalties incurred from violating the law.


48. See id. § 162(a)(1)–(3) (stating allowable business expenses). IRS Schedule C of Form 1040 is used by sole proprietors to report income or losses from their business. See 2020 Instructions for Schedule C, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1040sc (last updated Jan. 14, 2021). Schedule C demonstrates the breadth of business expenses that are deductible under section 162. See id. Sole proprietors can deduct expenses of operating their car or truck, contract labor, depletion, depreciation, costs of employee benefit programs, business insurance, professional fees charged by accountants and attorneys, office supplies and postage, rented or leased equipment, incidental repairs and maintenance, materials and supplies, certain taxes, travel and lodging expenses, business meals, utilities, and salaries and wages. See id. Section 280E prevents marijuana business owners from deducting any of these expenses. See I.R.C. § 280E. To view the statutory language of section 280E, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.


51. See id. at 160–61 (discussing Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30, 34 (1958), which disallowed a trucking company’s deductions for traffic fines incurred from driving overweight trucks).

52. See id. at 162 (“Although this amendment would coexist with the recognized, judicially-created public policy exception, Congress also intended ‘its codified version of the public policy doctrine to completely occupy this area of the tax law.’ “) (quoting Charles A. Boreck, *The Public Policy Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need for Consistency in Denying Deductions Arising from Illegal Activities*, 22 U. BALTIMORE L. REV. 45, 55–56 (1992)).

53. I.R.C. § 162(c), (e)–(f) (prohibiting deductions for payments of fines or penalties).
Notably, in the amended section 162 provisions, the denied deductions focus squarely on the illegality of the payment itself, completely ignoring the legality or illegality of the underlying business giving rise to the payment.\textsuperscript{54} For example, an illegal brothel that pays a bribe to the local sheriff is prohibited from deducting the cost of the bribe from its gross income not because the brothel operates illegally, but because the bribe itself is an illegal payment.\textsuperscript{55} Although the bribe is disallowed, the brothel can still deduct other business expenses under section 162.\textsuperscript{56} Section 280E, on the other hand, disallows all deductions because of the underlying illegality of the marijuana businesses; a stark contrast to section 162’s statutory scheme.\textsuperscript{57}

The Supreme Court has recognized that “[d]eductions are a matter of grace and Congress can . . . disallow them as it chooses.”\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, the Court seems to relinquish the matter entirely to Congress, saying that if deductions must be disallowed, “Congress should do it.”\textsuperscript{59} But there are differences of opinion as to how far Congress’s grace extends.\textsuperscript{60} In \textit{Davis v. United States},\textsuperscript{61} the Second Circuit acknowledged Congress’s discretion to grant or allow deductions, but distinguished a nondiscretionary class of deductions that “are inherently necessary as a matter of computation to arrive at income.”\textsuperscript{62} The Second Circuit viewed computationally necessary deductions as non-discretionary, but supported Congress’s discretion with regard to non-computational deductions,\textsuperscript{63} so long as Congress’s discretion does not violate other constitutional provisions.\textsuperscript{64}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} See Keller, supra note 50, at 163 (contrasting illegal payments with illegal businesses).
\item \textsuperscript{55} See, e.g., Toner v. Comm’r, Nos. 10826-80, 13639-80, 1990 WL 154691, at *6–7 (T.C. Oct. 17, 1990) (finding illegal massage parlor and prostitution operation was permitted to deduct necessary business expenses from gross income).
\item \textsuperscript{56} See id. (citing case where illegal business was allowed to deduct business expenses).
\item \textsuperscript{57} Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . .”), with § 280E (“No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business . . . consists of trafficking in controlled substances . . . which is prohibited by Federal law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
\item \textsuperscript{58} Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
\item \textsuperscript{59} See id. at 29.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Compare Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 324–25 (2d Cir. 1937) (asserting that deductions necessary for computing net income are not subject to Congress’s discretion), with N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 70 (2019) (“Deductions from gross income do not turn on equitable considerations; rather they are pure acts of legislative grace, the prudence of which is left to Congress.”).
\item \textsuperscript{61} 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1937).
\item \textsuperscript{62} Id. at 324–25 (comparing computational deductions with purely gratuitous deductions).
\item \textsuperscript{63} See id. at 325 (declaring non-computational deductions such as state and local taxes paid or personal exemptions for taxpayers and their dependents not necessary to determine income). The Second Circuit’s distinction in \textit{Davis played
\end{itemize}
2. **Cost of Goods Sold: An Exception to Legislative Grace**

While deductions are a matter of legislative grace, Congress may not prevent the exclusion of COGS from gross receipts. COGS is an accounting term that refers to the amount a business paid for the inventory it sells. In the landmark decision of [Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.](https://www.law360.com/tax-authoritative/articles/1209206/how-280e-became-the-industry-boosters-founder), the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the word “income” in the context of a manufacturer converting its capital assets to cash. The Court distinguished “capital” from “profit or income” and ruled that the return of capital was not income. Therefore, when calculating gross profit, a business owner must be permitted to exclude the cost of their inventory.

3. **Reseller or Producer: Different Ways Businesses Calculate COGS**

Businesses generally use the same equation to calculate their taxable income. But the methods used to calculate COGS can vary depending on whether the business merely resells goods or whether the business produces them. See Judge Gustafson’s dissenting opinion in [Northern California Small Business Assistants, Inc. v. N. Cal. Tax Assocs. Inc.](https://www.law360.com/tax-authoritative/articles/1209206/how-280e-became-the-industry-boosters-founder) (Gustafson, J., dissenting). The majority brushed the Davis distinction off as dicta and refused to apply it to section 280E’s disallowance of all deductions. See infra Section III.B.


66. 247 U.S. 179 (1918).

67. See id. at 184–85 (analyzing differences between return of capital and income). The plaintiff in *Doyle* was a lumber manufacturer that acquired timber lands for approximately $20 per acre in 1903. Id. at 181. By 1908, the market value of the land had increased to $40. Id. The plaintiff was subject to the Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909, which placed a 1% tax upon a corporation’s net income in excess of $5,000 from all sources derived. *Id.* at 181–82. The plaintiff calculated its net income as the difference between the original cost of the timber and the sum it received from selling the timber. *Id.* at 181. The IRS insisted that the plaintiff include the entire sum received for the timber as income for the purposes of the Act. *Id.* at 184.

68. *Id.* at 183–85. Instead of including the entire amount received in gross income and later deducting the cost of the timber, the Court held that the cost of the timber should be excluded from the outset, before gross income is calculated. See id. at 185. The Court observed that the same result is obtained through either method, but the case importantly distinguishes the exclusion of cost of goods sold, which is constitutionally mandated, from other deductible expenses, which may be subject to legislative grace. See id. at 187–88.

69. See Blackburn, *supra* note 64, at 299 (restating holding of *Doyle*).

70. See id. at 300 (“Retail merchants generally compute taxable income as follows: Gross Sales (less) Cost of Goods Sold (equals) Gross Profit; Gross Profit (plus) Other Income (equals) Gross Income; and Gross Income (less) Deductions (equals) Taxable Income.”).
duces and manufactures goods.\textsuperscript{71} COGS is determined using a three-variable formula: beginning inventories plus current-year purchases (in the case of a reseller) or current-year production costs (in the case of a producer) less ending inventories.\textsuperscript{72}

Marijuana resellers include the invoice price of marijuana in their COGS, less any discounts, plus any necessary costs of acquiring the marijuana (i.e., transportation).\textsuperscript{73} Marijuana producers calculate COGS more expansively using a different subsection of the tax code than resellers.\textsuperscript{74} A marijuana producer’s COGS includes the cost of direct materials (i.e., marijuana plants or seeds), direct labor costs (i.e., planting, cultivating, harvesting), plus certain indirect production costs (i.e., utilities, rent, tools and equipment not capitalized, costs of quality control, and inspection).\textsuperscript{75} Under current Treasury regulations, producers may also include some other costs in COGS if they appear on the business’s GAAP financial statements.\textsuperscript{76}

C. Take a Hit: The Added Strain of Section 280E

In the early 1980s, the United States Tax Court held that a drug dealer could deduct expenses related to a drug business, which prompted Congress to enact section 280E.\textsuperscript{77} As states began to legalize marijuana, marijuana companies petitioned the courts to limit the application of section 280E.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{71} Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(b) (as amended in 2018) (referring to merchandise purchased by a reseller), with § 1.471-3(c) (referring to merchandise produced by a manufacturer).

\textsuperscript{72} See Ronald Marcuson et al., The Evolving Taxation of the Marijuana Industry, 95 Taxs 7, 8 (2017).

\textsuperscript{73} See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(b).

\textsuperscript{74} Compare id. (discussing cost for merchandise purchased), with Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(c) (discussing cost for merchandise produced).

\textsuperscript{75} See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(c); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1993) (stating indirect production costs included in inventoriable costs).

\textsuperscript{76} See Marcuson et al., supra note 72, at 10 (describing benefits of producing GAAP financial statements); see also Treas. Reg. §1.471-11(c)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1993) (listing inventoriable costs). Costs pertinent to marijuana companies under Reg. §1.471-11(c)(2)(iii) include spoilage, administrative expenses related to production, and insurance costs related to production. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(c)(2)(iii). GAAP, which stands for “generally accepted accounting principles,” are accounting standards companies use to prepare their financial statements. US GAAP: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, CFA Instr., https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/advocacy/issues/gaap [https://perma.cc/YP58-PX3R] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). GAAP ensures that financial reporting is consistent from one organization to another. Id.

\textsuperscript{77} For a further discussion and analysis of the legislative history of section 280E, see infra Section II.C.1.

\textsuperscript{78} For a further discussion of cases challenging section 280E, see infra Section II.C.2.
1. Edmondson v. Commissioner—The Case That Sparked Section 280E and Its Repercussions on the Marijuana Industry

One year before Congress enacted section 280E, the United States Tax Court decided Edmondson v. Commissioner.\(^79\) Lacking an express statutory denial to the contrary, the court’s holding permitted the petitioner, a drug dealer, to deduct numerous “ordinary and necessary” expenses associated with dealing amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana under section 162.\(^80\) The petitioner was able to exclude $105,300 for the COGS and deducted business expenses, which included the purchase of a small scale, packaging expenses, phone expenses, car expenses, and one-third of the rental expense for the petitioner’s home, where they primarily sold the drugs.\(^81\)

Congress responded to Edmondson by enacting section 280E under the Tax Equity and Responsibility Act of 1982.\(^82\) Section 280E provides:

No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is conducted.\(^83\)

Congress enacted section 280E amidst the notoriously unsuccessful war on drugs.\(^84\) The legislative history of section 280E reveals Congress considered public policy in light of America’s renewed anti-drug stance of the ’70s and ’80s.\(^85\) Congress anticipated constitutional challenges to section

80. See id. (holding deductions associated with drug dealing business deductible). For a discussion of section 162, see supra notes 47–59 and accompanying text.
81. See Edmondson, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1533 (listing various expenses that petitioner was entitled to deduct).
85. See S. Rep. No. 97-494, at 309. There is a sharply defined public policy against drug dealing. To allow drug dealers the benefit of business expense deductions at the same time that the U.S. and its citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such persons is not compelled by the fact that such deductions are allowed to other, legal, enterprises. Such deductions must be disallowed on public policy grounds.
280E, and the Senate Finance Committee Report preemptively explained that “the adjustment to gross receipts with respect to effective costs of goods sold is not affected by this provision of the bill.” Consequently, marijuana companies have the unencumbered right to deduct COGS, but all other deductions and credits are prohibited under section 280E.87

2. Early Challenges to Section 280E in State-Legalized Marijuana Markets

One of the earliest challenges to section 280E, Californians Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems, Inc. v. Commissioner (CHAMP),88 was argued before the United States Tax Court by “CHAMP,” a caregiving facility that provided medical marijuana to its members legally under state law.89 CHAMP operated a community center where members with debilitating diseases such as AIDS, cancer, and multiple sclerosis could receive caregiving services.90 In addition to caregiving services, CHAMP also provided medical marijuana to members whose doctors recommended it as part of therapy.91

The IRS disallowed all of CHAMP’s deductions, claiming they were incurred in connection with the illegal sale of drugs.92 CHAMP argued it engaged in two trades or businesses, and only the expenses related to its secondary business of supplying medical marijuana to its members should

---

Id. Between the presidential terms of Richard Nixon and Barack Obama, the federal government has allocated over $1 trillion to the war on drugs. See Alsharaia, supra note 84, at 324 n.46 (illuminating costs of the war on drugs).

86. See S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 309. In other words, the cost of goods sold exclusion that was mandated by the Supreme Court in Doyle is unchanged by section 280E. See id.; see also supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (describing mandatory nature of COGS exclusions).

87. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text explaining section 280E’s differential application to marijuana companies.


89. See id. at 174–75. California Proposition 215, also known as the Compassionate Use Act, was passed in 1996, making California the first state to permit patients and caregivers to possess medicinal marijuana. See California Proposition 215, the Medical Marijuana Initiative, BALLOTpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_215_the_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative_(1996) [https://perma.cc/5CZD-DYTP] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).

90. See CHAMP, 128 T.C. at 174. CHAMP’s extensive caregiving services included various support group sessions, daily lunches for low-income members, hygiene supplies, one-on-one counseling with social workers, masseeuse services, social events, field trips, yoga classes, and more. Id. at 175–76.

91. Id. at 174–75. CHAMP charged a membership fee, which covered both the cost of caregiving services and the medical marijuana. Id. at 175. Members were provided a fixed amount of medical marijuana and were not entitled to unlimited supplies. Id. at 176.

92. See id. at 177. The disallowed deductions, which totaled $212,958, included employee salaries, repairs and maintenance, rents, payroll taxes, depreciation of property, advertising, employee health insurance plan, accountant fees, property insurance, office expenses, telephone services, and several other expenses. Id. at 178–80.
be disallowed under section 280E. The Tax Court agreed, finding that section 280E does not intend to deny all of a taxpayer’s business deductions when some expenses are attributable to a trade or business other than the illegal trafficking in controlled substances. The court held CHAMP’s characterization of caregiving services and medical marijuana distribution as separate business activities was not artificial or unreasonable. It apportioned CHAMP’s overall expenses and permitted CHAMP to deduct expenses attributable to its caregiving services.

Years later, another California dispensary attempted to claim separate trades or businesses under CHAMP, but was rejected by both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The petitioner in Olive v. Commissioner operated the Vapor Room, a dispensary that sold medical marijuana and also regularly provided complimentary on-site activities and amenities such as yoga classes, chair massages, movie screenings, snacks, and beverages. The IRS precluded the petitioner from deducting its businesses expenses under section 280E. The petitioner argued that the Vapor Room provided substantial caregiving services, and it should be permitted to deduct the business expenses incurred for the on-site activities.

The Tax Court distinguished the Vapor Room from CHAMP, noting that seventy-two percent of CHAMP’s employees worked exclusively in the caregiving practice, whereas the Vapor Room employees’ responsibilities spanned both sides of the business. The court rejected the petitioner’s

93. See id. at 180.
94. See id. at 181–82 (finding that section 280E does not prohibit deductions for separate non-marijuana business). For a further discussion of section 280E’s legislative history, see supra notes 85–86 and the accompanying text.
95. See CHAMP, 128 T.C. at 183–85 (approving CHAMP’s two separate trades or businesses). The court allocated expenses on the basis of the number of CHAMP’s employees who exclusively provided caregiving services and the portion of CHAMP’s facilities devoted to each activity. See id. at 185. Eighteen of CHAMP’s twenty-five employees worked exclusively as caregivers. Id. Additionally, CHAMP dispensed medical marijuana at only one of three facilities that it operated. Id.
96. See Olive v. Comm’r, 792 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting recognition as separate trades or businesses). See generally Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19, 42 (2012) (same), aff’d, 792 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2015).
97. 139 T.C. 19 (2012).
98. Id. at 23–24 (describing petitioner’s business model). The petitioner did not collect a fee to participate in the Vapor Room’s activities or services. Id. at 22. Patrons were also allowed to use the Vapor Room’s marijuana vaporizers, regardless of whether they purchased medical marijuana from the Vapor Room. Id. at 23–34. A vaporizer extracts the active component from the marijuana and allows the user to inhale vapor instead of smoke. Id. at 21 n.5.
99. Id. at 36–37.
100. See id. at 38–39 (detailing petitioner’s arguments in seeking application of CHAMP to their business).
101. See id. at 40 (comparing CHAMP’s and Vapor Room’s employees’ duties). The court even compared the names of the two organizations. Id. “‘Californians Helping To Alleviate Medical Problems,’ stresses the dispensary’s caregiving
claim that the on-site activities constituted a separate trade or business and explained that “to be engaged in a trade or business . . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.”

Here, the Vapor Room’s only source of revenue was from the sale of medical marijuana; the additional services and activities were merely incidental to its main business of selling marijuana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that the only “business” the petitioner engaged in was selling medical marijuana.

Unlike CHAMP and Olive, which sought to merely carve out exceptions to section 280E, Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. United States attempted to overturn section 280E altogether. The plaintiffs in Alpenglow owned a Colorado medical marijuana dispensary that was formed as a pass-through entity, meaning Alpenglow’s income tax liabilities “passed through” to the owners’ personal tax returns. When the IRS disallowed Alpenglow’s deductions under section 280E and issued a notice of deficiency, the owners paid the increased tax liability under protest and filed claims for a refund, which the IRS denied. Alpenglow argued that to calculate taxable income under the Sixteenth Amendment, ordinary and necessary business expenses must, in the same vein as COGS,
be treated as exclusions from gross income, as opposed to deductions, which is how the Tax Code categorizes business expenses. Alpenglow also asserted that section 280E results in an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

While the court acknowledged similarities between expenses that are included in COGS and other ordinary and necessary business expenses, it distinguished the two from one another. The court explained that COGS “relates to [the] acquisition or creation of the taxpayer’s product, while ordinary and necessary business expenses are those incurred in the operation of day-to-day business activities.”

Citing precedent from the Supreme Court, the court maintained that Congress has discretion to allow or deny deductions. Regarding Alpenglow’s Eighth Amendment claim, the court found that Alpenglow lacked evidentiary support for the public policy arguments it attempted to raise in its amended complaint to the district court. The court concluded that section 280E did not violate the Sixteenth or Eighth Amendments.

III. High Stakes: Contemporary Challenges to Section 280E

No marijuana company has had success disputing section 280E, except for CHAMP. Despite this dismal track record, two California marijuana dispensaries recently challenged sizable IRS tax deficiency notices. First, the petitioner in Patients Mutual Assistance Collective Corp.

109. See id. at 1198.
110. See id. at 1202. Alpenglow failed to include its Eighth Amendment claim in its original complaint to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Id. at 1205. When Alpenglow attempted to amend its complaint to include the Eighth Amendment claim, the District Court denied the motion, holding the Eighth Amendment claim was not plausible. See id. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
111. See Alpenglow, 894 F.3d at 1199 (drawing distinction between COGS and ordinary and necessary business expenses).
112. Id. at 1200.
113. See id. at 1201. For a further discussion of “legislative grace” and Congress’s power with regard to deductions, see supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
114. See Alpenglow, 894 F.3d at 1205.
115. Id. at 1206.
v. Commissioner,118 argued section 280E’s qualifying language excluded the company from its scope. The petitioner contended it was a producer, rather than a reseller, and it should have the ability to include certain indirect costs in its COGS calculation.119 Second, the petitioner in Northern California Small Business Assistants v. Commissioner120 challenged the constitutionality of section 280E under the Eighth Amendment.121

A. Patients Mutual Assistance Collective Corp. v. Commissioner

The petitioner, Harborside Health Center, is one of the largest marijuana dispensaries in the world.122 In compliance with California law, Harborside operates as a nonprofit,123 but for federal tax purposes, it files tax returns as a C corporation.124 The IRS audited Harborside’s tax returns from 2007 to 2012, disallowed its deductions under section 280E, and issued notices of deficiency that alleged over $10 million in penalties and deficiencies.125 Harborside argued that section 280E should not pre-

119. Id. at 188.
120. 153 T.C. 65 (2019).
121. Id. at 66 (discussing petitioner’s argument that section 280E as-applied results in excessive fines).
122. See About Harborside, HARBORSIDE, https://shopharborside.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/T7DL-FFA3] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). Founded in 2006, Harborside currently operates four retail locations throughout California as well as a forty-seven-acre farm in Monterey County. Id. Notably, Harborside has more than 250,000 registered customers. Id. After California voters adopted Proposition 64, which made recreational marijuana legal under California law, Steve DeAngelo, one of Harborside’s founders, marked the historic event by selling the first gram of legal cannabis in California. Id.; see also California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), BALLOTpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_64_Marijuana_Legalization_(2016) [https://perma.cc/3TVD-QKKW] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
123. Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 178 (introducing the petitioner’s business structure). “California laws decriminalizing medical marijuana specifically stated that they did not ‘authorize any individual or group to cultivate or distribute cannabis for profit.’” Id. at 178 n.8 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.765(a) (West 2007)). Harborside’s bylaws required it to use any excess revenue for the benefit of the community and its patients. Id. at 182. To that end, Harborside provided free therapeutic services such as reiki and acupuncture, as well as group classes in yoga, tai chi, and the Alexander technique. Id. Patients were not required to buy marijuana to use the services. Id.
124. Id. at 182 n.7 (noting marijuana companies cannot qualify as tax-exempt entities under federal law). Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts charitable organizations from federal income tax. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). Nevertheless, the IRS has determined that charities cannot be created for illegal purposes. See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (determining that criminal enterprises cannot obtain federal tax-exempt status). Because medical marijuana is regarded as a criminal enterprise under federal law, Harborside’s nonprofit status is not recognized for federal tax purposes. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 182 n.7.
125. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 184 (detailing the nearly $11 million in deficiencies plus accuracy-related penalties the IRS asserted in 2012). The accuracy-related penalties were dismissed in a separate ruling by the
clude deductions for ordinary and necessary businesses expenses because Harborside operated legally under California law and therefore was not “trafficking.”126 In the alternative, Harborside argued that it should be recognized as a producer rather than a reseller, so that it can capitalize its indirect costs and exclude those costs from its gross receipts under COGS.127

The court acknowledged that in Olive it held that a marijuana company operating legally under state law was still “trafficking” under section 280E.128 Nevertheless, the court addressed Harborside’s novel argument that the words “consists of” immediately preceding “trafficking” in section 280E suggests that only businesses that exclusively traffic controlled substances are subject to the provision, and those that engage in other legal business activities are exempt.129 Considering various principles of statutory interpretation, the court analyzed dictionary definitions, other tax code provisions, and case law before ultimately rejecting Harborside’s interpretation, concluding Harborside’s use of “consists of” as an exhaustive list would “render section 280E ineffective and absurd.”130 Harborside also argued there is interplay between literal meaning and statutory pur-

126. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 190–98 (analyzing petitioner’s arguments regarding meaning of “trafficking” under section 280E).

127. See generally id. at 204–13 (analyzing petitioner’s arguments regarding its status as manufacturer as opposed to solely retail operation). Harborside also sought CHAMP tax treatment for the portions of its business that were non-marijuana related. Id. at 198 (citing Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v. Comm’r (CHAMP), 128 T.C. 173, 184–85 (2007); Olive v. Comm’r, 792 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2015)). The court, however, found Harborside to be more like the dispensary in Olive, where non-marijuana services were incidental, and therefore Harborside did not constitute separate trades or businesses under CHAMP. See id. at 202. Whereas eighteen of CHAMP’s twenty-five employees exclusively provided caregiving services, Harborside paid independent contractors less than 1% of its sales revenue to lead therapeutic sessions and classes. Compare id. at 202–03, with CHAMP, 128 T.C. at 185.


129. Id. at 190–91 (analyzing whether “consists of” in section 280E introduces non-exhaustive list).

130. See id. at 190–98. The court considered Harborside’s arguments about the ordinary meaning of “consists of.” See id. at 191. The court’s opinion cited several secondary sources that Harborside included in its brief, including: Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner’s READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (contrasting “includes,” which sets off a non-exhaustive list, with “consists of” or “comprises,” each of which generally introduces an exhaustive list) and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (explaining that “consisting” “is not synonymous with ‘including’” because “including,” when used in connection with a number of specified objects, always connotes incompleteness). See id. Ultimately, the court was more persuaded by another fundamental canon of statutory construction: to “prefer textually permissible readings that don’t render a statute ineffective.” Id. at 192. Harborside’s reading of section 280E would produce an absurd scenario where a
Lastly, the court considered Harborside’s contention that it was not merely a reseller, but actually a producer. The court found that Harborside was a reseller when it sold marijuana edibles and non-marijuana products it purchased from third parties. The question is more complex with regard to the marijuana buds Harborside sold. In its analysis, the court cited a Ninth Circuit case that held that a “producer” retains title to items throughout the contract-production process. Although Harborside bought marijuana only from its members who “used Harborside’s clones . . . , took Harborside’s growing class, followed Harborside’s best practices, and met Harborside’s quality-control standards,” growers who used Harborside’s clones had no obligation to sell buds that the clones produced back to Harborside, and Harborside had no ownership interest in the marijuana plants after the clones left their possession.

drug dealer could circumvent the provision by selling any single item that was not a controlled substance, such as a lighter or rolling papers. See id.

131. See id. at 207–08 (describing statutory difference between producer and reseller). Harborside reminded the court that state-sanctioned marijuana dispensaries did not exist in 1982 when Congress enacted section 280E. See id. In fact, since 2015, Congress has prohibited the Department of Justice from prosecuting marijuana dispensaries operating legally under state law. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 31, 116th Cong. § 537 (2019) (enacted); H.R. Con. Res. 1625, 115th Cong. § 538 (2018) (enacted); H.R. Con. Res. 244, 115th Cong. § 537 (2017) (enacted) (“None of the funds made available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used . . . to prevent any [state] from implementing their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.” (emphasis added)). The Ninth Circuit addressed this same argument in Olive and held that enforcing section 280E as a tax does not change whether the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of marijuana is authorized in the states. See Olive, 792 F.3d at 1151 (holding section 280E did not violate Consolidated Appropriations Act).

132. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 206. Different rules apply to resellers and producers when determining what to include in COGS. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.471-3(b) (as amended in 2018) (applying to merchandise purchased and resold by the taxpayer), with § 1.471-3(c) (applying to merchandise produced by the taxpayer). For a further discussion of the differences between resellers and producers, see supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.


134. For a further discussion of Harborside’s labor in preparing marijuana buds for sale, see infra note 137.

135. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 211–12 (examining precedent for the meaning of “produce” versus “manufacture”). “The only requirement for being a ‘producer’ . . . is that the taxpayer be ‘considered an owner of the property produced’ . . . . A taxpayer can be a ‘producer’ . . . even if it uses contract manufacturers to do the actual production.” Id. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Suzy’s Zoo v. Comm’r, 273 F.3d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 2001)).

136. Id. at 179, 212–13 (analyzing petitioner’s practices for acquiring marijuana). “Clones are cuttings from a female cannabis plant that can be transplanted and used to cultivate marijuana.” Id. at 179.
Therefore, the court held that Harborside is a reseller, rather than a producer, for the purposes of calculating COGS under IRC section 471.\(^{137}\)

B. Northern California Small Business Assistants, Inc. v. Commissioner

Within a year of the Harborside decision, another marijuana dispensary challenged a $1.2 million tax deficiency.\(^{138}\) The petitioner asserted section 280E “imposes a gross receipts tax as a penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment” by disallowing all deductions and should therefore be invalidated.\(^{139}\) The majority rejected the petitioner’s argument and instead reinforced that deductions are acts of legislative grace, which Congress is free to grant, restrict, and deny at its discretion.\(^{140}\) The court cited numerous cases where the denial of a deduction did not violate the Eighth Amendment and reiterated that section 280E had never been considered a penalty in its forty-year history.\(^{141}\) Thus, the majority held that the peti-

\(^{137}\) Id. at 213. Harborside has appealed this issue to the Ninth Circuit. See generally Opening Brief for Appellant, Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 19-73078 (9th Cir. May 26, 2020). In its Opening Brief, Harborside analogizes itself to a grocery store butcher who prepares cuts of meat and packages them before they reach the retail floor. Id. at 60. Harborside had an extensive procurement process whereby dedicated employees sourced marijuana clones, flowers, marijuana-containing products, and non-marijuana containing products. See Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp., 151 T.C. at 179 (detailing Harborside’s inventory acquisition process). At least four employees spent all of their time purchasing and caring for the clones. Id. More than eight employees procured, inspected, and readied the bulk marijuana flowers for sale. Id. at 180. Harborside was selective about the marijuana flowers it purchased, ensured they contained the right “cannabinoid profile,” and inspected the buds for pathogenic mold. See id. Harborside sent marijuana samples to a third-party laboratory for testing, and if all went well, the marijuana was reinspected, manicured, and trimmed, and then weighed, packaged, and labeled before it reached the retail floor. Id.


\(^{139}\) Id. at 66–67. The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The petitioner also argued that because it operates a medical marijuana dispensary legally under California law, its business does not consist of “trafficking” a controlled substance within the meaning of section 280E. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 72. The majority rejected the argument, citing many holdings to the contrary. See, e.g., Olive v. Comm’r, 139 T.C. 19, 38 (2012); Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v. Comm’r (CHAMP), 128 T.C. 173, 182–83 (2007) (finding trafficking within the scope of section 280E to include sale of medical marijuana).

\(^{140}\) See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 69–70. “Deductions from gross income do not turn on equitable considerations; rather they are pure acts of legislative grace, the prudence of which is left to Congress.” Id.

tioner’s inability to deduct ordinary and necessary business expenses did not violate the Eighth Amendment.142

In contrast, two dissenting opinions illustrated how the constitutionality of section 280E is still in question.143 Judge Gustafson began a lengthy dissent by considering the meaning of “income” under the Sixteenth Amendment.144 Both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that “income” must exclude COGS because return of capital shall not be taxed.145 But Judge Gustafson’s dissent went further, emphasizing that “income” means gain, and that ordinary and necessary expenses must be accounted for before one can be said to have gain.146 In Judge Gustafson’s eyes, section 280E results in a tax on something other than “income” because it prohibits marijuana companies from deducting any expense besides COGS.147 As support, Judge Gustafson cited Davis, a Second Circuit

143. See id. at 77–90 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (concluding that taxing income where there is no gain violates Sixteenth Amendment); see also id. at 90–94 (Copeland, J., dissenting) (concluding that section 280E is a penalty that raises Eighth Amendment concerns).
144. See id. at 77 (Gustafson, J., dissenting). The Sixteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to tax incomes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
145. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 65 (recognizing distinction between return of capital and gross income). For a discussion of return of capital versus gross income that was established in Doyle, see supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
146. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 80–81 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (asserting that income without gain must not be taxed). “Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.” Id. at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206–07 (1920)).
147. See id. at 77–90 (explaining why section 280E results in an inaccurate measure of income). Judge Gustafson illustrated why “income” must account for a taxpayer’s cost of goods sold:

A taxpayer who purchased 100 widgets at a cost of $10 each and sold them at a price of $9 each would have gross receipts or sales of $900, which after being reduced by the “cost of goods sold” . . . of $1,000 . . . would yield a loss of $100. Given that obvious loss, Congress could not tax the gross receipts of $900 as if it were “income.” Id. at 80. Judge Gustafson then changed the facts of the hypothetical to demonstrate how section 280E’s prohibition of all deductions fabricates gain where there may not be any:

Suppose he purchased 100 widgets at a cost of $6 per widget . . . and suppose that for his business he leased a retail space for $200 and paid wages of $200 to employees, yielding additional expenses of $400, so that his out-of-pocket expenditures for COGS ($600) and additional expenses ($400) totaled $1,000. If he then sold the 100 widgets at a price of $9 each . . . after being reduced by his total costs of $1,000 (the sum of COGS and total expenses), [he would] yield a loss of $100. No one would propose that this seller had any gain. And if his product had been . . . illegal drugs costing the same amount, he would have the same . . . loss of $100. But despite this obvious loss, section 280E would disallow any deduction for his rent and wage expenses totaling $400, leaving him with gross receipts of $900, less COGS . . . yielding a supposed taxable “income” of $300—despite his having incurred not gain but loss.
decision that distinguished necessary expenses, which are “inherently necessary as a matter of computation to arrive at income,” from deductions of another sort that Congress has allowed as a matter of legislative grace.148 Despite Alpen Glow, which arguably contradicts his assertions, Judge Gustafson maintained that gain is an “indispensable ingredient of income.”149

Judge Gustafson further observed that “[e]ven if deductions are a matter of legislative grace, the disallowance of deductions must pass muster . . . under all other constitutional standards.”150 To that end, Judge Gustafson analyzed the Eighth Amendment and maintained that section 280E results in a “fine” under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.151 Judge Gustafson acknowledged that before the petitioner could prevail, the court would have to also determine whether the Eighth Amendment was offended by the petitioner’s convictions.

148. Id. at 82 (citing Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (1937)). For a further discussion of Davis, see supra note 61–63 and accompanying text.

149. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 82 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (asserting Davis is still persuasive despite contrary holding in Alpen Glow). For a further discussion of Alpen Glow, see supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. Judge Gustafson conceded the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Alpen Glow set the Second Circuit’s Davis decision aside as dicta and noted that the Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass Co. held that Eisner “was not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.” See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 82 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)). Nevertheless, Judge Gustafson asserted that the court’s findings in Alpen Glow are unpersuasive because the court relied on a prior opinion that only addressed whether, under the Anti-Injunction Act, the IRS could be enjoined from investigating whether the petitioner was trafficking in a controlled substance, which, if true, would invalidate its deductions under section 280E. See id. The Tenth Circuit did not address whether section 280E fails as a penalty under the Eighth Amendment in Alpen Glow. See id. at 89.

150. Id. at 85. Congress would clearly violate constitutional provisions if, for example, Congress allowed tax exemptions for one religious organization but denied them for another. See, e.g., Golden Rule Church Ass’n v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 719, 729 (1964) (first citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272–73 (1951); then citing Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953)) (noting that discriminating between religious organizations violates First Amendment). Similarly, it would be unconstitutional if individuals of one sex were allowed deductions, while same-sex deductions were denied to individuals of another sex. See, e.g., Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466, 469 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[I]f the Congress determines to grant deductions of a general type, a denial of them to a particular class may not be based on an invidious discrimination.”).

151. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 85–90 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (concluding that application of section 280E results in a fine, which may be prohibited under Eighth Amendment). The Eighth Amendment provides, “[c]ompensation for exactions shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). Judge Gustafson’s argument is supported by a second dissenting opinion by Judge Copeland, which asserted that, for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment, “fines” are “punishments to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.” See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 91 (Copeland, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998)).
Amendment extends to corporate taxpayers and whether the section 280E penalty is “excessive.”

Judge Copeland’s dissent emphasized that the intent of section 280E’s prohibition on deductions was to punish drug traffickers. Judge Copeland argued that a tax loses its character and becomes a sheer penalty “with the characteristics of regulation and punishment” when imposed to influence conduct. Judge Copeland characterized section 280E as a penalty provision because it operates to deter marijuana sales by broadly denying every deduction that would otherwise be allowed. Judge Copeland finished by stating Congress cannot evade the Eighth Amendment simply by labeling something a tax.

IV. DELVING INTO THE WEEDS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 280E

The Tax Court’s consistency in upholding section 280E should not warrant a hasty conclusion that section 280E is beyond reproach. On the contrary, section 280E masquerades as a mere tax, but given a closer look at the provision’s effect, it becomes clear section 280E is, in fact, a penalty. Moreover, by taxing marijuana companies on gross income rather than net income, section 280E blatantly ignores the ability-to-pay principle, which is one of the longest standing pillars of a just and equitable tax system. Since section 280E was enacted, public opinion has shifted to favor marijuana, and a majority of states have legalized medicinal marijuana. In states where medicinal or recreational marijuana is

152. Id. at 90 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing need for further proceedings to address outstanding questions relating to case).
153. See id. at 91–93 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 92 (quoting Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922)) (examining threshold between tax and penalty). Similarly, Judge Gustafson cited the Supreme Court, noting “if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission.” Id. at 87 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012)).
155. See id. at 93 (Copeland, J., dissenting) (describing section 280E as punitive in its sweeping application to all deductions).
156. See id. at 92 (citing Bailey, 259 U.S. at 37) (holding exception for employment of minor children, which was labeled tax, functioned as penalty).
157. See, e.g., id. at 93 (“Section 280E is punitive and requires further analysis under the Eighth Amendment.”).
158. See id. (“[E]ven if section 280E was not written as a penalty provision, it operates as such.”). For a further discussion of how section 280E operates as a penalty, see supra notes 138–56 and accompanying text.
159. See Buehler, supra note 30, at 243. (“To many persons ability to pay is synonymous with justice in taxation.”). For a further discussion of the ability-to-pay principle, see supra notes 26–43 and accompanying text. For a further discussion on how section 280E specifically frustrates the ability-to-pay principle, see infra notes 177–83 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 184–85 for supporting data.
legal, dispensaries provide many economic and social benefits. To preserve these benefits, harmful legislation like section 280E must be repealed or amended; otherwise, medical marijuana companies may be forced to close up shop and go underground.

A. Blunt Trauma: Section 280E Undeniably Penalizes Marijuana Companies

Although section 280E was intended to deter drug trafficking, its application results in something that resembles a punishment more than a tax. The Tax Equity and Responsibility Act of 1982, which promulgated section 280E, plainly identifies public policy against drug trafficking as the driving force behind the provision. Reflecting this legislative intent, the provision does not seek to merely levy a tax on drug traffickers, rather, it strives to bolster the war on drugs and serve as a weapon in the government’s arsenal.

Under the guise of a tax, section 280E punishes marijuana companies by levying a high tax burden based on gross income, diminishing profits, and making it more difficult to remain in business. Section 280E enables the IRS to disallow deduction after deduction from marijuana company tax returns. Research suggests the IRS singles out marijuana companies, which are over five times more likely to be audited than other businesses. Congress, the IRS, and the courts have all ignored the fact that taxing a business on gross income without taking into account ordinary and necessary business expenses and accompanying text.


162. See Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 335–36.

163. See id. at 335 (explaining how section 280E was enacted specifically to punish criminals who illegally buy and sell drugs because of link between drugs and violence); see also N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 92–93 (2019) (Copeland, J., dissenting) (characterizing section 280E as penalty disguised as tax).


165. See generally Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 324–25 (contextualizing section 280E’s enactment during war on drugs).

166. See id.


168. See Becky Olson, Chart of the Week: IRS Audit Rate for Existing Marijuana Businesses, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (June 15, 2015), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-of-the-week-irs-audit-rate-for-existing-marijuana-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/3CMX-35XT]. The IRS audited about 1.4% of all United States businesses in 2014. Id. Yet, surveys show that marijuana retail businesses have an 8% chance of being audited. Id. The likelihood of a business being audited fluctuates based on a number of factors such as corporate structure, gross income, and the nature of the business. Id. Marijuana business owners are being audited at the same rate of frequency as some of America’s largest corporations with over $100 million in assets. See id.
nary and necessary business expenses does not accurately reflect the business’s profits.  

Rather than remedying this disparity, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the issue, instead punting the issue back to Congress to decide whether to bestow its “legislative grace” upon marijuana companies to allow deductions.  

The Court could have addressed whether deductions that are mathematically necessary for taxpayers to compute their actual income are distinguishable from deductions that, by legislative grace, grant taxpayers a felicitous tax break.

Judge Gustafson’s dissent in North California Small Business Assistants, Inc. breaks the judicial silence on the matter and posits that the penalty section 280E does out is not the disallowance of deductions per se. Rather, the penalty is the oppressive tax burden that results from the disallowance.  

Take Harborside, for example: in 2007, Harborside operated at a loss of $26,407. Yet, Harborside was liable for $628,516 in federal income tax because the IRS asserted that its ordinary and necessary business expenses were disallowed under section 280E. Foisting a hefty tax burden on a marijuana company that operated at a financial loss illustrates section 280E’s penalizing effect.


170. See Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) (“If we enforce as federal policy the rule espoused by the Commissioner in this case, we would come close to making this type of business taxable on the basis of its gross receipts, while all other business would be taxable on the basis of net income. If that choice is to be made, Congress should do it.”).

171. See Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323, 324–25 (2d Cir. 1937) (distinguishing computational deductions from other deductions). Before Congress enacted the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, taxpayers could claim personal tax exemptions for themselves and their dependents. See What Are Personal Exemptions?, Tax Policy Ctr., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-personal-exemptions [https://perma.cc/6Q2S-UN6X] (last visited Mar. 31, 2021). The exemption reduced the amount of taxes a taxpayer owed, and personal exemptions were especially beneficial to families with more dependents. See id. Personal exemptions are distinguishable from deductions from gross income because personal exemptions are unrelated to the activities that resulted in income, whereas ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162 can be directly attributed to the taxpayer’s earned income. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 162(a).


173. See id. (declaring aspect of section 280E that makes it penalty); see also id. at 90–93 (Copeland, J., dissenting).

174. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 137, at 28.

175. See id.

176. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 92–93 (Copeland, J., dissenting). “A ‘penalty’ is a ‘punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its laws.” Id. at 91 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017)).
B. Up in Smoke: Taxing Income Absent Gain Causes Ability-To-Pay Burnout

By prohibiting ordinary and necessary expense deductions by marijuana companies, the tax code frustrates the long-standing principle that taxes should reflect the taxpayer’s ability to pay.177 To accurately represent a taxpayer’s ability to pay, tax must be measured by net income, which takes into account deductions for business expenses.178 Section 280E taxes marijuana companies on their gross income rather than their net income by forbidding them from taking deductions.179

Although Congress has lawfully disallowed deductions for certain expenditures such as bribe payments and traffic tickets, section 280E does not merely disallow some deductions; it sweepingly disallows all deductions, which can result in a tax bill that exceeds a company’s actual profits.180 What’s more egregious is that a marijuana company operating at a loss can face an enormous tax bill, where other profitless non-marijuana businesses would not have income tax and can even carry forward losses to offset income in future years.181 By taxing the marijuana company’s gross income, Congress taxes the company on an inflated representation of the company’s gain, ignoring the ability-to-pay principle.182 Consequently, marijuana companies are forced to somehow find a way to pay their taxes during unprofitable years, or else become extinguished.183


178. See id. (asserting that net income is the only accurate way to measure taxpayer’s ability to pay, rather than gross income).


180. See I.R.C. § 280E (2018) (declaring “no deduction” whatsoever for a trade or business engaged in trafficking in controlled substances as is prohibited by federal law).

181. See James V. Baker, IRS War on Cannabis Companies Must End, SEEKING ALPHA (July 8, 2020, 8:07 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4357511-irs-war-on-cannabis-companies-must-end [https://perma.cc/KH6K-ST3X] (reporting losses sustained by marijuana companies due to section 280E). Harborside is not the only marijuana company to have income tax in a year when it operated at a loss. See id. Five of the largest multi-state-operating marijuana companies faced net losses but were taxed as having net gains. Id.

Curaleaf lost $45.8 million but had a current tax of $17.1 million, Green Thumb lost $50.2 million but had a current tax of $22.8 million, Cresco lost $50.8 million but had a current tax of $13.3, Harvest Health lost $171.8 million but had a current tax of $5.7 [million], and MedMen lost $263.2 million but had a current tax liability of $18.8 million. Id. (citations omitted).

182. See N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc., 153 T.C. at 83–84 (Gustafson, J., dissenting) (“Section 280E would fabricate gain where there was none and would impose a tax based on artificial income.”).

183. See Baker, supra note 181 (explaining how marijuana companies sustain exorbitant losses due to section 280E). Marijuana companies who carry a sizeable tax balance must either sell assets, borrow money, or issue stock to pay their taxes. See id.
C. Flower to the People: Congress Should Amend Section 280E in Light of Widespread State Legalization

Congress should tune into recent societal attitude changes regarding marijuana usage and eliminate the harm that section 280E causes to states where recreational and medical marijuana is legal. Congress never imagined a legalized marijuana industry when it enacted section 280E in 1982, and undeniably, the public opinion of marijuana has radically shifted since then.184 State legislatures have responded to this shift in opinion, and now medical marijuana is legal in thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia, and fifteen of those jurisdictions also permit the sale of recreational marijuana.185 Today, marijuana is an ever-growing industry that creates jobs and generates a significant amount of state tax reve-


nue. The continued enforcement of section 280E against marijuana companies operating legitimately under state law incentivizes those companies to go underground and jeopardizes the societal benefits resulting from the legal marijuana industry.

1. Jackpot: Legal Marijuana Provides Considerable Societal Benefits

The legal marijuana industry provides jobs, tax revenue, and high-quality alternative medicines to chronically ill patients. Early in 2020, over 243,000 individuals were employed full-time by the marijuana industry, representing a 15% growth rate since 2019. Even more impressive is the marijuana industry’s 100% job growth rate between 2016 and 2020, a feat practically unheard of in other industries. Researchers believe that if all fifty states legalized marijuana, the industry would generate 1.63 million jobs by 2025.

The marijuana industry is a major source of revenue in states that have legalized marijuana. Excise and sales taxes on marijuana raised

186. See infra Section IV.C.1.
187. See infra Section IV.C.2.
over $1.9 billion in 2019, even without accounting for other revenue streams such as income taxes and license fees that states also collect from marijuana business owners. In a number of states, marijuana excise and sales tax revenues are equal to or in excess of revenues from similar taxes on alcohol. States use marijuana tax revenue to fund public assistance programs for education, substance abuse, criminal justice reform, and health care.

In addition to supporting communities at-large, legalized marijuana helps over 2.3 million medical marijuana patients in the United States. Although the FDA has not yet issued a ruling on the safety and efficacy of medical marijuana, extensive clinical research supports the use of marijuana as an effective treatment for a number of conditions. Medical marijuana can relieve symptoms of patients with conditions such as cancer, nausea, epigastric pain, glaucoma. State-regulated marijuana businesses are subject to strict testing, labeling, and packaging standards, which ensures that both medical marijuana patients and recreational users obtain high-quality, safe products. Excluding legally operating marijuana companies from section 280E will help preserve these societal benefits.

2. **Under Section 280E, Underground Drug Trafficking Grows Like a Weed, While Legitimate Business Goes to Pot**

Marijuana legalization attempts to redirect income from illegal drug dealers and direct it to legitimate business owners. In contrast, section

---

193. See Davis, supra note 192.
194. See Carl Davis et al., Inst. on Taxation & Econ. Policy, Taxing Cannabis 20-22 (2019), https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/012319-TaxingCannabis_ITEP_DavisHillPhillips.pdf (comparing marijuana excise tax revenue to other excise taxes). Excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana are referred to as “sin taxes.” Id. at 20. Excise taxes on tobacco generate the largest “sin tax” revenue in all states, except Colorado. Id. at 21. In Colorado, excise taxes on marijuana surpassed excise taxes on tobacco. Id.
195. See How Do Marijuana Taxes Work?, supra note 164 (discussing how states utilize marijuana tax revenue). Where marijuana has been legalized recreationally, state and local governments tax marijuana in three ways: as a percentage of the price, based on weight, and based on the potency of the marijuana. Id. The tax laws vary state to state, and Vermont, Maine, and Washington D.C. do not tax marijuana at all, but do collect income taxes from the marijuana business entities. See id.; see also Davis et al., supra note 194, at 15–17.
196. See Morrissey et al., supra note 185, at 18.
198. See id. at 51. In jurisdictions that permit medical marijuana, more than sixty qualifying medical conditions are treated with medical marijuana. Id.
200. See Alsharaia, supra note 84, at 335.
280E hinders the legal marijuana industry from doing just that.\textsuperscript{201} The Tax Court acknowledged that section 280E “make[s] it more costly to run a dispensary.”\textsuperscript{202} State-legal marijuana businesses are punished by the IRS’ application of section 280E, while black market drug dealers often evade paying income tax altogether to avoid detection of their illegal trafficking.\textsuperscript{203}

By penalizing businesses that traffic controlled substances, section 280E attempts to suppress the supply of drugs, but it does nothing to eliminate the demand for drugs.\textsuperscript{204} Americans spend billions of dollars per year on legal marijuana products.\textsuperscript{205} Consumer demand for marijuana will not simply vanish if legitimate marijuana companies are taxed out of business by section 280E. Instead, consumers will turn to unregulated street dealers and strengthen the very criminal enterprises that the government intended to eradicate.\textsuperscript{206} Amending section 280E to exclude legally operating marijuana companies will support states’ efforts to eradicate illegal drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{201} See id. (discussing how section 280E impedes states from reducing illegal drug trade).

\textsuperscript{202} Patients Mut. Assistance Collective Corp. v. Comm’r, 151 T.C. 176, 197 (2018) (quoting Olive v. Comm’r, 793 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2015)).

\textsuperscript{203} See Keller, supra note 50, at 177 (arguing that section 280E impacts legitimate businesses more than it does illegal drug dealers).

\textsuperscript{204} See id. at 172–73. In the 1960s and 1970s, drug policy in the United States was created to suppress the supply of drugs, but policy focus has since shifted to suppress demand. Id. (citing Peter H. Smith, The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy Options, in Drug Policy in the Americas 6 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1992)). Section 280E, which was enacted in 1982 when the government was focused on suppressing drug supply, “no longer has an effective role in the American drug initiative.” Keller, supra note 50, at 173.

\textsuperscript{205} See Morrissey et al., supra note 185, at 7. Combined, recreational and medical marijuana sales were $7.9 billion in 2017 and rose to $10.3 billion in 2018. Id. It is estimated that marijuana sales will steadily grow at a rate of approximately 16%. Id. Researchers project that sales will reach $29.7 billion in 2025. Id. To put these numbers into perspective, the NFL generates approximately $15 billion in annual revenue. See Eli McVey, Chart: Retail Marijuana Sales Surpass Fortnite Video Game, Closing in on Taco Bell, NFL, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (June 4, 2019), https://mjbdaily.com/retail-marijuana-sales-rival-taco-bell-nfl/ [https://perma.cc/E9GE-Z9X7].

\textsuperscript{206} See Alsharaiha, supra note 84, at 335–36. “The courts’ application of 280E to the legal marijuana industry hinders [a] market takeover [by the legal marijuana industry] because legal marijuana ‘stores that might not even be profitable can end up being taxed out of business,’ basically doom[ing] the legal marijuana industry while protecting drug dealers.” Id. at 335 (quoting Ariel Shearer, IRS Targets Medical Marijuana Businesses in Government’s Ongoing War on Pot, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2015, 12:01 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/irs-medical-marijuana_n_3346801 [https://perma.cc/Z2GG-K4Q8]).

\textsuperscript{207} See id. at 335.
V. REEFER GLADNESS OR REEFER MADNESS: SECTION 280E RISKS LEAVING STATES HIGH AND DRY

If section 280E is not repealed, or at least amended to exclude legal marijuana companies, states may see a decrease in the number of dispensaries because exorbitant federal taxes makes yielding a profit much more difficult than other enterprises.208 According to one of the leading publications for the marijuana industry, section 280E is the greatest threat to marijuana businesses and could force many in the industry, growers and retailers alike, to close completely or move underground.209 As dispensaries close, states will see a sharp decline in tax revenue and a reciprocal rise in unemployment.210 Shuttered marijuana dispensaries will drive consumers back to the illegal drug marijuana market, which will result in little tax revenue for state and federal governments.211 After all, drug traffickers have little incentive to accurately report their income to the IRS.212

The public perception of marijuana has dramatically changed since Congress passed section 280E in 1982.213 Now, marijuana is prescribed to help patients manage a range of chronic medical conditions.214 If dispensaries close, patients who rely on medical marijuana would have fewer options for obtaining medicinal marijuana products. With less competition,

---


210. See, e.g., BARCOTT ET AL., supra note 190 (reporting increase in employment opportunities as more states legalize marijuana).

211. See Alsharatha, supra note 84, at 335–36 (explaining how legal marijuana industry can help minimize illegal drug sales).

212. See Keller, supra note 84, at 177 (noting drug dealers do not accurately report income to IRS).

213. For a further discussion of surveys measuring public support for marijuana legalization, see supra note 184.

214. See Russell, supra note 197, at 51 (listing more than sixty qualifying medical conditions that are treated with medical marijuana in jurisdictions that have legalized medical marijuana).
marijuana merchants may take advantage of consumers in a market yielding few options to obtain medical marijuana.\textsuperscript{215} One must jump through hoops to justify the tax policy behind section 280E. Section 280E fails to reflect the ability-to-pay principle.\textsuperscript{216} Regardless of Congress’s “legislative grace,” the fact of the matter is that some marijuana businesses are subject to tax in years where they actually operated at a loss.\textsuperscript{217} The effect section 280E has on legitimate marijuana businesses could not be further from the intent of the ability-to-pay principle. To preserve the benefits that legalized marijuana provides to states and citizens alike, and in the name of the long-standing ability-to-pay tax principle, Congress should repeal or amend section 280E so legally operating marijuana companies are taxed like other legitimate businesses: according to their gains.


\textsuperscript{216} \textit{See I.R.C. § 280E (2018). For further discussion of the ability-to-pay principle, see supra notes 26–45 and accompanying text.}

\textsuperscript{217} For a further discussion of marijuana companies that sustained net losses but still owed taxes, see \textit{supra} note 181; \textit{see also} N. Cal. Small Bus. Assistants, Inc. v. Comm’r, 153 T.C. 65, 84 (2019) (discussing restraints of Congress’s “legislative grace”).