Excuse Me, Judge, but You're Standing in the Way of My Healthcare: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Halts Growth of Mid-Level Health Providers and Declares only Physicians Can Obtain Patient Consent in Shinal V. Toms

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EXCUSE ME, JUDGE, BUT YOU’RE STANDING IN THE WAY OF MY HEALTHCARE: THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA HALTS GROWTH OF MID-LEVEL HEALTH PROVIDERS AND DECLARES ONLY PHYSICIANS CAN OBTAIN PATIENT CONSENT IN SHINAL v. TOMS

DANIEL MICHAEL BAKER*

“[A Surgeon] is in the same complete charge of those who are present and assisting him as is the captain of a ship over all on board . . . .”

I. INTRODUCTION: THE ELEPHANT IN THE HOSPITAL WAITING ROOM

It is difficult to go a day without hearing about “Obamacare” or “Trumpcare” and the turmoil of the seemingly endless political snafu. However, beyond the

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1. McConnell v. Williams, 65 A.2d 243, 246 (Pa. 1949); see also Thomas v. Hutchinson, 275 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1971) (holding “the ‘captain of the ship’ doctrine imposes liability on the surgeon in charge of an operation for the negligence of his assistants during the period when these assistants are under the surgeon’s control, even though the assistants are also employees of the hospital”). For a further discussion of the “captain of the ship doctrine,” see infra note 148 and accompanying text.

political jabs across the aisle and the debate on who is to pay for the costs, a more fundamental problem looms behind the curtain; there are simply not enough doctors in America. A 2017 independently-led research study from the Association of American Medical Colleges, for instance, projected that physician demand will grow faster than supply, with a “shortfall of between 40,800 and 104,900 physicians by 2030.” More specifically, the study projected shortages of non-primary care specialties—including surgical specialties—of between 33,500 and 61,800 by 2030. These projected shortages are the result of a growing and aging American population, along with the aging of the physician workforce.

To address these problems, many scholars and health experts are calling for a reform of medical school education and increasing the number of residency programs. However, this solution has picked up little steam over the
years.\(^8\) Instead, a popular solution has been to turn to Physician Assistants (PAs) and Nurse Practitioners (NPs)—two professions that have seen dramatic growth—to address the shortages.\(^9\) Several studies have demonstrated that a


8. See Tierney & Terhune, supra note 7, at 315 (noting that although medical schools have responded to the physician shortage with an increase in enrollment, there has not been a similar increase in the number of residency programs). The programs remained capped by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. See id. This act was “designed to establish 15,000 new residency positions over 5 years, was first introduced in 2009 but did not pass.” Id. The most recent version remains in committee. See id. at 315; see also Jacqueline Belliveau, House Reps Address Physician Shortage in Medicare Residency Bill, REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (May 4, 2017), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/house-reps-address-physician-shortage-in-medicare-residency-bill [https://perma.cc/U3UW-9GF8] (describing the Resident Physician Shortage Reduction Act that attempts to resolve physician shortage challenges by increasing the number of residencies with Medicare funds).

9. See Grover et al., supra note 5, at 14 (“[T]he nurse practitioner workforce is projected to nearly double between now and 2025 and the physician assistant workforce doubled during the previous decade and is on a continued growth trajectory . . . .” (citation omitted)); Kristin Ray et al., Trends in Visits to Specialist Physicians Involving Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants, 2001 to 2013, 177 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1213, 1216 (2017) (finding the involvement of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) in the care of patients of specialist physicians has increased between 2001 and 2013). PAs and NPs require advanced degrees, certification through series of exams, continued education, and recertification after a number of years, and various other responsibilities at the state level. See Ray et al., supra, at 1216. For more information on PAs and NPs, see Roderick S. Hooker et al., Characteristics of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants in the United States, 28 J. AM. ASS’N NURSE PRACTITIONERS 39, 39 (2016) (“Their collective projected growth suggests a solution to emerging workforce shortages and an ability to help meet healthcare demands.”); see also Roderick S. Hooker et al., Similarities and Differences: Physician Assistants and Nurse Practitioners, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 1, 1 (2015) (noting the trend towards substantial overlap in PA and NP roles is a potential solution to emerging physician workforce shortages); Amos Zehavi & Baruch Levi, Delegation of Physician Authority, Administrative Culture, and the Dynamics of Policy Adoption, 19 J. COMP. POL’Y ANALYSIS: RES. & PRAC. 227, 230 (2016) (noting delegation of tasks to NPs and PAs). For more information regarding the Pennsylvania State Senate bill pertaining to expanding NP authority, see S. 25, Reg. Sess. 2017–18 (Pa. 2017) (purporting to grant NPs prescriptive authority and removing collaborative restrictions); see also Hilary Barnes, Evidence Supports Giving Nurse Practitioners Full Practice Authority, PENN LEONARD INST. OF HEALTH ECON.: HEALTH POLICY SENSE (May 17, 2016), https://ldi.upenn.edu/healthpolicysense/evidence-supports-giving-nurse-practitioners-full-practice-authority [https://perma.cc/9V9C-W5C8] (discussing study finding removing collaborative agreement requirements for NPs would increase number of NPs in Pennsylvania by 13% and lower health care costs by $6.4 billion over the next ten years); KYLE JAEF & JOHN BAILEY, DUKE UNIV. SCH. OF L., THE VALUE OF FULL PRACTICE AUTHORITY FOR PENNSYLVANIA’S NURSE PRACTITIONERS: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 14 (July 2015), https://law.duke.edu/news/pdf/nurse_practitioners_report-PA-TechnicalAppendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/37TJ-MVK7] (suggesting “granting Pennsylvania’s nurse practitioners Full Practice Authority could potentially benefit Pennsylvanians by increasing access to comparable or better health care at lower costs”); Vicki Terwilliger, Bill Would Expand Would Expand Roles of Nurse Practitioners, POCONO REC. (Apr. 9, 2017, 08:02 PM), http://www.
broader scope of practice for PAs and NPs has increased access to health care and can potentially reduce costs, while having little effect on the quality of care.\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, research has shown consumers are continually more open to the idea of expanded roles for mid-level professionals, such as PAs and NPs, notably for their patient education and communication skills.\textsuperscript{11} Further, studies have provided evidence that delegation of patient care duties can make hospitals more efficient and effective.\textsuperscript{12} The vast majority of PAs are involved in non-primary...
care, specialty practice groups, including surgical practices. The delegation of duties to PAs and NPs will place a greater emphasis on team-based care, leading to more efficient and cost-effective results.

However, hospital delegation, as with other healthcare innovation, attempts to strike a balance between making hospitals more efficient and effective, without health care personnel... are equally underused" and "[a]n effective team adds capacity by sharing the care between clinicians and nonclinicians“); Natalie Dies et al., Physician Assistants Reduce Resident Workload and Improve Care in an Academic Surgical Setting, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 41, 41 (2016) (finding “PAs reduce resident workload and improve care on surgical teams in tertiary [referral] hospital”); see also ROBERT A. GABBAY ET AL., TEAM-BASED CARE: EVIDENCE FOR COST SAVINGS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 1 (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.americasagenda.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=xXJnYhPIE8Y%3D&tabid=236 [https://perma.cc/38FB-RQ8F] (“[T]eam-based care enables physicians and other qualified healthcare providers to work with the patient and a multi-disciplinary team to coordinate and deliver high-quality health care across all settings.”); Roderick S. Hooker & Christine Everett, The Contributions of Physician Assistants in Primary Care Systems, 20 HEALTH SOC. CARE COMMUNITY 20, 28 (2012) (“Available evidence suggests that the care provided by PAs is safe, effective and satisfying to patients as far as is comparable to doctors.”); John K. Iglehart, Expanding the Role of Advanced Nurse Practitioners—Risks and Rewards, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1935, 1940 (2013) (finding “progress in restructuring delivery systems may come more rapidly at the practice level, where physicians, nurses, and other caregivers are freer to innovate and to assign tasks to persons on the basis of the full extent of their training and what makes organizational sense”).

13. See NAT’L COMM’N OF CERTIFICATION OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, 2016 STATISTICAL PROFILE OF CERTIFIED PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 15 (2017), https://prodcmstoragesa.blob.core.windows.net/uploads/files/2016StatisticalProfileofCertifiedPhysicianAssistants.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVL9-GT3N] (reporting 72.2% of PA’s were involved in non-primary care or specialty areas of practice and 27.8% were involved in either general or subspecialties surgery practices); see also American Academy of Physician Assistants, About Surgical PAs, AM. ACAD. OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, http://www.aaspa.com/about-surgical-pas [https://perma.cc/83FU-V6F4] (last visited Nov. 15, 2017) (stating “PAs work in general surgery and in virtually every surgical specialty and subspecialty. In addition to first and second assisting at surgery, PAs provide pre- and postoperative care, write orders and prescribe medication”). For examples of team-based care and influence of PAs, see Charles Mains et al., Staff Commitment to Trauma Care Improves Mortality and Length of Stay at a Level 1 Trauma Center, 66 J. TRAUMA, INJURY, INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 1315, 1319 (2009) (concluding that adding PAs to a trauma center reduced overall mortality rates and shortened lengths of stays); see also Bruce Jaspen, Physician Assistants Moving into Specialties Amid Doctor Shortage, FORBES (July 14, 2016, 09:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejaspen/2016/07/14/physician-assistants-moving-into-specialties-amid-doctor-shortage/#25ad48b45874 [https://perma.cc/R7SN-WUEH] (quoting Dawn Morton-Rias of NCCPA by stating “[o]ne part of the value equation is cost, and PAs are cost-effective providers of high quality care” and “[w]hile the PA salary is competitive, it is much less than a physician, particularly in the surgical specialties”); GABBAY, supra note 12, at 1 (“[T]eam-based care enables physicians and other qualified healthcare providers to work with the patient and a multi-disciplinary team to coordinate and deliver high-quality health care across all settings . . . .”).
sacrificing patient care.\textsuperscript{15} The law serves to draw these tough lines between efficiency and patient safety, and this dilemma has become especially prominent in the area of informed consent.\textsuperscript{16} The doctrine of informed consent lies at the heart of the patient-provider relationship, as well as a patient’s autonomy over his or her life and well-being.\textsuperscript{17} The doctrine requires the physician to disclose enough information about the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment so that a patient becomes sufficiently informed to participate in the shared decision-making process.\textsuperscript{18}

The issue of informed consent was tackled head on by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in \textit{Shinal v. Toms},\textsuperscript{19} where hospital delegation and the doctrine of

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  \item \textsuperscript{16} For a further discussion on the definition of informed consent in healthcare, see \textit{infra} notes 33–37 and accompanying text. Informed consent is used in both hospital and healthcare provider patient settings, as well as in clinical trials and research settings. This Note will solely focus on informed consent in hospital/healthcare provider settings. For further discussion on informed consent issues in research settings, see, e.g., Umesh Chandra Gupta, \textit{Informed Consent in Clinical Research: Revisiting Few Concepts and Areas}, \textit{4 PERSP. CLINICAL RES.} 26, 26 (2013) (noting that informed consent consists of three essential elements “including voluntarism, information disclosure, and decision-making capacity”); Marilyn J. Hammer, \textit{Informed Consent in the Changing Landscape of Research}, \textit{43 ONCOLOGY NURSING F.} 558, 558 (2016) (discussing the need for an individual in a clinical trial to understand “the requirements, risks, and benefits of the trial”); Lokesh P. Nijhawan et al., \textit{Informed Consent: Issues and Challenges}, \textit{4 J. ADVANCED PHARM. TECH. & RES.} 134, 138–39 (2013) (discussing the challenges of informed consent in research context).
  \item \textsuperscript{17} See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., \textit{INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE} 18 (2d ed. 2001) (“The primary goals of informed consent are the protection of patient or subject welfare and the promotion of autonomy.”)
  \item \textsuperscript{19} 162 A.3d 429 (Pa. 2017).
\end{itemize}
informed consent came to a clash.\(^{20}\) In a 4-3 opinion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a physician may not delegate an obligation to provide sufficient information in order to obtain a patient’s informed consent to an NP or PA.\(^{21}\) In arriving at this holding, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that the duty to obtain informed consent lies strictly with the physician, and there needs to be direct face-to-face communication between the physician and the patient.\(^{22}\) The decision applies to the procedures listed in the Medical Care Availability and Reduction Error Act (MCARE), including: performing surgery, administering radiation or chemotherapy, administering a blood transfusion, inserting a surgical device or appliance, or administering an experimental medication, experimental device, or an approved medication or experimental device.\(^{23}\) The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly overruled Foflygen v. Allegheny General Hospital\(^{24}\) and Bulman v. Myers,\(^{25}\) which previously allowed information communicated between qualified professionals and patients, acting under a physician’s supervision, to be considered in regard to finding informed consent.\(^{26}\) Shinal will have a major impact on how physicians and health providers across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania obtain informed consent and may force many health systems to change or modify their compliance procedures.\(^{27}\)

This Note analyzes the majority’s method of statutory interpretation and digs deeper into the current state of healthcare delegation, current medical research on hospital delivery systems, and the rise of PAs and NPs in the form of team-based care.\(^{28}\) Part II of this Note highlights the background of informed consent and

\(^{20}\) See id. at 429 (describing context of case).

\(^{21}\) See id. at 455 (explaining Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding).


\(^{23}\) See 40 PA CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(a) (West 2017) (describing which procedures are included under the statute). Because of the variety of procedures in which the MCARE Act applies to, the words “physician” and “surgeon” are used interchangeably.


\(^{26}\) See Foflygen, 723 A.2d at 711 (allowing jury to consider information given by surgeon’s nurse, along with what was discussed between patient and surgeon in determining whether physician fulfilled duty to obtain informed consent); Bulman, 467 A.2d at 1355 (holding information communicated to patient by qualified professional acting under doctor’s supervision may be considered when determining whether physician fulfilled duty to obtain informed consent). For a further discussion on the background and holdings of Foflygen and Bulman, see infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.

\(^{27}\) For a further discussion on the impact of Shinal, see infra notes 164–73173 and accompanying text.

\(^{28}\) For a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning in Shinal, see infra notes 125–64 and accompanying text.
the history of informed consent in Pennsylvania before Shinal. Part III describes the facts, procedural history, holding, and dissent in Shinal. Part IV analyzes the majority reasoning and considers the holding as a matter of statutory interpretation, as well as a matter of public policy. Finally, Part V of this Note examines the impact of Shinal on informed consent and predicts the future of informed consent in Pennsylvania.

II. DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS? THE HISTORY OF INFORMED CONSENT IN PENNSYLVANIA

The doctrine of “[i]nformed consent refers to the legal rules that prescribe behaviors for physicians and other healthcare professionals in their interactions with patients and provide for penalties, under given circumstances.” The doctrine focuses on patient autonomy—a patient’s consent is “informed,” and thus the doctrine satisfied if the patient is given enough information to make an informed choice. Patients generally know very little about medicine; thus, the physician must act as an educator by adequately informing the patient of the risks and benefits of a medical operation and ensuring that the patient can make a knowledgeable decision on how to proceed.

Originally, litigation surrounding whether a physician obtained patient consent was focused on the tort of battery—an intentional, unconsented, offensive touching. Although some courts have moved away from the use of

29. For a further discussion of the development of informed consent in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 40–60 and accompanying text.
30. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and reasoning in Shinal, see infra notes 70–123 and accompanying text.
31. For a critical analysis of the court’s reasoning in Shinal, see infra notes 124–63 and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of the impact of Shinal, see infra notes 164–73 and accompanying text.
33. BERG, supra note 17, at 3.
34. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.” (citation omitted)); BERG, supra note 17, at 18 (“The primary goals of informed consent are the protection of patient or subject welfare and the promotion of autonomy.”).
35. See Murray, supra note 18, at 563 (explaining doctrine of informed consent).
36. See generally BERG, supra note 17, at 42 (discussing origins of informed consent in eighteenth century English law in Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, where the court held that because it was professional custom among surgeons to obtain patients consent before beginning surgery, court found it only fair to impose liability on surgeon who failed to meet this professional standard); George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 115 (2004) (noting “under older case law, the duty to obtain informed consent for a medical intervention was inherent in the essential idea that nonconsensual touching was, and is, a legal battery”). See generally RESTATAMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 101 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). Under the Restatement:

An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if:

(a) the actor intends to cause a contact with the person of the other, as provided in § 102, or the actor’s intent is sufficient under § 110 (transferred intent);
battery and have instead used negligence law to solve consent disputes, other
states, including Pennsylvania, have continued to conceptualize the issue in terms
of an unconsented touching.\footnote{37}

A. Pennsylvania Courts and Informed Consent

In Pennsylvania, the doctrine of informed consent has been developed
through the common law.\footnote{38} Pennsylvania’s earliest conception of informed
consent emerged in 1932, in the case\footnote{39} Moscicki v. Shor.\footnote{39} There, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania held that a medical operation without the consent of a
mentally-competent patient performed in nonemergency circumstances constituted a “technical assault,” which, in modern nomenclature, would be
considered an unconsented touching.\footnote{40}

\begin{itemize}
\item [(b)] the actor’s affirmative conduct causes such a contact;
\item [(c)] the contact (i) causes bodily harm to the other or (ii) is offensive, as provided in
\S 103; and
\item [(d)] the other does not effectively consent to the otherwise tortious conduct of the
actor, as provided in \S 111.
\end{itemize}

\textit{Id.}

\footnote{37. See Joan P. Dailey, The Two Schools of Thought and Informed Consent
(1994) (explaining that battery theory of liability fell out of favor because courts
recognized that doctors “rarely intend to injure . . . patients,” the doctrine of
battery “exposes physicians to liability regardless of whether the patient was
physically injured as a result of the procedure,” and the courts understood the
“injustice of a liability theory which prevents recovery when a patient has
consented to an operation after receiving insufficient information with which to
make an intelligent consent”). \textit{But see} Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 452 (Pa. 2017)
(“The doctrine of informed consent developed through the common law under the
theory that a surgery conducted without consent was a battery . . . and that, to be
effective, a patient’s consent must be informed, i.e., based upon adequate
information . . . . Without the patient’s informed consent, the physician is
liable for the procedure, regardless of whether the physician was negligent.”
(internal citations omitted)); Cooper \textit{ex rel.} Cooper v. Lankenau Hosp., 51 A.3d 183, 191 (Pa.
2012) (“Similarly well-established is the proposition that claims alleging a lack of
consent for a surgical procedure constitute a battery committed upon a patient by a
physician.” (citation omitted)); Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742, 748–49 (Pa.
2002) (noting “[T]his Court has made clear on repeated occasions over a period of
several decades that a claim based upon a lack of informed consent involves a
battery committed upon a patient by a physician,” (citation omitted)); Morgan
v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 1997) (refusing to adapt a negligence standard and
holding “[i]t is the invasive nature of the surgical or operative procedure involving a
surgical cut and the use of surgical instruments that gives rise to the need to inform
the patient of risks prior to surgery” (citation omitted)).

\footnote{38. See A.D. Burnett III, Suturing the Loophole: Informed Consent As a
Requirement for Procedures Not Enumerated in Pennsylvania’s Medical Informed Consent Statute, 108
law).


\footnote{40. See id. at 343 (noting that the plaintiff consented to the eventual removal of all of
her teeth, but insisted that half of the extractions be performed at a later date). While the patient
was anesthetized, the physician removed all twenty-three of her teeth. \textit{See} id. at 341 (holding
that without consent, the procedure constituted a technical assault); see also\textit{ Burnett, supra note

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More than thirty years later, the doctrine of informed consent was solidified in *Gray v. Grunnagle.* The *Gray* court held that informed consent consisted of a “true understanding of the nature of the operation to be performed, the seriousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the disease or incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results.” The holding viewed informed consent in a contractual light, as an agreement between the physician and the patient of a clear understanding of the undertaking. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s ruling in *Gray* has been classified as the “formal birth of informed consent in Pennsylvania.”

Following the lead from *Gray,* the superior court in *Cooper v. Roberts* rejected the “medical community practitioner standard” in favor of a reasonable patient standard. The change in standard required the physician to disclose all facts, risks, and alternatives that a reasonable patient in the situation would want to know before proceeding. The superior court’s analysis further cemented the doctrine of informed consent in a patient’s individual physical integrity. Subsequent Pennsylvania courts have followed *Gray,* solidifying that the purpose of the doctrine is to ensure a patient has enough material information to determine whether to proceed with a surgical operation.

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38, at 1252 (“Informed consent in Pennsylvania originated from the notion that a doctor was required to obtain a patient’s consent before surgery lest the doctor be liable under a claim of battery, as first reported in *Moscicki v. Shor* in 1932.” (citation omitted)).

41. 223 A.2d 663, 664–67 (Pa. 1966). The patient underwent an exploratory spinal column examination. See id. at 665. The patient consented to the operation, but testified he was never informed as to the possibility of the paralysis that ensued. See id. at 673–74.

42. Id. at 674 (internal quotations omitted).

43. See id. (discussing the contractual nature of the relationship between a physician and a patient).

44. Burnett, supra note 38, at 1253.

45. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971). In *Cooper,* the patient “sought damages for the perforation of her stomach in the performance of a gastroscopic examination.” Id. at 648. The patient alleged she was not informed of any collateral risks that could occur from the procedure. See id. at 651.

46. See id. at 650 (“As the patient must bear the expense, pain and suffering of any injury from medical treatment, his right to know all material facts pertaining to the proposed treatment cannot be dependent upon the self-imposed standards of the medical profession.”).

47. See id. at 650–51 (declaring the change in standard for informed consent cases).

48. See id. at 649–50 (relying on the holding from *Gray*).

49. See Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993) (“The goal of the informed consent doctrine is to provide the patient with material information necessary to determine whether to proceed with the . . . procedure or to remain in the present condition.” (citations omitted)); Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 1992) (holding “a physician or surgeon who fails to advise a patient of material facts, risks, complications and alternatives to surgery which a reasonable man in the patient’s position would have considered significant in deciding whether to have the operation is liable for damages which ensue”); Rowinsky v. Sperling, 681 A.2d 785, 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (“The goal of the informed consent doctrine is to provide the patient with material information which is necessary to determine whether or not to proceed with the surgical procedure.” (citation omitted)); see also *Cooper,* 286 A.2d at 650 (invoking a “reasonable patient standard” to determine what information is material and must be disclosed).
B. Pennsylvania Informed Consent Doctrine and Delegation

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania have also considered the physician’s delegation of informed consent.\(^\text{50}\) Two superior court cases directly addressed the question of whether a jury could consider the information given by a member of a physician’s staff when considering if informed consent had been given to a patient.\(^\text{51}\) In Bulman, the superior court allowed a jury to consider information given by the nurse assistant when determining whether the plaintiff-patient gave informed consent.\(^\text{52}\) The superior court held that the most important consideration in determining whether informed consent is valid is the scope of the information provided, not the person communicating that information.\(^\text{53}\)

Similarly, the superior court in Foflygen allowed a jury to consider information given by a surgeon’s nurse, along with what was discussed between the patient and surgeon, in an informed consent case.\(^\text{54}\) Echoing Bulman, the superior court held that validity of a patient’s consent is based on the scope of the information given, not on the identity of the individual communicating the information.\(^\text{55}\)

In Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,\(^\text{56}\) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a medical facility does not control the manner in which a physician performs the duty to obtain informed consent.\(^\text{57}\) Therefore, the court held that the duty rests with the physician, and the hospital cannot be vicariously liable for the breach of that duty.\(^\text{58}\) In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that a battery resulting from lack of informed consent is “not the type of action that occurs within the scope of employment.”\(^\text{59}\) Furthermore, the court asserted that it did not want to inject the hospital into the

\(^{50}\) For a further discussion on the noted cases, see infra notes 51–60.


\(^{52}\) See Bulman, 467 A.2d at 1355–56 (discussing holding of case).

\(^{53}\) See id. at 1355 (agreeing with Justice Takiff’s opinion in Gray and holding that the main concern is whether the patient is informed of all the material facts to make surgical decision).

\(^{54}\) See Foflygen, 723 A.2d at 711 (concluding “that the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the information presented by Appellee-surgeon’s nurse along with that discussed by Appellee-surgeon when deliberating on the informed consent issue” (citation omitted)).

\(^{55}\) See id. (holding focus of informed consent is on information provided, not on exactly who provides information).

\(^{56}\) 505 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2002).

\(^{57}\) See id. at 1239 (describing holding of the case).

\(^{58}\) See id. (rejecting hospital’s vicarious liability defense and holding that informed consent does not require discussion of the manner or method of surgery).

\(^{59}\) Id.
relationship between a physician and patient.\textsuperscript{60}

\subsection*{C. The Pennsylvania General Assembly and Informed Consent}

In 1997, Pennsylvania codified the case law on informed consent in the Health Care Services Malpractice Act (HCSMA), which was later revised in 2002 as the Medical Care Availability and Reduction Error Act (MCARE).\textsuperscript{61} These bills were passed in response to the medical malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{62} The informed consent doctrine is specifically codified under chapter five of the MCARE Act.\textsuperscript{63} The statute declares that “a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the informed consent of the patient or the patient’s authorized representative” before performing surgery.\textsuperscript{64} Further, the statute declares that

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  \item \textsuperscript{61} See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301.101–1004 (West 2017); Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 1996 Pa. Laws 776, §§ 1, 10 (describing revised statute and change in language); Brief for the American Medical Association and the Pennsylvania Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 20, Shinal v. Toms, 2016 WL 7245376 (Pa. 2016) (No. 31 MAP 2016). For a further discussion of the revised statute and change in wording, see infra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.102 (stating statute’s purpose).
  \item (1) It is the purpose of this act to ensure that medical care is available in this Commonwealth through a comprehensive and high-quality health care system.
  \item (2) Access to a full spectrum of hospital services and to highly trained physicians in all specialties must be available across this Commonwealth.
  \item (3) To maintain this system, medical professional liability insurance has to be obtainable at an affordable and reasonable cost in every geographic region of this Commonwealth.
  \item (4) A person who has sustained injury or death as a result of medical negligence by a health care provider must be afforded a prompt determination and fair compensation.
  \item (5) Every effort must be made to reduce and eliminate medical errors by identifying problems and implementing solutions that promote patient safety.
  \item (6) Recognition and furtherance of all of these elements is essential to the public health, safety and welfare of all the citizens of Pennsylvania.
  
  \item \textsuperscript{63} See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Id. § 1303.504(a)(1).
  \item (a) Duty of physicians.—Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the informed consent of the patient or the patient’s authorized representative prior to conducting the following procedures:
\end{itemize}
“[c]onsent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure . . . and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure.”

MCARE holds physicians—not PAs or NPs—responsible for obtaining informed consent. Under the statute, the physician retains ultimate liability for a failure to obtain informed consent. However, nothing in the statute expressly precludes physicians from delegating the duty in obtaining informed consent to other medical professionals, as seen in Bulman and Foflygen. Consequently, in a time of increased delegation to mid-level healthcare professionals and an emphasis on team-based care, the lack of certainty on whether a physician can delegate the duty to obtain informed consent set the stage for the inevitable clash in Shinal.

(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia.

Id.

65. Id. § 1303.504(b).

66. See id. § 1303.504(a), (b) (explaining duty is on physician to obtain informed consent).


III. THE CONJOINING OF DELEGATION AND INFORMED CONSENT: THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA PREPARES FOR OPERATION IN SHINAL V. TOMS

In June 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided whether a physician could delegate the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent. The court held that a physician could not delegate to qualified staff in fulfilling the duty under chapter five of the MCARE Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed Bulman and Foflygen, holding that physicians—and only physicians—must obtain informed consent directly with a patient and shifted the central importance from the information being provided to the person delivering the information.

A. Informed Consent Delegation Meets the MCARE Act: Facts and Procedure in Shinal

On November 26, 2007, Megan L. Shinal met with Dr. Steven A. Toms, M.D, Director of the Department of Neurosurgery at Geisinger Medical Center, in Danville, Pennsylvania. In an initial consultation, Shinal and Toms discussed removing a recurrent, non-malignant tumor from the pituitary region of Shinal’s brain. According to Toms’s testimony, he discussed Shinal’s life goals and the

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70. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 429 (noting the issue for the court).
71. See id. at 453 (“[A] physician cannot rely upon a subordinate to disclose the information required to obtain informed consent.”).
72. See id. (“Without direct dialogue and a two-way exchange between the physician and patient, the physician cannot be confident that the patient comprehends the risks, benefits, likelihood of success, and alternatives.” (citation omitted)).
73. See id. at 429, 433–35 (summarizing factual background of Shinal’s medical situation and initial meeting with Dr. Steven Toms).
74. See id. at 433 (discussing Shinal’s medical history). Shinal had surgery on the tumor years before but the surgeon at the time was unable to remove all of it by accessing the tumor through the nose. See id. Therefore, some of the tumor remained, and the remaining portion had grown in the years since the initial surgery, placing her long term health at risk. See id.
risks associated with the different surgical options. Toms advised Shinal that a total resection of the tumor provided the greatest chance at long-term survival. While Shinal agreed to proceed with the surgery, they had not yet determined whether she would undergo total or subtotal resection.

On December 19, 2007, Shinal spoke with Toms’s PA over the phone. During this conversation, Shinal asked about any scarring from the surgery, possible follow-up radiation treatment, and the craniotomy incision. A little less than a month later, Shinal met with the PA at the neurosurgery clinic, where the PA interviewed Shinal on her medical history, performed a physical, and informed her about the surgery. “Shinal signed an informed consent form.” However, at trial, Shinal testified that she could not remember whether she was “informed of the relative risks of the surgery, other than coma and death.” Shinal “testified that, had she known the alternative approaches to surgery” and the differences between total versus subtotal resection, “she would have chosen subtotal resection as the safer, less aggressive alternative.”

On January 31, 2008, Shinal underwent surgery for a total resection of the brain tumor. During the surgery, Toms perforated, or pierced, Shinal’s carotid artery. The perforation resulted in a stroke, brain injury, and partial blindness.

On December 17, 2009, Shinal filed a medical malpractice lawsuit again Toms in the Court of Common Pleas of Montour County, Pennsylvania, alleging...
that she had not given informed consent prior to the surgery.\footnote{87} Shinal claimed that Toms did not inform her of the risks of surgery or explain that she could opt for subtotal resection combined with subsequent radiation treatments, which was the lower-risk option.\footnote{88} At trial, on the matter of informed consent, the judge instructed the jury “as follows: ‘[I]n considering whether [Dr. Toms] provided informed consent to [Mrs. Shinal], you may consider any relevant information you find was communicated to [Mrs. Shinal] by any qualified person acting as an assistant to [Dr. Toms].’”\footnote{89} “[T]he jury asked the court whether” PAs “could satisfy the informed consent requirements” laid out in the jury instruction.\footnote{90} The trial court repeated its prior instruction to the jury.\footnote{91}

“On April 21, 2014, the jury returned a verdict” for Toms.\footnote{92} “Shinal[] appealed to the Superior Court,” which affirmed the trial court’s holding in favor of Toms.\footnote{93} Shinal then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.\footnote{94} The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a physician may not delegate the duty to obtain informed consent, and that the duty requires face-to-face direct communication between the physician and the patient.\footnote{95}

B. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Puts on Scrubs and Dissects Informed Consent Delegation Once and For All

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began its analysis by briefly discussing the purposes and history of informed consent surrounding the protection of a patient’s bodily integrity and autonomy.\footnote{96} The court highlighted the need for a “meeting of the minds” between a patient and physician—physicians “ha[ve] a duty to inform the patient about the risks, benefits, likelihood of success, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{87}{See id. (noting the legal action taken against Dr. Toms after the surgery).}
\item \footnote{88}{See id. at 435 (“The Shinals initially named as defendants Geisinger Medical Center, Geisinger Clinic, and Dr. Toms. The parties agreed to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages. The liability phase of the trial was to address solely the issue of whether Dr. Toms obtained Mrs. Shinal’s informed consent before surgery.”).}
\item \footnote{89}{Id. at 436 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).}
\item \footnote{90}{Id.}
\item \footnote{91}{See id. (describing jury’s questioning of definition of informed consent and who can provide the information).}
\item \footnote{92}{See id. (noting the trial court’s jury verdict for Toms).
\item \footnote{93}{See id. at 437. The superior court relied on Foflygen v. Allegheny General Hospital and Bulman v. Myers in holding that information communicated to a patient by a qualified professional acting under a doctor’s supervision may be considered for obtaining informed consent. See id. at 438 (citations omitted).}
\item \footnote{94}{See id. at 436–38 (describing procedural history).}
\item \footnote{95}{See id. at 455.}
\item \footnote{96}{See id. at 452–53 (“The doctrine of informed consent protects a patient’s bodily integrity and autonomy in determining what medical treatment to allow. The doctrine recognizes that a patient has the right to be informed by his or her physician of the risks and benefits attending a proposed course of treatment in order to enable the patient to make an informed decision about the treatment. To ensure informed consent, the physician has a duty to inform the patient about the risks, benefits, likelihood of success, and alternatives.” (citation omitted)).}
\end{itemize}
alternatives” of a particular operation. Following its analysis of the contractual relationship between patient and physician, the court’s analysis was split into two sections: a common law analysis and a statutory interpretation analysis.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed Bulman and Foflygen, two superior court cases that allowed a jury to consider information provided by a surgeon’s qualified staff. The court contrasted the two lower court rulings with its decision in Valles, where it held that the duty to obtain informed consent rests only on the healthcare provider performing an operation and not on the hospital. Furthermore, the Valles court held the duty of disclosure lies only with the physician, stating the duty to obtain informed consent “belongs solely to the physician and that it is non-delegable.” Additionally, the court cited Kelly, explaining that due to nature of the physician-patient relationship, and the education of the surgeon, the surgeon is in the best position to obtain informed consent from a patient. Relying on the reasoning for separating informed consent liability between a physician and a hospital, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took one step further and held that physicians cannot rely upon a subordinate to disclose information and fulfill the duty to obtain informed consent. The court noted the importance of the physician-patient relationship and that direct discussions between the surgeon and patient ensure a patient has a complete understanding of the procedure, risks, and alternatives, while upholding patient autonomy and bodily integrity.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further reasoned that the common-law analysis was consistent with a plain reading of MCARE’s codification of

97. Id. at 452 (citation omitted).
98. See id. at 441–56.
99. See id. at 453 (comparing the superior court’s holdings in Bulman and Foflygen).
100. See id. (discussing the supreme court’s holding in Valles); see also Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1234 (Pa. 2002) (discussing that appellant claimed that Albert Einstein Medical Center and physician did not obtain informed consent of the patient, did not properly advise the patient of the risks of the dye used, and the alternatives that were available).
101. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 453 (citing Valles, 805 A.2d at 1239).
102. See id. at 453 (citing Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)) (explaining physician in best position to know patient medical history and explain risks of particular operations). In discussing the difference in liabilities, the Kelly court stated: “It is the surgeon and not the hospital who has the education, training and experience necessary to advise each patient of risks associated with the proposed surgery. Likewise, by virtue of his relationship with the patient, the physician is in the best position to know the patient’s medical history and to evaluate and explain the risks of a particular operation in light of the particular medical history. Kelly, 664 A.2d at 151.
103. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 453 (“Without direct dialogue and a two-way exchange between the physician and patient, the physician cannot be confident that the patient comprehends the risks, benefits, likelihood of success, and alternatives.” (citation omitted)).
104. See id. at 453–54 (explaining Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in expanding holding in Valles to physician’s subordinates).
informed consent.105 The court stated that nothing in the statute suggests that a physician can delegate the duty, and the focus of the statute is on who is giving the information directly to the patient and not just on who is receiving the information.106 Beyond the plain language of the statute, the majority reasoned that requiring direct communication between a physician and patient would serve the purpose of the MCARE Act in reducing costs of malpractice insurance.107

Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that Toms’s testimony was consistent with both the supreme court’s holdings in Valles and the court’s interpretation of the MCARE Act.108 Toms spoke of informed consent as “a real compact between the surgeon and the patient.”109 Speaking on the idea of delegation, Toms stated: “Truly, we’re not allowed to have a [physician assistant] or a resident physician [review the procedure with the patient], I have to do it, I have to hear it, I have to know it.”110

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately held that a physician may not delegate the obligation to provide sufficient information to obtain a patient’s informed consent.111 The court held the duty to obtain informed consent lies solely with the physician, who needs to give direct face-to-face communication to the patient in order to fulfill his or her duty.112 The supreme court, therefore, overruled Bulman and Foflygen, which had previously allowed a fact-finder to consider information given by a physician’s subordinate when determining whether a physician had fulfilled the obligation to obtain informed consent.113

C. “Let’s Stick to the Law”: The Dissent’s Response to the Supreme Court’s Reasoning

Justice Baer wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by two other justices, as he believed there was nothing in Pennsylvania law that directly prevented a physician from using qualified staff in fulfilling a physician’s duty to obtain informed consent.114

105. See id. at 454 (determining the plain language meaning of section 504 of MCARE Act). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that section 504 does not suggest a physician can delegate the duty the duty to a subordinate to obtain informed consent. See id.

106. See id. at 454 (interpreting section 504 of MCARE Act).

107. See id. at 454 n.28 (citing general objective of the MCARE Act). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted, “increased communication between the physician and patient relative to informed consent, as opposed to the physician’s delegation of communication to an agent or employee, enhances patient satisfaction, reduces the risk of litigation, and is consonant with the legislative goal of reducing malpractice costs.” Id.

108. See id. at 454–55 (discussing Toms’s testimony about informed consent).

109. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).

110. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

111. See id. (“We hold that a physician may not delegate to others his or her obligation to provide sufficient information in order to obtain a patient’s informed consent.”).

112. See id.

113. See id. (“To the extent that [Bulman and Foflygen] permit a physician to fulfill through an intermediary the duty to provide sufficient information to obtain a patient’s informed consent, we overrule them.”).
informed consent.\textsuperscript{114} Justice Baer based his argument on statutory interpretation and public policy.\textsuperscript{115} Justice Baer made clear that he agreed with the majority that a physician could not \textit{completely} delegate the duty to obtain informed consent, as the physician would still ultimately be liable, but argued that a physician may use qualified staff to help the physician fulfill this duty.\textsuperscript{116}

In regards to the statutory interpretation of the MCARE Act, Justice Baer argued that the statute does not explicitly mandate that only physicians can provide information to obtain patient consent.\textsuperscript{117} Justice Baer stressed that the Pennsylvania General Assembly could have expressly required that physicians were the only ones who could provide information to obtain patients informed consent, but the general assembly chose to leave the statute in the passive form.\textsuperscript{118} Therefore, the statute provided physicians with discretion in fulfilling the duty to obtain informed consent.\textsuperscript{119}

Furthermore, Justice Baer disagreed with the majority as a matter of public policy.\textsuperscript{120} The dissent stated that the majority’s holding “improperly injects the judiciary into the day-to-day tasks of physicians such as Dr. Toms and fails to acknowledge the reality of the practice of medicine.”\textsuperscript{121} Justice Baer argued that physicians would now have to be involved in every step of a patient’s informed consent, which would lead to negative consequences, such as longer lines and delayed care.\textsuperscript{122} In sum, the dissent asserted that unless the general assembly and law say otherwise, the courts should not unduly interfere the day-to-day tasks of

\textsuperscript{114} See \textit{id.} at 457 (Baer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority and stating that a jury should be allowed to consider relevant information communicated to a patient by any qualified person under a physician). Justice Baer agreed with the majority that a physician cannot simply delegate the duty and avoid liability. \textit{See id.} However, he believed a physician could delegate the duty, while still maintaining liability. \textit{See id.} Justice Bear stated the law on the duty to inform is “indisputable.” \textit{See id.} Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Mundy joined in the dissent. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{115} See \textit{id.} at 458.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{See id.} at 457 (claiming majority “makes a leap in logic and concludes that a physician is prohibited from utilizing his qualified staff to aid him in performing this duty”).

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{See id.} at 457–58 (arguing that the MCARE Act gives physicians discretion on how to fulfill the duty to obtain informed consent).  Justice Baer indicated that the statute states “[c]onsent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure,” but does not explicitly state that only physicians can provide information to obtain informed consent. \textit{See id.} at 458, 458 n.2 (quoting 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (West 2017)).

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{See id.} at 458 n. 2 (“[T]he Legislature crafted the first sentence of Subsection 1303.504(b) in passive voice, thus leaving open the method of informing a patient’s consent to the professional judgment and discretion of the physician charged with the duty of obtaining the patient’s informed consent.”).

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{See id.} (discussing reasoning for dissent).

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{See id.} at 458–59 (arguing that requiring that physicians—and only physicians—can obtain informed consent is inefficient and workable in a hospital setting).

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Id.} at 458.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{See id.} at 458–59 (arguing the practical consequences of the holding and the added strain the ruling places on physicians).
physicians and refrain from making their jobs unnecessarily more difficult.123

IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S IMPROPER DIAGNOSIS IN
SHINAL V. TOMS

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Shinal is problematic because it sidestepped the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act and failed to grasp the strong public policy argument in favor of team-based care and delivery system delegation.124

A. A Problem of Interpretation

In deciding a statutory interpretation question, Pennsylvania courts are guided by the Statutory Construction Act.125 Following this Act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has consistently held that the primary indication of the general assembly’s intent is the plain language of the statute.126 Accordingly,

123. See id. at 459 (fearing the majority’s holding would slow down the already burdened, healthcare delivery system).
124. See id. at 457–59 (arguing majority sidesteps plain reading of the MCARE Act).
125. See Statutory Construction Act, 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (West 2017) (guiding a court when determining statutory interpretation issue). Section 1921 states:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.

Id.

section 1303.504(b) of the MCARE states: “Consent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure.”

Applying section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act, the plain language of the MCARE statute allows discretion in how a physician fulfills the duty of obtaining informed consent. The phrase “the patient has been given” is written in the passive tense, which declares that the information must be given to the patient; importantly, it does not mention who must give the information. In stark contrast, the section of the MCARE immediately prior—section 504(a)—states that “a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the informed consent of the patient” before surgery. Therefore, if the general assembly wished to specifically require that only physicians could provide patients with information regarding consent, it very easily could have construed the statute in an identical manner to section 504(a), which specifically mentioned “physician.” However, in drafting section 504(b), the Pennsylvania General Assembly chose to leave the precise method for obtaining the informed consent to the physician, thus, allowing the physician to decide the best way the patient should be given a description of the procedure, risks, and alternatives.

The guiding principle in the Statutory Construction Act states that “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Therefore, under a plain reading of section 504(b) of the MCARE, a physician is allowed discretion to fulfill the duty under section 504(a) to provide informed consent.

A superior court opinion written by now supreme court Justice Wecht, previously held: “We...
may not arrogate to ourselves some magical power judicially to ‘improve’ the work done by the legislature.”\(^{135}\) In other words, “it is not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include.”\(^{136}\) As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held: “where the legislature includes specific language in one section of the statute and excludes it from another, the language should not be implied where excluded.”\(^{137}\) Here, the general assembly specifically chose to leave out “physicians” from section 504(b) when discussing the requirements that need to be satisfied in order to fulfill the physician’s duty of obtaining informed consent.\(^{138}\)

Even assuming, *arguendo*, that the words of the statute are unclear, the Statutory Construction Act states that the intention of the general assembly may be ascertained by considering other matters surrounding policy, including legislative history.\(^{139}\) In the original statute, section 103 specifically stated that informed consent meant “consent of a patient to the performance of health care services by a physician or podiatrist . . . of the proposed procedure or

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\(^{135}\) Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 303 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in *Cahill* held that “token” is not a “ticket” under statute because of the express language of the statute. *See id.* at 304. The court held that if the general assembly intended the statute to read broadly it would have stated so in the language. *See id.* at 303.


\(^{138}\) *See* Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 458 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (“The Legislature could have, but did not, expressly require that only physicians can provide patients with information regarding informed consent. Instead, the Legislature crafted the first sentence of Subsection 1303.504(b) in the passive voice, thus leaving open the method of informing a patient’s consent to the professional judgment and discretion of the physician charged with the duty of obtaining the patient’s informed consent.” (footnote omitted)).

\(^{139}\) *See* 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c) (West 2017) (directing courts to look at other factors only when the words of statute are not explicit). Under these other factors, the court is to look towards:

1. The occasion and necessity for the statute.
2. The circumstances under which it was enacted.
3. The mischief to be remedied.
4. The object to be attained.
5. The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
6. The consequences of a particular interpretation.
7. The contemporaneous legislative history.
8. Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.

*Id.* § 1921(c)(1)–(8).
In 1996, the statute was revised to define informed consent as “the consent of a patient . . . in accordance with Section 811-A.” Therefore, the earlier language—“the physician or podiatrist has informed the patient”—was replaced with “if the patient has been given.” The latter language remained in the latest MCARE Act at issue here. Thus, the revisions to the statutes show the General Assembly’s deliberate intentions to place the duty to obtain informed consent on the physician but not specify who exactly informs the patient, giving the physician discretion to fulfill the duty.

Additionally, under the plain language of the statute, delegation does not let the physician off the hook for liability for a failure to obtain informed consent. Under section 1303.504 (d), a physician is still liable for failing to obtain informed consent. The physician has a duty to obtain informed consent but may delegate that duty as the physician sees appropriate; however, the physician

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140. See Health Care Services Malpractice Act, 1996 Pa. Laws 776, § 1. “Informed consent” means for the purposes of this act and of any proceedings arising under the provisions of this act, the consent of a patient to the performance of health care services by a physician or podiatrist: Provided, That prior to the consent having been given, the physician or podiatrist has informed the patient of the nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alternatives to treatment or diagnosis that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision whether or not to undergo treatment or diagnosis.


143. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (“Consent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure.”).

144. See Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 458 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (stating decision of the General Assembly not to expressly require who can provide information regarding informed consent must not be ignored); see also Brief for the American Medical Association and the Pennsylvania Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra note 61, at 20 (“This change in language, which was continued in the MCARE Act, is particularly illuminating as to the question before the Court.”).

145. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(d)(1), (2) (discussing physician’s liability for failing to obtain informed consent). The provision states:

(d) Liability.—

(1) A physician is liable for failure to obtain the informed consent only if the patient proves that receiving such information would have been a substantial factor in the patient’s decision whether to undergo a procedure set forth in subsection (a).

(2) A physician may be held liable for failure to seek a patient’s informed consent if the physician knowingly misrepresents to the patient his or her professional credentials, training or experience.

146. See id. (leaving a physician liable for failure to fulfill the duty to obtain informed consent).
retains ultimately liability under the plain language of section 1303.504(d) of the MCARE.\textsuperscript{147} The situation is analogous to the “captain of the ship doctrine,” which “imposes liability on the surgeon in charge of an operation for the negligence of his assistants during the period when these assistants are under the surgeon’s control.”\textsuperscript{148} Therefore, the plain language of the MCARE Act allows for delegation of the physician duty to obtain informed consent, but the physician maintains liability for failure to fulfill the duty.\textsuperscript{149}

B. The Policy Argument and the Future of Medical Care

The dissent stated that the majority opinion “injects the judiciary into the day-to-day tasks of physicians . . . and fails to acknowledge the reality of the practice of medicine.”\textsuperscript{150} The reality of healthcare delivery systems is that with a shortage of doctors and the rise of the workforce of NPs and PAs, medical tasks such as diagnosis and drug prescription are now being delegated to mid-level health professionals.\textsuperscript{151} Following this momentum, the Pennsylvania State Senate recently passed a bill that would give NPs full practice authority, removing the mandate that required NPs to maintain written collaborative agreements with physicians for practice and prescription authority.\textsuperscript{152} This is just one example of implementation of delegation in healthcare delivery.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{147}. See id.; Shinal, 162 A.3d at 458 (“If qualified staff is somehow negligent in aiding a physician in informing a patient’s consent, then the physician remains liable if that negligence results in the failure to obtain the patient’s informed consent.”).


\textsuperscript{149}. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 458 (“Stated succinctly, there is nothing in the law of this Commonwealth precluding a physician from utilizing his qualified staff to aid in his duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent.”); cf. PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (stating informed consent doctrine in Pennsylvania).

\textsuperscript{150}. Shinal, 162 A.3d at 458.

\textsuperscript{151}. See Levi & Zehavi, supra note 9, at 227 (noting “Typical medical tasks such as diagnosis and drug prescription historically performed only by physicians are being delegated nowadays to nurses as well as to other health professionals, recasting traditional professional boundaries in the healthcare field.”).

\textsuperscript{152}. See S. 25, Reg. Sess. 2017–18 (Pa. 2017) (purporting to grant NPs prescriptive authority and removing collaborative restrictions); Terwilliger, supra note 9 (discussing Pennsylvania Senate Bill 25); see also Barnes, supra note 9 (discussing study finding removing collaborative agreement requirements for NPs would increase number of NPs in Pennsylvania by 13% and lower health care costs by $6.4 billion over the next ten years).

\textsuperscript{153}. See, e.g., Bowen et al., supra note 15, at 110–16 (discussing how delegation of nurse-led discharge can improve efficiency of patient discharge by providing services outside of usual time periods and allowing discharges ahead of schedule, resulting in an elimination of unnecessary delays in discharge); see also Beasley et al., supra note 15, at 1044–45 (arguing the practice of attending surgeons performing concurrent operations in two separate rooms with qualified surgical trainees assigned to the individual rooms improves the efficiency healthcare can be delivered); Lichtenstein et al., supra note 15, at 2170 (finding “[t]he delegation of specific processes for the management of urinary incontinence, dementia, and falls, to lower level providers is associated with higher quality care . . . [and] efficiency and quality can be improved through team care with increased delegation”).
Several studies have shown that delegation to NPs and PAs has little effect on the quality of care delivered, increases access, and potentially reduces healthcare costs.\textsuperscript{154} Additionally, according to some studies, PAs and NPs have lower rates of liability relative to physicians.\textsuperscript{155} The future of healthcare delivery seems to be in team-based care and in the efficient, effective use of technology and qualified staff to better serve an ever-growing population in need.\textsuperscript{156} The majority ruling puts a halt on the growing trend of team-based delegation and puts into question any reliance on video instructions as a tool in combination with others as means of obtaining informed consent.\textsuperscript{157}

Perhaps most importantly, the majority opinion ignores consumers and their voices in the marketplace for healthcare.\textsuperscript{158} A leading study showed that patients appear to be more open to a greater role for these mid-level professionals, and although the majority of patients would prefer a doctor, patients would rather see a PA than have to wait.\textsuperscript{159} Specifically imperative in the informed consent

\textsuperscript{154}. See Timmons, supra note 10, at 18 (concluding “that broader scope of practice for NPs and PAs has little effect on the quality of care delivered, increases access to health care, and also potentially reduces the cost of providing health care to patients”); see also Bauer, supra note 10, at 231 (presenting extensive evidence that NPs provide care of equal or better quality at lower cost than comparable services provided by other qualified health professionals); Horrocks et al., supra note 10, at 820–21 (concluding from eleven trials and twenty-three observational studies, patients were more satisfied with care by a NP, NPs had longer consultations, made more investigations than doctors, and quality of care in some ways was better for NPs); Niezen & Mathijssen, supra note 10, at 165–66 (concluding “[e]xisting evidence demonstrates substitution or delegation from cure to care is effective,” although introduction of NPs will require “organizational redesign”).

\textsuperscript{155}. See Brock et al., supra note 10, at 8, 11 (finding “[p]er capita, PAs and NPs were less likely to have made malpractice payments or have been subject to an adverse action than were physicians” and that “[t]he latest 10 years of observation is consistent with reports that PAs and NPs have lower reports of liability relative to their physician colleagues”).

\textsuperscript{156}. See Bodenheimer & Smith, supra note 12, at 1882 (noting “[l]icensed practitioners . . . [and non-licensed health care personnel] . . . are seriously underused” and “[a]n effective team adds capacity by sharing the care between clinicians and nonclinicians”); see also Gabbay et al., supra note 12, at 1 (concluding “team-based care enables physicians and other qualified healthcare providers to work with the patient and a multi-disciplinary team to coordinate and deliver high-quality health care across all settings”); Iglehart, supra note 12, at 1940 (finding “progress in restructuring delivery systems may come more rapidly at the practice level, where physicians, nurses, and other caregivers are freer to innovate and to assign tasks to persons on the basis of the full extent of their training and what makes organizational sense”).

\textsuperscript{157}. See Cordasco et al., supra note 22, at 468 (“Studies have shown that, in general, providing patients with simplified supplemental written materials, using decision-aids, using video educational tools, and using the ‘repeat-back method’ improves informed consent patient recall and comprehension. Studies using interactive computer programs have had mixed results . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{158}. See Hooker et al., supra note 11, at 90 (“In our national cross-sectional satisfaction study comparing physician, PA, and NP primary care, in all indices of satisfaction PAs and NPs were rated as favorably as physicians.”); see also Dill et al., supra note 11, at 1135–42 (2013).

\textsuperscript{159}. See Dill et al., supra note 11, at 1135–36 (showing greater patient openness to PAs and NPs); see also Frosch et al., supra note 11, at 1030–38 (finding patients felt limited, even trapped, into certain ways to speak with their doctors).
context, studies have found that patients can be more comfortable and upfront speaking with mid-level health professionals than the surgeon. If the heart of section 504 of the MCARE’s informed consent requirement is to ensure that a patient has all the necessary information in order to make an informed decision, then it seems vital that a patient feels comfortable enough to ask questions and openly discuss the procedure with a healthcare provider.

The majority’s abrupt ruling halting the growth of healthcare delegation appears inconsistent with the growing trend of research, as evidenced by the Pennsylvania State Senate’s Nurse Practitioner bill that was up for vote in the House in the Fall of 2017, which purports to expand the authority of NPs to increase access to care. Nonetheless, the public policy argument demonstrates that debate about the extent of healthcare delegation is better left for the legislature, rather than the courts.

V. “THE DOCTOR WILL SEE YOU IN A FEW HOURS”: THE FUTURE OF INFORMED CONSENT IN PENNSYLVANIA

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding in Shinal changes the way physicians must now obtain informed consent under the MCARE Act.

160. See Grumbach & Bodenheimer, supra note 11, at 1250 (“Nurse practitioners may also have better patient education and communication skills than do physicians.”). Additionally, the article cited numerous studies that suggested multidisciplinary clinical teams produced clinical outcomes superior to those achieved by “usual care.” See id.

161. See 40 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504(b) (West 20017) (declaring “[c]onsent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision as to that procedure”); see also Frosch et al., supra note 11, at 1030–38 (finding patients felt limited, even trapped, into certain ways to speak with their doctors).

162. See S. 25, Reg. Sess. 2017–18 (Pa. 2017) (purporting to grant NPs prescriptive authority and removing collaborative restrictions); see also Jaep & Bailey, supra note 9, at 14 (suggesting “granting Pennsylvania’s nurse practitioners Full Practice Authority could potentially benefit Pennsylvanians by increasing access to comparable or better health care at lower costs”).

163. See Shinal v. Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 458 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., dissenting) (arguing that plain meaning of the statute the legislature wrote should be effectuated); cf. Discovery Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 166 A.3d 304, 318 (Pa. 2017) (“Regardless of any policy reasons which may favor the creation of a mechanism through which the material terms of a charter can be amended, it is not the province of the judiciary to augment the legislative scheme.” (citation omitted)); Mohamed v. Commonwealth, 40 A.3d 1186, 1195 (Pa. 2012) (“Any legislative oversight is for the General Assembly to fill, not the courts.” (citation omitted)); Watson v. Witkin, 22 A.2d 17, 23 (Pa. 1941) (declaring “for the duty of courts is to interpret laws, not to make them.”).

164. See Shinal, 162 A.3d at 455 (majority opinion) (holding a physician may not delegate the duty to obtain patients’ informed consent and requiring direct, face-to-face communication between physician and patient). See generally Arensberg, supra note 69 (explaining holding of Shinal); Needles, supra note 69 (discussing impact of case); Robeznieks, supra note 69 (discussing impact of case); Tan, supra note 69 (“The urgent question now is whether other jurisdictions will adopt this Pennsylvania rule that drastically changes the way doctors obtain informed consent from their patients.”); Wilson, supra note 69.
Although physicians typically obtain informed consent themselves, it is often routine for physicians to rely on qualified staff to answer patient follow-up questions regarding the patient’s procedure. After Shinal, physicians can no longer rely on mid-level professionals to help them fulfill their duty to obtain informed consent and must personally answer all patient initial and follow-up questions. Since the holding, medical malpractice attorneys have already voiced concern that Shinal will lead to confusion among physicians and hospital administrators, delay patients access to care, and lead to an increase in informed consent litigation. On the other hand, proponents of the holding in Shinal argue that although the ruling may delay care, it will lead to fewer misunderstandings and legal disputes.

More immediate, the holding requires health care providers to review their informed consent policies and make the necessary changes to comply with the new ruling. Because the future of healthcare delivery appears to be in team-based care, the delegation of clinical roles to PAs and NPs, and the continued increase of new technologies, the issues presented in Shinal are not going to disappear anytime soon. In a time of growing physician shortages,
the focus and momentum in informed consent may shift to what information is being provided and the accuracy and effectiveness of the care, rather than on who is providing the information.\textsuperscript{171} Beyond the political stalemate on healthcare reform in Washington, D.C., the problem of a shortage of doctors for the growing population looms in the background.\textsuperscript{172} An effective solution will rely on innovation in delivery systems that focus on cost-effective measures to increase access to care, quality of care, and efficient care.\textsuperscript{173}

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\textsuperscript{171} See Brief for the American Medical Association and the Pennsylvania Medical Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra note 61, at 3 (concluding the focus of the MCARE and the common law is on the information a patient received, rather than on the identity of the person providing the information).
\textsuperscript{172} See generally Brader et al., supra note 2 (discussing current healthcare debate); Everett & Dawsey, supra note 2 (same); Kaplan & Sullivan, supra note 2 (same); Neuman, supra note 2 (same); Pear & Kaplan, supra note 2 (same); Sanger-Katz, supra note 2 (same); Tolbert, supra note 2 (same).
\textsuperscript{173} See generally Brader et al., supra note 2 (discussing current healthcare debate); Everett & Dawsey, supra note 2 (same); Kaplan & Sullivan, supra note 2 (same); Neuman, supra note 2 (same); Pear & Kaplan, supra note 2 (same); Sanger-Katz, supra note 2 (same); Tolbert, supra note 2 (same).
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