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“WORKS FOR ME”: WHAT’S NEXT FOR PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATE INCOME TAX LIABILITIES AFTER 
NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS OF THE MID–ATLANTIC v. COMMONWEALTH

Riley Bauer*

“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”

I. INTRODUCTION: ANSWERING THE CALL FOR FAIR TAX TREATMENT ACROSS ALL PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATIONS

Some critics argue that large corporations take the above quote to heart and arrange their taxes in a way that best serves them, to the detriment of everyone else. While Pennsylvania is home to some of the na-

* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.B.A., 2016, Belmont University. This Casebrief is dedicated to my parents, sister, and friends who have supported and encouraged me throughout my law school career. I would like to thank Nicholas Stratis and Scott Austin for their insight and suggestion of the topic. I would also like to thank the Villanova Law Review for their assistance with the writing and editing of this Casebrief, particularly Matthew Hall, Carolyn Toll, Meaghan Lane, Kimberly Sachs, Jessica DiBacco, Michael Neminski, Ryan Ahrens, Ryan Dieter, Thallia Malespin, and Timothy Muyano.

1. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); see also Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.”).


(477)
tion’s largest companies—including Comcast, Kraft Heinz, and Dick’s Sporting Goods—it is also home to a significant number of small businesses. These corporations, large and small, contribute an ample portion of the annual revenue to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via the corporate income tax. This tax revenue is vital to finance governmental initiatives, such as the twenty-two Community Revitalization Projects or the forty-five Multimodal Transportation Projects across Pennsylvania for which Governor Tom Wolf recently approved funding.


5. See Eleanor Lamb, Gov. Tom Wolf Announces 45 Multimodal Projects for Pennsylvania, TRANSP. TOPICS (Feb. 9, 2018, 2:45 PM), http://www.ttnews.com/articles/
Like most states, Pennsylvania allows corporations to lower their tax liabilities in the form of “deductions” if they meet certain conditions.6 Deductions are used to reduce taxable income for purposes of calculating overall tax liability.7 Under the Pennsylvania Revenue Code (PRC), one such deduction available for corporations is a “net loss carryover deduc-

6. See Nicole Kaeding, Does Your State's Corporate Income Tax Code Conform with the Federal Tax Code?, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/state-corporate-income-tax-code-conformity/ (detailing which states follow the federal tax code, which allows for deductions by corporations in certain instances). Other mechanisms that governments use to allow taxpayers to reduce their tax liabilities include credits and exemptions. See generally Policy Basics: Tax Exemptions, Deductions, and Credits, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 7, 2015), https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-tax-exemptions-deductions-and-credits (explaining exemptions, deductions, and credits). See also What Are Exemptions, Deductions, and Credits?, MONEYTIPS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.moneytips.com/exemptions-deductions-and-credits (explaining differences between deductions, exemptions, and credits). Exemptions are similar to deductions in that they reduce taxable income and thereby indirectly reduce taxes owed. See id. (noting similarities between exemptions and deductions). The main difference between the two is that exemptions normally deal with relationships of the taxpayer while deductions commonly deal with expenses paid by the taxpayer. See id. (distinguishing exemptions from deductions). Credits differ from deductions and exemptions because they directly reduce tax liability, dollar-for-dollar. See id. (explaining credits); see also Kimberly Amadeo, Progressive Tax with Examples, THE BALANCE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/progressive-tax-definition-examples-4155741 (further discussing credits).

A corporation is eligible for a net loss carryover deduction when it has incurred a net loss—when the total amount it spent exceeds the total amount it earned—in a prior year and it has not since claimed that loss as a deduction. The corporation then carries over the loss from the prior year to apply it to the current year’s tax calculation in order to decrease the corporation’s taxable income. Formerly, the PRC stipulated that corporations were only allowed to deduct from taxable income an amount of net loss carryover that was equal to the greater of either a fixed dollar amount (a flat dollar cap), which the Commonwealth set for tax year 2007 at $3 million, or a fixed percentage of the corporation’s taxable income (a percentage cap), which the Commonwealth set for tax year 2007 as 12.5% of taxable income. These options provided a notable advantage to smaller businesses over their larger counterparts.

In Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed this discriminatory advantage, and held that the flat dollar cap was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Specifically, the court held that the cap resulted in a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Uniformity Clause, which states that subjects “of the same class,” such as all businesses regardless of

8. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7401(3)(4)(a) (2017) (“[F]or the taxable year beginning in 1995 and each taxable year thereafter, a net loss deduction shall be allowed from taxable income . . . .”).


10. See Drenkard, supra note 9 (detailing net loss carryover deductions by state). Losses may only be carried forward for twenty years from the year they were incurred. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7401(3)(4)(c)(2)(A) (2017) (promulgating that losses incurred “1998 and thereafter” may be carried forward twenty years). A net loss is defined in the PRC as “the negative amount for said taxable year . . . .” Id. § 7401(3)(4)(b).


12. See Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid–Atl., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 171 A.3d 682, 699 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, 86 U.S.L.W. 3614 (2018) (detailing advantage provided to smaller corporations). Corporations with taxable income of $3 million or less were given essentially a “de facto” total exemption if they had net loss carryover equal to taxable income. See id. at 698–99 (explaining conditions for small corporations). On the other hand, corporations with taxable income over $3 million were not allowed to exempt their entire income even if they had net loss carryover equal to or greater than their taxable income. See id. at 699 (explaining conditions for larger corporations).

13. See id. at 699, 703 (elaborating on advantage given to smaller corporations over larger counterparts and holding $3 million flat deduction as unconstitutional).
their size, must be taxed uniformly. The court then severed the unconstitutional flat dollar cap, while preserving the uniform, and therefore constitutional, percentage cap.

In response to the Nextel decision, Governor Wolf signed a bill amending the tax provision for taxable year 2018 and onwards to include only a percentage cap. Though it has for Nextel, litigation related to Pennsylvania’s net loss carryover deduction has not yet entirely ceased. While it has since been denied, Nextel filed an Application for Reargument with

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14. See id. at 701 (finding unconstitutional via Uniformity Clause) (internal quotations omitted); see also PA. CONST. ART. VIII, § 1 (“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects”); Commonwealth v. Overholt & Co., 200 A. 849, 853 (Pa. 1938) (holding that uniformity requires tax to “operate alike on the classes of things or property subject to it.”).

15. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 705 (“Accordingly, we sever only the $3 million flat deduction from the NLC.”).


For tax year 2006 and all tax years before, there was no percentage cap, but only a flat dollar cap of $2 million. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7401(3)(4)(c)(1)(A)(I) (imposing flat dollar cap for all tax years “before January 1, 2007, [of] two million dollars”).
Application for Consolidation in *R.B. Alden Corp. v. Commonwealth*.\(^{18}\) *R.B. Alden*, a sister case to *Nextel*, deals with an earlier version of the net loss carryover deduction when there was solely a flat dollar cap and not a percentage cap at all.\(^{19}\) At the appellate level, the Commonwealth Court held that the flat dollar cap created different classes of taxpayers, and thus was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution.\(^{20}\) The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and is still pending.\(^{21}\)

This Casebrief argues that by invalidating and effectively discontinuing the flat dollar cap, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in *Nextel* upset long-standing legislation and extinguished a significant advantage that the General Assembly had given small business owners.\(^{22}\) Part II of this Casebrief will provide context and background to the constitutional issues related to the flat dollar cap and explain the relevant Pennsylvania Constitution clause and conflicting statutory provisions.\(^{23}\) Part III will recount

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20. See id. at 730 (“[T]he net loss carryover deduction limitation creates separate classes of taxpayers/corporations was with unequal tax burdens, based solely on income. Pennsylvania law clearly provides that the amount of a taxpayer’s income is not a reasonable distinction on which to treat taxpayers differently.”).


23. For a discussion of the background and legal environment in which the *Nextel* decision was made, see infra notes 28–66 and accompanying text.
the facts and procedure that led to the decision in *Nextel*. Part IV will discuss the court’s reasoning for finding only the net loss carryover flat dollar cap unconstitutional. Part V will analyze the consistency of the court’s conclusions in *Nextel* with respect to prior decisions and reasoning. Finally, Part VI will examine the impact that the *Nextel* decision could potentially have on corporations operating in Pennsylvania and their corporate tax liabilities.

II. THE #4-1-1: A BACKGROUND ON THE ISSUES PRESENT IN *NEXTEL*

For almost a century and a half, the Pennsylvania Constitution has mandated the General Assembly to uniformly prescribe taxes across the same class of taxpayers. And for almost four decades, the PRC has made a net loss carryover deduction available for corporations, commonly subject to caps. Large corporations contend that these caps create distinct classes artificially and arbitrarily based on revenue—one class that pays, another class that does not—and thereby impose non-uniform taxes on what are, in reality, subjects of the same class. Through the years, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has honed its Uniformity Clause jurisprudence to address the rift created between this concrete principle of uniformity and the relatively recent development of deductions and caps.

24. For a retelling of the facts and discussion of the procedure leading up to *Nextel*, see infra notes 67–83 and accompanying text.

25. For a narrative analysis of *Nextel*, see infra notes 84–103 and accompanying text.

26. For a critical analysis of *Nextel* in light of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Uniformity Clause jurisprudence, see infra notes 104-125 and accompanying text.

27. For a discussion of the impact that *Nextel* will potentially have on small business owners, large business owners, business advisors, and the Commonwealth, see infra notes 126–145 and accompanying text.

28. For a discussion of the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.

29. For a discussion of net loss carryover deductions in the PRC, see infra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.

30. See *Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atl., Inc. v. Commonwealth*, 171 A.3d 682, 699 (Pa. 2017), *cert. denied*, 86 U.S.L.W. 3614 (2018) (discussing how caps “effectively create[ ]” two classes). The court explains that one class is exempt from paying any corporate net income tax solely due to having income less than $3 million. See id. (discussing first and larger class). The other class, the one *Nextel* falls into, consists of those corporations that had income in excess of $3 million. See id. (discussing second class).

31. For a discussion on Supreme Court of Pennsylvania precedent regarding the Uniformity Clause, see infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text.
A. Statewide Coverage: The Uniformity Clause

The Uniformity Clause is the only provision within the Pennsylvania Constitution that addresses the state’s taxing power. Without creating a detailed definition, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that in order to be uniform, a tax must “operate alike on the classes of things or property subject to it.” The clause was first adopted in 1874 as a response to the legislative implementation of discriminatory tax laws that showed preference to particular industries and individuals. To this day, the clause remains the crux of the issue in many tax cases argued before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.


The net loss carryover deduction was first introduced in the PRC in 1980, exclusively with a flat dollar cap, in an effort to encourage businesses to make substantial investments in new technologies. A flat dollar cap is


34. See ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578 (1985) (“Tax exemptions which had been given to favored groups encouraged the approval of the uniformity clause which was inserted into the Constitution.”); see also Nextel, 171 A.3d at 694 (discussing adoption of Uniformity Clause). The main industry receiving preferential treatment prior to the adoption of the Uniformity Clause was the railroad industry. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 694–95 (noting railroad industry as “primary beneficiary of support from [the] Commonwealth’s public fisc”). The railroad industry was not only favored by special tax laws but also was appropriated significant funds for construction and was given charters for exclusive operation in certain parts of the Commonwealth. See id. (detailing benefits received by railroad industry).


36. See Act of December 8, 1980, 1980 Pa. Laws 1117 § 2 (instituting first net loss carryover deduction); Nextel, 171 A.3d at 704 (discussing policy for net loss carryover deduction). The legislative history shows that the General Assembly intended the deduction to encourage businesses to develop new technologies and to acquire any infrastructure necessary to do so. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 704. (discussing policy). The deduction would allow corporations to deduct the losses sustained during their investing years against their revenues enjoyed during more
a limitation of a particular dollar value on the amount of a corporation’s loss eligible for deduction for that year.\textsuperscript{37} For example, suppose in Year 1, Corporation X has a net loss of $1.5 million and then in Year 2, Corporation X has taxable income of $1 million.\textsuperscript{38} If the PRC established a flat dollar cap of over $1 million, for instance $3 million, Corporation X will be able to fully deduct its taxable income in Year 2 with the net loss carryforward of Year 1 and will have a remaining $500,000 of that net loss to carry forward to another year with positive taxable income.\textsuperscript{39} If, instead, the flat dollar cap were only $750,000, Corporation X would only be able to deduct $750,000 of its taxable income.\textsuperscript{40} Corporation X would still then have to pay taxes on the remaining $250,000 taxable income that was not deducted.\textsuperscript{41} However, Corporation X would still have the remaining $750,000 of net loss to carry forward to apply to another year with positive taxable income.\textsuperscript{42}

The deduction remained almost exclusively a flat dollar cap from 1980 until 2006.\textsuperscript{43} From 2006 until December 27, 2017, the deduction included a flat dollar cap as well as a percentage cap.\textsuperscript{44} A percentage cap is a limitation of a percent-based value, determined by a calculation of a percentage of taxable income on the amount of a corporation’s loss eligible for deduction for profitable future years. See id. (detailing mechanism of net loss carryover deduction). The flat dollar cap was implemented in order to maintain the Commonwealth’s financial health. See id. (explaining justification for flat dollar cap). In their argument, the Department states the inclusion of a cap indicates that the Commonwealth could not “sustain an unlimited deduction.” See id. at 701 (using legislative history of caps to buttress argument).

37. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 698–99 (explaining flat dollar cap).

38. See generally id. (detailing numbers relevant to calculation of net loss carryover deduction).


40. See id. (detailing calculation).


42. See id. (explaining how net loss is truly carried forward).

43. See, e.g., Act of December 8, 1980, 1980 Pa. Laws 1117 § 2 (instituting flat dollar cap). There was a brief period in the early 1990s where the deduction was removed in its entirety but was then later reinstated. See Act of June 16, 1994, P.L. 279, No. 48, § 10 (reinstating flat dollar cap); Act of August 4, 1991, P.L. 97, No. 22, § 16 (removing flat dollar cap). For further discussion of the use of a flat dollar cap’s treatment in Pennsylvania, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.

ble for deduction for that year. For example, suppose the percentage cap is 12.5% of taxable income and in Year 1, Corporation X once again has a net loss of $1.5 million and then in Year 2, Corporation X once again has taxable income of $1 million. Corporation X would only be able to deduct $125,000, or 12.5% of $1 million, from its taxable income. Corporation X would still have to pay tax on the remaining $875,000 of taxable income not deducted, as compared to the remainder of $250,000 under a flat dollar cap of $750,000. Corporation X would also then still have the remaining $1,375,000 of net loss to carry forward to apply to another year with positive taxable income. While a percentage cap likely means net loss will be spread over many more years than it would under a flat dollar cap, a percentage cap also means that if a corporation has any taxable income, that corporation will necessarily have a tax liability.

C. Call Back: Prior Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Decisions

Decided only a few years after the adoption of the Uniformity Clause, *In re Cope’s Estate* lays the foundation for the jurisprudence of the clause. At the time of the case, the Direct Inheritance Tax Law excluded all estates worth $5,000 or less from paying a direct inheritance tax. The court found the tax, dependent solely on property value, to be a means of unequally distributing the tax burden by granting an outright exemption for certain class members. The court ruled in favor of the estate of

45. *See Nextel Commc’ns of the Mid-Atl., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 171 A.3d 682, 698–99 (explaining percentage cap).*

46. *See generally id. (detailing numbers relevant to calculation of net loss carryover deduction).*

47. *See id. (explaining calculation of net loss carryover deduction subject to percentage cap).*


49. *See id. (detailing how net loss is carried forward to future years).*

50. *See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 698–99 (explaining implications of flat dollar cap versus percentage cap).*

51. 43 A. 79 (Pa. 1899).

52. *See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 696 (noting Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s longstanding and steadfast adherence to interpretation of Uniformity Clause in *In re Cope’s Estate*).*

53. *See In re Cope’s Estate, 43 A. at 79–80 (discussing Direct Inheritance Tax Law and implications).*

54. *See id. at 81 (declaring what qualities of tax law lead to unconstitutionality).* The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that the legislature has the authority to “justly and fairly, but never arbitrarily” classify subjects, but stated that a purported classification based “solely on a difference in quantity of precisely the same kind of property” is unconstitutional. *See id.* (justifying holding). The court stated that the Direct Inheritance Tax Law instituted an “arbitrary ratio” as to which estates are taxed and which are exempt. *See id.* (declaring Direct Inheritance Tax Law as arbitrary).
Marmaduke Cope, which was worth nearly $1 million, and held that the tax rate classification structure was “necessarily unjust, arbitrary and illegal” and therefore, unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{55}

Since \textit{In re Cope’s Estate}, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has heard a number of other tax cases where the tax provisions at issue were alleged to have violated the Uniformity Clause, similar to the tax provisions at bar in \textit{Nextel}.\textsuperscript{56} In \textit{Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Department of Revenue},\textsuperscript{57} per the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, casinos located outside Philadelphia County were obligated to pay both an “annual county local share assessment” and a “municipal local share assessment,” while casinos located within Philadelphia County were only required to pay the annual county local share assessment.\textsuperscript{58} Through the municipal local share assessment, casinos outside Philadelphia County were then necessarily subdivided based on whether they had yielded above or below $500 million in slot machine revenue.\textsuperscript{59} The court found merit in the argument made by Mount Airy, a hotel and casino located in Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania, that through this subdivision, the General Assembly was tax-

\textsuperscript{55}. See \textit{id.} (discussing constitutionality of Direct Inheritance Tax Law). In total, the estate of Marmaduke Cope was worth $917,519.88. See \textit{id.} at 80 (valuing estate).

\textsuperscript{56}. See, e.g., Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 107, 114 (Pa. 2013) (holding that averaging provision of shares tax not unconstitutional due to lack of uniformity from “justifie[d] . . . short-term disparity of result” from merger of two institutions).

\textsuperscript{57}. 154 A.3d 268 (Pa. 2016).

\textsuperscript{58}. See \textit{id.} at 271 (discussing facts). The act defined gross terminal revenue (GTR) as “all cash or cash equivalent wagers received by a slot machine,’ less any amounts paid out to players in various forms.” See \textit{id.} (quoting 4 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2017) (defining gross terminal revenue)). All slot machine licensees, regardless of location, had to pay a daily tax of 34% of GTR. See \textit{id.} at 279 (breaking down aspects of Gaming Act). Additionally, casinos located within Philadelphia County had to pay an annual county local share assessment of 4% of the casino’s GTR. See \textit{id.} at 271 (discussing tax assessment for Philadelphia casinos). If, instead, the casinos were located outside of Philadelphia County, they had to pay both an annual county local share assessment of 2% of the casino’s GTR and a municipal local share assessment, which is the greater of either 2% of the casino’s GTR or a lump sum of $10 million. See \textit{id.} (discussing tax assessment for non-Philadelphia casinos). See generally Christine Hanhausen, Frank Gallo, Kenneth Levine & Lee Zoeller, \textit{PA Supreme Court Declares Portion of Slot Machine Tax Unconstitutional; Provides Possible Preview of Pending NOL Cap Case}, \textit{REED S MITH} (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2016/09/pa-supreme-court-declares-portion-of-slot-machine (discussing the case and its impact).

\textsuperscript{59}. See \textit{id.} at 271–72 (explaining further classification of casinos located outside Philadelphia County based on slot machine revenue). With the municipal local share assessment, if a casino located outside Philadelphia County had GTR at or below $500 million, it necessarily would pay the $10 million lump sum. See \textit{id.} at 271 (detailing subdivision implications for casinos with GTR at or below $500 million). If a casino located outside Philadelphia County had GTR above $500 million, the casino would always pay more than $10 million for its municipal local share assessment. See \textit{id.} (detailing subdivision implications for casinos with GTR above $500 million).
ing them discriminately. \footnote{See id. at 272 (finding Mount Airy’s argument persuasive). The court stated that the General Assembly effectively created a “variable-rate tax.” See id. at 276 (noting lack of uniformity in “such quantitative distinctions”). The court stated that, while it might not be explicit in the language of the statute, the municipal local share assessment creates a “second tax bracket with a marginal rate of 2% for casinos with GTR greater than $500 million.” See id. (discussing tax effectively created by statutory thresholds).}

Thereafter, the court held the local share assessment unconstitutional as a non-uniform tax. \footnote{See id. at 280 (discussing holding). The court severed the local share assessment portions from the Gaming Act, left the remaining provisions intact, and left the task of replacing the severed provisions to the General Assembly. See id. at 279–80 (discussing rationale for severing completely and leaving to General Assembly for redrafting).}

In \textit{Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area School District}, \footnote{163 A.3d 962 (Pa. 2016).} the school district, as a taxing district, had the power to appeal property assessments within its boundaries. \footnote{See id. at 966 (detailing facts). Given constant market fluctuations, real property needs to be reevaluated in order to accurately reflect property value and assess taxes accordingly. See id. (discussing cause for reassessments). At the time of the case, 80% of single–family homes in the district were undervalued in their assessments. See id. (discussing need for reassessment).}

In these “reverse tax appeals,” the school district specifically targeted commercial properties while declining to appeal assessments of single-family residential homes. \footnote{See id. (describing motivations of school district regarding assessments). At the advice of a realty firm, the Upper Merion Area School District targeted commercial properties, like apartment complexes, because their property values are generally higher than those of single-family homes. See id. (detailing advice received). Further, residents who vote in local elections own most of the single–family homes, and therefore, for political reasons, appeals for their assessments were not pursued. See id. (discussing political motive).}

The court held that the school district was not able to adopt a program of targeting a specific sub-classification of properties (i.e., commercial properties), where that sub-classification is drawn according to property type, for assessment. \footnote{See id. at 978 (discussing holding). The court held by reversing the Commonwealth Court’s sustaining of the School District’s objections and remanded the matter back to the lower court. See id. (detailing procedure of holding); see also Jeffrey Wilhelm, \textit{PA Supreme Court Prohibits Taxing Jurisdictions from Specifically Targeting Commercial Properties for Reverse Assessment Appeals}, \textit{Reed Smith} (July 6, 2017), \url{https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2017/07/pa-sup-ct-prohibits-taxing-jurisdictions-targeting-commercial-properties} (discussing impact of \textit{Valley Forge} decision).}

Through both the \textit{Mount Airy} and \textit{Valley Forge} decisions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sharpened its Uniformity Clause jurisprudence, holding that differences in monetary value associated with property were not legitimate criteria for tax classification. \footnote{See Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268, 280 (Pa. 2016) (holding different levels of revenue as arbitrary with classifying casinos); see also \textit{Valley Forge}, 163 A.3d at 979–80 (holding initiative to assess only high value properties as discriminatory classification). Over a century ago, shortly after the adoption of the Uniformity Clause, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that disparate tax treatment based solely on asset value is unconstitutional. See \textit{In re...}
III. HOW THE CABLES WERE Laid Out: THE FACTS AND Procedure OF NEXTEL

In April 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard the parties’ cases in Nextel, which contained legal arguments relatively similar to those used in Mount Airy and Valley Forge. In short, while Nextel had sufficient net loss carryover greater than its income for the year, the company thought it was unfair that it still had to pay taxes, unlike 98.8% of its corporate competitors, simply due to its volume of revenue. The Commonwealth Court ultimately sided with Nextel and found both of the net loss carryover caps unconstitutional.

A. “Roll Right, Roll Call”: Recounting the Facts of Nextel

In 2007, Nextel, a mobile telecommunications services provider, earned $45,053,282 in total taxable income. The company had a cumulative net loss carryover of $150,636,792. Under the 2007 PRC, Nextel was only able to deduct 12.5% of their total taxable income, or $5,631,660, because its total taxable income was greater than the flat dollar cap of $3 million. Therefore, despite having a cumulative net loss carryover in excess of its total taxable income, the company still had to pay tax on the remaining taxable income after the deduction, which amounted to $39,421,622. Nextel made the payment but then immediately filed a refund claim to recover the $3,938,220 of taxes paid.

B. Procedure: The Commonwealth Court Rules in Favor of an Unlimited Plan

Nextel first filed its refund claim against the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (Department) with the Board of Appeals, claiming the

Cape’s Estate, 43 A. 79, 81 (Pa. 1899) (holding different monetary values as invalid when classifying estates).


68. See id. at 687 (elaborating how only 1.2% of all Pennsylvania corporations incurred tax liability in 2007). For a further discussion on the facts at issue in Nextel, see infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.

69. For a discussion on the Commonwealth Court decision, see infra notes 75–83 and accompanying text.

70. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 685 (reporting Nextel’s net income for tax year 2007).

71. See id. (detailing Nextel’s accumulated net loss carryover from years prior to tax year 2007).


73. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 686 (discussing Nextel’s tax liabilities).

74. See id. (documenting Nextel’s immediate filing for refund of $3,938,220).
The net loss carryover provision was unconstitutional. The Board of Appeals ruled that it did not have the legal authority to address the issue posed and subsequently rejected the claim. Nextel then petitioned to the Board of Finance and Revenue, which denied the petition and rejected the argument. Upon the Board of Finance and Revenue’s denial, Nextel appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court rejected the Department’s arguments and eliminated both caps for the deduction. The court held that the distinction made by the net loss carryover provision was based solely on revenue and was “unjust, arbitrary, and illegal.” Lastly, the Commonwealth Court directed the Department to refund Nextel its corporate net income tax paid of almost $4 million.

Judge Pellegrini wrote a dissenting opinion arguing in favor of severability, the process of striking only the invalid provisions of a statute while keeping the valid provisions intact. In his opinion, Judge Pellegrini argued that by severing the flat dollar cap and preserving the percentage cap, the legislative intent behind the net loss carryover deductions can and should be maintained.

75. See id. (describing Nextel’s first appeal). Nextel argued, as it did later at trial, that the net loss carryover deduction complete with the cap was unconstitutional under the Uniformity Clause. See id. (noting Nextel’s initial argument).

76. See id. (discussing Board of Appeals’ rejection on grounds that it had no legal authority to rule on constitutional challenge for opining on such challenges are outside the scope of the Board’s power).

77. See id. (describing Board of Finance and Revenue’s response). In its petition to the Board of Finance and Revenue, Nextel asserted its right to carry over all prior net losses to fully deduct its taxable income. See id. (describing Nextel’s petition). The Board denied the petition and rejected the argument, noting that while it was not authorized to determine questions of a tax provision’s constitutionality, it could “apply the law as it was written.” See id. (discussing holding of Board and what authority it has).


80. See id. (discussing reasoning for holding).

81. See id. at 13 (decreeing order for refund from Department to Nextel). The actual amount that the Department had to refund Nextel per the Commonwealth Court’s order was $3,938,220. See id. (ordering refund).

82. See id. at 14–15 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of severability). In his dissent, Judge Pellegrini quotes the Statutory Construction Act which states that unconstitutional provisions should be severed from any constitutional provisions so long as they are not “so essentially and inseparably connected with” them. See id. (Pellegrini, J., dissenting) (citing 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1925 (1972)).

83. See id. at 15 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting) (arguing that severability would achieve majority’s purpose while preserving General Assembly’s intention to limit
IV. “Raising the Bar”: A Narrative Analysis of Nextel

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Commonwealth Court. The majority agreed that, as applied to Nextel, the two different caps arbitrarily produced two separate classes, but the court severed solely the flat dollar cap to remedy and denied Nextel its refund. Justice Baer provided a concurring opinion arguing that the flat dollar cap was facially unconstitutional, not just unconstitutional as applied in this circumstance.

A. Calling the Shots: The Majority’s Response to Nextel’s Call

Justice Todd, writing for the majority, began the analysis with a review of the parties’ arguments. She specifically focused her attention on cases raised by the Department as examples of tax provisions held to be constitutional where the statutory rate, and not necessarily the actual rate, was uniform. Justice Todd distinguished these cases by noting that the provision at issue was not unconstitutional because of the calculation of the tax liability, but because the resulting tax liability was not uniform.

Judge Pellegrini contended that the General Assembly’s desire to limit net loss carryover is apparent and that severability should be implemented to protect that desire. See id. (Pellegrini, J., dissenting) (“Because the remaining valid provisions . . . carry out the intent of the General Assembly, protect the public purse, and are complete and capable of being administered without the severed provisions, I dissent . . . ”).

84. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 705 (decreeing Commonwealth Court decision affirmed in part and reversed in part).
85. For a further discussion of the majority opinion in Nextel, see infra notes 88–100 and accompanying text.
86. For a further discussion on Justice Baer’s concurring opinion in Nextel, see infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
87. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 689–92 (discussing arguments of both Department and Nextel).
88. See id. at 689–91 (discussing arguments of Department). The Department first argues that the Commonwealth Court incorrectly made its holding based on the actual rate of tax, contradicting precedent that based its opinion on the statutory rate. See id. at 689–90 (explaining first argument). To buttress its argument, the Department cites cases involving excise taxes, where calculations were uniform but resulting tax liabilities were not, held to be constitutional. See id. at 690 (citing Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 184 A. 37, 42 (Pa. 1936) and Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 27 A.2d 62, 64 (Pa. 1942)). The Department then distinguishes these cases from other cases where the taxes were not uniform, finding these to be in line with the corporate tax issue while the others dealt with either a personal income tax issue or an estate tax issue. See id. at 690–91 (distinguishing Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971), Clifton v. Allegheny Cty., 969 A.2d 1197 (Pa. 2009), and In re Cope’s Estate, 43 A. 79 (Pa. 1899)). The Department justifies this by arguing that these three forms of taxpayers “behave differently.” See id. at 691 (providing justification for argument). Finally, the Department argues in the alternative that the Uniformity Clause requires “only substantial, not perfect, uniformity.” See id. (raising alternative argument). Nextel responded to these claims comparing those cases noting how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found them to be “violative of the Uniformity Clause” because “similarly situated taxpayers shoulder[ed] unequal burdens of taxation,” as was the case here. See id. at 692 (addressing Department’s arguments). Nextel then hinges a series of arguments on the notion that the tax base is not the same for all
discrepancies in corporate tax liabilities in those cases were not the “product of purposeful legislative differentiation,” unlike the statutory provision at issue in Nextel, where the disparate tax treatment was caused by a “deliberate choice of statutory language.”

Following its analysis of the Department’s examples, the court described the basis and intent behind the Uniformity Clause’s adoption: to prevent preferential tax treatment given to one industry over another. The court delved into the clause’s history to establish the legislative intent that the court upheld throughout its decision. Next, the court discussed the purpose of the clause and concluded that the clause does not require absolute uniformity, but rather mere “substantial uniformity.”

The court then articulated the inquiry regarding whether subdividing subjects into classes is valid as whether that classification is “based upon some legitimate distinction between the classes that provides a non-arbitrary, reasonable, and just basis for the disparate treatment.”

corporations because over 19,000 corporations had no taxable income. See id. (disputing Department’s same tax base argument).

89. See id. at 700 (distinguishing Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 184 A. 37 (Pa. 1936) and Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 27 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1942)). In Turco Paint, the corporation net income tax statute hinged on three factors: gross receipts, payroll, and physical property. See Turco Paint & Varnish Co., 184 A. at 41 (describing tax statute relevant in case). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that while it caused a variation in amount of net income subject to tax between corporations, this variance was not “constitutionally offensive.” See id. at 40 (holding that corporation net income statute was constitutional). In Warner Bros., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected a claim arguing that by borrowing the federal income tax system’s definition of “taxable income” that there was an “unlawful delegation.” See Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 27 A.2d at 64 (Pa. 1942) (“The Act before us does not violate the Uniformity provision of the Constitution.”).

90. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 694–96 (discussing Uniformity Clause’s history). The Uniformity Clause came with a “Reform Constitution” in 1874, with an intent to disrupt practices that were advancing “private or personal interests at the expense of the public’s welfare.” See id. at 694 (providing context). At the time, many industries involving infrastructure, notably the railroads, were receiving preferential tax treatment. See id. at 694–95 (detailing issue at time of adoption).

91. See id. at 698–99 (discussing unconstitutionality of flat dollar cap based on its defiance to underlying policies of Uniformity Clause in not providing preferences for certain industries).

92. See id. at 696 (discussing Uniformity Clause’s purpose). The court described the clause as the “specific remedy” to quell the power of the General Assembly to enact special tax laws and to prevent a small select group from having to shoulder a burden that benefits all. See id. at 695 (describing Uniformity Clause’s role). The court then defines the level of uniformity required “as nearly uniform as practicable in view of the instrumentalities with which and subjects upon which tax laws operate.” See id. at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clifton v. Allegheny Cty., 969 A.2d 1197, 1210 (Pa. 2009)).

93. See id. (quoting Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268, 274 (Pa. 2016)). Due to a rebuttable presumption that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Pennsylvania Constitution, the burden of proof to show unconstitutional of a tax lies with the taxpayer. See id. (discussing burden of proof).
continued by noting a long-standing jurisprudence, which exhibits tax laws that purport to be applicable to an entire class but, in actuality, wholly exempt certain members and, therefore, were held unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{94} The court concluded by finding that the net loss carryover provision as written was in direct contravention to this principle and was unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{95} Through this holding, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision that the net loss carryover deduction is “unconstitutional as applied to Nextel”.\textsuperscript{96} While affirming an as-applied challenge leaves the possibility of the provision being constitutional in other contexts, the majority noted that the distinction between “facially unconstitutional” versus “unconstitutional as applied” is a “meaningless one,” thereby suggesting the net loss carryover provision would be unconstitutional in all circumstances.\textsuperscript{97}

The court then discussed severability, noting at first a general presumption in favor of it.\textsuperscript{98} Following the logic of Justice Pellegrini in the Commonwealth Court, the majority instituted the remedy that, it reasoned, maintains the legislative intent of the deduction by striking solely

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See id. at 697 (citing In re Cope’s Estate, 43 A. 79 (Pa. 1899), Kelley v. Kalodner, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935), Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 196 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1964), and Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971)). The court stated that this is based on the Uniformity Clause’s “paramount tenet” that tax burdens should be endured by all obligated to pay. See id. at 697. The court reassured that not all exemptions are unconstitutional, rather just those that, through structure and operation, guarantee entire excusal of any tax burden. See id. at 698 (clarifying position on exemptions).
\item See id. at 699 (discussing holding). The majority held that while the net loss carryover provision did not explicitly exempt income below a certain threshold, by operation it necessarily did. See id. at 698 (discussing real effect of net loss carryover provision). The majority stated that the existence of the flat dollar cap, in effect, created two classes of corporate taxpayers. See id. at 699 (describing effect). The majority then held that by having these two classes of similar taxpayers have different tax obligations based solely on their taxable income, the General Assembly created an “arbitrary and unreasonable classification.” See id. (establishing holding).
\item See id. at 699 (discussing implications of holding).
\item See id. at 701 n.20 (“However . . . the distinction in this case is arguably a meaningless one, given that our decision has precedential value in future challenges to similar statutes.”). In the footnote, the majority also noted that Nextel never argued that the net loss carryover provision was facially unconstitutional. See id. (“Nextel has not previously argued, and does not presently allege, that the NLC is facially unconstitutional.”). A statutory provision is facially unconstitutional when no application of the provision would be constitutional. See Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 663–73 (2010) (explaining constitutional challenges and differences between facial and as-applied challenges). A statutory provision is unconstitutional as applied when it is generally constitutional but operates unconstitutionally under particular circumstances. See id.
\item See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 702–03 (discussing public policy of severability). The court noted two exceptions where provisions should be entirely eliminated rather than just severed: (1) where the valid provisions are dependent on the void provisions or (2) where the valid provisions are incomplete as to the legislative intent. See id. at 703 (explaining justifications to not sever).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the flat dollar cap deduction and thereby reversing the Commonwealth Court’s total elimination of the deduction.\textsuperscript{99} Finally, the court rejected Nextel’s refund for all corporate income tax paid for 2007, reversing the Commonwealth Court’s decree.\textsuperscript{100}

\textbf{B. Justice Baer’s Concurrence: Ensuring Good Reception}

In his concurring opinion, Justice Baer clarified his view that the majority’s holding struck down the net loss carryover provision as facially unconstitutional rather than unconstitutional as applied.\textsuperscript{101} Justice Baer noted that the majority opinion included the following sentence: “We have determined that the NLC, as written, is unconstitutional as applied to Nextel,” yet in a footnote considered the distinction “meaningless.”\textsuperscript{102} Further, Justice Baer rejected adhering to Nextel’s own claim that it was an as-applied challenge.\textsuperscript{103}

\textbf{V. “Hitting the Mark”: A Critical Analysis on How Nextel Fell in Line with Precedent, Reinforcing a Flat Tax System}

While taxes can generally be categorized into three major categories—regressive, progressive, and flat—entire tax structures, e.g. all taxes within a specific state, rarely fall into one category.\textsuperscript{104} While one may assume a tax structure based around a “Uniformity Clause” would be flat,\textsuperscript{99} See \textit{id.} at 704 (discussing appropriate remedy). The court laid out three options that it perceived: (1) remove the flat dollar cap, (2) remove both the flat dollar cap and the percentage cap, or (3) remove the entire net loss carryover deduction. \textit{See \textit{id.} at 703 (describing options available).} The legislative intent behind the deduction and its caps, as determined by the court, was to incentivize investment while maintaining Pennsylvania’s fiscal health. \textit{See \textit{id.} at 704 (detailing legislative intent).}

\textsuperscript{100} See \textit{id.} at 705 (dismissing Nextel’s refund as previously granted by Commonwealth Court). The court reasoned that by severing only the flat dollar cap, Nextel is still required to pay its tax under the percentage cap, which it already had done and therefore there was no overpayment. \textit{See \textit{id.} (discussing implications).} Nextel argued that by not rewarding the company, the court would chill the bringing of future related actions by other litigants. \textit{See \textit{id.} (discussing Nextel’s argument in favor of refund).} But the court dismissed this argument, stating “there is always an incentive in the avoidance of liability for payment of taxes.” \textit{See \textit{id.} (quoting Oz Gas, Ltd. V. Warren Area Sch. Dist., 938 A.2d 274, 84 (Pa. 2007)) (dismissing Nextel’s argument).}

\textsuperscript{101} See \textit{id.} at 706 (Baer, J., concurring) (clarifying that court’s decision invalidates NLC provision on its face despite majority’s ambiguity). Justice Baer found that Nextel’s challenge “necessarily implicates the facial validity of the NLC.” \textit{See \textit{id.} (Baer, J., concurring) (justifying argument).}

\textsuperscript{102} See \textit{id.} at 701, 701 n.20, 706 (Baer, J., concurring) (reaffirming holding and considering distinction between facially and as-applied challenge as “meaningless”).

\textsuperscript{103} See \textit{id.} at 706 (Baer, J., concurring) (“[A] court should not be constrained in its holding simply by virtue of the manner in which a litigant has characterized its claim.”).

\textsuperscript{104} For descriptions and examples of regressive, progressive, and flat taxes, see \textit{infra} notes 108–112 and accompanying text.
what constitutes as “uniform” remains slightly uncertain. Nonetheless, the Nextel decision still falls within the bounds set out by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s own jurisprudence. Though the court honored its precedent, the decision is still highly disruptive.

### A. Drawing Lines: Distinguishing Between a Regressive, a Progressive, and a Flat Tax

The United States’ federal tax system is, on the whole, considered a progressive system, meaning that tax rates increase as an entity’s taxable income increases. However, through recent tax reform legislation, more federal taxes—such as the federal corporate tax—have become flat, meaning that no matter how much more taxable income an entity might have, its tax rate remains the same. Still, the federal tax structure is neither entirely progressive nor entirely flat, for there are even some taxes, such as the Social Security payroll tax, that are regressive. A regressive tax is one where tax rates decrease as taxable income increases. Through Nextel and other recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Penn-

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105. See Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268, 273 (Pa. 2016) (noting uncertainty in Uniformity Clause jurisprudence). The opinion states “no provision in our constitution has been so much litigated yet so little understood.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Lower Merion Twp., 233 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. 1967)).

106. For an analysis on how Nextel connects with murky precedent, see infra notes 113–118 and accompanying text.

107. For a discussion on how Nextel disrupts long-standing systems, see infra notes 119–125 and accompanying text.

108. See Kimberley Amadeo, supra note 110 (defining regressive tax).


110. See Kimberley Amadeo, supra note 110 (defining Social Security payroll tax).
sylvania has solidified that the Pennsylvania tax structure is becoming more and more flat.112

B. Audible, Though Slightly Muffled: How Nextel Fits Within Hazy Precedent

While a flat tax system would seem to be inherent in a mechanism that is commonly referred to as a “Uniformity Clause,” this presumption has not proven to be the case.113 As noted in Mount Airy, the exact scope of the General Assembly’s ability to tax within the confines of the Uniformity Clause is not completely clear.114 In Nextel, the majority opinion described what makes a reasonable classification, albeit with a nebulous definition.115

In Mount Airy, the court held that the relevant inquiry into whether a tax classification is valid is whether “the classification is based upon some legitimate distinction between the classes that provides a non-arbitrary, reasonable, and just basis for the disparate treatment.”116 Through this inquiry, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has previously found that classifications based on certain criteria, such as geographic location, gross revenue, and property type, as in Valley Forge, were invalid.117 By determining that an implicit classification based solely on a certain level of net income is invalid, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Nextel is in line with its own precedent and ensures that the corporate income tax remains uniform, or flat, across corporations regardless of income.118


113. See Swift, supra note 35 (detailing how Uniformity Clause requires taxes be levied at “a flat percentage rate” across taxpayers of same class). But see Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 184 A. 37, 41 (Pa. 1936) (providing three factor test for corporate excise tax, resulting in disparate tax treatment for like corporations as uniform).

114. See Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 154 A.3d 268, 273 (Pa. 2016) (“Despite the well-understood text and impetus of the Uniformity Clause, this Court occasionally has struggled to articulate the precise limits that the provision imposes upon the General Assembly’s authority to enact tax legislation.”).

115. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 695–96 (describing ability of General Assembly to classify). Examples of reasonable bases of classification include “differences recognized in the business world, . . . the want of adaptability of subject to the same method . . . to produce justice and reasonably uniform results, or . . . public policy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment Case, 175 A.2d 856, 863 (Pa. 1961)).

116. See Mount Airy, 154 A.3d at 274 (discussing what forms of tax classification satisfy Uniformity Clause concerns); see also Hanhausen, Gallo, Levine & Zoeller, supra note 58 (discussing what Mount Airy explains for Nextel).

117. See Mount Airy, 154 A.3d at 274–80 (finding classifications based upon geographic location and gross revenue as invalid); see also Valley Forge Towers Apartments v. Upper Merion Area School Dist., 163 A.3d 962, 978 (Pa. 2016) (finding classification based on property type as invalid).

118. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 699 (discussing holding).
C. Leaving Your Provider: How Nextel Departs from the Status Quo

While Nextel conforms to judicial precedent, the decision still sent a shock by disrupting long-standing legislation. While not as expansively nullifying as the Commonwealth Court’s decision, by keeping the percentage cap in place rather than eliminating both caps, the Nextel decision still drastically disturbed the previous status quo. For nearly forty years, corporations have had certain faith that a flat dollar cap would be in place.

To that effect, the Nextel decision extinguishes a substantial advantage that had long been given to small businesses. No more “de facto” full deductions will be granted to the 98.8% of corporations with taxable income. The 1.2% of corporations with taxable income—being those with over $3 million in taxable income—will no longer be left to undertake the entire corporate tax burden themselves. Regardless of size, if a corporation has taxable income, then that corporation will have at least some tax liability.

VI. Hold the Phone: Measuring the Impact of Nextel

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Nextel will most acutely affect small businesses in the state. While not to the extent desired by Nextel, large businesses will experience some changes. This, by extension, affects those practitioners advising these businesses, be they ac-

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119. See id. at 703–04 (discussing history of deduction dating back to 1980).
122. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 698–99 (detailing advantage given to corporations under $3 million in taxable income with equivalent or greater net loss carryover).
123. See id. ("Thus, the NLC gives corporations with $3 million or less in taxable income, and carryover losses equaling or exceeding their taxable income, a de facto total exemption from paying the corporate net income tax.").
124. See id. at 699 ("[A] much smaller class of corporate taxpayers, 1.2%, was required to shoulder the entire corporate net income tax burden for that tax year.").
125. See id. (explaining consequences of net loss carryover deductions corporations subject to percentage cap). Once 12.5% of a corporation’s taxable income is deducted, the remaining 87.5% will be subject to the corporate income tax rate of 9.9%. See id. (detailing calculation). If Corporation X has taxable income of $1 million and net loss carryover of $1.5 million, Corporation X will still be responsible for tax based on the remaining $875,000, or 87.5% of taxable income, after the deduction. See id. (explaining calculation). In that example, Corporation X would have a corporate income tax liability of $86,625, or 9.9% of $875,000, for that year. See id.
126. For a discussion on how small businesses will be impacted by Nextel, see infra notes 130–134 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion on the impact that large businesses will potentially experience, see infra notes 135–137 and accompanying text.
countants or tax attorneys.\textsuperscript{128} Lastly, by eliminating a deduction that once exempted over 19,000 corporations from any tax liability, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will see a tremendous increase in revenue.\textsuperscript{129}

A. “Welcome to the Network”: Small Businesses Now Have to Pay the Tax

Corporations with taxable income of $3 million or less will no longer be fully exempt from their corporate income tax burden.\textsuperscript{130} For example, assuming for taxable year 2007 Corporation X had $3 million in taxable income and had a net loss carryover of $3 million from prior years, previously Corporation X would be fully exempt from its tax liability under the PRC.\textsuperscript{131} With the Nextel decision, the corporation will now only be permitted to deduct $375,000, or 12.5\% of $3 million, from its taxable income.\textsuperscript{132} This change means $2,625,000 of their income will be taxable, resulting in an ultimate tax liability of $259,875 for Corporation X.\textsuperscript{133} This will greatly affect the 98.8\% of corporations that, according to the majority in Nextel, were not paying any corporate income tax.\textsuperscript{134}

B. “Always Reliable”: Large Businesses’ Tax Burden Remains Unchanged

While the larger businesses will be paying the same percentage that they always have paid, they will no longer be the only ones “shouldering the entire corporate net income tax burden.”\textsuperscript{135} In order to maintain political favor with small business owner constituents by enacting a tax advantage, the legislature will now necessarily have to give an equal advantage to their large business counterparts.\textsuperscript{136} While it was ultimately unsuccessful,

\textsuperscript{128} For a discussion on what Nextel means for tax practitioners, see infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{129} See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 702 (reporting 19,303 corporations paid no taxes in 2007). For a discussion on the impact to the Commonwealth, see infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{130} See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 702 (discussing impact of decision on corporations).

\textsuperscript{131} See id. at 698–99 (demonstrating calculation).


\textsuperscript{133} See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 698–99 (demonstrating calculation).

\textsuperscript{134} See id. at 699 (noting 98.8% of corporations with taxable income avoid corporate tax in 2007); see also Marines, supra note 44 (discussing great impact that Nextel will have on small corporations).

\textsuperscript{135} See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 699 (discussing which corporations will bear tax burden). In 2007, the taxable year at issue in Nextel, 1.2\% of corporations were responsible for the payment of the entire Pennsylvania corporate income tax revenue. See id. (comparing smaller and larger corporations in 2007).

\textsuperscript{136} See, e.g., 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7401(3)(4)(c)(1)(A)(VII)–(VIII) (2017) (promulgating caps for taxable years 2018, 2019, and beyond). In response to Nextel, the percentage cap has now been significantly increased from 12.5\% to 30\% for taxable year 2018 and to 40\% for taxable year 2019 and beyond. See id.
Nextel attempted to use this proportionality dilemma to persuade the court in favor of an uncapped net loss carryover deduction.137

C. “We’ll Ring You!”: How Practitioners Should Advise Business Owner Clients

Regardless of size or total revenue, corporations need to be informed as to the status of their taxes.138 If R.B. Alden, Nextel’s sister case, is heard by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the court remains consistent with its reasoning in Nextel and again strikes down the flat dollar cap, there is potential that many businesses with pending refunds—that is, refunds where the amount of tax originally owed is still in dispute between the Department of Revenue and the taxpayer—dating from 2006 and earlier may be eligible to yield even larger refunds.139 If this occurs, while the Commonwealth will lose revenue, corporations will recover their taxes paid, allowing them to reinvest those funds into their businesses.140 Therefore, advisors to these businesses, such as accountants and tax attorneys, would be wise to advise their clients of any potential refunds for which they may be eligible.141

D. Growing & Expanding: More Tax Revenue for The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

While these smaller companies with taxable income of $3 million or less, especially companies such as start-ups, may have net loss carryovers to deduct, the Department of Revenue will necessarily incur corporate tax revenue from these companies when they have net income, assuming no other deductions are available.142 To the relief of many smaller corporations, the Department of Revenue announced that it would not pursue those businesses that filed in 2007 and deducted utilizing the flat dollar cap.

137. See Nextel, 171 A.3d at 702 (discussing Nextel argument using burdensome effect on small business as defense). In its argument against severability, Nextel argued that there would be no cap on net loss carryover at all if not for the flat dollar amount due to the burden it would put on small businesses. See id. (arguing against severability, in favor of total elimination of caps).

138. See Wilk, supra note 17 (encouraging businesses to contact tax advisors).

139. See Sollie & Melniczak, supra note 19 (discussing potential impact of R.B. Alden decision). If the flat dollar cap is eliminated for tax years 2006 and before, there would be no caps on the amount of net carryover loss allowed to be deducted. See id. (detailing impact on net carryover loss). Without a cap, any corporation with net loss carryforward equal to or greater than its taxable income will be able to fully deduct and have no tax for that year. See id. (identifying consequences of elimination of flat dollar cap).

140. See Harrison, supra note 5 (discussing business possibilities with recovered taxes paid from refunds).

141. See id. (highlighting possibility of refund as result of favorable decision in R.B. Alden).

Regardless, by extinguishing this advantage to smaller corporations, the Commonwealth anticipates millions for its annual budget moving into the future. This means more money for infrastructure and revitalization projects, which may convince more corporations to move to Pennsylvania, which will, in turn, make the Commonwealth more prosperous.


144. See Pennsylvania Tax Update, supra note 143 (listing changes contributing to expected $600 million increase to Pennsylvania’s budget).

145. See Lamb, supra note 5 (discussing upcoming Pennsylvania multimodal projects); see also Governor Wolf Approves Support, supra note 5 (discussing upcoming Pennsylvania “Community Revitalization Projects”); Governor Wolf Announces $1 Million, supra note 5 (discussing Scranton, Pennsylvania revitalization project). Both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia made the list of the twenty finalists cities being considered by Amazon for their second headquarters. See Jan Murphy, Pa. Bid to Win Amazon HQ2 in Philly or Pittsburgh May Be Among the Biggest Ever from the State, PENN LIVE (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.pennlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2018/01/landing_amazons_hq2_in_philly.html [https://perma.cc/QVB3-6WYE]. Amazon has stated that it plans to invest more than $5 billion and will employ around 50,000 workers for whichever city it ultimately selects for HQ2’s location. See id. (describing potential impact of second Amazon headquarters).