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THE UNCOMPENSATED Takings OF NUisance Law

JILL M. FRALEY*

I. Introduction

NUISANCE law has long since graduated from the boundaries of property and tort to influence a variety of fields from environmental law1 to patents,2 domestic violence prevention3 to drug con-

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trol,\textsuperscript{4} products liability\textsuperscript{5} to the recent mortgage and financial crisis.\textsuperscript{6} As this progression demonstrates, nuisance law deeply influences an astonishing number of legal fields and issues.\textsuperscript{7}

In addition to the direct impacts of nuisance law on other fields, nuisance doctrines have become a significant part of the more theoretical literature, particularly within the law and economics movement. Nuisance was a key part of Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s famous article on the economics of tolerating pollution.\textsuperscript{8} Other scholars have followed their lead and used nuisance as a point of entry for analyzing property and tort from a law and economics perspective.\textsuperscript{9}


7. For better or worse. As William L. Prosser once observed, “There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’” W. L. PROSSER, \textit{HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS}, § 86, at 571 (4th ed. 1971). For this reason, it is fair to question the sanity of anyone who undertakes to write an article about the evolution of the doctrine of nuisance. Guilty. In my defense, only two statements can really be made. First, this Article focuses specifically on the idea of balancing and nuisance. That does something to bring the project within the realm of manageability. Second, while this Article does attempt (perhaps somewhat unreasonably) to roughly track the many states as a whole, it does not attempt to lay out the doctrine in full in any jurisdiction. Rather the Article focuses on trends that are apparent across some to many jurisdictions at key points in time. The overall argument focuses on what can be noticed from these trends, without needing to argue that the trends are simultaneous or that the doctrines exactly align across jurisdictions.


One might expect, given the importance of nuisance law in terms of its both theoretical and practical impacts, that a great deal of effort would be invested in the process of understanding the doctrine’s intricacies, history, and evolution. Yet few scholars have examined the evolution of nuisance law. In 1976, Paul Kurtz published an article on the history of injunctive remedies for nuisance during the industrial rise of the nineteenth century. Kurtz focused on the ability of defendants to avoid injunctions through largely procedural devices that limited or stalled injunctions and left plaintiffs to seek damages remedies instead.

Little has been written about the transformation that took place in the twentieth century. In an article about compensated injunctions and nuisance law, Jeff Lewin briefly addressed the history of nuisance law. As Lewin’s central point lay elsewhere, his discussion was limited. But we can point to a few key claims that Lewin made. Lewin believed that a significant change had happened within nuisance law, finding that “[i]n the nineteenth century America witnessed a profound evolution of nuisance doctrine from its roots in property law into a doctrine of tort law.” Overall, Lewin glimpsed a trajectory of decreasing liability until environmental concerns of the 1960s and 1970s pushed back against the idea of allowing social utility to entirely outweigh a plaintiff’s concerns.

This Article argues that a significant transformation of nuisance law took place in the mid-to-late twentieth century. Prior to that time, through two mechanisms—the reasonableness test and injunction re-
quests—courts had begun to balance social utility as a part of a nuisance case.  This change was not at all an open door to reducing nuisance claims. Instead, courts sharply limited balancing, usually to injunction decisions, so as to protect property rights. This continued through the first half of the twentieth century with early courts accepting balancing but also limiting it sharply.

Tracing these limitations forward into the twentieth century, I demonstrate that within the mid-to-late twentieth century, a revisionist trend emerged. Nuisance law transformed as courts dropped longstanding limits on balancing and fully embraced weighing the harms to the defendant as well as the public. In this same era, courts revised the concept of reasonableness, moving it from an analysis of property contexts to a balancing inquiry that included both social utility and potential harms to the defendant. This change significantly altered property rights because when courts incorporated balancing into the prima facie case for nuisance (as opposed to only allowing balancing within the equitable remedies analysis), courts made it much more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed. Contrary to Lewin’s more optimistic view of modern nuisance law, I argue that modern nuisance law is characterized by a lack of limits on balancing and a trajectory of making even damages awards less available.

This transformation of nuisance law—the removal of limits on balancing and the full embrace of the reasonableness test in the prima facie case—makes nuisance actions more difficult to win. As a result, modern courts protect property less—a lot less—than fifty years or so ago. Mostly notably, this evolution of the key elements of nuisance has happened in a rather slow, gradual, and sneaky fashion. It has been largely under the radar. So courts have, effectively, reduced property rights without much fanfare and without an opportunity for the public to consider this transformation of property law.

Most importantly, courts have made the same changes to nuisance law that they previously described as creating regulatory takings claims. Yet, as I will explain, courts adopted those changes with little explanation and no rebuttal to their prior concerns about regulatory takings.

In light of the danger of takings and the reduction of property rights associated with curtailing the scope of nuisance claims, I argue that courts today need to reconsider nuisance law and return to limiting all balancing inquiries to injunction decisions. Courts again reject balancing within the prima facie case. Such a revision would allow balancing to limit injunctive remedies and thereby take into account the public interest as necessary.

16. See infra notes 27–58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 59–68 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 93–113 and accompanying text.
20. See id.
but it also would allow plaintiffs to recover money damages if a nuisance is otherwise provable.

This Article begins in Part II by focusing on early nuisance doctrines so as to set up the contrast of the original strict liability formulations of nuisance law with modern developments.\(^{21}\) I also pause here to clarify the original meaning of reasonableness as a part of the nuisance test. This is important because it was through the element of reasonableness that courts were later able to introduce balancing into the prima facie case—as opposed to reserving balancing for solely the question of injunctive remedies. In Part III, I discuss the early life of balancing in the first half of the twentieth century, explaining the many limitations that courts placed upon the doctrine.\(^{22}\) After examining the most powerful limitations individually, I conclude this Part by describing how many courts and commentators combined these limitations to even further restrict balancing. Part IV details how revisionist courts from the mid-to-late twentieth century (1) dispensed with the many limits on the balancing doctrine, (2) embraced a more general idea of balancing, and (3) more clearly seated balancing within the prima facie case, incorporating a balancing analysis in cases seeking only damages as a remedy.\(^{23}\) Part V focuses on the implications of this transformation of nuisance law for property.\(^{24}\) I examine the degree to which changes in nuisance doctrine make the courts more and more likely to engage in regulatory takings. Additionally, I consider theoretically what the transformation of nuisance means in terms of the right of undisturbed possession. Finally, I argue that modern courts should, in light of the dangers of takings, consider returning to the practice of early courts of limiting balancing to the consideration of equitable remedies. Courts should reconstruct the older strain of thinking on nuisance law, removing balancing from the prima facie case, so that plaintiffs are at least protected in their right to damages, even if injunctive remedies are limited by balancing social utilities and the harms to the defendant.

II. EARLY NUISANCE DOCTRINES

Traditionally, the nuisance action protected property quite strictly. Indeed, that protection has often been described as absolute or complete.\(^{25}\) Two things ensured this level of protection. First, courts applied the doctrine as a strict liability style enterprise, imposing “absolute liability for interference with the enjoyment of property.”\(^{26}\) Section A describes how this approach allowed for no balancing of the harms to the defendant or the local community when a court considered whether to issue an in-
junction. Second, while courts did consider reasonableness as a part of the test for nuisance, this did not involve a balancing of harms or a social utility style analysis. Section B focuses on the original definitions of reasonableness, which did not include balancing harms or social utility but instead focused on the physical context of the land use.

A. Strict Liability on a Finding of Nuisance

The traditional nuisance doctrine strictly protected property. Thus, “[a] judgment for damages in this class of cases is a matter of absolute right, where injury is shown.”27 The traditional rule refused balancing because it was not a just principle that “a nuisance in one place may be compensated by any degree of benefit conferred in another.”28 The central problem with balancing, the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized, was that “[n]o comparison can be instituted between accommodation to one set of persons and loss of rights to another.”29

In the most traditional formulation of the rule, even public necessity was not enough to limit this strict formulation of nuisance law. The 1942 American Jurisprudence statement on nuisance noted that “[i]t has been said that in determining whether a business is a nuisance, it is of no consequence that the business is a useful or necessary one, or that it contributes to the wealth and prosperity of the community.”30 Following this approach, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, for example, found that while slaughterhouses were necessary, that necessity did not legalize the intrusions such businesses could make onto the property of other landowners.31 It was of no matter that the business creating the nuisance was “a great and essential accommodation to the public.”32 The traditional rule was that “the court would not balance conveniences, but, when the violation of the public or private right was clear, there could be no excuse heard of public convenience that would protect the person or corporation committing the nuisance.”33 The defendant simply would “not be permitted to show that the public benefit resulting from the alleged nuisance was

29. See id. (alteration in original).
30. See 39 AM. JUR. Nuisances § 45, at 327 (1942). The treatise goes on to note that there are only two exceptions to this rule. See id. The first is for criminal prosecutions for nuisance. See id. The second suggests that some courts will consider social utility in granting an injunction, but not in the context of a damages decision. See id.
33. See id. at 200.
equal to the public inconvenience occasioned thereby.” 34 Nor was the
court interested in hearing evidence that this particular defendant was
“less offensive than any other answering the same public demand.” 35

Courts following the traditional rule refused to consider balancing
even where the damage to the defendant resulting from issuing an injunc-
tion was quite substantial. Consider, for example, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland case Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone. 36 The court concluded
that it would not “undertake to balance the conveniences, or estimate the
difference between the injury sustained by the plaintiff and the loss that
may result to the defendant from having its trade and business, as now
carried on, found to be a nuisance.” 37 The court’s reasoning was a simple
affirmation of the strength of property rights: “No one has a right to erect
works which are a nuisance to a neighboring owner, and then say she has
expended large sums of money in the erection of his works, while the
neighboring property is comparatively of little value.” 38 The court pulled
no punches in its final conclusion: “The neighboring owner is entitled to
the reasonable and comfortable enjoyment of his property, and, if his
rights in this respect are invaded, he is entitled to the protection of the
law, let the consequences be what they may.” 39 The simple rule was that
“courts of equity will not balance the inconvenience of a tortious wrong-
doer against one whose rights have clearly been infringed upon.” 40

This strict rule was necessary, courts reasoned, because “[t]o hold oth-
erwise would be to compel the citizen to abandon his property at the de-
mand of the public convenience.” 41 Balancing was, for these courts,
simply an “irrelevant question.” 42 The strict rule protecting property ex-
isted because the courts reasoned that it was protecting already established
property rights, specifically the “rights of habitation” of the neighboring
landowners. 43

Early twentieth century courts regularly not only rejected balancing,
but also suggested that the injunctive remedy was a matter of right when
such property rights had been invaded. 44 Such courts reasoned that refus-
ing to grant an injunction “upon the ground that plaintiff cannot suffer as great a loss from the continuance of the nuisance as defendant would from its interdiction, would be as far removed from equity as can be.” 45 The Illinois Appellate Court applied this reasoning, finding that there was a right to injunctive remedies. 46 The court found that:

[I]f a business is offensive to such a degree as to materially interfere with ordinary physical comfort, measured, not by the standard of persons of delicate sensibilities and fastidious habits, but by the habits and feelings of ordinary people, and the damages are of a nature which cannot be adequately compensated for in an action at all, a court of equity will grant an injunction.” 47

Other courts responded similarly: “The use of property that produces a nuisance may be very convenient to the owner, and even convenient and useful to the public, but if the effects are such as to bring it within the legal idea of a nuisance, this furnishes no defense whatever.” 48

Notably, some courts went so far as to fully reject balancing even in the context of a temporary or preliminary injunction. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court of Alabama, for example, backed away from “conditioning or qualifying the absolute right to injunctive process.” 49 Instead the court found that “even on hearing for the temporary writ, that the relative prejudice between the parties resulting from the granting or the refusal to grant the writ was ‘wholly immaterial.’” 50

B. Reasonableness Without Balancing

In early cases, reasonableness did not involve balancing—at least not balancing in terms of the hardship resulting from an injunction and the advantage to the other party of granting the injunction. Instead, in early cases reasonableness was more a question of what rights a party had to use her own property before she impinged on the property of her neighbor. Courts have observed that reasonableness was a general limit on the ability

46. See Deterding, 233 Ill. App. at 544.
47. Id. at 559–60.
49. See Folamr Mercantile Co. v. Town of Luverne, 83 So. 107, 108 (Ala. 1919).
50. See id. at 108 (citing Bank v. Tyson, 32 So. 144, 149 (Ala. 1902)).
of the government to declare things to be nuisances. Whether or not something was unreasonable, then, was a conclusion of law.

Reasonableness was about understanding the conflicting rights of neighbors: “Ordinarily one has a right to use his property as she sees fit, but a man’s dominion over his own premises is qualified to the extent that his use of them must be reasonable and such as not to create a nuisance.” The flip side of nuisance has always been that parties have a right “to use their own property in every reasonable way.” To determine whether or not there is a nuisance, the court would “say whether or not the use of the property in the manner complained of is reasonable, and in accordance with the relative rights of the parties.”

The reasonable use of property, then, was not about balancing rights but about examining the particular circumstances presented by a given case. As a New York case explained, “As to what is reasonable use of one’s own property cannot be defined by any certain general rules, but must depend upon the circumstances of each case.” General rules did not help because “[a] use of property in one locality and under some circumstances may be lawful and reasonable, which, under other circumstances, would be unlawful, unreasonable and a nuisance.” The purpose of looking to circumstances was to determine the degree of the invasion of rights: “There can be no fixed standard as to what noise constitutes a nuisance, and the circumstances of the case must necessarily influence the decision . . . [t]he location and surroundings must be considered.” Traditionally, then, reasonableness was not about balancing but rather about the context of the land use.

III. The Nuisance Balancing in the Early Twentieth Century: Sharp Limits

At the outset, it is important to clarify an issue of terminology. When courts began to integrate balancing into nuisance doctrine in the late nineteenth century, they used a variety of phrases used to describe the court’s task. Some courts spoke of “balancing the equities,” “balancing the hardships,” and others spoke of the “doc-

55. See id.
57. See Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (1876) (alteration in original).
trine of comparative injury.” Given the different phrasing, one might expect to find very different analytical processes taking place when each of these doctrines is invoked. Generally speaking, this does not seem to be the case. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, it was extremely common for courts to group together the terms, using them interchangeably to generally assert that a balancing analysis is available.

Whatever phrasing American courts adopted, a common theme united jurisdictions: sharp limits on applying the balancing analysis. As a Florida court observed, “It is quite true that some of the states refuse to follow the doctrine of balancing the conveniences and others qualify it sharply.” A number of the cases generally observed that while balancing may be acceptable, it was also a doctrine to be applied “with great cau-

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59. See, e.g., Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chem. Co., 11 Conn. Supp. 82, 91 (Super. Ct. 1942) (“Entangled in every case involving a nuisance is the problem of weighing conflicting interests that are often most difficult to evaluate. The process has been called the doctrine of ‘balancing interests’ or ‘balancing conveniences’ or ‘comparison of injuries’ or ‘balancing hardships.’”).

60. Instead courts are regularly using the doctrines interchangeably and using multiple phrases simultaneously. See Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207, 213 (Ga. 1919) (noting that injunctive relief is denied through balancing referred to as either “the balance of injury” or the “public benefit” or the “discretionary” doctrine); Sam Warren & Son Stone Co. v. Gruesser, 209 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948) (noting party “invokes the doctrine of balance of interests,” or as it is sometimes called “the balance of conveniences”); Carr’s Beach Amusement Co. v. Annapolis Rds. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 160 A.2d 598, 599 (Md. 1960) (noting that “principle of balancing conveniences and inconveniences” is now sometimes referred to “in terms of the gravity of the harm weighed against the utility of the activity causing the harm”); Estancias Dall. Corp. v. Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (equating doctrine of comparative injury and balancing of equities). Despite some effort looking specifically at each of these doctrines, my research did not show that each one represented a notably different approach. More than that, I primarily saw a historical progression in terminology. The doctrine of comparative injury was commonly referenced in older cases, but today it is rarely used, even though balancing analyses are much more common in modern cases.


This caution seemed to be even further amplified if there was any potential of injury to the health of the plaintiffs.\footnote{See \textit{Ritz v. Woman's Club of Charleston}, 173 S.E. 564, 565 (W. Va. 1934). Other courts note that “the “comparative injury” doctrine should be applied with great caution in nuisance cases.” \textit{Bd. Of Comm'rs v. Elm Grove Mining Co.}, 9 S.E.2d 813, 817 (W. Va. 1940) (internal quotation omitted).} This cautious approach also appeared in cases, indicating that balancing was really only appropriate for circumstances in which the proof of nuisance is flawed or inadequate. Thus, some courts noted that balancing is not appropriate where the facts are “clearly established.”\footnote{See \textit{Elm Grove Mining Co.}, 9 S.E.2d at 817.} Courts reasoned that the rule of balancing “is not applied where the existence of a private right and the violation of it are clear.”\footnote{See \textit{Morgan v. Zuckerman}, 23 Pa. D. & C. 199, 204 (York Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. 1935). A virtually identical rule was put forth in \textit{Krocker v. Westmoreland Planing Mill Co.}, 117 A. 669, 670–71 (Pa. 1922).} In some of these cases, the real problem was that the proof of a significant harm, generally required for nuisances, may have been missing. Thus, the California Court of Appeals was able to say, “When an injunction to restrain a nuisance will produce great public or private mischief, a court of equity is not bound to grant it merely for the purpose of protecting a technical unsubstantial right.”\footnote{See \textit{Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago}, 185 N.E. 170, 177 (Ill. 1933); \textit{see also Shaw v. Queen City Forging Co.}, 10 Ohio Dec. 107, 113 (Super. Ct. 1900) (citing H.G. Wood, \textit{The Law of Nuisances} § 802, at 1103 (3d ed. 1893) with nearly identical language).} The court was concerned that injunctions should be limited to those instances when they remedy “some material injury to plaintiffs.”\footnote{See \textit{Baldocchi v. Four Fifty Sutter Corp.}, 18 P.2d 682, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933) (quoting Frost v. City of Los Angeles, 183 P. 342, 346 (Cal. 1919)).} Through such adoptions of caution, courts in the early twentieth century frequently found ways to limit the idea of balancing generally.

More importantly, however, early twentieth century courts adopted a number of specific limits on balancing as a method of sharply limiting the application of the doctrine. The following sections discuss some of these specific limitations and their combinations.

\section{A. Damages a Matter of Right and Balancing Limited to Injunctions}

Traditionally, courts granted damages as “a matter of absolute right where the injury is shown.”\footnote{See \textit{Collier v. City of Memphis}, 4 Tenn. App. 322, 333–34 (1927). A balancing analysis is not a part of the damages analysis: “In estimating damage, the law will [not] undertake to balance conveniences or estimate the difference between the injuries sustained by the plaintiff and loss which may result to the defendant from having his business declared a nuisance.” \textit{See Ingram v. City of Gridley}, 224 P.2d 798, 801 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (citation omitted).} Thus, even if the plaintiff was unable to obtain an injunction from the court, the plaintiff always traditionally still...
had a remedy at law. The rule simply was that the court could, in its "sound discretion, refuse the injunction and leave the complainant to his remedy at law." In other words, courts wanted plaintiffs to always have a right of damages upon proving that a nuisance existed.

Courts also utilized their idea of adequate compensation as a condition for the availability of balancing tests in an injunction inquiry. Courts specifically limited the balancing test for an injunction to those circumstances where the injury "was such as to be capable of adequate compensation at law." If the "damages were of a nature which cannot be adequately compensated for in an action at law," then the courts would grant injunctions. In such cases the courts refused to "balance public benefits or public inconvenience against the individual right." As the Michigan Supreme Court stated it, the rule was that "the doctrine of 'comparative injury' should be confined to those situations where the plaintiff can be substantially compensated."

The point of a rule of full damages compensation before allowing balancing was to limit the discretion that a court would ordinarily have when considering an injunction request. Normally, the process of granting an injunction is one that involves discretion and a consideration of the equities. An injunction determination involves a balance of rights between private parties, and for this reason, many courts have refused to grant injunctions as a matter of right within nuisance cases. The common rule applied in nuisance cases is the general one for injunctions: "[A]n injunction is not a remedy which issues as a matter of course."

70. See Mobile & M. Ry. Co. v. Ala. M. Ry. Co., 23 So. 57, 58 (Ala. 1896) (“The bill, notwithstanding it presented a case where the court might grant the relief, was deemed not to be a proper one for injunction, but one in which the complainant should be left to the assertion of its legal rights in a court of law.”).


74. See id.; see also Wheeler v. McIntyre, 175 P. 892, 895 (Mont. 1918) (finding that practice of weighing damages "should be resorted to only when the party whose substantial rights are threatened with invasion or destruction can be thoroughly protected.").

75. See Stream Control Comm’n v. City of Port Huron, 9 N.W.2d 41, 43 (Mich. 1943).

76. See Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chem. Co., 11 Conn. Supp. 82, 92 (Super. Ct. 1942) (“The doctrine of balancing interests is well ingrained in equity procedure, although many of the courts which actually apply it refuse to admit it is a part of their practice.”).

77. See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 1944, at 4414–16 (2d ed. 1919).

78. See Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 82 N.W.2d 151, 160–61 (Iowa 1957). But see Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207, 214 (Ga. 1919) (“The weight of authority is to the effect that at the final trial the right to injunctive relief is not discretionary.”).

While this general idea of discretion for injunctions in nuisance actions was common in the early twentieth century, courts also expressed concern over whether so much discretionary authority was appropriate in cases involving property rights. There was some natural appeal, perhaps, to the idea of courts having discretion that could be fitted to the circumstances of the case before them; however, there were also historical reasons to question the reasonableness of giving courts wide discretion, particularly when it came to property rights. As the Supreme Court of California observed, the idea of injunctions granted in equity had their “origin in an age when kings dispensed their royal favors.” The court concluded that such an idea of grace or discretion “has no rightful place in the jurisprudence of a free commonwealth, and ought to be relegated to the age in which it was appropriate.”

Granted, the court noted, “no chancellor . . . will at this day admit that he dispenses favors or refuses rightful demands.” Still, the court embraced a rule that focused on the finding of a nuisance—not allowing a later option to balance. The court concluded that it was “enough to observe that [the doctrine of discretion/grace] has no application where the act complained of is in itself, as well as in its incidents, tortious. In such cases it cannot be said that injury would result from an injunction.” The Supreme Court of California was not inclined to allow general discretion where the consequences so immediately impacted an established property right.

B. Limiting Balancing to Prospective and Preliminary Injunctions

Some courts went much further than just limiting balancing to injunctions and indeed limited balancing to only preliminary or prospective injunctions, not final ones. In this context, the Supreme Court of South Carolina considered the prima facie showing, as well as the “balance of inconvenience on either side” before granting or denying an injunction. The question was whether “granting the injunctive relief work[ed] a greater hardship and greater injury upon the public than would result to the plaintiff by its denial.”

Courts commonly limited such inquiries to the preliminary injunction stage. A Pennsylvania court, for example, concluded that balancing was

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81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 931–32.
84. See id. at 932.

only appropriate “when a preliminary injunction [was] sought.”87 When a final injunction was sought, and the “right [was] clear,” the court found that “a refusal of an injunction, upon the ground that plaintiff cannot suffer as great a loss from the continuance of the nuisance as defendant would from interdiction, would be as far removed from equity as can be.”88 The general rule in these jurisdictions was that “[s]o far as the ‘balance of injury’ notion refers to the parties of the litigation, it is pointed out . . . that its legitimate application is to motions for preliminary injunctions, not to final decrees.”89

In granting a prospective injunction in a nuisance action, a court refused the injunction where “upon balancing the inconveniences or injuries, greater injury [would] be inflicted by granting than by refusing an injunction,”90 but refused to consider balancing “on final hearing.”91 The rule in these jurisdictions was that consideration could be given to the hardships worked on the defendant or the public “upon preliminary or interlocutory applications, but not upon final hearing.”92

C. Equitable Balancing Limited to Public Necessity and Public Rights

Particularly in older environmental cases, courts were at times moved to balance the injury to the private party against the many public benefits that accrued from the operation of mines and the like. Such benefits included not only employment and tax bases but also the products, such as copper or iron, that were publicly necessary. In some cases, courts denied injunctions due to the severity of the detriments to the public if the mines or plants were closed.93 Such industries, while problematic, could also be “the basic, sustaining industry of the community.”94

These environmental cases raised the issue of whether and how to consider the impact on the public of issuing an injunction that might close an important business. On this issue, courts reasoned that when acting in equity, the court should not “remedy a wrong committed against one class

88. See id. at 243 (quoting Evans v. Reading Chem. & Fertilizing Co., 28 A. 702 (Pa. 1894)).
89. See United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385, 416 (Cir. Ct. D. Del. 1905) (citation omitted).
90. See Steiner v. Hennon, 17 Ohio Dec. 585, 589 (Allen Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. 1907); see also Madoo v. Willis, 54 S.E.2d 632, 638 (Ga. 1949) (“In an application for an interlocutory injunction there should be a balancing of conveniences and a consideration of whether greater harm might be done by refusing than by granting the injunction.” (citations omitted)).
91. See Benton v. Kerman, 13 A.2d 825, 842 (N.J. Ch. 1940).
93. See Bliss v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 167 F. 342, 371 (Cir. Ct. D. Mont. 1909) (discussing drastic consequences on the general public that would result from injunction); see also McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927, 940 (9th Cir. 1908) (same).
of persons by the commission of another wrong against a larger class.\footnote{See Fields Sewerage Co. v. Bishop, 30 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). The Fields Sewerage case involved the provision of sanitation services to the citizens of a particular community, where the injury resulted from the operation of a sewerage plant. See id. In this particular instance, the court reasoned that “[t]he exercise of such power would be attended with the infliction of as great a wrong upon a much larger number of citizens. Under such a condition, appellees would be remitted to a suit for damages for compensation because of the injuries inflicted upon them.” See id.}

The overall rule then became that “if it is found that the greater number would suffer injury by the allowance of such relief [an injunction] than the number of those that would be benefited by granting it, then the minority must yield to the majority and relief by abatement be denied.”\footnote{See id.} In some instances, courts reasoned, the detriments caused by a nuisance could be “more than balanced by the public benefits.”\footnote{See New York v. Transit Dev. Co., 115 N.Y.S. 297, 304 (App. Div. 1909) (quoting New York v. Horton, 64 N.Y. 610, 620 (1876)). Notably, a number of these cases actually involve situations where the detriments of the alleged nuisance would fall to the public rather than to a private citizen. For example, the erection of a wharf could impede transportation for all citizens but also provide those citizens with “countervailing benefits,” thus, the court would find that “if the public advantage greatly overbalance[d] any slight inconvenience that may be produced, it is no nuisance.” See Pilcher v. Hart, 20 Tenn. 524, 533 (1840). The Pilcher case is remarkable for the finding that it is “no nuisance” (as opposed to finding a nuisance, but refusing an injunction), but the holding can be highly qualified here by the fact that the damages fell to the public as a whole (for interference with a public easement), rather than really to one private land owner. See id.} When the courts balanced, then, what they were looking for was adding a consideration of the “interests of the public good.”\footnote{See Gray v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 91 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Mich. 1958).} The idea was that as with “so many questions in the law,” the court needed to consider “the needs of trade and the rights of citizens.”\footnote{See L.D. Pearson & Son v. Bonnie, 272 S.W. 375, 377 (Ky. 1925). But see City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933) (noting that balancing may be accepted by court “even if the conflict is between interests which are primarily private”).} Balancing was accepted in these cases, with the limitation that the question must be one that was “affected by a public interest.”\footnote{See Huebschmann v. Grand Co., 172 A. 227, 230 (Md. 1934).}

The idea of necessity played a substantial role in courts accepting the idea of balancing the public interest when deciding whether to issue an injunction to abate a nuisance. Some courts reasoned that the private individual has to give way when there was a clash with “the necessities of a great public industry.”\footnote{See Pennsylvania v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 50 Pa. D. & C. 411, 417 (Phila. Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. 1944) (citation omitted).} The idea was that “[i]n those cases in which a nuisance is permitted to exist, under the rule of balancing rights . . . are based on the stern rule of necessity rather than on the right of the author of the nuisance to use his property in such a manner as to work a hurt or injury.
to his neighbor.”\footnote{See Fields Sewerage Co. v. Bishop, 30 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).} Courts also were sympathetic to business owners who operated their facilities to the best of their ability while generating a necessary product—in other words, some businesses, no matter how cleanly and carefully operated, generate negative externalities. As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia explained regarding a mine, “[A] problem of coal dust to at least some degree is inevitable wherever coal is mined, processed, handled, and transported.”\footnote{See Harless v. Workman, 114 S.E.2d 548, 552 (W. Va. 1960).}

The Iowa Supreme Court issued what may be the strongest formulation of the rule of considering public benefits.\footnote{See Friedman v. Forest City, 30 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Iowa 1948).} The Iowa Supreme Court faced a case in which the alleged nuisance was caused by “a public service corporation furnishing light and power to the public”; notably, the corporation could not “abandon its public service without consent of the public service commission.”\footnote{See id. (quoting Byrne v. Monongahela W. Penn Pub. Serv. Co., 146 S.E. 522, 524 (W. Va. 1929)).} In these circumstances, the Iowa Supreme Court found that an “injunction would be proper only under extreme circumstances.”\footnote{See id.}

Finally, even while courts have been willing to consider public benefits when contemplating an injunction, there still seems to be strong limits to this position. In short, even substantial public benefits have not always been sufficient for courts to deny an injunction. In a number of similar cases, the defendants argued for a balancing of the injuries, but the courts still granted injunctions against the company defendant.\footnote{See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Am. Smelting & Ref Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225, 241 (8th Cir. 1907); Arizona v. Smelting & Lead Co., 124 P. 692 (Cal. 1912); Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 100 P. 465, 471 (Ariz. 1909).} The problem, for some courts, was that “[t]he violation of a public right enjoyed by a portion of the community is not justified by offsetting an advantage accruing to others.”\footnote{See Conn. River Lumber Co. v. Olcott Falls Co., 21 A. 1090, 1094 (N.H. 1889). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire observed that this type of balancing of public advantages and disadvantages was a task better suited to the legislature than to the courts. See id. at 1095. Another reason that courts have granted injunctions is that often these businesses, while providing a public benefit, also create detriments to public health. In such instances a court might conclude that if “it is shown by facts and circumstances to constitute a nuisance affecting public health ‘no measure of necessity, usefulness or public benefit will protect it from the unflinching condemnation of the law.’” Bd. of Comm’rs v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 9 S.E.2d 813, 817(W. Va. 1940) (quoting Horace G. Wood, The Law of Nuisances, § 19, at 40–43 (3d ed. 1895)).}

Additionally, when courts balanced the public interest against the damage to the plaintiff-neighbor of the nuisance, another limiting doctrine came into play: the courts carefully noted that not all injunctions,
not even all injunctions that required abatement of a nuisance, necessarily meant shutting down the operations of a business. In other words, injunctions are devices that allow for a spectrum of solutions and need not be just binary (grant or deny) decisions. Instead, one of the options that the court has is to find ways that the business can still provide its services, while at the same time limiting or removing the ongoing nuisance through some change in operations and expenditure of funds. Thus, for example, an injunction might be granted where the court found on the evidence that a change could be made “at a cost apparently not prohibitory, but means of which full relief is granted” to the plaintiffs while services continue for the public.\(^\text{109}\)

Notably, even in the circumstances where courts were willing to balance harms to the public and then potentially refuse to grant injunctions, this did not mean that the plaintiff was left entirely without a remedy. In such cases, the courts still made available to the plaintiff his or her legal remedies, including damages.\(^\text{110}\)

Finally, some courts explicitly rejected the public interest as a justification for entering into a balancing analysis when considering whether to issue an injunction. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reasoned that “the fact that the primary purpose of defendant is to serve the public does not alter the situation.”\(^\text{111}\) The problem was that “it would be manifestly unfair to require plaintiffs to bear all the ill-effects of this nuisance, merely that the public might benefit indirectly.”\(^\text{112}\) In considering this case, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia then directly connected the problem to a takings claim, noting that “the Constitution itself forbids injury to private property for a public purpose without just compensation.”\(^\text{113}\) Consequently, the court concluded, because there was no compensation for the nuisance, it could not matter that the public would lose some benefits by abating the nuisance.\(^\text{114}\) Summarizing this rule, one Ohio court explained that while the nuisance might be “convenient and useful to the public,” provided that the nuisance was proven, then the benefit to the public “furnishe[d] no defense whatever.”\(^\text{115}\)

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\(^{110}\) See id.


\(^{112}\) See id.

\(^{113}\) See id. at 566.

\(^{114}\) See id.

D. Balancing Really Means Addressing De Minimis Advantages

In some jurisdictions, when courts speak of balancing in the nuisance analysis, the inquiry is not one of weighing competing interests but rather the much simpler question of whether the advantages accruing to the landowner from granting the injunction would be de minimis. The idea here is that an injunction should be denied “where the injury to the complainant by the continuance of the nuisance is small, and the injury to the defendant by its discontinuance is great.” Courts have refused to issue injunctions where doing so “[would] cause great injury to defendant, and [would] confer no benefit or very little benefit in comparison upon complainant.”

More generally, when courts say balance, they do not mean a slight tipping of the scales. Instead, the courts seem to be looking for a strong tilt in one direction. In other words, while the action of the court in making a judgment is referred to as simply balancing, what the court is really doing is searching for a “disproportionate hardship.” In City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co., the United States Supreme Court incorporated this approach, requiring a finding of not only a disproportionate hardship but even a “grossly disproportionate hardship.” Courts applied this approach where granting an injunction would “work an undue hardship on the defendant without corresponding benefit to the plaintiff and substantial redress [could] be afforded by the payment of money.” The idea here was that “equity may sanction the denial of injunctive relief when such relief would cause damage greatly disproportionate to the injury sought to be redressed.” Rules like these ensured that when courts balanced, the real inquiry was not a general measure of weights but rather a tough look for a disproportionate outcome. This significantly limited the balancing test as applied.

E. Balancing Granted in the Event of Laches

In some cases, defendants have argued not that they are entitled to a balancing test generally, but rather that they are entitled to that balancing specifically because the plaintiff has engaged in laches. In such cases, as a

117. See id. (emphasis added).
119. 289 U.S. 334 (1933).
120. See id. at 338.
121. See Sam Warren & Son Stone Co., 209 S.W.2d at 820. The corresponding benefit idea occurs regularly in the nuisance case law. For example, the Supreme Court of Oregon found that an injunction should be refused where “the issuance of an injunction would cause serious public inconvenience or loss without a correspondingly great advantage to the complainant.” Fraser v. City of Portland, 158 P. 514, 516 (Or. 1916).
result of laches, the plaintiff has been “standing by until after [the] defendant has expended a large sum of money.” ¹²³ Some courts have supported this position and allowed laches to be grounds for invoking a balancing analysis in the injunction question. This position aligns with the Restatement (First) of Torts’ position generally on injunctions, which finds that one of the things to be considered is “plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit.”¹²⁴ Under this theory, laches is not an “absolute defense,” but rather one of the “matters of equitable consideration” for the court.¹²⁵ In these jurisdictions, courts could limit balancing to circumstances where the plaintiff had already done the defendant a disservice through unreasonable delay.

F. Combining Strict Restrictions on Balancing for Greater Limits

Commonly, courts incorporated more than one of these limits on the balancing test. In 1915, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence and Equitable Remedies noted “where the damages can be measured and compensated, equity will not interfere where the public benefit greatly outweighs private and individual inconvenience.”¹²⁶ Looking carefully at this position, Pomeroy’s position requires (1) that damages are measurable, (2) damages can adequately compensate for the damage, (3) a strong public benefit that will outweigh, and (4) that the other side is a private or individual inconvenience as opposed to a public one.¹²⁷

In W.S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co., the United States Supreme Court incorporated a similar position. The Court reasoned that “[w]here substantial redress can be afforded by the payment of money and issuance of an injunction would subject the defendant to grossly disproportionate hardship, equitable relief may be denied although the nuisance is indisputable.”¹²⁸ Notably, the Court not only embraced the two limitations (redress by damages and disproportionate hardship), the court also left the decision as discretionary, finding that relief “may be denied.”¹²⁹

One common combination of restrictions was that of balancing only for preliminary injunctions and only where there was a public interest in the outcome. Thus, requests for preliminary injunctions could also be limited by only considering a balance between the harm to the plaintiff and public interests rather than the interests of private party defendants. The question was whether “granting the injunctive relief work[ed] a

¹²³. See Pomeroy, supra note 77, § 1944, at 4419 n.15.
¹²⁴. See Restatement (First) of Torts § 939 (Am. Law Inst. 1939).
¹²⁶. See Pomeroy, supra note 77, § 1945.
¹²⁷. See id., § 1945, at 4419–23.
¹²⁸. See City of Harrisonville, 289 U.S. at 338.
¹²⁹. See id.
greater hardship and greater injury upon the public than would result to the plaintiff by its denial. 130

Courts also combined the de minimis limitation with other limits. Limitations included whether “the right [was] doubtful” or that “money damages [would] compensate the plaintiff,” or that there was some other method of otherwise redressing the wrong. 131 Additionally, courts limited the idea of balancing benefits to the public by looking for something that appeared to be de minimis on the other side. In other words, the situation was not just that there were strong public benefits but also that in comparison to those benefits, there was a “trifling inconvenience” of the private individual. 132 Some courts, rather than looking only for de minimis benefits on the plaintiff’s side, looked more generally to the proportionality between the detriments and the benefits in cases that involve an inconvenience to the public. 133

Such combinations of limits also fit with contemporary treatises that combined limits on balancing. H.G. Wood’s The Law of Nuisances supported balancing, but in a very limited fashion. The Law of Nuisances focused first on limiting its advice to those cases before a court of equity. 134 Within the context of a court of equity, Wood focused on the special role of that court, whose “true intent” Wood believed to be “do[ing] justice between the parties.” 135 As a result, Wood found that an injunction was only appropriate “where the rights of the parties demand it.” 136 To determine that, Wood found that the courts should look to “all the circumstances of the location, the effect of the act claimed to be a nuisance, and the effect upon the defendant’s business and interests.” 137 Notably, Wood discussed these limitations in the context of a case that involved a claim of laches on the part of the plaintiff. 138 Even in this circumstance, Wood cautioned that the “usefulness of the business, or its importance, magnitude or extent” would not prevent an injunction from issuing. 139 Thus, what Wood proposed was not simple balancing and looking for a bare tip of the scales.

Instead, Wood noted that refusing to issue an injunction would require that the injury be “small and fairly compensable in damages” while in contrast the “damages and loss to the other party would be large and

133. See Fraser v. City of Portland, 158 P. 514, 516 (Or. 1916).
135. See id. § 801, at 1182.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
disastrous.” Therefore, the court would have to make two distinct findings: (1) that the plaintiff’s injuries were quite minor, perhaps de minimis, and (2) that the plaintiff could be fully compensated by damages. Wood concluded by noting that the denial of the injunction would not result in sending away the plaintiff without remedy—only that the plaintiff would be left to his legal remedy of damages. Most importantly, Wood did not appear to consider balancing within the context of an action for damages. Instead: “The law does not, however, balance conveniences, and it makes no difference if the work is really in the interest of society, or necessary for the preservation of the public health.”

IV. The Revisionist Trend and the Power of Balancing

In general, courts frequently recognized that the doctrines of nuisance, both in terms of the prima facie case and the remedies rules, are confused and conflicting, even within individual jurisdictions. As the Iowa Supreme Court observed in 1957, “There is considerable conflict among decisions as to the basic doctrine and various elements thereof and exceptions thereto.”

This confusion escalated with the unification of courts of equity and courts of law through the twentieth century. As the Restatement (First) of Torts explained, “A potent cause of confusion as to the meaning and scope of private nuisance lies in the failure to distinguish the action at law from the suit for injunction in equity. Cases in equity are cited as precedents in actions at law without regard to their differences.” This is particularly important because, as the Restatement (First) of Torts observes, “considerations enter into the determination of the right to an injunction that are inapplicable or have less weight in determining the right to damages.” Such mingling of equity jurisprudence with thought about the prima facie case for nuisance may well have caused much of the shift in nuisance law during the modern era.

This process of conflating equity and law explains how a doctrine once limited to an equitable remedy could migrate into the prima facie case of nuisance. This section focuses on the substantial changes that took place in the mid-to-late twentieth century: the movement of balancing into the prima facie case through the reasonableness element and the dropping of limitations on balancing.

140. See id.
141. See id.
144. See Restatement (First) of Torts, supra note 124, at 223.
145. See id. at 224.
A. Removing the Limits on Balancing

Historically, one of the most significant limits on balancing was the requirement that courts consider the public interest—as opposed to the harms to the defendant. Courts from the 1950s forward moved away from the restriction on limiting balancing to concern about the public interest. These courts weighed not only the potential damage to the public from granting an injunction (a rarer occurrence) but also considered the potential damage to the private defendant from granting an injunction (a virtual certainty in any nuisance case). This was no small change for plaintiffs, who now must balance their property rights against the investments that the plaintiff may have made in a neighboring property that just happens to be worth more money.

The new rule became that the courts would consider “the injury which may result to the defendant” as well as the public from granting an injunction.146 Notably, after stating a rule that allows considering the damage to the defendant, the Supreme Court of Texas followed the rule with a discussion of the public interest and necessity.147 The court then concluded the discussion by embracing a rule that favored not just balancing public detriments but also any private detriment to the defendant, despite having not really addressed reasons for including private damage within the balancing test.148 Rather than weighing only the public interest, the court only considered the alternative argument of giving injunctions as a matter of right (an idea that the court dismissed as less favored).149 This case is indicative of the kind of soft reasoning that allowed courts to move from considering only the public interest to also considering the harms to private defendants.

Treatises, and particularly the Restatements, appeared to play a role in adopting balancing more generally and without limits. The Law of Torts by William L. Prosser concluded that “[t]he reasonableness of the interference is determined by weighing the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff against the utility of the defendant’s conduct.”150 A number of cases that adopted a weighing of utilities approach to reasonableness cited to Prosser

146. See Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co., 226 S.W.2d 615, 619 (Tex. 1950); see also Fields Sewerage Co. v. Bishop, 30 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (holding that “[i]t is always the duty of the court to consider the inconvenience and damage that will result to the defendant . . . in all cases where a writ of injunction is sought.”).
147. See Storey, 226 S.W.2d at 619.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 515. Notably, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals also moves the balancing test from being limited to temporary injunctions to being applicable to final injunctions as well. See Massengill v. Jones, 308 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
150. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 72, at 405 (2d ed. 1955).
for this point.151 Notably, Prosser began with the historical definition of reasonableness—he noted that nuisance was about the conflict of one owner’s right to use his land as she pleased with the other owner’s right to be secure in not being bothered in his possession.152 Prosser then observed that “[t]he two are correlative and interdependent, and neither is entitled to prevail entirely, at the expense of the other.”153 It was from this latter thought that Prosser moved to the idea of balancing as a solution to this dilemma, saying, “[s]ome balance must be struck between the two.”154

The Restatements also may have played a role in adopting the idea of balancing harms to the defendant and eschewing any limits on the doctrine. The Restatement (First) of Torts did not explicitly include balancing as a part of the prima facie case for nuisance;155 it did, however, include reasonableness as a part of the prima facie case.156 The balancing inquiry entered through the element of reasonableness because of how the Restatement (First) of Torts defined unreasonableness. The Restatement (First) of Torts declared that unreasonableness was determined in part by weighing the “utility of the actor’s conduct” against “the gravity of the harm.”157

Most importantly, the Restatement (First) of Torts omitted one of the strongest historical limitations on balancing—the limitation of public interest or public necessity—by declaring that a part of the analysis was weighing not only the community interests but also the harms to the defendant—“the interests of the actor”—as well.158 In its strongest statement, the Restatement (First) of Torts urged that “determining unreasonableness is essentially a weighing process, involving a comparative evaluation of conflicting interests in various situations according to objective legal standards.”159 The Restatement (First) of Torts focused heavily on balancing, making the heart of the unreasonableness analysis a weighing process160—something it had

152. See Prosser, supra note 150, § 72, at 410–11.
153. See id. § 72, at 410.
154. See id.
155. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, supra note 124, § 822, at 226.
156. See id.
157. See id. § 826, at 241.
158. See id. § 826 cmt. b, at 241–42. The Restatement (First) of Torts also acknowledged that law would place a “social value” on any type of use of land and that this should also be a part of the weighing of the gravity of harm to the defendant. See id. § 827, at 244. Similarly, social value was also given as a part of the weighing of utility of conduct. See id. § 828, at 250. Notably, in this discussion, the Restatement (First) of Torts is limiting itself to a discussion of actions for damages—the “[c]hapter does not state the rules that are peculiar to the determination of the right to an injunction.” See id. at 215.
159. See id. § 826 cmt. b, at 242.
160. See id. § 826 cmts. b–d, at 241–44 (describing reasonableness as “essentially a weighing process” and then extensively discussing the many ways of weighing gravity of harm and social utility within next two comments); see also Nair v.
not been historically. Cases adopted this perspective by citing the Restatement (First) of Torts. The Restatement (First) of Torts approach of considering a wide variety of circumstances and weighing the conflicting interests became a standard approach of the courts by the 1950s and 1960s.

Ultimately, a number of courts have shifted the idea of reasonableness, a key element of the nuisance inquiry, in such a way that the concept now includes a balancing of harms to the defendant as well as the community. As a result, for the plaintiff to even prove that a nuisance exists,
the plaintiff must establish that the harm outweighs the utility of the defendant’s use to the community as well as any harms to the defendant personally. Such a balance may be naturally difficult to win where the defendant is operating a business that has any use at all to the community or if the defendant would suffer any substantial harm by removing the offending use.165

B. Balancing in the Prima Facie Case Through Reasonableness

One of the most important transformations of nuisance law has been the movement of the balancing test from the remedies analysis to the prima facie case—meaning that damages were always available without passing a balancing test even if injunctions were not. When balancing moves into the prima facie case, it means that balancing could prevent there ever being a finding of nuisance, thus denying the plaintiff all remedies.166 Balancing moved into the prima facie case primarily through the element of reasonableness. In this section, I discuss in detail the expansion of reasonableness and the movement of the balancing test into the prima facie case for nuisance. In the next part, I consider the theoretical implications of this transformation of doctrine.

The redefinition of reasonableness was significant for a few reasons. First, by redefining reasonableness, courts moved the balancing inquiry from the remedies phase of litigation into the initial question of whether a nuisance exists. Second, by redefining reasonableness, courts made this substantial shift—one that Lewin described as reducing the scope of nuisance actions—without any obvious change to the elements of the prima facie case.167 Third, such a change did not take a great deal of effort in many ways. Reasonableness, allowing for an examination of contexts, is


165. Consider, for example, the recent case of Blue Ink, Ltd. v. Two Farms, Inc., where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals weighed the reasonableness of the interference with the utility of a convenience store available to the community. 96 A.3d 810, 820 (Md. Ct. Special App. 2014).

166. See Lewin, supra note 12, at 780. In Lewin’s article on compensated injunctions, he briefly mentions that the element of reasonableness appears to be the mechanism that allows the balancing inquiry to become a primary part of the nuisance analysis. See id. Lewin concludes that this move “reduced the scope of the nuisance doctrine, enabling courts to find that certain interferences with the use and enjoyment of land were not actionable.” See id. Despite making such a remarkable observation—and one that, I believe, is quite accurate—Lewin moved on to other topics rather than further discussing the evolution of the reasonableness element or considering how these changes might have had greater theoretical implications for property law. See id. at 780–81.

167. See id. at 780.
rather amenable to expansion. Thus, courts in the 1950s could easily move between discussing the flexibility of reasonableness to including an idea of the balancing of the rights of the parties. This was particularly true because some of the early formulations of reasonableness already used the term “balance” but just did so in a way that did not include a weighing of harms or social utility.

With respect to this flexibility of reasonableness and the already existent idea of some sort of balance, the Washington Supreme Court’s analysis of reasonableness provides a great example of how courts shifted the doctrine. The Washington Supreme Court stated that within the law of nuisance, “rights as to the usage of land are relative.”\textsuperscript{168} The court then explained that this relativity was primarily about when it was unreasonable to interfere with another landowner’s use and enjoyment.\textsuperscript{169} After noting that “[t]he crux of the matter appears to be reasonableness,” the court noted that the term “has many shades and varieties of meaning” and is always fitted “in relation to all the facts and surrounding circumstances.”\textsuperscript{170} The court then immediately observed that the application of nuisance law “requires a balancing of rights, interests, and convenience.”\textsuperscript{171} Balancing to determine reasonableness became the norm for Washington courts, where the rule became that the courts “determine the reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct by weighing the harm to the aggrieved party against the social utility of the activity.”\textsuperscript{172}

Throughout the twentieth century, American courts increasingly redefined reasonableness in a way that adopted the \textit{Restatement (First) of Torts} perspective, described above, which included not only the social utility weighing, but also a consideration of the harms to the defendant. To determine “whether an actionable nuisance exist[ed],” courts weighed “the gravity of harm to the plaintiffs against the utility and reasonableness of the defendants’ conduct.”\textsuperscript{173} This analysis did not just take place in the remedies phase, but instead, reasonableness was a part of “determining . . . the fact” of the existence of a nuisance.\textsuperscript{174}

At times, courts adopted this perspective specifically to favor local industries. The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that its state was “sparsely populated and its economy depend[ed] largely upon the benefits of agriculture, lumber, mining and industrial development. To eliminate the utility of conduct and other factors . . . to be considered in determining

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{168} See \textit{Morin v. Johnson}, 300 P.2d 569, 572 (Wash. 1956).
\item \textsuperscript{169} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{170} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{171} See \textit{id.}
\item \textsuperscript{173} See \textit{Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co.}, 283 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1955).
\end{itemize}
whether a nuisance exists... would place an unreasonable burden upon these industries.” The court specifically noted that it was embracing a definition of nuisance that included weighing these public interests in a suit that was seeking only damages and not an injunction.

In 1942, a Connecticut Superior Court judge observed the sneakiness of including balancing as a part of the reasonableness analysis. The judge noted that while balancing was a normal part of equity procedure, many courts did not want to “admit it is a part of their practice.” Such courts instead “prefer[red] to base their conclusions on the ground that the use to the invader is not unreasonable under all the circumstances.” The judge then concluded: “[T]his is splitting hairs, because, fundamentally, the unreasonableness of an intentional invasion is a problem of relative values to be determined after giving due weight to all of the factors of each case.”

V. Theoretical Implications of Balancing in Nuisance Doctrine and Modern Reconsiderations of Nuisance Law

A. Balancing as Affecting a Taking

Some scholars have connected nuisance law and takings claims in the context of recent right-to-farm statutes. I argue here that there is no need to constrain our inquiry to the right-to-farm style statutes. There is ample evidence that the modern evolution of nuisance law—the sharp limitation of its scope through the introduction of (unlimited) balancing into the prima facie case—creates regulatory takings more generally within nuisance law.

 Courts shared this concern throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Early courts regularly discussed the problem of takings in the context of nuisance law, particularly when courts were resisting the introduction of balancing tests or the removal of limits on those tests.

The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected the idea of thinking about social utility in the nuisance context because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to compel the citizen to abandon his property at the demand of public convenience, without the forms of law and without compensation.” The court further reasoned that a nuisance would compel the plaintiff to “submit to having their lives made physically uncomfortable, and their

176. See id. at 229.
178. See id. at 92.
179. See id.
homes made unenjoyable." \textsuperscript{182} This was unacceptable because, "[p]rivate property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation, and it can make little difference whether it is taken, or it is destroyed for the uses of civilized life." \textsuperscript{183} The court further observed that, "It can make no difference that the convenience, or even the preservation of the health, of a large population . . . or that the number actually injured by the nuisance is comparatively small." \textsuperscript{184}

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia connected nuisance with takings, reasoning that "the Constitution itself forbids injury to private property for a public purpose without just compensation." \textsuperscript{185} Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded, because there is no compensation for the nuisance, it cannot matter that the public would lose some benefits by abating the nuisance. \textsuperscript{186}

The Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed with this analysis. The court concluded that:

\begin{quote}
Under the provisions of the Constitution of this State, that private property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, the court could not have considered, in deciding whether or grant or refuse the injunction, the question raised by the defendant as to the balance of convenience, or of advantage or disadvantage to the plaintiff and defendant and the public at large . . . . \textsuperscript{187}
\end{quote}

On the topic of social utility and balancing, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that it could not “find a case in which substantial injuries to property rights, to the rights of enjoying and possessing property, have been sanctioned by a final refusal to enjoin, on the mere ground that the public was interested in their continuance." \textsuperscript{188} The problem in the end was that “the public usefulness of an enterprise is no reason why private right should be infringed." \textsuperscript{189}

Some courts felt so strongly about the takings problem that they refused to even dismiss those cases where the plaintiff’s injury could easily be described as de minimis. Their reasoning was that “[t]he fact that the damage already suffered is slight is no reason for denying the relief given." \textsuperscript{190} To respect property rights, and particularly the right to exclude

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{182} See id. at 201.
\item \textsuperscript{183} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{184} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{185} See Ritz v. Woman’s Club of Charleston, 173 S.E. 564, 566 (W. Va. 1934).
\item \textsuperscript{186} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 66 S.E. 117, 118 (S.C. 1909).
\item \textsuperscript{188} Evans v. Reading Chem. & Fertilizing Co., 28 A. 702 (Pa. 1894).
\item \textsuperscript{189} See id. (citation omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{190} See Shevlin v. Johnston, 205 P. 1087, 1087 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1922) (citation omitted). The court concluded that the party who created the “nuisance should bear the expense of abating it.” See id.
\end{itemize}
fully, then “[w]hatever hardship there it must be laid at defendants’
door.” 191

It is important to note that most of the commentary of nuisance and
takings comes from courts worrying about employing a social utility analy-
sis—i.e., courts thinking about sacrificing private property for the gain of
public goods. Notably, however, when it comes to considering the harms
to the defendant before finding a nuisance, courts would not only be sacri-
facing private property to public utility but also sacrificing private property
for another private party. Takings for private use have, of course, become
one of the great problems of recent years. 192

In the context of nuisance, the Court of Appeals of Maryland ob-
served this problem of nuisance creating a taking for private use, finding
that the court “[knew] of no respectable authority for the principle that
one may for his own private gain appropriate his neighbor’s property to
improve his own because his neighbor’s loss will be less than his gain.” 193
The court finally concluded that none of the authorities for balancing the
hardships “can be authority for the proposition that equity . . . will refuse
to protect a man in the possession and enjoyment of his property because
that right is less valuable to him than the power to destroy it may be to his
neighbor or to the public.” 194

For this reason, some courts have not been willing to see injunctions
as discretionary remedies in the case of a nuisance. The Supreme Court
of Georgia observed, “It has been said that the final settlement of property
rights does not lie in the broad discretion of the chancellor, but in the
clear legal and equitable rules which bind the chancellor himself.” 195 The
problem with a balancing inquiry when considering whether to issue an
injunction is that this allows a court “otherwise having cognizance of the
case” to “measure the rights of one party by the cost to the other, commit-
ting the injury.” 196 The Colorado Supreme Court reasoned:

As it was put in the English cases, it would be a sorry condition of
the law if the courts were compelled to hold that the property of
another might be taken because it would be either inconvenient
or expensive to the one committing the nuisance to restrain or
prevent its continuance. 197

191. See Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 798 (Iowa 1971).
192. See Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemna-
to decrease incidence of takings for private use).
194. See id.
197. Id. (citation omitted).
The balancing doctrine “has been subject to criticism as an odious method by which the larger property owner always has the advantage over the smaller.”198

State supreme courts around the country engaged this question of the relationship between nuisance and takings, concluding that to deprive the plaintiff of her compensatory damages would be to make a taking of property. Where the court rejects the claim of nuisance due to the social utility of the defendant’s conduct, what the court is doing is allowing the plaintiff’s property to be reduced in value for the benefit of the public and without compensation. Worse, where the court balances the harms to the private defendant and then refuses to allow a claim for nuisance, the court is effectively creating a taking not for public purposes, but indeed for private ones. The plaintiff’s property reduces in value to benefit the property of the defendant. The first scenario is bad, the second even worse. Both should offend our understanding of how private property is constitutionally protected within this country.

B. Diminishing Rights to Possession and the Future of Nuisance Law

Property focuses much of its attention and energy on the idea of possession, which may be the fundamental determining feature of a property claim.199 Theorists who greatly disagree about the nature of property and its best and most useful ends still tend to congregate around the idea of possession as the touchstone.200 Common law history tends to grant possession a primary place in determining property ownership rights.201 The right of exclusive possession is “the bedrock of English land law.”202 Richard A. Epstein has described possession as “the backbone of the common law system of property rights.”203 William Blackstone translates possession into occupancy, but retains a similar idea, noting that “occupancy is the


201. See Epstein, supra note 199, at 1222.

202. See Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655 (HL) 703 (appeal taken from Eng.). With that said, Carol Rose has argued that William Blackstone would have seen the right of exclusive possession as an “ideal type rather than a reality.” See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601, 604 (1998) (citation omitted).

thing by which the title was in fact originally gained."^{204} We have remained attached to these ideas, despite the fact that possession is often poorly defined and, worse, used circularly to define property. Despite any flaws, possession is at the center of our ideas of property and at the heart of the rights we believe we are protecting as property interests.

Possession is also at the heart of the idea of a nuisance claim. Generally, a definition of a nuisance claim begins by speaking of a “non-trespassory” invasion.\footnote{See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, reprinted in Perspectives on Property Law 45, 51 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2002).} This is because “[i]nterests in the exclusive possession of land are distinguished from interests in the use and enjoyment of it.”\footnote{See Restatement (First) of Torts, supra note 124, § 822, at 226.} The difference between the two determines whether the plaintiff should pursue a trespass action for an entry to the property instead of a nuisance action for an interference with the enjoyment of the property.\footnote{See id. at 224–25.} So, the heart of the nuisance claim is the protection of the plaintiff’s right of non-exclusive possession, but more generally, undisturbed possession. Thus, when the doctrine of nuisance balances social utility and harms to the defendant within the prima facie case, the courts make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in nuisance actions, thereby offering much more limited protection to the right of undisturbed possession—a central notion of what it means to have property rights.

Such curtailing of property rights is not an insignificant move by the courts. It is all the more alarming that such changes appear to have happened in the last half century without much in the way of public debate or significant analysis by scholars. We have allowed rights to creep away, slowly, and without notice.\footnote{This is perhaps all the more remarkable given that in general, citizens are always seeking additional and more effective methods of protecting their assets, including optimizing all possible routes to successful litigation. In the context of securities regulation, for example, plaintiffs continually push to utilize state laws that may provide for better verdicts, while avoiding the constraints of federal claims. See generally Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 305, 306–307 (2015).} For whatever reason, modern courts have not paid significant attention to the takings problem that so troubled courts in the earlier half of the twentieth century.

One explanation for this lack of awareness may be the collapse of the distinction between law and equity. At one time the courts of law would have had one definition for nuisance that would be used in cases seeking money damages, while courts of equity would have had their own definition of nuisance to be used in cases where the plaintiff sought an injunction. The different jurisdictional scopes of the two courts would have kept these two different doctrines relatively separate—an issue that the

\footnote{See id. at 225.}
ment (First) of Torts notes as problematic.209 By simply merging the two doctrines as the two jurisdictions merged, courts may have simply not given particular attention to how the differences had performed an important function in protecting the rights of plaintiffs to money damages, even if the courts would not be willing to grant an injunction due to the strong social benefits of the defendant’s actions.

Whether the modern doctrine emerged from inattention or the confusion of merging courts of law and equity, the current rule poorly serves to protect private property. Indeed, the current rule places an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs who wish to bring a case for nuisance, even if the plaintiffs are seeking only compensatory damages. If the offending use is beneficial to the public, plaintiffs are extremely unlikely to succeed on a claim for nuisance—even where they can demonstrate substantial harms—not only in terms of everyday annoyances, but also in terms of clear drops in their property values. Additionally, such plaintiffs are likely to be without another remedy; no other cause of action works in the same way to protect against such external interferences that reduce property values.

In light of the danger of takings, particularly for public purposes such as industrial development, I argue that the doctrine of nuisance should again transform. Specifically, courts should reconstruct the earlier doctrines of nuisance that specifically took into account whether the plaintiff was seeking damages in equity or at law. I propose that courts return to their previous jurisprudence, which curtailed balancing (in terms of harms to the defendant or harms to the public interest) to the approval or denial of injunctive remedies. Balancing should not be a part of the prima facie case for a nuisance. If it is, there is always the limiting of the plaintiff’s property rights in favor of someone else—either the defendant or the public. If balancing of either public or private interests is a part of the prima facie case for nuisance, and the plaintiff is unable to recover money damages because the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie case, then there will be an uncompensated taking of her property for either public or private purposes. For this reason, the rule that would better protect private property and avoid uncompensated takings would be a rule that includes balancing only within questions of equitable remedies, allowing compensatory damages to be available as a matter of right when the plaintiff proves the remaining elements of a case of nuisance.

VI. Conclusion

Despite the importance of nuisance law both as a tool of theoretical inquiry and as a baseline of doctrine for a variety of legal fields, little has been written about the evolution of nuisance law.210 Indeed, scholars have entirely ignored the changes that have taken place in nuisance law within the last half of the twentieth century. By focusing on the idea that

209. See Restatement (First) of Torts, supra note 124, at 223–24.
210. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
balancing was introduced at the end of the 1800s, scholars did not question whether balancing had ever become a significant part of the nuisance analysis, as opposed to a heavily limited portion of the inquiry. Additionally, scholars failed to question what the introduction of balancing did to plaintiffs’ property rights.

This Article focused on detailing the many ways that courts originally limited balancing, keeping it from playing any significant role in limiting the scope of nuisance rights of plaintiffs. The Article then detailed how the many limitations on the balancing inquiry were dropped during the mid-to-late twentieth century. During this process I argued balancing became a part of the prima facie case for nuisance, significantly reducing the rights that property owners have in nuisance to protect their properties from interference. I described how courts had originally limited balancing severely, based on the idea that to fail to do so would be to invite takings claims. While modern courts have ignored the takings problem, I discussed the many concerns of courts in earlier decades and concluded that modern courts should reconsider whether balancing should ever take place within the prima facie case for nuisance given that doing so deprives plaintiffs not only of their equitable remedies, but also their damages at law.

211. See supra notes 25–58 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 59–142 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 143–79 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 180–98 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 199–210 and accompanying text.