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Doctor's Orders: The Third Circuit Approves Short-Term Annuities as a Viable Planning Tool in Zahner v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Human Services

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I. SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LONG-TERM CARE AND MEDICAID PLANNING

Meet Roy.2 Suffering from “Crohn’s disease, diabetes, and dementia,” he first entered a nursing home in 2001 and quickly depleted his resources to pay for his care.3 Roy applied for Medicaid assistance, but his application was denied because he transferred his home to his family a
year earlier.4 Because this transfer “occurred within [Medicaid’s] look-
back period,” Roy became ineligible for Medicaid assistance, even though
he had no other assets to pay for his care.5

The experience described above is not unusual.6 As the U.S. popula-
tion ages at a high rate, the demand for long-term care has become a very
real problem.7 As a result, some Americans turn to Medicaid to cover the
costs of long-term care.8 To qualify for Medicaid, individuals must meet
specific requirements, essentially “exhaust[ing]” their assets in the pro-
cess.9 Many spend all of their assets either before entering a nursing

4. See id. (discussing reasons for denial of Medicaid application).
5. See id. (explaining impact of “asset transfer” on Medicaid application). Follow-
ing his denial, Roy and his niece sought legal advice. See id. Roy’s niece sold
the home and used the funds to pay for Roy’s nursing home bills and other fees
until he was finally eligible for Medicaid. See id. For an explanation of Medicaid’s
look-back period, see infra notes 58–62, 67–68 and accompanying text.
6. See id. at 12 (discussing other resident’s loss of Medicaid eligibility after
selling home). As previously noted, Profiles of Nursing Home Residents on Medicaid
discusses several nursing home residents whose Medicaid eligibility was affected by the
presence or absence of assets. See id. at 9–11, 13, 15.
7. See Alison Barnes, An Assessment of Medicaid Planning, 3 Hous. J. Health L.
& Pol’y 265, 280 (2003) (“[T]he prospect of the numbers of aging baby boomers
in the next twenty years causes concern about an absolute increase in the numbers
of nursing home residents.” (citing CITIZENS FOR LONG TERM CARE, Defining
Common Ground: Long Term Care Financing Reform in 2001, 2 J. Post-Acute & Long-
Term Care Med. 187, 187 (2001))); Karla Levinson, Comment, Long-Term Care
Alert: An Analysis of Delaware’s Approach to Medicaid Planning Techniques and Why
Curbing Medicaid Planning Will Not Solve the Nation’s Long-Term Care Problem, 13 Wid-
ener L. Rev. 223, 223–24, 239–41 (2006) (discussing United States’ aging popula-
tion); see also Kelly, supra note 2 (questioning how long-term care for retiring baby
boomers will be paid); Rick Jurgens, Despite Offerings, Nursing Home Beds and Funds
critical-needs [https://perma.cc/P6DS-DA34] (last updated Feb. 1, 2016) (“About
12 million Americans receive long-term care—services that extend for at least nine
months and help individuals with serious physical or cognitive limitations cope
with health-related and other challenges of daily life—in communities or in nurs-
ing homes or other institutions . . . .”).
8. See Ellen O’Brien, Medicaid’s Coverage of Nursing Home Costs: Asset Shelter for
the Wealthy or Essential Safety Net?, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LONG-TERM CARE FIN.
[https://perma.cc/2LQZ-WSK5] (reporting Medicaid paid for “[n]early half of
the nation’s nursing home bill . . . in 2003”); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 224
(discussing prevalence of Medicaid in providing funding for “long-term care ser-
ices”); Williams et al., supra note 2, at 1 (acknowledging Medicaid contributed to
forty-six percent of nursing home costs in 2003). In 2003, nursing home costs
exceeded $100 billion. See id.
9. See Timothy Waidmann & Korbin Liu, Asset Transfer and Nursing Home Use:
[https://perma.cc/7MWP-799Y] (illustrating Medicaid eligibility requirements).
For further discussion of the requirements of Medicaid eligibility, including the
specific requirements for individuals in Pennsylvania, see infra notes 34–52 and
accompanying text.
home or during their stay on the care itself.  For individuals who wish to leave something behind for their loved ones, Medicaid planning is an attractive option.  With help from elder law attorneys, individuals can strategically give away and shield their assets from consideration as “available resources” when applying for Medicaid.

Fearing abuse of the Medicaid system, federal and state legislatures began to restrict how much Medicaid planning individuals could actually do.  In 2005, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) with the goal of closing loopholes in the Medicaid statute that had allowed for financial planning.  The DRA also provided a safe harbor provision for


11.  See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (explaining Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (“Some people are employing attorneys to help them plan ahead and transfer their assets properly so that they can qualify for Medicaid benefits without losing their life savings. Many techniques exist for people to protect their assets and still receive Medicaid benefits.”) note omitted); Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1 (indicating individuals will “find ways to shelter any assets [to qualify for Medicaid”).

12.  See Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (noting frequent use of assets to become eligible for Medicaid); Milan Markovic, Lawyers and the Welfare State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1945, 1954 (2016) (“Lawyers have nevertheless devised numerous financial impoverishment techniques to allow clients to preserve wealth and qualify for Medicaid.”); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (discussing how individuals employ attorneys to help with Medicaid planning); see also Guide to Long-Term Care Planning: Medicaid Planning, NAT’L CARE PLANNING COUNCIL, http://www.longtermcarelink.net/eldercare/medicaid_planning.htm [https://perma.cc/CU68-V7Z9] (last visited Oct. 18, 2016) (hereinafter Medicaid Planning Guide) (providing guide to Medicaid planning). When applying for Medicaid, individuals must report all available resources in order for their eligibility to be determined.  See Levinson, supra note 7, at 225 (explaining Medicaid application process). Not all assets “count” as being available.  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (listing exempt assets for Medicaid eligibility determination). Assets like a person’s “primary residence [and] personal possessions” do not count in determining Medicaid eligibility.  See id. (reporting which resources do not count for determining eligibility).  For further discussion of the Medicaid application and which assets figure in Medicaid eligibility determinations, see infra notes 34–52 and accompanying text.

13.  See Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (stating Congress acted to “address [ ] Medicaid abuses”); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (detailing efforts by government to decrease use of Medicaid planning); Michelle Higgins, States Crack down on Families That Shed Assets to Get Benefits, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2003, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10461133334984461543 [https://perma.cc/A7C8-C8L8] (“States and counties have begun to crack down on people who purposely make themselves poor so the government will pay for their nursing-home care.”).

14.  See generally Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4; see also Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (discussing purpose and effect of DRA); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (“[The DRA] has a huge impact on Medicaid qualification rules.”).
annuities, shielding qualified annuities from being counted as available resources.15

Recently, in Zahner v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Human Services,16 the Third Circuit examined whether short-term annuities, a specific instrument used in Medicaid planning, qualified for the DRA’s safe harbor provision.17 If so, assets used to purchase short-term annuities would be sheltered from factoring into individuals’ eligibility for Medicaid.18 Holding that short-term annuities can qualify for protection, the Third Circuit’s decision signifies that the DRA did not completely foreclose the “use of short-term annuities in Medicaid planning.”19

This Casebrief argues that the Third Circuit’s Zahner decision is a win for elder law attorneys and their clients, as it solidifies the viability of the


16. 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015).

17. See id. at 499 (stating reason for appeal). An annuity is a financial tool that can be used in Medicaid planning. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292–93 (discussing how annuities are used in Medicaid planning). The Supreme Court has defined annuity as a “contract[] under which the purchaser makes one or more premium payments to the issuer in exchange for a series of payments, which continue either for a fixed period or for the life of the purchaser or a designated beneficiary.” See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 254 (1995) (defining “annuity”); Barnes, supra note 7, at 292 (“An annuity is established by a contract in which the buyer pays a sum of money in exchange for a promise that payments will be made to the buyer on an agreed upon schedule and rate.” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (7th ed. 1999))). For further discussion of how annuities can be used in Medicaid planning, see infra notes 75–91 and accompanying text.

18. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 509 (determining annuities fall under DRA’s safe harbor provision).

use of short-term annuities in Medicaid planning. Part II examines how individuals take part in Medicaid planning, including a discussion of the DRA and the use of annuities in planning. Part III presents the facts of Zahner and reviews the Third Circuit’s analysis. Part IV analyzes the Third Circuit’s decision to approve the use of short-term annuities. Part V advises elder law practitioners on the use of short-term annuities going forward. Part VI concludes by discussing the long-term viability of short-term annuities.

II. FILLING OUT PATIENT HISTORY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID PLANNING, THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT, AND THE USE OF ANNUITIES IN MEDICAID PLANNING

One year in a nursing home will cost a Pennsylvania resident over $100,000. Even for an individual who saved for retirement, a few years in a nursing home could quickly exhaust savings and leave nothing behind for that individual’s family. This is where Medicaid and Medicaid plan-

20. For an analysis of Zahner’s impact on Medicaid planning and its role in solidifying short-term annuities as a viable planning tool, see infra notes 156–95 and accompanying text.

21. For a discussion of Medicaid planning, specifically the Deficit Reduction Act’s impact and the use of annuities in planning, see infra notes 26–91 and accompanying text.

22. For discussion of the facts of Zahner and the Third Circuit’s analysis, see infra notes 92–155 and accompanying text.

23. For an analysis of the Third Circuit’s holding in Zahner, see infra notes 156–90 and accompanying text.

24. For discussion of what Zahner means for practitioners wishing to use short-term annuities in planning, see infra notes 184–90 and accompanying text.

25. For discussion of the future of annuities and Medicaid planning, see infra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.


ning become factors. Medicaid planning helps individuals qualify for Medicaid without completely depleting their assets. Both federal and state governments disfavor Medicaid planning and require elder law practitioners and their clients either to comply with restrictions on transfers or face penalties.

**A. Name and Date of Birth: An Introduction to the Basics of Medicaid and Medicaid Planning**

Established in 1965, Medicaid is the largest provider of health services in the United States. Medicare, while designated as the health care option for the elderly, is less recognized. Disability leads to impoverishment . . . deeply degrad[ing] or even eliminat[ing] the prospects for inheritance by the disabled person’s family.” (footnote omitted); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 223 (theorizing how quickly one can spend $100,000 in savings on nursing home care); Kelly, supra 2 (“F[ew] sticker shocks are as bracing as the price of hiring someone to help with the simplest activities—bathing, toilet use, dressing, eating and moving. Whether recovering from surgery or a stroke or suffering a chronic illness like arthritis, those needing skilled help need deep pockets indeed.”).

28. See Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1–2 (discussing Medicaid eligibility and practice of Medicaid planning); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (defining Medicaid planning); Reif, supra note 10, at 348 (discussing criticism of those who engage in Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227–28 (explaining Medicaid planning); Higgins, supra note 13 (“For years, thousands of middle-class and even affluent retirees—terrified that long-term health-care costs could wipe out their savings—have transferred their assets to relatives in order to qualify for Medicaid, the government health plan for the poor.”). Although there are those who engage in Medicaid planning, it is important to note that it may not be as prevalent as believed. See O’Brien, supra note 8, at 3 (“There is little evidence that large numbers of the elderly are planning their estates for the purpose of gaining easy access to Medicaid in the event they need nursing home care.”). In a 2005 study, Professor Ellen O’Brien found that empirical data did not support the notion that large numbers of elderly Americans transfer assets in order to qualify for Medicaid. See id. at 5 (noting “research studies confirm that Medicaid-induced transfers are not widespread among current or likely nursing home residents”).

29. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (“[A]rranging assets and income for an individual or couple in order to achieve earlier Medicaid eligibility . . . is an important legal service that is identified with the broader field of elder law.”); Bleck et al., supra note 27, at 155 (defining Medicaid planning).

30. See Cori Nichols, The Impact of the DRA on Estate and Long-Term Care Planning, 49-NOV ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 46, 47–48 (2007) (illustrating different aspects of DRA with which individuals must comply when transferring assets); see also Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1 (“Because Medicaid was designed to be a safety net only for the poor, asset transfer practices are thought to distort the intent of the Medicaid program and unnecessarily inflate public spending.”).

tion for older Americans, does not cover the cost of long-term care. Medicaid, however, does cover long-term care.

1. Qualifying for Medicaid in Pennsylvania

Medicaid is jointly run by the federal government and the states. Although states can create their own requirements for Medicaid eligibility, their regulations must comply with federal guidelines. In addition, state Medicaid regulations cannot be more restrictive than federal standards. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services provide states with a State Medicaid Manual to “assist[] states in interpreting the complex labyrinth of statutory and regulatory requirements that govern receipt of Medicare and Medicaid benefits.”

32. See Reif, supra note 10, at 344 (“Medicaid is the only federal government program that pays for long-term nursing home care.”); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 269 (describing Medicare as “a program of health care services for elderly and long-term disabled people”). Although this Casebrief focuses on long-term care in nursing homes, individuals can also receive care in the community, meaning the home, either from health care professionals or family members. See Bleck, et al., supra note 27, at 159–60 (discussing long-term care found in individuals’ homes); see also Williams, Rosen & O’Malley, supra note 2, at 12 (recounting how nursing home resident received care at home prior to stay in nursing home).

33. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 266 (“The basic federal rules of the program require the states to cover institutional care, such as long-term care nursing home services for a restricted group of eligible people.”); see also Stephen A. Moses, The Brave New World of Long-Term Care, 21 Notre Dame J. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 561, 562 (2007) (describing federal government’s involvement in paying for long-term care through Medicaid).

34. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 225 (noting Medicaid’s status as jointly run).


36. See Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (2012)) (stating “states may not create more restrictive requirements”); see also Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2013) (“If the State’s public policy requires it to count as resources certain annuities that federal law excludes from the scope of resources that may be considered in making eligibility determinations, then the State’s methodology is more restrictive than the federal methodology.” (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i), (r)(2)(B)) (2012))).

To qualify for Medicaid, individuals and, if married, their spouses, must meet certain income and resource thresholds. Individuals may be “categorically needy” or “medically needy.” Categorically needy persons are defined as those with incomes low enough to qualify them for government income assistance . . . . while medically needy people are those who would be eligible for Medicaid but for the fact that their income or property exceeds financial guidelines. For the medically needy, health care costs are counted against their excess income.

In Pennsylvania, individuals must meet both “financial and non-financial eligibility requirements.” The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS), the agency responsible for running Pennsylvania’s Medicaid program, asks whether an individual (1) is “a U.S. citizen or a qualified non-citizen” and “a resident of Pennsylvania,” (2) “ha[s] a Social Security number,” and (3) is “medically need[y].”

See Levinson, supra note 7, at 225–28 (discussing Medicaid requirements); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 266 (“[T]he general policy of the United States continues to be: Government funds will not be expended for long-term care costs for those who do not meet poverty eligibility limits.”).

See Barnes, supra note 7, at 270 (establishing two types of need requirements); see also Spero, Asset Protection: Legal Planning, Strategies, and Forms ¶ 14.03 (2d ed. Westlaw 2016) (“Two categories of individuals generally are eligible to receive Medicaid: the categorically needy and the medically needy.”).

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (describing who qualifies for Medicaid because of their financial situations); Barnes, supra note 7, at 270 (footnotes omitted) (explaining who is categorically eligible for Medicaid); see also 1 Joan M. Krauskopf, et al., ELDERLAW ADVOC. AGING § 11.14 (2d ed. Westlaw 2015) (database updated Nov. 2015) (“The medically needy are those individuals whose income exceeds the levels allowed for the cash assistance programs (SSI or AFDC), but is insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical services.”);

See Barnes, supra note 7, at 270 (explaining that eligibility results from “incurring health and long-term care costs”); see also Krauskopf, supra note 40 (discussing how “individuals are allowed to ‘spend-down’ their excess income to the level at which they qualify for Medicaid benefits”).


See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (listing non-financial eligibility requirements). To be considered medically needy, an individual must have a doctor “complete a form telling [DHS] of the medical need.” See id. (detailing medically-needy requirement). The DHS will then review the individual’s need to determine eligibility for long-term care. See id. (describing DHS’s process for determining medical need).
Pennsylvania’s financial eligibility requirements focus on an individual’s income and other resources. Income can be calculated from various sources, such as Social Security or “withdrawals” from an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). An individual’s income cannot exceed “300% of the Federal Benefit Rate,” which is currently $733.00 per month. If a medically-needy individual’s income exceeds the income limit, he or she can still qualify for assistance by deducting the cost of long-term care “to reduce [his or her] monthly income.” Aside from a government-specified monthly personal allowance, all of an individual’s income must go toward paying for nursing home care, with Medicaid picking up the residual cost.

Pennsylvania also considers an individual’s other resources to determine Medicaid eligibility, including “[b]ank accounts[,] [s]tock[,] and [“IRA [ ] accounts.” Individuals with income below 300% of the Federal Benefit Rate cannot have more than $2,000 in resources. For those with income above 300% of the Federal Benefit Rate, the resource limit is $2,400. Additionally, Pennsylvania has special rules for married individuals seeking Medicaid assistance in order to avoid impoverishing the “community spouse”—the spouse not seeking nursing home care and thereby remaining in the community.

44. See id. (listing Pennsylvania’s financial eligibility factors).
45. See id. (listing what DHS considers income for determining Medicaid eligibility).
46. See id. (declaring Pennsylvania’s income limit).
47. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (detailing income requirements for medically needy).
48. See Reif, supra note 10, at 345 (discussing senior citizen’s contribution to nursing home costs).
49. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (listing what Pennsylvania considers resources). Pennsylvania also counts “bonds and mutual funds,” “Keogh accounts,” “non-resident[ial] property,” and the “cash value of life insurance [policies]” that exceed $1,500.
50. See id. An individual’s home does not count as a resource if it is “less than or equal to $525,000.” See id. (stating exclusion of home as resource if valued at $525,000 or less). For a home to be excluded, Pennsylvania also requires that the individual plans “to return to the home or [is] residing in the home,” or that the individual’s “spouse or dependent resides in the home.” See id. Additionally, an individual’s motor vehicle, burial space, and burial funds are also excluded. See id. (listing what is not counted as resource).
51. See id. (stating resource limit).
52. See id. (stating requirements for married persons seeking long-term assistance). In Pennsylvania, there is no limit on community spouses’ income because they are “not required to pay for the institutionalized spouse’s long-term care services.” See id. (reciting income rule for community spouses). Additionally, the state considers the spouse using long-term care and the community spouse’s re-
2. Medicaid Planning

For individuals whose financial situation does not automatically qualify them for Medicaid, becoming eligible requires planning and depleting resources.\(^53\) To become eligible, individuals can take multiple steps.\(^54\) They can spend all of their resources, whether on home improvements or a luxury vehicle.\(^55\) If individuals do not want to spend all of their resources, they can also transfer them away by undertaking Medicaid planning.\(^56\)

Medicaid planning is a skill, which is why individuals often seek the help of attorneys.\(^57\) Although individuals can transfer resources away, through either gifts or financial instruments, the government imposes limits together. See id. (discussing resource limit for married individuals). Pennsylvania also allows the community spouse to keep one-half of the couple’s resources, so long as the amount does not exceed that maximum amount set by the state. See id. (discussing resource limit for married individuals). Pennsylvania allowed community spouses to keep up to $119,200 in resources in 2016. See Long-Term Care Handbook, supra note 42, at ch. 440, app. A (listing Pennsylvania’s allowance for community spouses); see also 2016 SSI and Spousal impoverishment Standards, Medicaid, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/eligibility/downloads/2016-ssi-and-spousal-impoverishment-standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FN9-6MFY] (listing federal spousal impoverishment limits for 2016).

53. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (describing Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (“[S]ome people are employing attorneys to help them plan ahead and transfer their assets properly so that they can qualify for Medicaid benefits without losing their life savings. Many techniques exist for people to protect their assets and still receive Medicaid benefits.” (footnotes omitted)); Waidmann & Liu, supra note 9, at 1 (implying that individuals “find ways to shelter any assets” to qualify for Medicaid).

54. See Higgins, supra note 13 (explaining “[h]ow to [i]mpoverish [y]ourself”); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 283–89 (discussing ways individuals can transfer assets); Reif, supra note 10, at 340–42 (providing examples of how individuals may shed resources).

55. See Higgins, supra note 13 (“[T]he strategy is to spend on assets that generally aren’t counted . . . in determining eligibility. So people buy a new car. They pay down their home mortgage or they remodel their home.”); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 288 (commenting that people will spend money to “acquire or improve an exempt asset”); Reif, supra note 10, at 341 (hypothesizing about senior citizen who purchased luxury vehicle and renovated kitchen to become eligible for Medicaid).

56. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292–93 (describing use of annuities in Medicaid planning); Levinson, supra note 7, at 228 (“While there are many Medicaid planning techniques available, one of the most common asset-protection techniques is purchasing certain types of annuities to convert otherwise countable resources into income.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Higgins, supra note 13, at D2)).

57. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 267 (stating how Medicaid planning is subset of elder law practice); see also Jeffrey Marshall, Three Ways to Protect Your Assets from Nursing Home Costs, MARSHALL, PARKER & WEBER, LLC (July 17, 2013), http://www.paelderlaw.com/three-ways-to-protect-your-assets-from-nursing-home-costs/ [https://perma.cc/4KRP-YWVX] (explaining how elder law attorney can help with Medicaid planning).
its on how much individuals can transfer without facing penalties. In Pennsylvania, the DHS reviews all assets transferred within the look-back period, the sixty months prior to an individual qualifying for Medicaid. If a transaction is found to be less than fair market value (FMV), the DHS will levy a penalty on the individual. To determine the penalty, the DHS divides the asset’s uncompensated value (FMV minus the amount received) by the “average daily [cost] for [long-term] care services.” The DHS then imposes the penalty on an individual’s first day of eligibility and “will not pay for long-term care services [during the penalty period].”

B. Past Treatment: Congress Tries to Limit Medicaid Eligibility with the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005

Congress passed the DRA in 2005. Aimed at closing “loopholes” in the Medicaid statute, the DRA had a significant impact on Medicaid planning. First, the DRA instituted fractional periods of ineligibility for indi

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58. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 284 (discussing ineligibility when transfers are “less than fair market value”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2012) (outlining which transfers of assets affect eligibility and which transfers do not); Marcus, supra note 15, at 24–26 (explaining exceptions to Medicaid’s rules on transfers of assets); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (summarizing Medicaid penalty rules).

59. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (requiring look-back period for asset transfers); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 284–85 (discussing look-back period); Bleck, Isenhour & Miller, supra note 27, at 170 (discussing imposition of penalty as result of transfers made during look-back period); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227–28 (discussing look-back period and penalties created by DRA). As of 2005, a look-back period of sixty months is required. See Levinson, supra note 7, at 228 (noting DRA increased look-back period to five years). Gifts made before the look-back period are not subject to penalty. See Bleck, Isenhour & Miller, supra note 27, at 172 (explaining how gifts made before look-back period are not penalized); Levinson, supra note 7, at 228 (stating penalty period will apply to transfers made within look-back period).

60. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (“If FMV is not received, a period of ineligibility, known as a penalty period, is established.”); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (noting imposition of penalties for transfers of resources “at less than fair market value”).

61. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (reciting calculation of penalty period); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (discussing how penalty is determined).

62. See Long-Term Care Requirements, supra note 42 (announcing imposition of penalty on individual).

63. See generally Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, 120 Stat. 4; see also Moses, supra note 33, at 565 (referencing passage of DRA); Nichols, supra note 30, at 46 (referencing DRA); Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (examining passage of DRA).

64. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 46 (“The DRA aims to reduce government spending by cutting federal funding of the Medicaid program and tighten Medicaid’s long-term care eligibility requirements.”). When President George W. Bush signed the DRA into law, he mentioned how the bill was a reaction to people abusing Medicaid. See Reif, supra note 10, at 347 (“The bill tightens the loopholes that allowed people to game the system by transferring assets to their children so they can qualify for Medicaid benefits.” (quoting President George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at...
individuals who made small transfers of assets. Under the DRA, each small transfer is combined to create a larger, cumulative penalty. It also expanded the look-back period from “three years to five years,” making the timing of asset transfers even more important. Transfers made during the look-back period for less than FMV are assessed for a penalty. In addition, the DRA changed the time at which a penalty period begins, “mak[ing] it harder for a Medicaid applicant to transfer assets and qualify for Medicaid.” Rather than running the penalty clock as soon as a transfer is made, the penalty period begins when an individual, after depleting all of his or her assets first, applies for Medicaid. Therefore, individuals may find themselves unable to pay for care during a penalty period.

Regarding resources, homes remain an exempt asset in determining Medicaid eligibility, but the exemption is not limitless. Individuals with “homes with more than $500,000 . . . in equity” cannot receive Medicaid benefits, but “[s]tates can elect to increase that amount up to $750,000.”

65. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (stating states “must [ ] apply partial months of ineligibility”); Reif, supra note 10, at 357–58 (describing “fractional” penalty periods).

66. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(E)(i)–(iv) (2012); see also Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (explaining how fractional penalty periods are applied); Reif, supra note 10, at 358 (illustrating how penalty periods are combined into single period).

67. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing extension of look-back period under DRA).

68. See id. at 47 (“Medicaid reviews any asset transfers at less than fair market value (divesting assets, giving cash gifts or transferring mortgage titles to family) prior to application for Medicaid benefits in order to determine eligibility.”); see also Reif, supra note 10, at 355 (discussing how penalty period is determined). For discussion of how Pennsylvania uses the look-back period and determines the penalty period, see supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.

69. See Reif, supra note 10, at 352 (citing Jason Frank, The Case for Asset Protection, 205 ELDER L. ADVISORY 1, 3–4 (2008)) (discussing impact of new start date for penalty periods); see also Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing new start date of penalty).

70. See Reif, supra note 10, at 352 (examining change in imposition of penalty period); see also Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (noting when penalty period begins for Medicaid applicants); Carlson, supra note 15, at 1308 (“Formerly, the penalty period began to run when the transfer was made, but the new provisions dictate that the penalty period in most cases will not begin until the individual would otherwise be eligible for Medicaid.” (footnote omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)))

71. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (stating new look-back period “may cause individuals to be in a penalty period without benefits or money to pay for their care”); see also Carlson, supra note 15, at 1311 (noting how individuals who cannot pay for their long-term care “may face eviction”); Medicaid Planning Guide, supra note 12 (discussing how individuals must be wary of gifting assets during look-back period).

72. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing limit on protection of home equity); see also Levinson, supra note 7, at 225 (noting how individual’s house does not count when determining Medicaid eligibility).

73. Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (discussing home equity limit); Transfers of Assets in Medicaid Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 8, 2008).
The DRA also limited the use of annuities in Medicaid planning, allowing only qualified annuities to receive protection under a safe harbor provision.74

C. Reason for Appointment: The Use of Annuities in Medicaid Planning

Although individuals have various options when it comes to planning, annuities are a popular tool used by practitioners and their clients.75 Annuities rose in popularity after Congress “curtailed the use of trusts in Medicaid planning.”76 When individuals purchase annuities, they “pay[ ] a sum of money in exchange for a promise that payments will be made to [them] on an agreed upon schedule and rate.”77

In order for individuals to use annuities in Medicaid planning, they must be DRA-compliant.78 For an annuity to be exempt from counting as

74. See Nichols, supra note 30, at 47 (“Prior to the DRA, individuals were able to 'protect assets' via commercial annuities.”).

75. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292 (asserting “sale[s] of annuities [have] increased” since trusts became harder to use in Medicaid planning); see also Marshall, supra note 57 (illustrating how annuities are used in planning).

76. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 285–86, 292 (citing John M. Broderick, Note, To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Congress Failed to Stiffen Penalties for Medicaid Estate Planning, but Should the Practice Continue?, 6 ELDER L.J. 257, 265 (1998)) (comparing congressional action against use of trusts and rise in popularity of annuities).

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “trust” as the following:

1. The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title; a property interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary). For a trust to be valid, it must involve specific property, reflect the settlor’s intent, and be created for a lawful purpose. . . . 2. A fiduciary relationship regarding property and charging the person with title to the property with equitable duties to deal with it for another’s benefit; the confidence placed in a trustee, together with the trustee’s obligations toward the property and the beneficiary. A trust arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1740 (10th ed. 2014). Congress first restricted the use of trusts with respect to Medicaid planning in 1985 with the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). See Barnes, supra note 7, at 285 (summarizing changes in trust policy). Previously, assets held in a trust did not impact an individual’s Medicaid eligibility. See id. (considering use of trusts in Medicaid planning prior to 1985). In 1993, Congress further restricted the use of trusts by exempting only “irrevocable trust[s] from which the applicant cannot benefit” from counting as an available resource for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(A)-(B) (2012)) (reporting 1993 changes to using trusts in Medicaid planning).

77. See Barnes, supra note 7, at 292 (defining annuity). See supra note 19 for the Supreme Court’s definition of annuities.

78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (outlining requirements for annuities); see also Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 501 (3d
a resource, it must: (1) be “irrevocable and non-assignable,” (2) be “actuarially sound,” (3) name the state as the “remainder beneficiary,” and (4) be dispersed in equal payments. Transmittal 64 of the State Medicaid Manual provides guidance regarding annuities, noting that annuities are considered actuarially sound when “the expected return on the annuity is commensurate with a reasonable estimate for the life expectancy of the beneficiary.” Annuities are not protected under the DRA’s safe harbor provision if they are “trust-like.”

Annuities can be particularly “useful for married couples” seeking Medicaid assistance for the spouse using long-term care services. Because the community spouse’s income has no effect on the other spouse’s eligibility, the community spouse can purchase an annuity using the couple’s “excess funds.” The annuity payments then count as the community spouse’s income.

Some individuals may also use annuities to take part in “half-a-loaf planning.” In half-a-loaf planning, individuals gift half of their assets and “us[e] the remaining one-half to purchase a DRA compliant annuity.” Individuals can then use the annuity payments “to pay for . . . nursing home care” during the penalty period caused by the gifts.

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79. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (outlining requirements for annuities); see also Zahner, 802 F.3d at 501 (3d Cir. 2015) (acknowledging DRA requirements).


81. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 510 (noting how Transmittal 64 disallows trust-like “annuit[ies] from protection in the [DRA’s] safe harbor”); see also Transmittal 64, supra note 80, at § 3258.9B (“[T]he term ‘trust’ includes an annuity to the extent and in such manner as the Secretary specifies.”).

82. See Marshall & Parker, supra note 80, at 10–11 (discussing planning options for married couples).

83. See Marshall, supra note 57 (presenting how community spouse can purchase annuity); see also Marshall & Parker, supra note 80, at 10 (“The purchase of a DRA annuity by a community spouse does [not] trigger a transfer penalty.”).

84. See Rothkoff, supra note 85 (describing half-a-loaf planning technique).

85. See Jerold E. Rothkoff, The Zahner Decision—Court Approves Use of Medicaid Compliant Annuities, ROTHKOFF L. GRP. (Oct. 18, 2015), http://rothkofflaw.com/the-zahner-decision-court-approves-use-of-medicaid-compliant-annuities/ (discussing “use of annuities” to engage in half-a-loaf planning); see also Barnes, supra note 7, at 286–87 (explaining half-a-loaf planning).

86. See id. (explaining annuities are used in half-a-loaf planning).
Like Medicaid planning in general, states, including Pennsylvania, disfavor the use of annuities to prevent assets from factoring into an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid.88 The Third Circuit, along with other circuits, has found that annuities are protected and thus exempt under the DRA so long as they meet the applicable statutory requirements.89 Further, although the Third Circuit has acknowledged loopholes in the Medicaid statute, the court has refused to bar the use of annuities in Medicaid planning, stating that Congress would have to make any changes to the law.90 The Third Circuit’s position concerning whether to close Medicaid loopholes judicially is similar to that of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the only other circuit courts to consider the issue, which have also stated that Congress is responsible for closing loopholes regarding annuities in the Medicaid statute.91

III. THE EXAMINATION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT ACCEPTS THE USE OF SHORT-TERM ANNUITIES IN ZAHNER

In Zahner, the Third Circuit examined the use of annuities to prevent assets from factoring into Medicaid eligibility determinations.92 The court

88. See Marshall & Parker, supra note 80, at 10 (explaining DHS’s plan “to treat community spouse annuities . . . as a resource”); Rothkoff, supra note 85 (noting DHS argued that half-a-loaf annuities were not DRA-compliant in Zahner).
89. See Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2015) (stating “annuities are not barred from the safe harbor”); Weatherbee ex rel. Vecchio v. Richman, 351 F. App’x 786, 788 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s decision that state “improperly denied eligibility for Medicaid benefits” after factoring community spouse’s annuity into eligibility decision); James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We simply cannot allow a denial of eligibility if there is no statutory justification for that denial.”); see also Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that community spouse’s “annuity [is] an uncountable stream of unearned income” and cannot be considered as resource in determining institutionalized spouse’s Medicaid eligibility); Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 696 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We therefore hold that the payment stream from a non-assignable annuity is not a resource for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility.”); Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 932–34 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating Congress has not closed loophole allowing for asset protection using annuities that may provide income to spouse).
90. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 509 (“Although we are sympathetic to the concerns the dissent and DHS outline, Congress must resolve them.”); James, 547 F.3d at 219 (“[W]e do not create rules based on our own sense of the ultimate purpose of the law being interpreted, but rather seek to implement the purpose of Congress as expressed in the text of the statutes it passed.” (citing Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2011))).
91. See Geston, 729 F.3d at 1086 (“We see no warrant, however, to implement any of these measures through judicial decision under the current law and believe that the suggestions must be directed to the policymaking branches.”); Morris, 685 F.3d at 928 (“Although we understand the district court’s concerns regarding the exploitation of what can only be described as a loophole in the Medicaid statutes, we conclude that the problem can only be addressed by Congress.”).
92. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499 (noting district court’s holding and subsequent appeal).
determined that Pennsylvania could not bar the use of annuities and established that the short length of an annuity’s term does not matter, approving the use of short-term annuities in Medicaid planning.93

A. Taking Height and Weight: Background Facts and Procedure of Zahner

Plaintiffs Donna Claypoole and Connie Sanner both took part in Medicaid planning to help pay for their long-term care.94 In 2010, Mrs. Claypoole entered a nursing home while her husband “remained in their [shared] home.”95 Over a two-year span, the Claypooles made various gifts to their family members, which “total[ed] over $100,000” and “result[ed] a period of Medicaid ineligibility” for Mrs. Claypoole.96

The Claypooles purchased two annuities, as well.97 Mrs. Claypoole bought an annuity from ELCO Mutual Life & Annuity (ELCO) for “$84,874.08 in return for monthly payments of $6,100.22 for [fourteen] months.”98 She purchased the annuity “to pay for [her] nursing home care” while she was ineligible for Medicaid due to her previous asset transfers.99 Her husband also purchased an annuity “for which he paid MetLife $45,000.00 in return for monthly payments of $760.20 for five years.”100 Further, “both [annuity] contracts contained anti-assignment provisions.”101

93. For further discussion on the Third Circuit’s analysis in Zahner, see infra notes 120–55 and accompanying text.


95. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499 (discussing Claypoole’s entry into nursing home). Because Mrs. Claypoole’s husband remained in the home they shared, he is known as a community spouse. See id. (acknowledging Mr. Claypoole’s status as community spouse).

96. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499 (explaining effect of gifts on Mrs. Claypoole’s eligibility for Medicaid).

97. See id. (identifying Claypooles’ purchase of annuities).

98. See id. (providing details of Mrs. Claypoole’s annuity).

99. See id. (explaining Mrs. Claypoole’s reasoning for purchasing ELCO annuity and planned use of monthly payments).

100. See id. (detailing Mr. Claypoole’s annuity).

101. See id. (discussing specific provisions in annuities contracts).
Like Ms. Claypoole, Connie Sanner also “entered a nursing home.” She purchased an annuity from ELCO for $53,700.00 shortly after entering the nursing home. Ms. Sanner then received monthly payments of $4,499.17 for a year. Like Ms. Claypoole, Ms. Sanner purchased an annuity to pay for her care during “a period of Medicaid ineligibility.” Because Ms. Sanner had previously made “large financial gift[s]” to her family, she was penalized and deemed ineligible for a certain time period.

In calculating both Mrs. Claypoole’s and Ms. Sanner’s eligibility for Medicaid, the DHS viewed the various annuities as available resources for each of them. Because DHS included the annuities, both plaintiffs received new penalty periods, which extended their period of Medicaid ineligibility. Mrs. Claypoole and Ms. Sanner filed suit against DHS, “arguing that DHS acted illegally by counting the amount of their respective annuities as an available resource for purpose of Medicaid eligibility.”

The district court consolidated Mrs. Claypoole’s and Ms. Sanner’s suits against DHS. Both parties subsequently moved for summary judgment. “[T]he [d]istrict [c]ourt partially granted each party’s motion” for summary judgment. The trial court determined that “the plaintiffs’ . . . annuities were sham transactions intended only to shield resources from the calculation of Medicaid eligibility.”

102. See id. at 500 (reporting Ms. Sanner was admitted to nursing home in 2011). Unlike Mrs. Claypool, Ms. Sanner did not have a community spouse. See id. (noting Ms. Sanner “entered a nursing home . . . without a community spouse”).

103. See id. (listing Ms. Sanner’s purchase of annuity from ELCO).

104. See id. (examining details of Ms. Sanner’s annuity).

105. See id. (stating Ms. Sanner’s purpose in purchasing annuity from ELCO).


107. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 499–500 (discussing how DHS categorized plaintiffs’ annuities in determining plaintiffs’ Medicaid eligibility).

108. See id. (recounting how plaintiffs were penalized for purchase of annuities).

109. See id. at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted) (detailing actions brought against DHS pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).

110. See id. (noting consolidation of plaintiffs’ suits).

111. See id. (noting “cross motions for summary judgment”).

112. See id. (summarizing district court’s rulings on cross motions).

considered the annuities to be “trust-like,” giving DHS the ability to count them as available resources.\textsuperscript{114}

The district court also discussed Pennsylvania’s assignment statute.\textsuperscript{115} Pennsylvania law made “all annuities assignable,” allowing DHS to count annuities as available resources, even those held by community spouses.\textsuperscript{116} Because certain annuities are exempt under the DRA, the district court found that the Pennsylvania statute “was preempted by the federal Medicaid law.”\textsuperscript{117} Therefore, the district court “held that the nonassignability clause in [Mr. Claypoole’s] annuity” prevented DHS from counting his annuity as an available resource, as it conformed to the DRA’s safe harbor provision.\textsuperscript{118} The parties cross-appealed to the Third Circuit.\textsuperscript{119}

B. \textit{Diagnosis and Treatment: Short-Term Annuities Are a Viable Planning Tool in the Third Circuit}

The \textit{Zahner} court determined that short-term annuities could qualify for the DRA’s safe harbor provision, making them a feasible planning option for those looking to qualify for Medicaid.\textsuperscript{120} First, the Third Circuit evaluated whether the plaintiffs’ annuities should be counted as resources in determining the plaintiffs’ Medicaid eligibility.\textsuperscript{121} Second, the Third Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs’ annuities could be considered trust-like.\textsuperscript{122} Finally, the Third Circuit undertook a discussion of whether federal law preempted the Pennsylvania law that made all annuities assignable.\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[114] See \textit{id.} (citing \textit{Zahner I}, 2014 WL 198526, at *14) (discussing district court’s view of plaintiffs’ annuities as "trust-like").
\item[115] See \textit{id.} (providing district court’s determination that federal Medicaid law preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute ); see also generally 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b) (West 2016) (making all annuities assignable).
\item[116] See \textit{id.} at 511 (discussing Pennsylvania’s assignment statute).
\item[117] See \textit{id.} at 500 (acknowledging conflict between federal law and Pennsylvania law).
\item[118] See \textit{id.} (explaining district court’s holding regarding Mr. Claypoole’s annuity).
\item[119] See \textit{id.} (noting appeals filed by parties).
\item[120] See \textit{id.} at 509 (holding that short-term annuities can be protected under DRA’s safe harbor provision).
\item[121] See \textit{id.} at 500–09 (examining whether plaintiffs’ annuities are available resources).
\item[122] See \textit{id.} at 510–11 (analyzing whether plaintiffs’ annuities are trust-like).
\item[123] See \textit{id.} at 511–15 (considering whether federal law preempts Pennsylvania law).
\end{footnotes}
1. **Annuities Do Not Always Count As Resources in Determining Medicaid Eligibility**

The Third Circuit first analyzed whether the annuities fell under the DRA’s safe harbor provision.\(^{124}\) For the plaintiffs’ annuities to be protected, the court acknowledged “the annuit[ies] [had to] (1) name the State as the remainder beneficiary, (2) be irrevocable and nonassignable, (3) be actuarially sound, and (4) provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of the annuity, with no deferral and no balloon payments.”\(^{125}\)

First, DHS argued that the plaintiffs’ contracts could not be considered annuities because they cost more than what the plaintiffs’ eventually received, asserting the contracts were “not investment products” and, therefore, were not annuities.\(^{126}\) The Third Circuit disagreed.\(^{127}\) Relying on the Supreme Court’s definition of “annuity,” the Third Circuit stated “[i]t is not disputed that each of the annuities here is a transfer of a sum of money in exchange for a series of payments, continuing for a fixed period.”\(^{128}\) Further, the court found that annuities are not required to “provide a certain rate of return.”\(^{129}\)

The Third Circuit then tackled DHS’s argument that the “relatively short terms of [the plaintiffs’] contracts disqualif[ied] them from being annuities” within the scope of the DRA.\(^{130}\) DHS argued for the Third Circuit to require all annuities to have a term of at least two years in order to fall under the safe harbor provision.\(^{131}\) DHS feared that any annuity

\(^{124}\) See id. at 501 (“We must determine if the disputed annuities here are within this safe harbor and therefore sheltered from inclusion in the plaintiffs’ assets.”).

\(^{125}\) Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (2012)) (referencing requirements for DRA’s safe harbor provision).

\(^{126}\) See id. at 503 (describing DHS’s argument regarding whether plaintiffs’ annuities can be considered investments); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant at 34–38, Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015) (No 14-1328), 2014 WL 2921383 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee] (arguing plaintiffs’ annuities should not be considered investments).

\(^{127}\) See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503 (“We see no reason why the relatively short-term of these instruments necessarily precludes viewing them as investments . . . .”).


\(^{129}\) See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503 (explaining how neither Supreme Court decisions nor statutes require specific return rates for annuities).

\(^{130}\) See id. at 502 (internal quotation marks omitted) (referencing DHS’s argument); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 21, 34–38 (arguing plaintiffs’ annuities are not “bona fide annuities”).

\(^{131}\) See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503 (“DHS next asks us to disallow any annuity that does not have a term of two years or more because Transmittal 64 uses the plural of ‘years’ in its definition of an annuity.”); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36 (discussing use of “‘term of years’ (plural)”).
could qualify for the safe harbor, even those lasting only “two seconds,” if
the court did not establish a “floor” on the length of annuities.132 Al-
though the court acknowledged that DHS correctly stated that Transmittal
64 used “term of years,” the court called it a “term of art.”133 Rather than
requiring multiple years, the court concluded the term simply requires the
annuity’s term to be “for some definite period of time.”134 Further, the
Third Circuit felt that imposing a minimum term length would be “an
improper judicial amendment.”135 Because the plaintiffs’ annuities were
of a definite length, the court found that they qualified as terms of
years.136

The Third Circuit also dealt with DHS’s argument that the plaintiffs’
annuities were not “actuarially sound.”137 An annuity is actuarially sound
“if the expected return on the annuity is commensurate with a reasonable
estimate of the life expectancy of the beneficiary.”138 The Third Circuit
stated that annuities met the definition if their terms were for “less than
the annuitant’s reasonable life expectancy.”139 The annuities at issue were

132. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 503–04 (citing Brief of Appellee, supra note 126,
at 36) (discussing DHS’s concerns regarding lack of floor for length of annuities);
see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36 (“If there is no floor on the payback
period timeframe then the company could write contracts of two days, two hours,
or even two seconds, and call that contract an ‘annuity.’”). In Pennsylvania, the
Commissioner of Insurance must approve all annuities before they can be sold in
the state, leading the court to believe it would be hard for annuities of a very short
length (i.e. “lasting only for hours or a few days”) to “win approval” and to reject
the DHS’s argument that failing to impose a minimum would lead to “sham trans-
actions.” See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 504 (citing Herman v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
108 F.2d 678, 682 (3d Cir. 1939)) (explaining why it would be difficult for very
short annuities to exist).

133. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 505 (“We agree that a term of years is merely a
term of art[,]” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 18)).

134. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brief of Appellee,
supra note 126, at 18) (discussing what “term of years” means).

135. See id. at 506 (asserting court would not impose “some minimum ratio
between duration of an annuity and life expectancy”).

136. See id. at 505 (“The contracts here, lasting [twelve] and [fourteen]
months, fall within the legal meaning of a ‘term of years’ as each contract permits
multiple, periodic payments, over time, though not indefinitely, and not for a pe-
riod that is coterminous with the annuitant’s actual life.” (citing NationsBank of
The Third Circuit also noted that “if Congress intended to limit the safe harbor to
annuities lasting two or more years, it would have been the height of simplicity to
say so.” See id.

137. See id. (discussing DHS’s argument regarding “actuarial sound[ness]” of
plaintiffs’ annuities); see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 40 (arguing plaint-
iffs’ annuities were not actuarially sound because length of annuities “ha[d] no
relationship to the plaintiffs’ life expectancies”).

138. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 505 (quoting Transmittal 64, supra note 80, at
§ 3258.9(B)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining “actuarially sound”).

139. See id. at 508 (discussing “actuarially sound” annuities).
deemed actuarially sound because their terms were less than the plaintiffs’ life expectancies.\textsuperscript{140}

Further, the Third Circuit held that an “annuitant’s motive” in purchasing an annuity is not “determinative” of whether the instrument is protected.\textsuperscript{141} Although the court understood that this application of the Medicaid rules might allow people to take advantage of loopholes, the court opined that Congress must make efforts to close them.\textsuperscript{142}

2. \textit{Annuities Are Not Always Trusts}

The Third Circuit next analyzed whether the plaintiffs’ annuities were “trust-like.”\textsuperscript{143} If annuities are trust-like, they cannot fall under the DRA’s safe harbor.\textsuperscript{144} The Third Circuit determined that “Transmittal 64 [did] not present any support for treating [the] annuities as trust-like devices.”\textsuperscript{145} Rather, Transmittal 64 simply requires that an annuity be actuarially sound, and the court determined that the plaintiffs’ annuities met this requirement.\textsuperscript{146} Further, the Third Circuit held that the annuities were not trusts, rejecting the argument that ELCO owed the plaintiffs any fiduciary duties.\textsuperscript{147}

3. \textit{Federal Law Preempts Pennsylvania’s Assignment Statute}

Finally, the Third Circuit examined whether the DRA preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute.\textsuperscript{148} First, the Third Circuit noted that Pennsylvania law made all annuities assignable “regardless of who purchase[d] them, either the Medicaid applicant . . . or the community

\textsuperscript{140}. \textit{See id. at 507 (“[Mrs. Claypoole’s] [fourteen month] annuity was, in fact, far more commensurate with her actual life expectancy than the actuarial predictions . . . .”). Judge Rendell dissented from the court’s decision. \textit{See id. at 515 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (stating she would affirm district court’s ruling). Unlike the court, Judge Rendell found the plaintiffs’ annuities “were not actuarially sound” because their terms did not “coincide[ ] with [nor] were [they] commensurate with [the plaintiffs’] life expectancies.” \textit{Id. at 516. (explaining why plaintiffs’ annuities were not actuarially sound). Judge Rendell also disagreed with the court’s definition of actuarially sound, stating that “[i]f Congress simply wanted to require the annuity terms to be shorter than life expectancy, it could have expressly stated that.” \textit{See id.}}

\textsuperscript{141}. \textit{See id. at 509 (citing James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2008)).}

\textsuperscript{142}. \textit{See id. (rejecting judicial attempt to close loopholes).}

\textsuperscript{143}. \textit{See id. at 510 (questioning whether plaintiffs’ annuities could be considered “trust-like”).}

\textsuperscript{144}. \textit{See id. (discussing Transmittal 64’s restriction on trust-like annuities).}

\textsuperscript{145}. \textit{See id. at 510–11 (discussing Transmittal 64 and relevance to DHS’s argument that plaintiffs’ annuities were trust-like).}

\textsuperscript{146}. \textit{See id. at 511 (determining plaintiffs’ annuities satisfied requirements under Transmittal 64).}

\textsuperscript{147}. \textit{See id. (“Moreover, these annuities cannot be equated with trusts because there is nothing akin to a fiduciary relationship between the annuitants and ELCO.” (citing Transmittal 64, supra note 80, at §§ 3258.9(B), 3259.1(A)(1)).}

\textsuperscript{148}. \textit{See id. at 511–15 (questioning whether federal law preempted Pennsylvania law).}
spouse.” Because annuities must be non-assignable to fall under the DRA’s safe harbor provision, Pennsylvania’s assignability statute automatically barred all annuities from protection.

The Third Circuit stated that Pennsylvania, as a participant in the Medicaid program, must follow federal guidelines and may not enact “more restrictive requirements,” as compared to the federal government’s guidelines. Regarding annuities, the Third Circuit found Congress’s policy unambiguous: “annuities with certain characteristics, including nonassignability clauses, are not assets to be counted as resources for their Medicaid eligibility.” According to the court, by enacting the assignability statute, Pennsylvania impermissibly limited this federal protection.

Additionally, the Third Circuit found nothing to support DHS’s position that Congress gave states the option to choose to exclude annuities as resources. Therefore, the Third Circuit upheld the portion of the district court’s holding stating that federal law preempted Pennsylvania’s assignation statute.

149. See id. at 511 (citing 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b) (West 2016)) (discussing Pennsylvania assignability statute). The statute reads as follows:

Any provision in any annuity or other contract for the payment of money owned by an applicant or recipient of medical assistance, or owned by a spouse or other legally responsible relative of such applicant or recipient, that has the effect of limiting the right of such owner to sell, transfer or assign the right to receive payments thereunder or restricts the right to change the designated beneficiary thereunder is void.

62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b).

150. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 511 (“Thus, if § 441.6(b) controls, no Medicaid applicant or his or her spouse can exclude an annuity from being considered a resource for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because Pennsylvania makes all annuities assignable.” (citing 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b))).

151. See id. at 512, 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (2012)) (discussing requirements of states in Medicaid program).

152. See id. at 514 (explaining Congressional intent behind 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(1)–(G)).

153. See id. at 515 (declaring Pennsylvania’s statute to be invalid). In Zahner, the Third Circuit employed the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning from Geston to show when a state’s law is more restrictive than the federal government’s: “[i]f the State’s public policy requires it to count as resources certain annuities that federal law excludes from the scope of resources that may be considered in making eligibility determinations, then the State’s methodology is more restrictive than the federal methodology.” See id. at 514 (alteration in original) (quoting Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

154. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 514 (“The Medicaid Act cannot reasonably be read to support DHS’s contention that Congress intended to make protection of annuities optional.” (citing United States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050, 1087 (3d Cir. 1996)))). DHS argued federal law “[did] not create an impermeable safe harbor.” See id. at 512 (citing Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 31–33). Instead, Pennsylvania had “the option of allowing annuities to be excluded” as available resources, which it did “not exercise.” See id. (providing DHS’s position).

155. See id. at 515 (“Pennsylvania may not create more restrictive requirements.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III)).
IV. ASKING FOR A CONSULT: ANALYZING THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S APPROVAL OF SHORT-TERM ANNUITIES

Zahner is a win for elder law practitioners and their clients in the Third Circuit. By holding that federal law preempts Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit solidified DRA-compliant annuities as viable Medicaid planning tools in Pennsylvania. Further, the Third Circuit broke new ground by determining annuities cannot be barred from the DRA’s safe harbor because of the shortness of their terms.

A. The Third Circuit Observes Federal Preemption in Holding Pennsylvania Cannot Bar Use of Annuities

In Zahner, the Third Circuit preserved federal law’s place in the administration of Medicaid. The Third Circuit accurately recognized that states “must . . . comply with federal [standards],” such as the DRA, in creating rules for their respective programs. As the court correctly determined, states are not free to disregard federal law, even if it conflicts with their desire to toughen eligibility requirements for Medicaid.

Although Congress intended to close loopholes in the Medicaid statute by enacting the DRA, it nonetheless created a safe harbor provision for annuities. As the Third Circuit correctly noted, Pennsylvania’s assign-
ment statute directly conflicted with the DRA’s safe harbor provision. Application of Pennsylvania’s assignability statute would have barred otherwise qualified annuities from receiving protection, regardless of whether the annuities included anti-assignment clauses. Consequently, using annuities in Medicaid planning would have been futile in Pennsylvania because DHS would have had the ability to count them as available resources.

The Zahner court properly safeguarded the use of annuities by holding that the DRA’s safe harbor preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute. In creating the DRA’s safe harbor provision, Congress intended for certain annuities to be protected, such as those with anti-assignment provisions. Pennsylvania’s statute frustrated congressional intent.

The Zahner court’s decision to recognize preemption falls in line with Third Circuit precedent, which also found that federal law preempted Pennsylvania’s assignment statute. Although other circuits have not dealt specifically with preemption, they have generally recognized statutory-compliant annuities as protected.

163. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 513 (“Congress did not intend that all annuities be considered [available resources].”).

164. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 511 (noting Pennsylvania statute made “all annuities” assignable). The Third Circuit noted that “no Medicaid applicant [could] exclude an annuity from being considered [an available] resource” because of the Pennsylvania assignability statute. See id. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii) (requiring annuities to be assignable), with 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b) (West 2016) (rendering all annuities assignable).

165. See 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b) (requiring all annuities be available as resources regardless of who holds them).

166. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) (holding “Pennsylvania may not create more restrictive requirements”); see also Zumpano, supra note 19 (“[T]he state must acknowledge the assignability of an annuity in accordance with the intent of Congress.”).

167. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 513 (“Congress clearly intended for some annuities to be considered [available] resources for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility. However, it is equally clear that Congress did not intend that all annuities be considered.”).

168. See id. at 513–15 (discussing congressional intent regarding annuities and how Pennsylvania law cannot be valid).


court properly solidified DRA-compliant annuities as viable planning tools.  

B. The Third Circuit Breaks New Ground by Approving Short-Term Annuities

However, the Zahner decision raises several concerns. 172 The court’s holding seems to conflict with the goal of restricting Medicaid eligibility. 173 Allowing short-term annuities expands the type of financial tools available to individuals interested in Medicaid planning. 174 Individuals may try to push the limit on acceptable term lengths, going even shorter than the annuities at issue in Zahner, because no minimum term is re-

171. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 514 (stating “Pennsylvania cannot enact legislation that changes federal law (or binding judicial interpretation of federal law) with respect to annuities” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803))); see also Zumpano, supra note 19 (“Pennsylvania DHS argued that this law caused all annuities purchased by Medicaid applicants in Pennsylvania to fail the safe harbor test. The District Court and Third Circuit held that this is untrue.”).

172. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36 (“If there is no floor on the payback period timeframe then the company could write contracts of two days, two hours, or even two seconds, and call that contract an ‘annuity.’”); Moses, supra note 33, at 565 (stating DRA is intended to limit Medicaid eligibility); Nichols, supra note 30, at 46 (noting Congressional intent to close loopholes with DRA); LATSHA DAVIS & MCKENNA, P.C., Third Circuit Greenlights Short-Term Medicaid Annuities (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.ldylaw.com/blog/2016/01/third-circuit-greenlights-short-term-medicaid-annuities.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZQ3D-Y26S] (“Congress intended the passage of the DRA to curb certain Medicaid planning strategies such as ‘half-a-loaf’ gifting . . . . Zahner explicitly allows short-term annuities to be used in this manner.”); see also Court Approves Use of Short-Term Annuities for Medicaid Planning, ELDER L ANSWERS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.elderlawanswers.com/court-approves-use-of-short-term-annuities-for-medicaid-planning—15317 [hereinafter Court Approves] (“Although the Third Circuit is only one of 13 federal appeals courts, the court noted its opinion is ‘precedential’ federal law for Medicaid-compliant annuities.”). For further discussion of case law involving the use of annuities in Medicaid planning, see supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.

173. See Higgins, supra note 13 (finding governments are working on restricting Medicaid eligibility); Levinson, supra note 7, at 227 (discussing efforts to limit use of Medicaid planning).

quired. The decision also permits half-a-loaf planning, which Congress sought to proscribe with the DRA.

Additionally, the court’s reliance on plain readings of the DRA and Transmittal 64 unquestionably allows individuals to take advantage of a loophole and shield their assets. Expanding the use of a Medicaid loophole directly undercut the federal and state governments’ goal of narrowing Medicaid eligibility. Nevertheless, neither the DRA nor Transmittal 64 imposes a minimum term length for annuities, leaving the Third Circuit entirely free to reject DHS’s request for a judicially-imposed minimum term length, rightly allowing people to shelter assets in a safe harbor Congress created. Although potentially expanding eligibility seems to conflict directly with Congress’s goal, the Third Circuit justifiably worked within the framework Congress itself provided to find the use of short-term annuities viable, following Eighth and Tenth Circuit prece-

175. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 36–38 (“ELCO is already writing contracts as short as two months.”); cf. Markovic, supra note 12, at 1854 (discussing how some Medicaid planning strategies violate ethical boundaries and are harmful to those who actually need help in paying for long-term care).

176. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 126, at 38 (discussing Congress’s addition of “half-a-loaf gifting prohibition” through DRA); LATSHA DAVIS & McKENNA, P.C., supra note 172 (commenting that Zahner allows for “half-a-loaf” planning); see also Rothkoff, supra note 85 (“Since 2005, [DHS’s] position was that the annuities used in half-a-loaf gifting were not DRA-compliant.”). For an explanation of “half-a-loaf planning,” see supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.

177. See Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 509 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing Transmittal 64 and use of annuities to “shelter assets”); see also id. at 516 (Rendell, J., dissenting) (“If Congress simply wanted to require the annuity terms to be shorter than life expectancy, it could have expressly stated that. Instead, Congress said that annuities must be actuarially sound . . . meaning that annuities must be commensurate with or coincide with life expectancy.”). In her dissent, Judge Rendell argued that there was no basis for the court to determine “that an annuity with a term that is less than the annuitant’s life expectancy passes the actuarial soundness test.” See id. Judge Rendell opined that this definition would allow for annuities that “[have] no investment purpose and operate[,] only to shield assets.” See id.

178. See id. at 509 (noting DHS’s concerns in allowing short-term annuities). In addition to undercutting the federal and state governments’ goal of narrowing Medicaid eligibility, expanding eligibility also raises questions about the ethics of Medicaid planning. See Takacs & McGuffey, supra note 174, at 132–35 (outlining common objections to Medicaid planning, including ideas that “Medicaid planning will lead to a deprivation of health care from the truly needy, those who are really poor, not those who have artificially impoverished themselves in order to qualify for Medicaid,” and that “Medicaid planning may be legal, but it is against public policy”); see also Patricia F. Sitchler, Cutting Edge vs. over the Edge: Ethics and Malpractice Issues for Medicaid Planning, 2 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 175, 183–86 (2009) (describing why some individuals see Medicaid planning as unethical).

179. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 506 (“[W]e conclude that any attempt to fashion a rule that would create some minimum ratio between duration of an annuity and life expectancy would constitute an improper judicial amendment of the applicable statutes and regulations.”); see also supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (discussing DRA’s safe harbor provision for annuities).
dents by choosing to leave the responsibility of closing any loopholes to Congress.  

The Third Circuit’s opinion also alleviates DHS’s fear that individuals will be able to protect assets through annuities lasting for very short durations. Pennsylvania’s Commissioner of Insurance must approve all annuities, making it “doub[ful] that an annuity lasting two seconds, two hours, or [even] two days would win approval.” Further, the Third Circuit’s refined definition of “actuarially sound” still achieves a key objective of federal and state governments—by requiring an annuity’s term to be less than an individual’s life expectancy, it allows states to recover a portion of the money spent on long-term care.  

V. DOSAGE INSTRUCTIONS: GUIDANCE FOR ELDER LAW PRACTITIONERS USING SHORT-TERM ANNUITIES

Following Zahner, Third Circuit elder law practitioners have a clearer picture of the requirements for DRA-compliant annuities. To serve their clients best, elder law attorneys must ensure that annuities comply with all four elements of the DRA’s safe harbor provision. Although three of the four elements were easily established before Zahner, the Third Circuit’s opinion was consistent with the holdings of other circuit courts. See Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1086 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We see no warrant . . . to implement any of these measures through judicial decision . . . and believe that the suggestions must be directed to the policymaking branches.”); Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Although we understand the district court’s concerns regarding the exploitation of what can only be described as a loophole in the Medicaid statutes, we conclude that the problem can only be addressed by Congress.”).  

180. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 509 (“Although we are sympathetic to the concerns the dissent and DHS outline, Congress must resolve them.”). The Zahner holding was consistent with the holdings of other circuit courts. See Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1086 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We see no warrant . . . to implement any of these measures through judicial decision . . . and believe that the suggestions must be directed to the policymaking branches.”); Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Although we understand the district court’s concerns regarding the exploitation of what can only be described as a loophole in the Medicaid statutes, we conclude that the problem can only be addressed by Congress.”).  

181. See Zahner, 802 F.3d at 504 (noting Commissioner of Insurance must approve annuities before they can be purchased in Pennsylvania).  

182. See id. (citing Herman v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 108 F.2d 678, 682 (3d Cir. 1939)) (rejecting DHS’s argument that sham transactions would “gain[ ] a foothold in the marketplace”).  

183. See id. at 508 (“[I]t discourages the purchase of annuities for terms that are so long that assets would pass to heirs and not be available to reimburse the State for the Medicaid assistance the annuitant received while alive.” (citing Brief for National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Inc., and Its Pennsylvania and New Jersey Chapters as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4, 30–31, Zahner v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1328))).  

184. See Zumpano, supra note 19 (“The Third Circuit’s decision sets a precedent[ that] is important for [e]lder [l]aw practitioners, not only in Pennsylvania, but potentially in our field at large.”); see also Zahner Follow-Up: Medicaid Annuities in Practice, Krause Agency, Inc. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://thekrauseagency.com/2015/10/01/zahner-followup2/ [https://perma.cc/DYG7-RMVB] (discussing Zahner decision and noting “[t]he clarity with which each issue was addressed makes it a valuable model for other states, and other courts, as they consider similar situations”).  

Circuit provided clarity regarding the meaning of “actuarially sound,” delivering essential guidance to those seeking to use annuities in planning.\(^{186}\) When determining the length of an annuity, elder law attorneys must ensure the annuity’s term does not “exceed [the purchaser’s] reasonable life expectancy.”\(^{187}\)

Further, elder law attorneys within the Third Circuit should not feel uneasy about whether their clients’ annuities will be deemed “too short” to qualify for protection under the DRA’s safe harbor.\(^{188}\) Because Congress has not set a minimum term length for annuities, attorneys whose clients need annuities only for as little as twelve or fourteen months, like the plaintiffs in \textit{Zahner}, should feel confident in their ability to find protection in the DRA’s safe harbor.\(^{189}\) Additionally, for practitioners with less affluent clients, short-term annuities are a great planning option because they require a lower, “upfront cost.”\(^{190}\)

\section*{VI. Prognosis: The Future of Short-Term Annuities in Medicaid Planning}

After \textit{Zahner}, elder law practitioners are free to use short-term annuities while guiding their clients through the Medicaid planning process.\(^{191}\)

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^{186}\) See \textit{Zahner}, 802 F.3d at 508 (discussing “actuarially sound” element); Zumpano, \textit{supra} note 19 (“The Third Circuit also offers a more clear definition of what a period of time is for purchases of Medicaid Qualified Annuities, allowing purchases for less than a term of years if the time period of payout is in proportion to the annuitant’s life expectancy.”).
\item \(^{187}\) See \textit{Zahner}, 802 F.3d at 508 (determining appropriate length of annuity to be considered “actuarially sound”).
\item \(^{188}\) See \textit{id.} at 505 (“Congress did not require any minimum term for an annuity to qualify under the safe harbor.” (citing 42 U.S.C. \S\S\ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(iii))).
\item \(^{189}\) See \textit{Zahner}, 802 F.3d at 503 (“[W]e see no reason why the relatively short-term of these instruments necessarily precludes viewing them as investments, and Congress has not foreclosed that possibility.”); \textit{see also} Linda Ershow-Levenberg, \textit{Third Circuit Rejects State’s Claim That Short-Term Annuities Can’t Meet Medicaid Requirements}, FINK ROSNER ERSHOW-LEVENBERG LLC (Sept. 2, 2015), http://blog.finkrosnerershowskevenberg.com/elder-law-news/third-circuit-rejects-states-claim-that-short-term-annuities-cant-meet-medicaid-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/WF6D-P66Y] (discussing how Third Circuit found “no lawful basis to impose any additional criteria concerning the length of [an] annuity contract”); \textit{Zahner Follow-Up, supra} note 184 (stating elder law practitioners should feel “comfortable in recommending [short-term annuities]”); Zumpano, \textit{supra} note 19 (stating how \textit{Zahner} is “solid legal precedent” regarding short-term annuities).
\item \(^{190}\) See \textit{Zahner}, 802 F.3d at 508 n.14 (describing benefits of short-term annuities).
The Third Circuit will not bar the use of qualified short-term annuities in Medicaid planning, instead leaving any change in policy to Congress.\(^{192}\) Therefore, until Congress acts, short-term annuities are a viable planning tool in the Third Circuit for the foreseeable future.\(^{193}\) For people who wish to leave assets to loved ones, *Zahner* presents good news.\(^{194}\) Rather than causing people to exhaust their savings on long-term care, *Zahner* provides individuals greater ability to protect resources through Medicaid planning.\(^{195}\)

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\(^{192}\) See *Zahner*, 802 F.3d at 509 ("[T]he definition of protected annuities is one best left to the policymakers in the legislative branch.").

\(^{193}\) See id. (stating Congress must make any changes regarding annuities); see also LATSHA DAVIS & MCKENNA, P.C., *supra* note 172 (stating "*Zahner* explicitly allows short-term annuities to be used" in half-a-loaf planning).

\(^{194}\) See Rothkoff, *supra* note 85 ("Persons requiring nursing facility care will have an additional planning technique available to them that potentially can preserve a large portion of their assets to their family."); Scales, *supra* note 191 (discussing how *Zahner* decision will benefit single applicants and married applicants when applying for Medicaid).

\(^{195}\) See Rothkoff, *supra* note 85 (noting how *Zahner* allows for people to protect assets for their families); see also More on Short Term Annuities, *supra* note 15 ("[*Zahner*] helps to clarify for the elder law client what financial products will not disqualify a Medicaid applicant from applying for benefits.").