Keeping FLSA's Promises: The Third Circuit Extends the Law's Reach to More Joint Employers, Successors, and Supervisors in Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network

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KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES: THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXTENDS THE LAW’S REACH TO MORE JOINT EMPLOYERS, SUCCESSORS, AND SUPERVISORS IN THOMPSON v. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK

JOHN M. D’ELIA*

“Sometimes I’d work 60, even 90 days in a row . . . . They never paid overtime.”1

- Guadalupe Rangel
Mira Loma, California

I. INTRODUCTION

Guadalupe Rangel spent most of his waking hours unloading products for the largest private employer in the world—Walmart.2 Mr. Rangel worked up to eleven hours per day and often seven days per week for months on end.3 The family that owns Walmart boasts a cumulative wealth greater than that of 42% of American households combined.4 Mr. Rangel, on the other hand, alleged he never received overtime pay after putting in seventy-hour work weeks unloading Walmart products.5 At the warehouse where Mr. Rangel worked, Walmart dictated the work done, determined workers’ schedules, set accuracy and productivity standards, oversaw training programs, supervised workers, maintained staffing reports, and created budgets for labor costs.6 However, on paper, Walmart was not Mr. Rangel’s employer.7 A company called Schneider

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2. See id. (describing Mr. Rangel’s account of his work schedule and responsibilities).

3. See id.


5. See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (noting Mr. Rangel’s allegations of “wage theft” brought on by working up to eleven hours per day and sometimes seventy hours per week).


7. See id. (describing direct employment of workers by Schneider Logistics while
Logistics, Inc. directly employed Mr. Rangel, and its warehouse’s only client was Walmart.8 Generally, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) entitles employees to receive “time and a half” pay (one and one-half the regular rate of pay) for any hours they work in excess of forty per week, and employees can sue employers who fail to compensate them for their overtime work.9 In the Ninth Circuit, where Mr. Rangel’s case unfolded, courts apply a test outlined in Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency10 to determine whether a company is a “joint employer” of workers by virtue of its control over employment matters.11 This “Bonnette” test empowers aggrieved workers to sue companies other than their immediate employer for wage and hour violations when such companies have significant influence, even indirect influence, over workers.12 Imposing such liability empowers workers to vindicate their workplace rights in reality; often companies without a formal employment relationship with employees exert tremendous power over working conditions and precipitate FLSA violations.13 When Mr. Rangel and other plaintiffs sued Schneider and Walmart, the companies settled with the plaintiffs for $21 million dollars, which covered 1,800 Schneider warehouse workers.14

Walmart exerts considerable authority over workers’ terms and conditions of employment).

8. See id. at 9–10.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012) (requiring employers to compensate employees at one and one-half rate of pay for any hours worked in excess of forty per week).
10. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
11. See id. at 1470 (articulating Ninth Circuit’s test for determining whether company is joint employer of workers liable for FLSA violations, emphasizing hiring and firing authority, supervisory authority, authority to control schedules and employment, power to set rate and method of payment, and maintenance of employment records), disapproved by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
12. See id. at 1469–70 (stressing breadth of FLSA’s definition of “employer”—which includes individuals acting indirectly in interest of employers—and quoting regulations by Department of Labor, which enforces FLSA, that provide hypothetical examples of indirect employment relationships that meet FLSA’s liberal definition, including company that controls another company that immediately employs workers).
13. See, e.g., Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding hospital was joint employer of nurse despite that nurse was directly employed and paid by third party agencies because “(1) [the nurse] worked on [the hospital’s] premises using [its] equipment; (2) no referral agency shifted its employees as a unit from one hospital to another, but instead each assigned health care workers, including [the nurse], to the same facility whenever possible to ensure continuity of care; (3) [the nurse] performed work integral to [the hospital’s] operation; (4) [the nurse’s] work responsibilities at [the hospital] remained the same regardless of which agency referred her for a particular assignment; (5) [the hospital] effectively controlled the on-site terms and conditions of [the nurse’s] employment; and (6) [the nurse] worked exclusively for [the hospital]”), abrogation recognized by Adorno v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The hospital in Barfield had the power to hire and fire nurses referred by agencies, although “ultimate” authority rested with the agencies. See id. at 144. Similarly, the court observed that the hospital exercised some influence over pay, because it effectively determined employees’ hours and capped their pay when it set the hourly rates referral agencies would receive. See id. at 144–45.
In *In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation*\(^5\) (*Enterprise*), the Third Circuit adopted aspects of the *Bonnette* test to ensure plaintiffs like Mr. Rangel may hold indirect employers accountable for wage theft.\(^6\) As a result, companies exercising both direct and indirect control over workers may be deemed joint employers liable to workers for violations of the FLSA.\(^7\)

In 2014, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its *Enterprise* test in *Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network*.\(^8\) Additionally, the *Thompson* court adopted new FLSA tests with respect to successor and supervisor liability, which will similarly expand the universe of entities responsible for FLSA violations.\(^9\) *Thompson* extended the FLSA’s reach in the Third Circuit to cover more employers, a positive development that comports with the text and underlying policies of the FLSA.\(^10\) *Thompson* also has important implications in light of the unprecedented growth in subcontracting and other multi-layered

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\(^{15}\) 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012).

\(^{16}\) See generally id. at 469–70 (articulating test for joint employment and acknowledging that its test is “melding” of *Bonnette* test from Ninth Circuit and test developed by Western District of Pennsylvania in *Lewis v. Vollmer*, No. 05–1632, 2008 WL 355607 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008), which found joint employment only under more limited circumstances involving only direct control over employment matters in context of Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims).

\(^{17}\) See id. at 469 (articulating a standard to determine whether a company is joint employer under FLSA, considering “1) the alleged employer’s authority to hire and fire the relevant employees; 2) the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work rules and assignments and to set the employees’ conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) the alleged employer’s involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline; and 4) the alleged employer’s actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes”). The *Enterprise* court stressed that this list is not exhaustive and other indicia of significant control may also be considered. See id.

\(^{18}\) 748 F.3d 142, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying *Enterprise* test to mortgage underwriter’s claim that two real estate companies were joint employers and thus jointly and severally liable for FLSA violations she suffered).

\(^{19}\) See id. at 152–54 (adopting broad federal common law standard for successor liability in context of FLSA claims and extending prior test for supervisor liability under Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to FLSA claims). For a further discussion on both of these standards, see infra notes 108–30 and accompanying text.

\(^{20}\) Compare, e.g., *Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc.*, 431 A.2d 811, 815 (1981) (delineating traditional, narrow New Jersey state law standard for successor liability), with *Thompson*, 748 F.3d at 150–52 (delineating and adopting federal common law standard for successor liability in context of FLSA claims, which extends liability to more successors than state law standard to further important “employment-related policies”). See also 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (declaring far-reaching United States industrial policy to eliminate burdens and obstructions to commerce posed by substandard terms and conditions of employment); id. § 203(d) (defining “employer” to include employers exerting indirect control over employees).
employment relationships because it will subject more of these relationships to FLSA’s protections.21

Part II of this Casebrief provides background information on the substantive provisions and policy purposes of the FLSA.22 Additionally, Part II traces the development of case law in the Third Circuit regarding the FLSA’s application to corporations and individuals outside the immediate employment relationship.23 Part III explores the facts, procedural history, and holding of Thompson.24 Part IV concludes that Thompson appropriately extended the FLSA’s reach to subject more employers to liability for wage theft consistent with the statutory text and underlying policies.25 Part V provides advice to practitioners representing employees and employers in the Third Circuit after Thompson.26 Part VI states a brief conclusion.27

II. BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the FLSA in the wake of the Great Depression to improve labor standards by establishing minimum wage and overtime pay requirements.28 These policies were intended to spur macroeconomic change and ensure workers fair pay.29 Courts have interpreted the FLSA to apply to an evolving range of “employers” since its enactment, including joint employers, successors, and individual supervisors.30


22. For a background discussion of the FLSA, see infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text.

23. For a discussion of Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law on the FLSA’s definition of employer, see infra notes 43–83 and accompanying text.

24. For a detailed explanation of the Third Circuit’s decision in Thompson, see infra notes 84–130 and accompanying text.

25. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s holding in Thompson, see infra notes 131–78 and accompanying text.

26. For practical advice for practitioners, see infra notes 182–206 and accompanying text.

27. For a conclusion of this Casebrief, see infra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.

28. For a discussion of the history of FLSA, see infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text.

29. For a discussion of FLSA’s industrial policy aims, see infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.

30. For a discussion of judicial interpretation of FLSA to apply to various employer entities, see infra notes 43–83 and accompanying text.
A. FLSA: Groundbreaking Labor Protections and Far-Reaching Industrial Policy

The FLSA is a landmark piece of New Deal legislation enacted by Congress in 1938.\textsuperscript{31} For the first time, the law established a federal minimum wage and mandated overtime compensation.\textsuperscript{32} The FLSA’s overtime provisions require employers to pay covered employees “time and a half” for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week.\textsuperscript{33} The FLSA provides a private cause of action to employees who suffer a statutory violation.\textsuperscript{34} Employees can recover unpaid compensation in addition to an equivalent amount in liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.\textsuperscript{35}

The FLSA not only reflected the New Deal Congress’s determination to protect workers from “sweatshop” conditions, but also represented groundbreaking industrial policy calculated to bring about macroeconomic changes.\textsuperscript{36} Congress saw the minimum wage as a means of eliminating unfair business competition rooted in substandard wages.\textsuperscript{37} In Congress’s view, that


\textsuperscript{32} See id. §§ 206–212 (establishing minimum wage, maximum hours, and abolishing child labor). Currently, the minimum wage rate required by FLSA is $7.25 per hour. See id. § 206(a) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages . . . not less than . . . $7.25 an hour . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{33} See id. § 207(a)(1) (“[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”).

\textsuperscript{34} See id. § 216 (“Any employer who violates the provisions of [the minimum wage or overtime provisions] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”).

\textsuperscript{35} See id. (providing courts shall “in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action”).


\textsuperscript{37} See 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (calling Congress to pass legislation “insuring to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work”). President Roosevelt’s message to Congress “served as the inspiration” for the enactment of the FLSA. See Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36 n.8 (1987) (emphasizing importance of presidential message); see also 29 U.S.C. § 202 (declaring it to be U.S. policy to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers[,]” which “constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce[,]” and has the effect of “burdening and obstructing commerce”).
sort of competition harmed more efficient firms that derived their profits from innovation and superior products or services by permitting inefficient firms to survive by eroding workers’ wages. Additionally, Congress sought to stimulate growth and support markets for the products of industry by driving up workers’ wages, and thus their purchasing power as consumers.

To complement the FLSA’s minimum wage policy, Congress enacted the overtime compensation requirement for two purposes. Congress sought both to protect workers from exploitative “overwork” and to reduce unemployment. By making “overwork” costly for employers, Congress hoped to spread work hours across more employees and thus increase the employment rate.

38. See Amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Educ. & Labor on S. 1349, 79th Cong. 847 (1945) (testimony of Chester Bowles, Adm’t, Office of Price Admin.) (describing Congress’s rationale for establishing minimum wage: “[T]he Congress decided that it is against the public interest for business to operate on the sweat of exploited workers. Any employer so inefficient that he could stay in business only by paying sweatshop wages—like the employer who could stay in business only by operating an unsafe plant—was told that he did not belong in business.”); see also Marc Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS. 151, 157 (1990) (contending minimum wage promotes “macroeconomic productivity” by “interfering” with low-wage labor markets that “disguise inefficiency, creating large profit margins that are due not to efficient production but to extreme exploitation”). Professor Linder further contends that this results in “forc[ing] out of business” inefficient, “low-productivity” firms that fail to become efficient or “modernize.” See id. According to Professor Linder, the minimum wage may also be conceptualized as a corrective for a “market failure.” See id. at 151 (internal quotations omitted). Firms employing workers at substandard wage rates had at least partially shifted the “minimum social cost of maintaining a worker” onto workers themselves or the public at large. See id.; see also 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (“Enlightened business is learning that competition ought not to cause bad social consequences, which inevitably react upon the profits of business itself.”). The FLSA forces firms to “internalize” these costs. Linder, supra, at 151.

39. See 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging Congress to “take further steps to reduce the lag in the purchasing power of industrial workers and to strengthen and stabilize the markets for the farmers’ products”); see also 82 CONG. REC. 11 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (calling on Congress to pass legislation “to maintain wage income and the purchasing power of the Nation against recessive factors in the general industrial situation” including “[t]he exploitation of child labor and the undercutting of wages and the stretching of the hours of the poorest-paid workers in periods of business recession[,]” which “have a serious [detrimental] effect on buying power”).

40. See 81 CONG. REC. 4983–84 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging Congress to reduce excessive work hours in industry, which President Roosevelt hoped would spread employment).

41. See id. at 4984 (criticizing practice of “stretching workers’ hours” and “overwork” and stating “[r]easonable and flexible use of the long-established right of government to set and to change working hours can, I hope, decrease unemployment in those groups in which unemployment today principally exists’’); see also 82 CONG. REC. 11 (1937) (statement of Congress to “protect workers unable to protect themselves from . . . excessively long hours”).

42. See Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Misset, 316 U.S. 572, 577–78 (1942) (“By this [overtime compensation] requirement, although overtime was not flatly prohibited, financial pressure was applied to spread employment to avoid the extra wage and workers were assured additional pay to compensate them for the burden of a workweek beyond the hours fixed in the act. In a period of widespread unemployment and small profits, the economy inherent in
B.  FLSA’s Evolving Reach: Third Circuit and Supreme Court Precedents
Cast a Wide Net in Defining “Employer”

In service of its broad policy agenda, the FLSA expansively defines
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee . . . .”43 This definition of “striking
breadth” looks to the “economic reality” of the employment relationship rather
than “technical concepts.”44 Accordingly, the definition encompasses work
relationships outside the traditional, formalistic conception of the employer-
employee relationship.45 Corporate officers, supervisors, and businesses that
directly or indirectly control workers may also fall within the definition,
sometimes simultaneously.46 For example, a company may hire a
subcontractor to provide labor without hiring any of the subcontractor’s

avoiding extra pay was expected to have an appreciable effect in the distribution of available
work. Reduction of hours was a part of the plan from the beginning.”), superseded by statute
holding on propositions that “economic reality” rather than “technical concepts” is to be the
test of employment”); Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir. 2012) (characterizing Supreme
Court precedent on FLSA as recognizing definition of employer of “striking breadth” (quoting
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its application to many persons
and working relationships, which prior to [the FLSA], were not deemed to fall within an
employer-employee category.”). Similarly, the FLSA defines “employ” and “employee”
expressively. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), (e)(4)(A), (g) (providing “[t]he term ‘employee’
means any individual employed by an employer[,]” and “[e]mploy includes to suffer or
permit to work”). “Employ” in FLSA means only to “suffer or permit to work.” See id. A
FLSA “employee” is “any individual employed by an employer.” See id. As the Supreme
Court has observed, it would be difficult to imagine more inclusive definitions of “employ”
and “employee.” See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945) (“A
broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees within the stated categories would be
difficult to frame. The use of the words ‘each’ and ‘any’ to modify ‘employee,’ which in turn
is defined to include ‘any’ employed individual, leaves no doubt as to the Congressional
intention to include all employees within the scope of the [FLSA] unless specifically
excluded.”). Indeed, the Court acknowledged FLSA gave “employer” the “broadest definition
that has ever been included in any one act.” See id. at 363 n.3. So long as a person works for
another, he or she is an employee, regardless of whether or not the employer actively hired or
instructed them; “suffer or permit to work” is all the FLSA requires. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
All employees, no matter how they work or receive payment, are covered unless specifically
excluded. See Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 363.
46. See, e.g., Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding
corporate officers to be employers personally liable for FLSA violations); Bonnette v. Cal.
Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding local public agencies
to be joint employers of homecare workers they provided to eligible recipients by virtue of agencies’
“considerable control over the structure and conditions of employment,” their
determining tasks and “number of hours” of each chore worker, and their supervision of chore
workers in event of dispute with the recipients), disapproved by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
workers, signing their paychecks, or fixing their wages and benefits. However, the client company may be deemed a joint employer if it sets work schedules, influences pay rates, or monitors workers’ productivity. In the case of Mr. Rangel presented in Part I, for instance, Walmart arguably did each of these. When determining employer status, courts must always remain cognizant of the long-established rule that FLSA is to be “liberally construed.” To serve its broad policy agenda, the FLSA also imposes liability upon successor firms for their predecessors’ violations in some circumstances.

1. Joint Employers: When Two Bosses Call the Shots

Because the FLSA’s conception of employment reaches beyond immediate, formal employment relationships, it is possible for two or more entities to be deemed “joint employers” of workers. This is an important determination because, in addition to violations they commit themselves, joint employers are also jointly and severally liable for the FLSA violations of other joint employers.

In 2012, the Third Circuit articulated its standard for joint employment under FLSA in Enterprise. The Enterprise court blended the Ninth Circuit’s

47. See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 642–44 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding grower was joint employer of farm workers hired by staffing firm when grower set harvest schedules, inspected work performed, communicated satisfaction with work, and increased rates to subcontractor for explicit purpose of increasing workers’ pay during a “first picking,” but did not actually hire workers, pay them, or directly supervise them daily, with court stressing such indicia of direct control are not essential and that indirect control may suffice to establish joint employment).

48. See id.

49. See supra notes 2–27 and accompanying text.

50. See Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e adhere to the firmly-established guidon that the FLSA must be liberally construed to effectuate Congress’ remedial intent.”), abrogated on other grounds by Reich v. Bay, Inc., 23 F.3d 110 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955) (recognizing that long history of Supreme Court precedents have given FLSA “liberal construction” guided by “practical considerations, not by technical conceptions”).

51. See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2013).

52. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014) ("Under the FLSA, multiple persons or entities can be responsible for a single employee’s wages as ‘joint employers’ in certain situations. One such scenario occurs where both employers ‘exert significant control’ over the employee, ‘by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.’” (citations omitted)).

53. See id. (explaining liability that arises after a court finds entity to be joint employer of workers within FLSA’s definition of employer).

54. See Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012). In Enterprise, the court examined a case involving assistant managers for Enterprise Holdings’s subsidiaries. See generally id. The managers asserted Enterprise Holdings was a joint employer along with the subsidiaries. See id. at 464–65. The Enterprise court looked to the Third Circuit’s NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn., Inc. (Browning-Ferris), 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982), standard as its analysis’s “starting point.” See id. at 468. In 1982, the Third Circuit’s
Bonnette test with the more restrictive test from *Lewis v. Vollmer* adopted by the Western District of Pennsylvania. The *Lewis* test would have effectively required direct control of employment matters because its factors failed to leave room for indirect avenues of control as contemplated by the FLSA. Consequently, the Third Circuit refused to adopt *Lewis* wholesale, finding it too narrow for the FLSA.

To better conform *Lewis* to the FLSA, the Third Circuit adopted aspects of the Bonnette test into its new standard. The result was a blended test, considering the alleged employer’s:

landmark decision in *Browning-Ferris* established a test for joint employment under the NLRA. See *Browning-Ferris*, 691 F.2d at 1122–23. The *Browning-Ferris* standard still guides the National Labor Relations Board’s standard on joint employment relationships under the NLRA nationwide. See *Browning-Ferris* Indus. of California, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“Today, we restate the Board’s joint-employer standard to reaffirm the standard articulated by the Third Circuit in [the] *Browning-Ferris* decision. . . . In determining whether a putative joint employer meets this standard, the initial inquiry is whether there is a common-law employment relationship between the employees and the alleged employer.”). According to the Third Circuit in *Browning-Ferris*, two or more entities are joint employers when they “share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.” *Browning-Ferris*, 691 F.2d at 1119, 1123 (finding joint employment of drivers by waste processing facility (BFI) and truck brokers after consideration of following facts: drivers wore BFI logo on clothing; brokers and BFI insured trailers; BFI determined drivers’ start times; BFI approved drivers before hire; BFI directed drivers to perform certain tasks in certain spots; and BFI employee effectively terminated certain drivers). The Third Circuit in *Enterprise* noted the *Browning-Ferris* standard is consistent with the standard articulated by the Department of Labor (which enforces FLSA) regulations, which find joint employment “[w]here the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another employer.” See *Enterprise*, 683 F.3d at 468 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

55. See *Lewis*, 683 F.3d at 470 (“Therefore, we hold that the test for ‘joint employer’ under the FLSA as is as we have fashioned it, a melding of the modified *Lewis* test and the Bonnette test, consistent with those considerations of the real world where such additional economic concerns are prominent. We will refer to this test as the *Enterprise* test . . . .”). The *Lewis* test from the Western District considers the following factors when determining joint employer status: “1) authority to hire and fire employees, promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, and hours; 2) day-to-day supervision of employees, including employee discipline; and 3) control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like.” *Lewis*, 2008 WL 355607, at *4 (quoting *Cella v. Villanova Univ.*, No. CIV.A 01–7181, 2003 WL 329147, at *9* (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003), aff’d 113 Fed. App’x 454 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

57. See *Enterprise*, 683 F.3d at 469 (“A simple application of the *Lewis* test would only find joint employment where an employer had direct control over the employee, but the FLSA designates those entities with sufficient indirect control as well. We therefore conclude that while the factors outlined today in *Lewis* are instructive they cannot, without amplification, serve as the test for determining joint employment under the FLSA.”).

58. See id.

59. See id.
1) authority to hire and fire the relevant employees; 2) authority to promulgate work rules and assignments and to set the employees’ conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline; and 4) actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.60

The court stressed this list is not exhaustive and courts may consider other indicia of control.61

The Enterprise test’s relative breadth is illustrated by its consideration of any “indicia of ‘significant control’” to show joint employment, and mere “involvement” in supervision and discipline as opposed to actual supervisory power.62 “Significance,” however, injects an important limitation: while indirect or direct control may suffice, such control must be significant.63 For example, a parent company’s nonbinding advice to subsidiaries about how to operate under its brand is something analogous to the suggestions of a “third party consultant” and insufficient to show joint employment in the Third Circuit.64 In the final analysis, a joint employment determination “must be based on a consideration of the total employment situation and the economic realities of the work relationship.”65

2. Successors: FLSA Liability as a Hot Potato

Generally, under most states’ laws, successor corporations are “legally distinct” from their predecessors.66 Successors only assume the debts or

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60. See id. at 469.

61. See id. at 469–70 (stressing Enterprise test is not to be “blindly applied,” and that “other indicia of significant control” may suffice to establish joint employment “when incorporated with the individual factors we have set forth,” and in view of “economic realities of the work relationship” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

62. See id. at 469 (articulating non-exhaustive factors considered in Third Circuit’s Enterprise test).

63. See id. at 468 (“We conclude that where two or more employers exert significant control over the same employees—[whether] from the evidence it can be shown that they share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment—they constitute joint employers under the FLSA.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

64. See id. at 471 (concluding Enterprise Holdings lacked sufficient authority to be deemed a joint employer of its subsidiaries’ workers and comparing parent company’s control to “third-party consultant”).

65. See id. at 469 (quoting Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding Enterprise Holding not a joint employer). The Ninth Circuit found that Enterprise Holdings exercised “no control, let alone significant control.” See id. at 471.

66. Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (articulating general rule that successor corporations are completely distinct from predecessors and delineating factors which could justify exception rendering successors liable for debts of predecessors under New Jersey law). In Wilson, a corporate defendant that bought a predecessor’s assets, assumed its contractual and property liabilities, and maintained its
liabilities of predecessor entities when (1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agreed to assume debts or liabilities, (2) the transaction is tantamount to a merger of the successor and predecessor, (3) the successor is a “mere continuation” of the predecessor, (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape liabilities, or (5) there was inadequate consideration for the sale or transfer.67

In recent decades, however, federal courts have developed a broader standard for successor liability, specifically within the context of employment claims.68 The federal standard holds more successor entities liable for predecessor violations than state common law rules in order to further federal labor policies.69 Under the federal standard, courts may find successors liable considering merely “(1) continuity in operations and work force of the successor and predecessor employers; (2) notice to the successor-employer of its predecessor’s legal obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide adequate relief directly.”70

The Supreme Court first applied the federal standard to claims under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NRLA).71 The NRLA seeks to promote labor peace by guaranteeing workers full freedom of association and the right to organize into unions and by imposing upon employers a duty to bargain collectively with those unions.72 In personnel was deemed a “continuation” of the predecessor, and thus liable for predecessor tortious conduct in allegedly producing a defective product. See generally id.

67. See id. Under New Jersey law, a “mere continuation” is established by the following factors: “continuity of ownership; continuity of management; continuity of personnel; continuity of physical location, assets and general business operations; and cessation of the prior business shortly after the new entity is formed,” and “the extent to which the successor intended to incorporate [the predecessor] into its system with as much the same structure and operation as possible,” thus determining “whether the purchaser holds itself out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller.” See Bowen Eng’g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F. Supp. 467, 487–88 (D.N.J. 1992) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 1994). The court stressed this standard does not require that all factors are present—only some. See id.

68. See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 150 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing “federal common law standard for successor liability that has slowly gained traction in the field of labor and employment disputes over the course of almost fifty years”).

69. See id. at 150–51 (noting federal standard “presents a lower bar to relief than most state jurisprudence,” in order to “impos[e] liability upon successors beyond the confines of the common law rule when necessary to protect important employment-related policies” (alteration in original) (quoting Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir.2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).


72. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (finding “the denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce” and declaring it U.S. policy to eliminate these problems by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
the view of the Court, employees expect that NLRA violations, which disrupt their associational rights, will be remedied regardless of whether a predecessor or successor is in charge. Further, such remedies may usually be achieved “at minimal cost” to successor employers. The Court noted that employees and their unions typically are not involved in corporate negotiations to sell a business and therefore may be greatly “disadvantaged.” After weighing companies’ interest in being able to restructure their businesses with employees’ interest in “some protection . . . from a sudden change in the employment relationship,” the Court decided to apply the federal standard to NLRA claims.

The Third Circuit later extended the federal standard to claims under Title VII and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), noting the policy agendas underlying those statutes are similarly broad and justify application of the standard. Finally, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have extended the federal standard to the FLSA claims as the “logical extension of existing case law.”

organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”); id. § 157 (providing “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”); id. § 158(a)(5) (providing “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees”).

73. See Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 184 (finding “[t]o the extent that the employees’ legitimate expectation is that the unfair labor practices will be remedied, a successor’s failure to do so may result in labor unrest as the employees engage in collective activity to force remedial action[,]” and noting successors may benefit from predecessors’ NLRA violations if employees identify labor policies of successor with those of predecessor and refrain from protected activities out of fear).

74. See Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177 (citing Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 168) (discussing protection for employees’ associational rights and promotion of labor peace are important goals imposing only minimal costs on successors and noting costs associated with liability for NLRA violations can be taken into account during corporate purchase negotiations and may affect purchase price or be covered by indemnity clause).

75. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 549.

76. See id.

77. See Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying federal common law standard for successor liability to ERISA claims finding that policies underlying ERISA, protecting pension plan participants and their beneficiaries, “are no less important, and no less compel the imposition of successor liability than do the policies animating the NLRA, Title VII, or the other statutes to which the doctrine has been extended” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177–79 (applying federal common law standard for successor liability to employment discrimination claims under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, noting similarities between Title VII and NLRA in that both emphasize protecting and “providing relief for the victims of prohibited practices . . . sufficient . . . to warrant imposing liability on a corporate successor for Title VII violations of the predecessor company” (quoting EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

78. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 151 (3d Cir. 2014). See generally Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 765–67 (7th Cir. 2013); Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
3. **Supervisors: When the Wage Thief is a Person**

Individuals are *personally* liable to workers for FLSA violations when they commit the violations while “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 79 In *Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation & Parole*80, the Third Circuit articulated a standard for individual liability under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), noting that statute’s close similarity to the FLSA.81 The court held “an individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises ‘supervisory authority’ over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation” while acting in the employer’s interest.82 Sufficient “supervisory authority” exists under this standard when a supervisor “independently exercise[s] control over the work situation.”83

### III. **Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network: The Third Circuit Reaffirms Enterprise and Adopts New Tests on Successor and Supervisor Liability**

In *Thompson*, the Third Circuit significantly expanded the FLSA’s reach to encompass more employment relationships. The court considered a claim by Patricia Thompson, an employee of one “defunct” business and its successor.84 Ms. Thompson sued for alleged overtime violations and sought to hold both entities liable and two co-owners personally liable as supervisors.85 Vacating the lower court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claims, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its test for joint employment established in *Enterprise* and adopted new tests with respect to successors’ and supervisors’ liability for FLSA violations.86

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79. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(a), (d) (2012) (defining “person” as “an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons” and defining “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee”).

80. 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012).

81. See id. at 417 (articulating standard for individual liability for FMLA violations).

82. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417 (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987)) (discussing individual liability under FMLA). The *Haybarger* court found a supervisor at a public agency may be liable for allegedly disciplining and discriminating against an employee for exercising protected FMLA rights. See id. at 419.

83. See id. at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).


85. See id. at 153–54 (detailing allegations against individual supervisors).

86. See generally id. (applying *Enterprise* factors to alleged joint employment relationship in *Thompson*, adopting the federal common law standard for successor liability, and adopting *Haybarger* standard for supervisor liability).
A. Accountability Through a Maze: Thompson’s Factual Background

Security Atlantic Mortgage Company (SA), a “nationwide direct mortgage lender,” hired Patricia Thompson as a mortgage underwriter in June of 2009.87 Soon after being hired, SA required Thompson to attend a training session led by an employee of Real Estate Mortgage Network (REMN).88 The REMN employee represented that SA and REMN were “sister compan[ies].”89

In February 2010, Thompson’s superiors instructed her and other employees to “fill out new job applications to work for REMN.”90 Thompson complied and then REMN, not SA, began issuing her paychecks.91 SA went out of business, and the defendants characterized it as “defunct.”92 “Virtually no change” occurred in Thompson’s work environment despite her transfer to REMN.93 She and other employees continued to do “the same work, at the same desks, at the same location.”94 Her “pay rate, work email address, and direct supervisors” did not change.95 No employees were discharged, but some “continued to receive paychecks from [SA].”96

Thompson alleged that between being hired by SA in June 2009 and leaving REMN on August 5, 2010, both employers permitted her “to regularly work more than eight hours per day and more than forty hours per week without overtime compensation” in violation of the FLSA.97 Thompson also sought to recover against Samuel Lamparello, SA’s co-owner and President, and Noel Chapman, its co-owner and Executive Vice President.98 According to Thompson, Lamparello and Chapman “made decisions concerning [both firms’] day-to-day operations, hiring, firing, promotions, personnel matters, work schedules, pay policies, and compensation,” including the authority to direct lower-level supervisors on personnel issues.99 In June 2010, Thompson asked Chapman about overtime, and he replied that he “did not pay overtime to underwriters.”100 The following month, Chapman emailed all employees thanking them for “long hours, late nights and even weekends” working for the

87. See id. at 145.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 146.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. Thompson further alleged that her employers “uniformly misrepresented” to her and other employees “that they were exempt, salaried employees and, therefore, ineligible to receive overtime pay.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See id.
99. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“When a work or personnel issue arose at [SA] or REMN that Thompson’s immediate supervisor could not address alone, the supervisor would consult with, among others, Chapman or Lamparello.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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company.101 “In 2011, both Chapman and Lamparello became officers of REMN.”102 On August 5, 2011, Thompson quit her job at REMN.103

Thompson sued SA, REMN, Lamparello, and Chapman, seeking “to hold REMN liable for SA[’]s own statutory violations under theories of joint [employment] liability and successor liability.”104 Thompson further sought to hold Lamparello and Chapman “personally, jointly, and severally liable” as employers “by virtue of their [management] positions” within both firms.105 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed Thompson’s complaint without prejudice.106 Thompson appealed the district court’s holding to the Third Circuit.107

B. Widening the Net: Thompson Holdings on Joint Employers, Successors, and Supervisors

The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claims.108 First, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claim based on primary employer liability.109 The defendants argued that the lower court’s ruling should be sustained because Thompson “improperly group[ed] all defendants—individual and corporate—together and fail[ed] to differentiate between them . . . .”110 The Third Circuit disagreed, finding it sufficient that “[t]he pleadings here put the corporate defendants on fair notice that the alleged violations began during Thompson’s employment” with SA and continued through her time at REMN.111

Second, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s joint employment claim.112 The court recited the factors of the Enterprise test and

101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 146–47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id. at 147. The district court found Thompson failed to adequately plead a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. According to the district court, Thompson simply alleged an employment relationship without alleging “specific facts connecting her employment to each named Defendant” as her employers. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, No. 11–CV–01494 (DMC–JAD), 2011 WL 6935312, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2011) (“The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is an employee as defined by the FLSA and the NJWHL, and that each named Defendant is an employer and/or joint-employer within the meaning of the FLSA and the NJWHL. Plaintiff does not, however, allege any specific facts connecting her employment to each named Defendant. Without such specific facts, both the Court and Defendants are unable to determine the extent to which any of the named Defendants could be liable.”), vacated, 748 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2014).
107. Thompson, 748 F.3d at 147 (noting Thompson “elect[ed] to stand on the dismissed complaint without further amendment” (citing Hogan v. Rodgers, 570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009))).
108. See id. at 154.
109. See id. at 148.
110. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 149.
applied Enterprise to the facts of Thompson.\textsuperscript{113} According to the Third Circuit, the district court’s finding that Thompson’s employment at each company was separate and distinct considered only “the name of the payor appearing on Thompson’s pay stubs,” which was inconsistent with FLSA’s broader conception of employment relationships.\textsuperscript{114} The court found Thompson’s required attendance at an REMN training indicated REMN had the “authority to promulgate work rules and assignments,” the second Enterprise factor, even before it officially hired Thompson.\textsuperscript{115} The REMN employee’s representation that REMN and SA were “sister compan[i]es” suggested to the court a “broader degree of corporate intermingling.”\textsuperscript{116} The court also found the “abrupt[ly] and seamless[ly]” nature of the alleged transfer of all SA employees to REMN suggested “shared authority over hiring”—the first Enterprise factor.\textsuperscript{117} Finally, the court cautioned that its “assessment res[ted] heavily on the [case’s] procedural posture,” and that a “fully developed factual record” may still indicate no joint employment existed.\textsuperscript{118} The court concluded Thompson alleged a joint employment relationship that could pass its Enterprise test with sufficient detail.\textsuperscript{119}

Third, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claim against REMN as a successor to SA responsible for its FLSA liabilities.\textsuperscript{120} The defendants urged the court to apply the New Jersey state law standard for determining when a successor corporation is liable for its predecessor’s liabilities.\textsuperscript{121} As noted in Part II.B, the state law standard is significantly less inclusive than the federal common law standard for employment claims.\textsuperscript{122} Thompson urged the court to apply the federal standard, and the court agreed, finding it to be the “logical extension of existing case law.”\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{113} See id. at 148–49 (“We have recently treated [joint employment issues] in some depth, and in so doing announced a directive that we described as the ‘Enterprise test.’” (citation omitted)).

\textsuperscript{114} See id. at 149.

\textsuperscript{115} See id.

\textsuperscript{116} See id.

\textsuperscript{117} See id.

\textsuperscript{118} See id.

\textsuperscript{119} See id.

\textsuperscript{120} See id. at 153.

\textsuperscript{121} See id. at 150 (noting defendants urged application of New Jersey law on successor corporations’ liability for predecessor debts and liabilities and reciting state law standard).

\textsuperscript{122} For a comparison of the state and federal standards on successor liability, see supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{123} See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 150–51. The court quoted and adopted Judge Posner’s reasoning for applying the federal standard in the Seventh Circuit. See id. at 152 (“We find [Judge Posner’s] pronouncement well reasoned, directly applicable, and in accord with our own jurisprudence.”). According to Judge Posner, a more liberal successor standard is applied to employment claims because the various labor statutes have overarching policy objectives like “labor peace” (NLRA) or non-discrimination in employment (Title VII). See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (justifying broader standard for statutes with broad policy aims). Judge Posner found these statutory goals are
After adopting the federal standard, the Third Circuit applied it to the facts of Thompson and found the allegations sufficient to demonstrate that REMN could be a successor liable for SA’s violations. The court found Thompson alleged plausible “continuity in operations and work force” because she “allege[d] that essentially all facets of the business at issue, including operations, staffing, office space, email addresses, employment conditions, and work in progress, remained the same after the February 2010 intercession of REMN.”

With respect to the third factor, the predecessor’s ability to compensate victims, the court noted the defendants’ own characterization of SA as “defunct” and thus unable to pay any damages.

Fourth, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claims against Lamparello and Chapman as supervisors. The court recited its Haybarger standard for personal claims against supervisors for FMLA violations. Applying that standard to Thompson’s FLSA claims, the court found her allegations contained sufficient information on the “scope of the [supervisors’] workplace authority . . . .” In particular, the court cited Chapman’s alleged statement “that he ‘did not pay overtime to underwriters’” and the fact that mid-level supervisors consulted with Lamparello and Chapman when they could not resolve a personnel issue alone.

IV. KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES: THOMPSON’S HOLDINGS COMPORT WITH THE
TEXT AND POLICIES OF FLSA

Thompson liberalized the tests for determining when an entity is an “employer” and liable for FLSA violations. These holdings are consonant

served by a broader standard because “workers will often be unable to head off a corporate sale by their employer aimed at extinguishing the employer’s liability to them.” See id. Judge Posner found the FLSA’s goal of protecting workers’ standards of living is just “as fully deserving of protection” as the goals of other employment statutes. See id. Judge Posner also argued there is value in “legal predictability” in dealing with successors in the context of claims made under federal statutes designed to protect employees. See id. at 767 (noting predictability weighs in favor of applying federal standard given “all the cases” that applied federal standard to employment claims).

124. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 153 (“In total, then, these allegations are enough to surmount a motion to dismiss under the federal standard.”).
125. See id. at 152. The court found it was “unclear” whether the federal standard’s second factor, notice to the successor, was met here. See id. at 153. However, the court found at this stage in the litigation, Thompson could not be expected to offer “detailed proof” of this notice given her relatively subordinate position within the company. See id.
126. See id. at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. See id. at 154.
128. See id. at 153 (noting “[a]side from the corporate entity itself, a company’s owners, officers, or supervisory personnel may also constitute ‘joint employers’ for purposes of liability under the FLSA” and describing its recently articulated standard for such supervisor claims in context of FMLA).
129. See id. at 154.
130. See id.
131. For a discussion of Thompson’s holdings, see supra notes 84–130 and accompanying text.
with FLSA’s broad conception of employment, evidenced by its “employer” definition.\textsuperscript{132} Further, these holdings facilitate FLSA’s ambitious policy purposes.\textsuperscript{133}

A. Thompson Is Consistent with FLSA’s Broad Language

Thompson’s broad tests to determine employer status under FLSA match the “expansive” statutory definition of employer and its emphasis on “economic reality” rather than technical concepts.\textsuperscript{134} Joint employers can exercise significant influence over workers’ terms and conditions of employment as a matter of “economic reality,” even when such influence is not exercised directly.\textsuperscript{135} For instance, if a contractor-employer requires its employees to attend a client-employer’s training and learn its rules, the client-employer is shaping the rules that govern workers’ conduct.\textsuperscript{136} If a client-employer demands discipline of workers and the contractor-employer complies, workers face punishment—though indirect—at the command of the client-employer.\textsuperscript{137} If a client-employer caps the wages of a contractor-employer’s employees, the client-employer controls the most important employment term through its contract demands.\textsuperscript{138} All of these examples of indirect control suggest control over the work relationship in view of “economic reality.”\textsuperscript{139} As such, they

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} For an analysis of Thompson in the context of the FLSA’s statutory language, see infra notes 134–44 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{133} For a discussion of Thompson’s impact on FLSA’s policy purposes, see infra notes 145–78 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{134} See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012) (defining “employer”). The FLSA “expansively” defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee[,]” a definition of “striking breadth.” See id.; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (“While the FLSA, like ERISA, defines an ‘employee’ to include ‘any individual employed by an employer,’ it defines the verb ‘employ’ expansively to mean ‘suffer or permit to work.’ This latter definition, whose striking breadth we have previously noted, stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”) (citations omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{135} See Hickton v. Enter. Holdings, Inc. (In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig.), 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Because of the uniqueness of the FLSA, a determination of joint employment ‘must be based on a consideration of the total employment situation and the economic realities of the work relationship.’ A simple application of the Lewis test would only find joint employment where an employer had direct control over the employee, but the FLSA designates those entities with sufficient indirect control as well.”) (citation omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{136} See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014) (observing joint employment exists when “one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3) (2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{137} See, e.g., Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B. 23, 23 (1973) (finding joint employment in NLRA case where contractor-employer requested employee discipline carried out by client-employer).
\item \textsuperscript{138} See, e.g., id. (noting that while client-employer set rates of pay, contractor employer indirectly influenced those rates by schedule and amount of payments to client-employer).
\item \textsuperscript{139} See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1961) (declaring
ought to be taken into account and Thompson appropriately facilitates such consideration.\textsuperscript{140}

This “economic reality” interpretation resonates equally in the context of individual supervisors that act as FLSA employers.\textsuperscript{141} When a supervisor, pursuing the employer’s interest, violates the FLSA, they do so buttressed by the economic power of the employer.\textsuperscript{142} To the employee, the supervisor embodies the employer because the supervisor is authorized to act in the employer’s interest.\textsuperscript{143} Imposing liability on these actors for the violations they actually bring about comports with the “economic reality” interpretation of the FLSA’s definition, because, in a practical sense, they function as employers in relation to employees.\textsuperscript{144}

B. Thompson’s Tests Serve FLSA’s Broad Policy Agenda

Congress enacted the FLSA not only to protect workers from abusive employment terms, but also to achieve the industrial policy goals of spreading employment and increasing consumers’ purchasing power.\textsuperscript{145} The Thompson tests focus on whether employment exists in economic reality, which is necessary to facilitate a policy calculated to affect nationwide economic

\textsuperscript{140} See generally Thompson, 748 F.3d 142. This interpretation draws additional support from the Department of Labor’s FLSA regulations, which find employer status “[w]here the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.” See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3). The Department’s emphasis on control is consistent with the “economic reality” standard for evaluating whether employer status exists: an employee of an employer that is controlled by a second employer surely may be said to be within the control of the second employer as a matter of economic reality. See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32–33 (outlining “economic reality” standard).

\textsuperscript{141} See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding FLSA test for employment turns on whether “supervisor carried out the functions of an employer with respect to the employee” (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983))).

\textsuperscript{142} See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166–67 (1971) (finding statutory definition looks to the “facts involved in the economic relationship” (internal quotation mark omitted)).

\textsuperscript{143} See, e.g., Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418–19 (finding supervisor exercised sufficient control to be deemed employer in analogous FMLA context when he evaluated employee’s performance, recommended her discharge to her employer, which the employer carried out, and finding “a jury could reasonably conclude that, but for the substantial authority wielded by [the supervisor], [the employer] would not have exercised his ultimate authority to fire [the employee]”).

\textsuperscript{144} See id. at 419 (finding rational jury could find supervisor was FMLA employer when he supervised an employee’s work, prepared her performance review, disciplined her, and retained the authority to fire her).

\textsuperscript{145} See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
The joint employer context illustrates this point. If an immediate employer of workers is not free to act outside the constraints that a second-level employer imposes, the latter should have obligations under the FLSA if its policies are to be realized. The FLSA seeks to spread employment by making “overwork” costly. This policy is most workable if FLSA’s disincentive structure affects all entities that control worker employment. Similarly, the minimum wage provisions of FLSA seek to increase workers’ purchasing power, but they are of little practical relevance if one or more entities that control the employment relationship may ignore noncompliance and shift blame to smaller entities with smaller economic footprints.

Broad “employer” standards are especially necessary given the recent growth in subcontracting and other multi-layered employment relationships.

146. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasizing “economic reality” as “the test of employment” and eschewing “technical concepts” (quoting Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Linder, supra note 38, at 152 (“Although the minimum wage was obviously also designed to create micro-welfare effects, its primary function lay in removing labor costs from competition, increasing productivity macroeconomically by driving ‘parasitic’ firms out of business and concentrating production in the most competent firms, and in steering capital-labor relations.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).

147. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 148–49 (explaining “economic reality” is impacted by the dynamics of control, finding control firms exert on each other in real world factor into employer analysis).

148. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–27 (1947) (agreeing that Congress enacted FLSA to reduce distribution of goods produced under “subnormal labor conditions” or to correct “economic evils”); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947) (noting FLSA’s conception of employment was “comprehensive enough to require its application to many persons and working relationships, which prior to [the FLSA], were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court in Rutherford Food Corp. concluded this policy agenda justified a legal test of employment that hinged on “the circumstances of the whole activity.” See id. at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted). One commentator credited Rutherford Food Corp. and other early FLSA cases with interpreting the law “broadly and to appeal to its underlying purposes.” See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2010). Professor Rogers found Rutherford Food Corp. noteworthy in that it broadly “appealed to the statute’s purposes,” and emphasized that workers were “part of [an] integrated unit of production.” See id. at 23. (internal quotation marks omitted).

149. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

150. For further discussion on the FLSA’s policy justifications, see supra notes 31–42 and accompanying text.

151. See Rogers, supra note 148, at 23 (“One thus might interpret the Court as having based its [Rutherford] decision on grounds of policy: if the statute aimed to eradicate the ‘economic evil’ of very low-wage work, it seemed to reason, and if the [second level, client-employer] enjoyed the power to determine the workers’ wages, then it should be held liable as their employer.”).

152. See id. at 1 (“In recent decades, responding to the globalization of product and labor markets, major firms have extended their supply chains and subcontracted many tasks that do not require skilled labor.”). Professor Rogers argued that while FLSA scholars mostly support addressing this issue by “liberalizing tests for joint employer liability,” courts would better effectuate FLSA by imposing a “duty of reasonable care to prevent wage and hour
In 2013, 3.4 million Americans worked for “staffing” businesses, accounting for 2.5% of all employment in the United States. The American Staffing Association reports an even higher number, stating that one in ten workers are hired by a staffing business each year. From 2009 to 2013, employment in the staffing industry increased by 41%, while all other employment grew by just 6%. Multi-layered employment is especially common in construction and custodial services where 51% and 37% of workers, respectively, are employed by contractors, rather than the clients receiving the services. Research suggests outsourcing is associated with lower wages and fewer benefits for employees. This renders the joint employment inquiry under the FLSA especially important as multi-layered employment relationships proliferate.

Congress enacted the FLSA to protect workers who occupied vastly unequal bargaining positions with respect to their employers. Workers in...
subcontracted or other multi-layered employment relationships are likely to earn low wages and have very little bargaining power. Subjecting outsourcing employers to the FLSA’s protections serves the law’s goals by ensuring that even employees with an intermediary employer enjoy the law’s protections. Employers may argue that this imposes unjust costs on outsourcers for violations they did not commit. However, the Enterprise test still requires active participation or influence of some kind on the part of the employer (including the ability to set rules, make hiring decisions, and the like). In this regard, Enterprise is arguably under-inclusive if “economic reality” is to be the guiding principle; Enterprise fails to encompass some employers that take no active role in the employment relationship, yet still hold sway over terms and conditions of employment in view of “economic reality.” For example, companies at the purchasing end of a supply chain (to which Enterprise likely would not apply) may be uniquely capable of demanding compliance of employers down the supply chain via contractual provisions and monitoring.

See Rogers, supra note 148, at 46–47 (arguing for even broader joint employer liability standard than tests akin to Enterprise/Thompson). Professor Rogers’s proposed standard would impose a “duty of reasonable care” to prevent foreseeable FLSA breaches down a company’s supply chain, regardless of whether a “contractual relationship with the primary wrongdoer” exists. See id. at 2. Professor Rogers argues, “violations are arguably foreseeable whenever one enters into a contract for goods or services in an industry with a well-publicized history of violations . . . . They are acutely foreseeable if a firm plays one contractor or supplier off against another to lower prices, is a frequent purchaser of such goods or services, enters into a contract that does not include sufficient funding for minimum wages to be paid, and/or could but does not take reasonable steps to deter or prevent such violations. In other words, when a firm engages in such a course of action it is not a mere bystander, but rather is helping to create or heighten the risk—or even the near-certainly—of
The FLSA’s practical impact would be similarly diluted if employers could evade their responsibilities under the law by handing their business off to a new entity, even one with the same top personnel, with no responsibility to compensate wronged workers. Opponents of the federal standard Thompson adopted may argue its broad standard unduly burdens successor corporations by forcing them to pay the cost of the predecessor’s violations. However, as Judge Posner pointed out in Teed, this is a weak argument. Judge Posner explained, “The successor will have been compensated for bearing the liabilities by paying less for the assets it’s buying; it will have paid less because the net value of the assets will have been diminished by the associated liabilities.” Judge Posner also appropriately pointed out there is an interest in uniformity, and if the goals of other statutes warrant a broader federal successor standard, so should the equally important purposes of the FLSA. Moreover, Judge Posner and Thompson’s concern that employers could “extinguish” workers’ FLSA rights by transferring a firm to a successor company resonates with the Supreme Court’s application of the federal standard to NLRA claims.

See id. at 46–47. Although the Enterprise test fails to erect such a scheme, its “catchall” factor may partially address Rogers’s concerns. See Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 469–70 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]his list is not exhaustive, and cannot be blindly applied as the sole considerations necessary to determine joint employment. If a court concludes that other indicia of significant control are present to suggest that a given employer was a joint employer of an employee, that determination may be persuasive, when incorporated with the individual factors we have set forth.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It must be noted, however, as Professor Rogers stresses, that courts have often fallen short in the “implementation” of similar control language to the detriment of aggrieved workers. See Rogers, supra note 148, at 1.

See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (“In the absence of successor liability, a violator of the [FLSA] could escape liability, or at least make relief much more difficult to obtain, by selling its assets without an assumption of liabilities by the buyer (for such an assumption would reduce the purchase price by imposing a cost on the buyer) and then dissolving.”).

See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant at 16, Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2440), 2012 WL 6127031, at *16 (arguing against application of federal common law successor standard to FLSA claims, emphasizing that FLSA “focuses its impact on an existing employment relationship,” and arguing none of FLSA’s policy objectives are served by requiring a bona fide successor to compensate a predecessor employer’s former workers for unpaid wages).

See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766–67 (pointing out that liability for FLSA violations will affect predecessor firms’ purchase prices).

Id. at 767.

Compare Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973) (finding that “[t]o the extent that the employees’ legitimate expectation is that the unfair labor practices will be remedied, a successor’s failure to do so may result in labor unrest as the employees engage in collective activity to force remedial action,” and noting successors may benefit from predecessors’ NLRA violations if employees identify labor policies of successor with those of predecessor and refrain from protected activities out of fear), with Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (“[W]orkers will often be unable to head off a corporate sale by their employer aimed at extinguishing the employer’s liability to them.”).
Workers are no more capable of avoiding a sale calculated to deny their FLSA rights than one “extinguish[ing]” their associational rights.\textsuperscript{173} Additionally, the FMLA’s policy goal of ensuring workers job-protected leave in the event of a birth or medical condition is no more important than FLSA’s protections against abusive employment terms.\textsuperscript{174} FLSA’s protections are arguably even more impactful upon workers’ interests in that they constantly govern the most important term (payment) of the employment relationship, not how that relationship must adapt to specific eventualities.\textsuperscript{175} If broadening the employer standard to certain supervisors is necessary to effectuate the FMLA, it is just as essential to FLSA, where supervisors act as the face of the employer with respect to wage violations by, for example, refusing to pay overtime.\textsuperscript{176} Extending FLSA’s scheme of incentives and disincentives to supervisors to achieve compliance serves the law’s broad agenda.\textsuperscript{177} Accordingly, Thompson’s adoption of the Haybarger FMLA standard for supervisor liability comports with FLSA’s equally expansive policy agenda.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{173} See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding FLSA’s policy purposes were “as fully deserving of protection as the labor peace, anti-discrimination, and worker security policies underlying the NLRA, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, ERISA, and MPPAA.” (quoting Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 745 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

\textsuperscript{174} See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding Third Circuit’s holding in Haybarger applied in “analogous context” of FMLA claims). Indeed, the Third Circuit in Haybarger observed “that Congress, in drafting the FMLA, chose to make the definition of ‘employer’ materially identical to that in the FLSA means that decisions interpreting the FLSA offer the best guidance for construing the term ‘employer’ as it is used in the FMLA.” See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\textsuperscript{175} Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2012) (establishing minimum wage rates and overtime compensation requirements applicable to most employees), with id. § 2612(a)(1) (ensuring twelve work weeks of job-protected leave per year for covered employees because of child’s birth, employee’s serious health condition, or to care for close relative’s serious health condition, among other reasons).

\textsuperscript{176} See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417 (holding FMLA “permits individual liability against supervisors at public agencies” given FLSA’s express definition of “employer” including “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency,” and FMLA’s “materially identical” definition (quoting Modica, 465 F.3d at 186) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

\textsuperscript{177} See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947) (agreeing with lower court that FLSA seeks to “correct[] [] economic evils through remedies which were unknown at common law” and that “underlying economic realities” should establish employment, finding employment where employees’ work is “a part of the integrated unit of production,” if not technically part of established employment relationship (internal quotation marks omitted)).

\textsuperscript{178} For a discussion of the policy agendas and “materially identical” definition of “employer” in FLSA and FMLA, see supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
V. ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS: HANDLING FLSA CLAIMS AFTER THOMPSON

Thompson’s tests expand the universe of potential FLSA-employer defendants. Accordingly, attorneys for employee-plaintiffs will argue Thompson renders multiple entities liable for FLSA violations. Conversely, defense attorneys will argue that their clients’ connections to workers or violations are too tenuous to render them employers.

A. After Thompson, Employee–Side Attorneys Will Argue That Putative Employers Exercise Sufficient Control

On the joint employer front, plaintiffs’ attorneys will want to stress the interconnectivity of immediate employers and indirect employers with respect to employment matters. Evidence like a putative joint employer’s recommendations to an immediate employer regarding hiring, promotion, discipline, discharge, and the like will be probative to establish sway over hiring and discipline authority, the first and third Enterprise factors. Evidence of control over the parameters of the work relationship, such as dictating workers’ schedules, tasks, and rules, helps establish the second Enterprise factor. Mr. Rangel’s working conditions, described in Part I, provide an illustrative example. In addition to the delineated factors, plaintiffs’ attorneys should stress any outside indicia of control showing employment in “economic reality,” for instance, if one employer’s “hands were tied” because it was controlled by another employer.

179. For a discussion of Thompson’s holdings, see supra notes 84–130 and accompanying text.
180. For advice for employee-side attorneys, see infra notes 182–96 and accompanying text.
181. For advice for employer-side attorneys, see infra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2014) (stressing, in joint employment determination, “[t]he employee responsible for Thompson’s training allegedly described REMN as [SA]’s ‘sister company,’ a term which suggests some broader degree of corporate intermingling.” (emphasis added)).
183. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he scenario described by Thompson, in which she and virtually all other [SA] employees were abruptly and seamlessly integrated into REMN’s commercial mortgage business while some of those same employees continued to be paid by [SA], supports Thompson’s claim that the two companies shared authority over hiring and firing practices.”).
184. See, e.g., id. (“[A]n employee of REMN conducted Thompson’s training immediately after she was hired by [SA] in June 2009, indicating that REMN had at least some authority to ‘promulgate work rules and assignments’ even before REMN formally hired Thompson . . . .” (emphasis added)).
185. See supra notes 2–28 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Thompson, 748 F.3d at 148 (relying on Department of Labor’s conception of joint employment, holding joint employment exists where multiple employers “exert significant control” over workers “by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
With respect to successors, plaintiffs’ attorneys will want to demonstrate that, though a transition occurred, workers’ conditions remained the same. Crucially, “continuity in operations” is considered as well as notice of FLSA violations and the predecessor’s ability to pay. Thompson’s facts provide a useful example: although the plaintiff’s paychecks were signed by a different payor, none of the workplace operations changed. Workers did the same work at the same stations. Furthermore, the predecessor was “defunct” and therefore unable to pay. Attorneys should mine the facts of their cases to draw parallels to this sort of scenario.

Finally, employee-side attorneys will want to establish that when supervisors were directly involved in conduct running afoul of FLSA, they were responsible for the statutory violation. Further, to be liable, the supervisors must have acted within the employer’s interest when the FLSA violation occurred. Here, Haybarger’s facts are instructive: a supervisor expressly recommended an allegedly unlawful discharge as “in the best interest of the employer’s overall operations.” Evidence establishing a FLSA violation under similar circumstances will go a long way towards holding supervisors responsible as employers for wage and hour violations.

B. Employer-Side Attorneys Will Argue That Their Corporate and Individual Clients Lack Sufficient Control over Workers

On joint employment, employer-side attorneys will seek to minimize the

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187. See id. at 151 (considering “continuity in operations and work force of the successor and predecessor employers” to determine liability, abandoning state law factor of express or implied adoption of liabilities by successor).
188. See id. (considering continuity in addition to “notice to the successor-employer of its predecessor’s legal obligation” and “ability of the predecessor to provide adequate relief directly” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. See id. at 145–46 (“Despite Thompson’s transfer to REMN, virtually no change occurred in on-site operations. Thompson and her colleagues continued to do the same work, at the same desks, at the same location. Thompson’s pay rate, work email address, and direct supervisors remained the same. Thompson alleges that no employees were laid off during this transition, although some of her colleagues continued to receive paychecks from [SA].”).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 153 (“[D]efendants have represented that [SA] is now ‘defunct,’ which we take to mean that it is likely incapable of satisfying any award of damages to Thompson.”).
192. See id.
193. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (crafting test for supervisor liability under FMLA, which Thompson court applied to FLSA: “an individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises ‘supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation’ while acting in the employer’s interest” (citing Riodran v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987))).
194. See id.
195. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418 (emphasis added).
196. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 154 (noting supervisor’s alleged statement and authority to address personnel issues that mid-level supervisors could not established sufficient control to be deemed FLSA employer).
“degree of corporate intermingling” between putative joint employers and immediate employers. These attorneys will argue that all control over the terms and conditions of workers’ employment rests with the immediate employer. They will argue, whenever possible, that defendants have no control—or even knowledge—over personnel decisions and that the defendants do not involve themselves in employee discipline. While some control of the rules and schedules governing workers may be unavoidable, putative joint employers seeking to avoid that designation will argue that they simply set broad and general parameters that the immediate employer was free to meet any way it chose, and assigned workers only according to its own policies.

Successor defendants will stress that a complete break occurred when the firm changed hands. Any evidence that supports the absence of continuity will be useful to show the new business is not a continuation, but simply a firm that had the misfortune of purchasing all or parts of a business without knowing about any FLSA violations. These defendants will also argue that, although the predecessor no longer controls the business, it is still capable of compensating workers for its own wrongs, in which the successor was uninvolved.

Supervisors’ attorneys will seek to minimize the supervisor’s role in precipitating FLSA violations. While a violation may have occurred, these

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197. See id. at 149.
198. See, e.g., Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding plaintiff failed to show joint employment to pass its newly enunciated joint employment test because putative joint employer “exercised no control, let alone significant control, over the [employees]”).
199. See id.
200. See id. (finding putative joint employer had “no authority to promulgate work rules or assignments, and no authority to set . . . schedules,” and while plaintiffs argued putative joint employer’s “guidelines and manuals” to subsidiaries made it hold these roles “functionally,” the court found this unpersuasive, noting putative joint employer’s “suggested policies and practices [were] entirely discretionary on the part of the subsidiaries,” and that putative joint employer held “no more authority over the conditions of the assistant managers’ employment than would a third-party consultant who made suggestions for improvements to the subsidiaries’ business practices”).
201. See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, 711 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[i]f [a firm’s] assets had been sold piecemeal there is no successor liability, because of the lack of continuity between predecessor and successor; for when a company is broken up and its assets sold piecemeal, there is no successor to transfer the company’s liability to. But to allow [a firm] to acquire assets without their associated liabilities, thus stiffing workers who have valid claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, is equally a ‘windfall.’” (emphasis added)).
202. See id. (stressing “lack of continuity” between predecessors and successors when deciding whether to impose liability and finding where continuity is present, it would be inequitable to allow workers to go uncompensated for FLSA violations).
203. See id. at 766 (considering “[w]ether the predecessor could have provided relief after the sale,” as factor weighing in favor of workers’ interests because it considers likelihood they will be made whole in reality).
204. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014) (requiring supervisors be “responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation” in order to impose liability (emphasis added) (quoting Riodran v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
attorneys will want to show the supervisor was not actually the driving force behind the violation, and that some other player in the work relationship is responsible instead.\(^\text{205}\) Companies seeking to deflect responsibility for supervisors’ conduct will argue the supervisor was acting to serve an unsanctioned, personal interest that was unrelated to the employer’s interests.\(^\text{206}\)

VI. CONCLUSION

*Thompson* expanded the reach of the FLSA in the Third Circuit to encompass “joint employers” with indirect control over workers, more successors under a relaxed standard, and individual supervisors so long as they are directly responsible for the violations themselves.\(^\text{207}\) This development comports with FLSA’s expansive language and policy agenda, which were intended to apply to a wide array of employment relationships to raise labor standards and reduce unemployment.\(^\text{208}\) This decision is especially relevant in today’s economy, where a growing percentage of work relationships are structured with multiple levels of businesses controlling workers’ terms and conditions of employment.\(^\text{209}\) However, the true test of *Thompson’s* progress will be whether courts adhere to its liberalized standards or instead look for escape routes in the facts of future cases.\(^\text{210}\)

\(^{205}\) See *id.*

\(^{206}\) See *id.* (requiring supervisors to have committed FLSA violations “while acting in the employer’s interest” in order to impose liability (emphasis added)).

\(^{207}\) For a discussion of Thompson’s confirmation of *Enterprise* and additional tests on successor and supervisor liability, all of which will liberalize the test for employment, see supra notes 84–130 and accompanying text.

\(^{208}\) For a discussion of FLSA’s underlying policies, see supra notes 31–42 and accompanying text.

\(^{209}\) For a discussion of the increasing prevalence of multi-layered employment relationships, see supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text.

\(^{210}\) See Rogers, supra note 148, at 1 (noting FLSA scholars have mostly endorsed liberalized tests like *Thompson*, while noting courts have often fallen short on “implementation”).