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STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING: VICTIMS, VIOLATORS AND REMEDIES—INCLUDING AN ANALOGY TO FRAUD IN THE SALE OF A USED CAR WITH A GENERIC DEFECT*

WILLIAM K.S. WANG**

I. INTRODUCTION

STOCK market insider trading is buying or selling a publicly traded stock based on information that is both nonpublic1 and material.2 This Article will address the following four questions:


2. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") is considering adopting a clarifying rule in this area. See Neil Hare, Four Insider Trading Rules Possible, SEC Solicitor Gonson Says, 31 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 973 (July 23, 1999) (discussing possibility of new rules on insider trading).

Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1999), and its accompanying rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999), are important antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. For § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, one definition of material information adopted by the United States Supreme Court is: information which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider important in deciding whether to buy or sell. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (paraphrasing definition of materiality adopted in TSC Indus. v. Northway,
1. Is the act of stock market insider trading a victimless crime (Part II)?

2. Is stock market insider trading fraud (Part III)?

3. When does insider trading or tipping violate federal securities law (Part IV)?

4. Under federal securities law, what are some remedies and sanctions against a stock market insider trader or tipper (Part V)?

II. Is the Act of Stock Market Insider Trading a Victimless Crime?

Perhaps surprisingly, a lively debate exists among academics over whether to regulate insider trading at all. Supporters of regulation argue that society should forbid insider trading to preserve confidence in the securities market. Opponents of regulation have a variety of arguments. One is that insider trading makes stock prices more accurate. Remarkably, both opponents and supporters of regulation often assume that insider trading has no specific victims. In other words, these commentators assume that insider trading is not even a but-for cause of harm. This assumption is wrong.

The presence of victims is important to the debate. Analogous to this issue is the controversy about regulating pornography. Some argue that pornography is a victimless crime. Others contend that pornography increases sex crimes or undermines respect for women. Whether pogorno-
raphy has victims does not resolve the question of how to regulate it. Nevertheless, society is more likely to regulate pornography strictly if it has victims. Similarly, whether insider trading is a victimless crime does not resolve the question of how to regulate it. Nevertheless, society is more likely to regulate insider trading strictly if it has victims.

In fact, each act of stock market insider trading has specific victims. This part of the Article will discuss the victims of the act of insider trading. These victims are those who would be better off, but for the act of insider trading. This part of the Article will not focus on the victims of the nondisclosure accompanying a stock market insider trade.\footnote{13}

Assume that the outstanding number of shares of a company remains constant between the time of the insider trade and public disclosure. Let us focus on the shares outstanding at the time of public disclosure.

With an insider purchase of stock, the insider has more of that issue at public disclosure. Someone else must have less. That someone is worse off because of the insider trade.

With an insider sale of shares, the insider has less of that issue at public disclosure. Someone else must have more. That someone is worse off because of the insider trade.

Paraphrasing "the law of conservation of mass-energy,"\footnote{14} I call this phenomenon "the law of conservation of securities."\footnote{15} I label as "trade victims" those harmed by the phenomenon of the "law of conservation of securities."

Who are those harmed by the phenomenon of the "law of conservation of securities"? The victims are those whose transactions were either

\footnote{13. Victims of the nondisclosure include those who would not have traded had the information been disclosed to them. For discussion of the distinction between trade victims and nondisclosure victims, see \textit{Insider Trading}, supra note 1, §§ 3.2-3.4, at 42-105; \textit{Insider Trading Supp.}, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.1-3.4.4, at 17-32; \textit{infra} notes 24, 55, 65 and accompanying text.

If an independent duty to disclose exists, the nondisclosure accompanying an insider trade may harm the party owed the duty of disclosure. For discussion of possible independent duties to disclose either to the party on the other side of the insider trade or to the information source, see \textit{infra} Part IV notes 50-96 and accompanying text.

Furthermore, if the act of insider trading triggers a duty to disclose to a large class, the victims of the accompanying nondisclosure may be huge in number. For discussion of such duty-triggering, see \textit{infra} Part V notes 99-100 and accompanying text.


15. \textit{See} \textit{Insider Trading}, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.5-3.3.8, at 62-86 (discussing "Law of Conservation of Securities"); \textit{Insider Trading Supp.}, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.5-3.3.7, at 22-29 (same).}
preempted or induced by the insider trade. To paraphrase Milton Friedman, there is no such thing as a free insider trade.\(^\text{16}\)  

To explain preempted and induced traders, I shall use an analogy to used cars. The used automobile market is roughly comparable to the securities market. Over the counter dealers, stock exchange specialists and large block positioning firms often trade stock for their own account with the public.\(^\text{18}\) All these market-makers are somewhat like used car dealers.

Many commentators assume that stock exchange transactions are anonymous. This is an oversimplification, at least with large block trades between an institutional investor and a block positioner.\(^\text{20}\) In fact, if Prudential Life Insurance Company wants to sell a large block of IBM stock, Prudential may sell to Goldman Sachs, a block positioner. Prudential and Goldman Sachs know each other's identity before, during and after the trade.

They could even ask each other questions before the transaction. At least conceivably, Goldman Sachs could ask Prudential: "Do you have any

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16. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 65-73 (discussing insider trading as cause in fact of harm to preempted or induced traders); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 24-26 (same). For discussion of an analogy to sale of used cars with a generic defect, see infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.


18. For discussion of how the stock market functions, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 17-21 (same).

19. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 48-56 (discussing over counter market makers, stock exchange specialists, and block positioners); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 17-21 (same).

20. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 52-56 (discussing transactions between institutions and block positioners); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 21 (same).

Measured by number of shares traded, roughly half of all New York Stock Exchange reported volume consists of block trades (transactions of 10,000 shares or more). See N.Y.S.E. FACT BOOK 1998 DATA, at 16, 93 (1999) [hereinafter N.Y.S.E. FACT Book] (defining "block trade" as transaction of 10,000 or more shares, "block trades" constituted 48.7% of all New York Stock Exchange reported volume in 1998); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 21 & nn.9-10 (same, citing N.Y.S.E. FACT Book, supra, at 16, 93).

Such blocks are often bought and sold by block positioning brokerage firms. See N.Y.S.E. FACT Book, supra, at 16 (New York Stock Exchange estimates that roughly 27% of New York Stock Exchange block volume (transactions of 10,000 or more shares) is facilitated by "block positioners" or "block traders"); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 21 & n.11 (same, citing N.Y.S.E. FACT Book, at 16).

In 1992, institutional investors (both customer and broker-dealer) accounted for an estimated 75-80% of the average daily volume on the New York Stock Exchange. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 52 & n.13 (citing various sources).
material, nonpublic information about IBM?" At least conceivably, Prudential might lie in response. In other words, much trading in New York Stock Exchange listed shares has aspects of face-to-face dealing.\(^\text{21}\) This strengthens the analogy between stock market and used car transactions.

To illustrate how induced and preempted stock traders are harmed by insider trading under the law of conservation of securities, I shall use two analogies to used car trading:

1. the *solitary* defect hypothetical, and
2. the *generic* defect hypothetical.\(^\text{22}\)

In the solitary defect hypothetical, only one automobile is a lemon. In contrast, in the generic defect situation, many individuals are buying and selling cars, *all* the same year model and *all* with the same defect. Even a slight change in price may dissuade or induce trading. Stock market insider trading resembles the *generic* defect used car hypothetical.

The *generic* defect used car analogy will demonstrate two points: First, each act of stock market insider trading has one or more particular victims. Second, these victims are anonymous. They exist, but, practically, cannot be identified.

I shall start with the *solitary* defect used car hypothetical. Suppose Mr. Greedie owns a 1998 Cadillac. He discovers that his particular automobile has a major defect. He goes to a car dealer and sells the car for the going price, $25,000.

Assume in the alternative that:

1. the dealer does not ask Greedie about any defect, or
2. the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and Greedie lies.

The dealer discovers the defect and is stuck with a lemon. The victim of Greedie's sale is clearly the dealer.

Suppose the dealer does not discover the defect and resells the car to Mr. Public Buyer. This resale is illustrated in Figure 1 below:

\(^{21}\) See *INSIDER TRADING*, *supra* note 1, § 3.3.1, at 54-56 & nn.14-21 (discussing how stock transaction between institution and block positioner has aspects of face-to-face trade). *Cf. id.* § 8.2.2, at 681-83 (discussing practical problems of distinguishing between "fortuitous" and "nonfortuitous" transactions as defined in American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code).

\(^{22}\) For a much shorter discussion of used car analogies to insider trading, see *id.* § 3.2, at 45, § 3.3.7, at 80-82.

For a brief discussion of a similar analogy involving sale of used law casebooks based on inside information about a forthcoming new edition, see *id.* § 3.3.7, at 82-83.

For a somewhat similar hypothetical involving the president of a closely held corporation who sells company stock based on material nonpublic information (by undercutting the selling price offer of one of the company's other ten shareholders), see *id.* § 3.2, at 44-46.
FIGURE 1:  
SOLITARY DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL  
(ONLY GREEDIE’S 1998 CADILLAC HAS DEFECT) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GREEDIE</th>
<th>DEALER</th>
<th>MR. PUBLIC BUYER,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sells Lemon to</td>
<td>SellsSame Lemon to</td>
<td>The Victim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assume that Mr. Public Buyer is now stuck with a lemon. Who is the victim of Greedie’s sale? Only one 1998 Cadillac is a lemon. If Greedie had not sold his lemon to the dealer, the dealer would not have been able to resell the lemon to Mr. Public Buyer. The victim of Greedie’s sale is Mr. Public Buyer.

Now, I shall turn to the generic defect example. (This hypothetical is analogous to stock market insider trading.)

Suppose Mr. Greedie is an employee of General Motors. Through his job at GM, Greedie receives material, nonpublic information that all 1998 Cadillacs have a major defect. By coincidence, Greedie personally owns a 1998 Cadillac. He immediately sells his Cadillac to a car dealer for the going price, $25,000.

Again, assume in the alternative that:
1. the dealer does not ask Greedie about any defect, or  
2. the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and Greedie lies.

When GM announces the news of the defect to the public, the price of the 1998 Cadillac falls by $10,000. Greedie is clearly better off.

Who is the victim of Greedie’s sale? Who in the universe would be better off had Greedie not sold? Is it the car dealer who bought the Cadillac? The answer is not necessarily.

Suppose, without changing its prices, the dealer resold Greedie’s Cadillac to Mr. Public Buyer before announcement of the defect. Mr. Public Buyer is stuck with the lemon after the announcement.

Nevertheless, Mr. Public Buyer is also not necessarily the victim of Greedie’s sale. All 1998 Cadillacs are lemons, although only Greedie knows this. Had Mr. Public Buyer not bought Greedie’s car, he might have purchased another 1998 Cadillac.

These transactions are illustrated in Figure 2 below:

FIGURE 2:  
GENERIC DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL  
(ALL 1998 CADILLACS HAVE THE SAME DEFECT) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GREEDIE</th>
<th>DEALER</th>
<th>MR. PUBLIC BUYER,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sells Lemon to</td>
<td>With No Change In Price, Dealer Sells Same Lemon to</td>
<td>Not Necessarily The Victim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is the difference between this *generic* defect hypothetical and the *solitary* defect hypothetical? In the *solitary* defect hypothetical, Greedie’s car was the only one with the defect. In the *solitary* defect hypothetical, had Greedie not sold his Cadillac, and had Mr. Public Buyer bought another 1998 Cadillac, Mr. Public Buyer would have been better off.

In the *generic* defect hypothetical, *all* 1998 Cadillacs have the same defect. Innocent individuals without Greedie’s information compete with Greedie to sell 1998 Cadillacs with the same defect. Had Greedie not sold his Cadillac, and had Mr. Public Buyer bought another 1998 Cadillac instead of Greedie’s, Mr. Public Buyer would have been equally worse off.  

This phenomenon has prompted some commentators to conclude that each act of insider trading has *no* specific victims. This conclusion is wrong.

In the *generic defect* example, the insider trade has a specific victim. Identifying this victim is easier if we assume that the dealer does not sell Greedie’s automobile to Mr. Public Buyer and still owns Greedie’s car at the time of public disclosure (as illustrated in Figure 3 below).

![Figure 3: The Victim in the Generic Defect Hypothetical (Assume that Dealer Still Owns Greedie’s Car at Time of Public Disclosure)](image)

Even if the dealer still owns Greedie’s car at the time of the public announcement of the defect, the dealer is not necessarily the victim of

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23. See id. § 3.3.3, at 58-61 (discussing why party in privity is not necessarily harmed by small stock market insider trade). For a discussion of why the party in privity is not necessarily harmed by a large block trade based on material, nonpublic information, see id. § 3.3.4, at 61.

24. See id. § 3.3.5, at 62 & n.32 (citing sources suggesting that insider trading does not have specific victims); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.5, at 22 (same).

These commentators’ conclusions apply only to the *act* of trading. For discussion of the distinction between *trade* victims and *nondisclosure* (or deceit) victims, see supra note 13 and accompanying text; infra notes 55, 65 and accompanying text. Victims of nondisclosure include those who would not have traded had the information been disclosed to them.
Greedie's sale. Prior to public disclosure, the dealer may have passed the harm to someone else.

The dealer desires a certain inventory level. Because of Greedie's sale, the dealer's inventory of 1998 Cadillacs increased. The dealer sets a price at which it will purchase a car from the public. The dealer sets a higher price at which it will sell to the public. In an attempt to reduce inventory, the dealer may have slightly reduced both its buying and selling prices for 1998 Cadillacs.

Assume that Mr. Potential was interested in purchasing a 1998 Cadillac. The lower price may have induced him to buy another 1998 Cadillac (other than Greedie's) from the dealer. All 1998 Cadillacs have the same defect. As an induced purchaser, Mr. Potential may be the victim of Greedie's sale.

Alternatively, assume that Ms. Marginal owned a 1998 Cadillac and was thinking about selling her automobile. The lower price may have dissuaded her from selling the car to the dealer. She may still hold the car at the time of the public announcement of the defect. As a preempted seller, Ms. Marginal may be the victim of Greedie's sale.

What is the difference between this generic defect hypothetical and the solitary defect hypothetical? In the solitary defect situation, Greedie's automobile was the only one with the defect. In the solitary defect hypothetical, if the dealer owned Greedie's particular car at discovery of the defect, the dealer was worse off. The size of the dealer's total inventory of 1998 Cadillacs at discovery of the solitary defect was not relevant.

In the generic defect hypothetical, all 1998 Cadillacs have the defect. The size of the dealer's inventory of 1998 Cadillacs at public disclosure is crucial. The size of the inventory determines the dealer's damage.

The dealer is only worse off as a result of Greedie's sale if his sale causes the dealer's inventory at disclosure to be higher than it otherwise would have been. Initially, Greedie's sale increased the dealer's inventory. Nevertheless, the dealer may have decreased its inventory by lowering prices. The dealer may have shifted the harm to a preempted seller or induced buyer.

In practice, identifying the preempted seller or induced buyer is impossible. In order to identify the victim, one must determine the prices the dealer would have charged absent Greedie's sale. Then, one must ascertain how the public would have reacted to these prices. This information is unknowable. Nevertheless, the victim still exists.

At the time of the defect's announcement, there are a fixed number of 1998 Cadillacs. If Greedie has one less Cadillac at the time of the announcement, someone else must have one more. That someone is the

25. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 73-83 (discussing practical difficulty of identifying those harmed by stock market insider trade); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 27-29 (same).
victim of Greedie’s sale. I call this “the law of conservation of used automobiles.”

If the sale of one car on inside information to the car dealer causes even a slight lowering of the dealer’s prices for 1998 Cadillacs, that decline may dissuade or induce a transaction. If the dealer’s prices do not change (or if the price declines fail to dissuade or induce a trade), the loss falls on the automobile dealer (an induced buyer). Under the “law of conservation of used automobiles,” Greedie’s sale must induce a purchase or preempt a sale.

Only one victim exists: either a preempted seller, like Ms. Marginal, or an induced buyer, like Mr. Potential or the dealer. The loss is not spread among a large number of victims. The price decline after disclosure falls on this one victim; that loss corresponds to Greedie’s gain.

The law of conservation of used automobiles is similar to the law of conservation of securities. Each stock market insider trade has one or more specific victims, either induced and/or preempted traders. 26


Professor Aldave’s article, cited above, stated:

As Professor Wang has explained, each act of “inside trading”—i.e., trading on material nonpublic information—benefits the “inside trader” and harms other specific investors. It is virtually impossible, however, to identify the particular investors who are injured. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1217, 1230-40 (1981). In [United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981)], the conspirators’ trading injured the investors who were induced to sell, or who were preempted from buying, securities of the target companies. The improper trading may also have injured other investors by affecting the prices of the targets’ securities.

Aldave, supra, at 120 n.107.

One commentator has stated: “The [O’Hagan] Court, in finding that the connection to a purchase or sale had been formed by the “simultaneous harm [to] members of the investing public,” relied on Professor Aldave’s article and on a footnote therein citing to an article by Professor William K.S. Wang.” Daniel A. McLaughlin, The “In Connection With” Requirement of Rule 10b-5 as an Expectation Standard, 26 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 62 (1998); cf Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1223, 1269 n.224 (1998) (“Professor Barbara Bader Aldave was one of the first securities law scholars to advance investor protection concerns as specific policy justifications for the “fraud on the source” version of the misappropriation theory. . . . Professor Aldave was influenced, in part, by Professor William Wang’s arguments that insider trading directly damages contemporaneous traders in the marketplace by causing them to sell (or buy) at an improper time or price.”).
One may make the following objection. Suppose an innocent individual fortuitously sells stock in advance of an announcement of adverse, material information. Under the law of conservation of securities, does not this innocent sale also cause harm? Does not this innocent sale either preempt a sale or induce a purchase? The answer is yes.

Clearly, society will not impose liability on traders who unknowingly, fortuitously make advantageous trades prior to public disclosure. Therefore, causing harm under the law of conservation of securities is not sufficient in itself to impose liability.

Unlike innocent traders, however, stock market insider traders knowingly profit by taking advantage of others. This difference alone may or may not be sufficient to impose liability. (Suppose an analyst discovers material nonpublic information about a corporation through diligent outside research with no contact with company employees. If the analyst’s firm traded on this information, the transaction would harm preempted or induced traders. Nevertheless, the analyst and the firm might not be liable.)

One analogy is to but-for causation and proximate causation. The law of conservation of securities demonstrates that the insider trade is a but-for cause of injury to specific victims. Whether the insider trade is a proximate cause of harm is a separate issue. Nevertheless, if the insider trade is not even a but-for cause of injury, liability is much less likely. As mentioned earlier, as with pornography, whether insider trading has victims, affects, but does not resolve the question of how strictly to regulate it.

27. See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 322 (1979) (for an argument that federal securities law should not bar transactions where one party possesses informational advantage that public investors may lawfully overcome).

For an argument somewhat similar to Professor Brudney’s but not limited to stock transactions, see Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (1978) (arguing that law should encourage deliberate search for information that reveals change in circumstances affecting relative values, because expediting relay of such information to market promotes allocative efficiency). For discussion of possible weaknesses in Dean Kronman’s analysis, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.2.2, at 20 (arguing that is it difficult to apply Kronman’s standard).

For discussion of the difficult issue of selective disclosure to analysts, see infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.

For discussion of whether the dictum in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 & nn.16-18 (1988), may suggest a reluctance to regulate analysts’ use of material nonpublic information because analysts help to preserve a “healthy market,” see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.

28. For a general discussion of but-for causation (also called “causation in fact”), see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263-66 (5th ed. 1984). For a general discussion of proximate cause, see id. at 263-321.

29. For discussion of when insider trading or tipping violates federal securities law, see infra Part IV.

30. See supra text accompanying note 12.
The analysis above deals with the specific ex post victims of a stock market insider trade. What are some of the broader possible adverse effects of insider trading?

If the public becomes aware of insider trading, the prices of stocks generally may decline (although estimating the risk may be difficult).\footnote{31}{See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.3, at nn.1-4, n. 18 and accompanying text (discussing insider trading's harm to investor confidence and consequent possible increase in public corporations' cost of capital); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 2.3, at 8-10, 12-13.} If the employees of a particular corporation acquire a reputation for trading on nonpublic information, that specific company's stock may decline in price.\footnote{32}{See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.3.2, at nn.16-17 and accompanying text (noting possible decline in price of company's stock if public becomes aware of insider trading by company's management).} Such declines would increase the cost of capital of particular companies or of publicly traded corporations generally.\footnote{33}{See id. § 2.3.2, at nn.16-18 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that if some investors refrain from purchasing shares because of possible insider trading, cost of capital will increase); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 2.3.2, at 12-13.}

Ex ante, these price decreases might partially compensate new buyers for the risk of being victims of stock market insider trading\footnote{34}{See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 72 & nn.48-49 and accompanying text (discussing partial compensation of new buyers if prices of stocks decline because of general public awareness of insider trading).} (although, as mentioned earlier, estimating the risk would be difficult). Nevertheless, ex post the harm of insider trading would not be spread equally. An insider trade has arbitrary, but specific victims. These victims are disproportionately harmed by the trade. (Some victims, preempted buyers, may never own stock in the issuer.)

Even ex ante, a decline in the price of all publicly traded stocks (or of a particular stock) would not adequately compensate all investors for the risk of being victims of a stock market insider trade. This risk of harm is associated with the act of trading (or of almost trading, in the case of a preempted trader). Consequently, the risk varies with the frequency of one's trades (or "near trades").

Even if the return on all publicly traded stocks (or of a particular stock) were slightly higher because of the risk of harm from insider trading, the higher return would not adequately compensate frequent traders for incurring that risk. Nor would risk-averse investors who trade often be able to diversify away the risk of becoming a victim.

In short, ex post, victims of a stock market insider trade are disproportionately injured even if they originally purchased their stock at a price that...
accurately reflected the possibility of insider trading. Even ex ante, frequent traders definitely suffer harm from insider trading.

To analogize, suppose apartment rents in one neighborhood are slightly lower because a small percentage of arbitrarily chosen residents will be mugged and/or assaulted. Ex post, the unfortunate victims suffer disproportionately and are only minimally compensated by the lower rents. Ex ante, residents who take walks often are not adequately compensated because they take more risk than others.35

Because specialists and market-makers trade so frequently, they may be disproportionately harmed from insider trading.36 Nevertheless, specialists and market-makers may sometimes pass the injury to others prior to disclosure by altering prices and thereby readjusting inventory to the level preferred.37 The presence of insider trading may cause specialists and market makers to widen their spreads to compensate for the risk of becoming a victim.38 If so, ex ante, specialists and market makers may

35. See id. § 3.3.6, at 65-73 & n.50 and accompanying text; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.6, at 26. For a somewhat similar analogy, see id. § 3.5.2 and text accompanying note 20, supra.

36. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 82 n.66 (discussing how market-makers are especially exposed to risk of harm of insider trading); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.7, at 27, 29 (same).


37. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.6-3.3.7, at 65-82 (discussing identity of victims of insider trading); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 3.3.6-3.3.7, at 24-29 (same); supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text at the first printing of Figure 3.

A surge in orders may itself send a message to the specialist or market-maker that something good or bad is happening to the issuer, especially if he or she can deduce the identity of the insider traders. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 2.2.2, at 26-27 & nn.37-38 and accompanying text (describing how trading volume and/or price movement may indicate that something positive or negative is happening to issuer). Such a message would cause the specialist or market-maker to adjust prices earlier and ease the task of maintaining the desired level of inventory.

38. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 855-56 (1995) (explaining that market maker must increase spread to compensate for losses to unidentified insider traders); Haddock & Macey, supra note 36, at 1457 (same); see also INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 2.3.4, at 15-16 (noting insider trading may cause market-makers to widen spread); William J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 888-89 (1987) (explaining that market-makers increase their bid-ask spread to compensate for risk of dealing with insider traders); John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, 218 N.Y.L.J. 5-6 (July 31, 1997) (same); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and Op-

One of the amici briefs in O'Hagan made the following argument:

Trading in organized securities markets is usually effected through specialized intermediaries (e.g., market makers in dealer markets or specialists on the exchanges), who determine a bid-ask spread at which they trade with public customers. The width of the spread between the prices at which intermediaries will buy or sell (the bid-ask spread) is essentially a measure of the efficiency of the market for a security. While dealers and specialists are the initial victims of those who trade on misappropriated material nonpublic information, they pass this injury along to public customers through a widened bid-ask spread. To the extent it is foreseeable that people will trade with misappropriated material nonpublic information, intermediaries must protect themselves in advance by widening the bid-ask spread. Thus trading by those who misappropriate material non-public information for personal profit necessarily injures all public customers through a widened bid-ask spread. To the extent it is foreseeable that people will trade with misappropriated material nonpublic information, intermediaries must protect themselves in advance by widening the bid-ask spread. Thus trading by those who misappropriate material nonpublic information for personal profit necessarily injures all public customers by decreasing the price at which they can sell to intermediaries (the bid) and increasing the price at which they can buy from intermediaries (the ask). Indeed, customers trading other securities will also be injured, because dealers cannot anticipate which securities will be traded by those in possession of material nonpublic information and will consequently widen the bid-ask spread for all securities that may be the subject of such information.

Amicus Curiae Brief of North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., and Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, at 8, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842) (I assisted in the drafting of this brief). This excerpt from the brief is reprinted in Ribstein, supra, at 161-62. For criticism of the arguments in this excerpt, see id. at 161.

While discussing the likelihood that market markers will widen bid-ask spreads to compensate for the risk of dealing with insider traders, one commentator has noted: "This risk of dealing with insider traders is magnified in the options market, a favorite haven for insider traders because of the leverage it provides to the value of the information." A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 50 (1998).
pass some or all of their injury from insider trading to the public. The increase in spreads would harm all public trading investors, but especially those who trade often. Again, ex ante, more frequent traders would bear the brunt of the harm of insider trading. (In addition, the increase in bid-ask spreads may deter investors from trading. This would decrease the liquidity of the market.)

These are only some of the possible adverse effects of insider trading. A full discussion of the broader arguments both for and against regulation is beyond the scope of this Article.

For discussion of how the stock market functions, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 48-56; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 3.3.1, at 17-21.

To return momentarily to the generic defect used car hypothetical, if used car dealers were frequent victims of insider trading, their profits would decline. To compensate for this loss, they would widen the spread between the price at which they buy from the public and the price at which they sell to the public.

39. See INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 2.3.4, at 15-16 (discussing insider trading’s possible harm to investors generally); supra note 38. But see Ribstein, supra note 38, at 162 ("Increased spreads hurt investors only in the trivial sense that stock returns are not as high as they might be in a perfect world.").

40. For a discussion of the disproportionate harm of insider trading on frequent traders, see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

41. See Junk Bonds, supra note 38, at 1724 (noting that trading by outsiders will decrease as spread widens).

42. See id. (noting decreased outsider trading will reduce liquidity); Weiss, supra note 38, at 434 (same); see also Georgakopoulos, supra note 38, at 30-31, 36 (discussing how reducing transaction costs of outsider traders increases liquidity). But cf. Ribstein, supra note 38, at 163-65 (questioning whether decreased liquidity is harmful); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 101, 102-03 (1989) (arguing that stock transfer tax is likely to increase overall efficiency of American economy by discouraging short-term speculative trading); Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is a Molley Fool Born Every Minute?, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 791, 808-10 (1997) (arguing that, if investor demand for speculative trading is highly elastic, increasing investors’ marginal costs of trading may actually decrease both speculative trading and investors’ aggregate transaction costs and thereby increase investor welfare); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611, 667-91 (1995) (concluding that much stock trading is speculative: "Alleged efficiency benefits of speculative trading are at least exaggerated, and possibly illusory." Id. at 691); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transaction Tax, 3 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 261, 262-72 (1989) (noting that United States stock markets may have "excessive" liquidity, thereby encouraging speculation and increasing volatility). For disagreement with Professor Stout’s Virginia Law Review article and the suggestion of an alternative reason for excessive stock trading (incentive structures facing investors and financial intermediaries), see Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for “Excessive Trading?,” 81 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1995). For Professor Stout’s reply to Professor Mahoney, see Lynn A. Stout, Agreeing to Disagree Over Excessive Trading, 81 Va. L. Rev. 751 (1995).

Extrapolating from these contrary authorities, any increase in bid-ask spreads arguably might benefit society by deterring excessive stock trading and speculation.

43. For an extensive discussion of the arguments for and against regulation of stock market insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 2-3, at 13-118; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 2-3, at 3-34.
III. Is Stock Market Insider Trading Fraud?

In a traditional fraud scenario, the victim is the party on the other side of the trade. Also, disclosure in advance of the transaction would have saved the victim from harm.

To examine whether stock market insider trading is fraud, I shall rely on the Greedie used car hypothetical. The typical fraud situation is the solitary defect Greedie hypothetical. Greedie’s particular automobile is a lemon. Greedie sells the car to the dealer. Greedie either lies to the dealer or fails to disclose a material defect. The dealer discovers the defect and is stuck with the lemon.

Below is a reprint of Figure 1 (the solitary defect hypothetical):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 1:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOLITARY DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ONLY GREEDIE’S 1998 CADILLAC HAS DEFECT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEDIE ———&gt; DEALER ———&gt; MR. PUBLIC BUYER,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELLS LEMON TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELLS SAME LEMON TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE VICTIM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Suppose the dealer does not discover the solitary defect and sells the car to Mr. Public Buyer. Suppose Mr. Public Buyer is stuck with the lemon. Is Greedie’s conduct fraud?

The victim is not the party on the other side of Greedie’s trade, i.e., the dealer. Still, disclosure by Greedie in advance of his proposed sale would have prevented the dealer from purchasing and would have saved Mr. Public Buyer from loss.

Maybe Greedie’s conduct is still fraud even when Mr. Public Buyer is the victim. Maybe the victim of fraud need not be the party on the other side of the trade.

Now I shall examine whether Greedie’s conduct in the generic defect hypothetical constitutes fraud. Below is a reprint of Figure 3 (the generic defect hypothetical):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 3:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE VICTIM IN THE GENERIC DEFECT HYPOTHETICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ASSUME THAT DEALER STILL OWNS GREEDIE’S CAR AT TIME OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEDIE ———&gt; DEALER,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELLS LEMON TO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEALER MAY LOWER PRICES, AND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY OR MAY NOT BE VICTIM DEPENDING ON SIZE OF INVENTORY AT DISCLOSURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY INDUCE MR. POTENTIAL TO BUY ANOTHER 1998 CADILLAC (INDUCED BUYER);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR MAY DISSUADE MS. MARGINAL FROM SELLING (PREEMPTED SELLER)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Again, assume alternatively that: (1) the dealer does not ask Greedie about any defect, or (2) the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and Greedie lies. Is Greedie’s conduct in the *generic* defect hypothetical fraud?

In the generic defect situation, *all* 1998 Cadillacs have the defect. The victim of Greedie’s sale is not necessarily either the dealer or Mr. Public Buyer. The victim exists, but cannot be identified. The victim might be either a preempted seller, like Ms. Marginal, or an induced buyer, like Mr. Potential or the dealer.

Is Greedie’s misconduct fraud? Greedie’s lie or nondisclosure facilitates or even enables Greedie’s sale to the dealer. The sale causes harm to the anonymous victim. Nevertheless, even though a *lie* or nondisclosure facilitates misconduct, the misconduct may not necessarily be fraud. For example, nondisclosure facilitates embezzlement. Embezzlement is not necessarily labeled fraud.

At least three significant differences exist between traditional fraud and Greedie’s misconduct in the *generic* defect situation. First, in the generic defect hypothetical, premature disclosure by Greedie to either the dealer or to the world may be a breach of duty to Greedie's employer, General Motors. Second, disclosure of the generic defect by Greedie to just the dealer might also be offensive. This would give an unfair advantage to the dealer in its transactions with others. 44 Third, disclosure by Greedie may not help the victim of Greedie's misconduct if the victim is a preempted seller. Suppose the real victim of Greedie's sale is a preempted seller, like Ms. Marginal. (Ms. Marginal is someone who would have sold a 1998 Cadillac, but for Greedie’s sale. Greedie’s sale decreased the dealer’s price for 1998 Cadillacs. This price decline dissuaded Ms. Marginal from selling. 45)

Had Greedie disclosed just to the dealer, the dealer would have ceased buying 1998 Cadillacs. Ms. Marginal still would not have sold. Ms. Marginal would not be saved from loss. Suppose Greedie disclosed the defect to the world in a press release. The price of 1998 Cadillacs would have drastically declined. Ms. Marginal still would not be saved from

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44. *But see* Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-64 (1983) (stating that insider/tipper does not violate rule 10b-5 under "classical relationship" theory unless tip is for "personal benefit." Conceivably, selective disclosure to avoid committing fraud in a face-to-face transaction might be considered motivated by "personal benefit"). For a discussion of SEC rule 10b-5 liability for tipping under the "classical relationship" theory, see *INSIDER TRADING*, *supra* note 1, § 5.2.8, at 336-43; *INSIDER TRADING Supp.*, *supra* note 1, § 5.2.8, at 174-81; *infra* notes 75-80 and 83-93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "classical relationship" theory, see *INSIDER TRADING*, *supra* note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 283-354; *INSIDER TRADING Supp.*, *supra* note 1, §§ 5.2.1-5.3.5, at 144-86; *infra* Part IV and notes 57-65.

45. *See supra* Part II, text accompanying Figure 3 (discussing Ms. Marginal as preempted seller victim).
harm. In other words, disclosure by Greedie would not have saved the victim of his sale, Ms. Marginal.\(^4\)

In short, in the generic defect hypothetical, Greedie’s conduct has some features of fraud, especially if he lies. Nevertheless, his conduct differs from traditional fraud in several respects. Disclosure by Greedie to the party on the other side or to the public might breach other duties. Also, such disclosure would not save the victim of the trade if the victim is a preempted seller. Whether Greedie’s misconduct is fraud is not clear.

What difference does it make whether his misconduct is fraud? Suppose a federal statute provides: “thou shalt not commit fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a \textit{used automobile}.” Assume that violation of the statute is a federal crime. Should the federal used car fraud statute apply to Greedie’s sale in the generic defect hypothetical?

How a judge answers this question depends in part on judicial conservatism versus judicial activism. An extremely conservative judicial solution would be to refuse to apply the federal act.\(^4\)

True, Greedie either has lied or has failed to disclose material information. Nevertheless, what seems objectionable about his conduct is not the fraud, but the unjust taking from the \textit{anonymous} victim of the transaction. The victim may not be the dealer.

One principle of statutory construction is to interpret criminal statutes narrowly.\(^4\) The judiciary could wait for Congress to amend the Act to prohibit \textit{expressly} this type of unjust enrichment.

\(^4\) This hypothetical involves the seller of a used car with a generic defect. For a somewhat similar hypothetical involving the president of a closely held corporation who sells company stock based on material nonpublic information (by undercutting the selling price offer of one of company’s other ten shareholders), see \textsc{Insider Trading}, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 44-46.


\(^4\) See \textit{United States v. Lanier}, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (discussing briefly rule of lenity as one of “three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement”); \textsc{Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 2.2(d) (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1998)} (explaining rule that requires strict construction of criminal statutes in favor of defendant); Steven B. Duke, \textit{Legality in the Second Circuit}, 49 \textsc{Brook. L. Rev.} 911, 911 (1983) (discussing doctrine of strict construction of criminal statutes, also known as rule of lenity); \textit{see also United States v. Brennan}, 183 F.3d 139, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting in dictum that case against defendants is seriously problematic in part because of rule of lenity); Audrey Strauss, \textit{Mail Fraud and the Rule of Lenity}, 222 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Nov. 4, 1999) (discussing \textit{Brennan} and \textit{Lanier}). \textit{See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345} (discussing debate among Supreme Court justices over lenity and recommending abolition of rule of lenity and substitution of theory of federal common law crimes). \textsc{But cf.} \textit{Holloway v. United States}, 526 U.S. 1, 12 n.14 (1999) (“We have repeatedly stated that: ‘[t]he rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, . . . we can make no more than a guess as to
A more activist judicial solution would be to extend the federal used car fraud statute to Greedie's misconduct. The conduct seems offensive and close enough to fraud to include within the act.


In his dissent in United States v. O'Hagan, Justice Scalia rejected the rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting with respect to misappropriation doctrine). For discussion of the misappropriation doctrine, see infra Part IV, notes 66-72 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia said:

In light of that principle [of lenity applied to criminal statutes], it seems to me that the unelaborated statutory language: "[t]o use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," [in] § 10(b), must be construed to require the manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction.

O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679. For discussion of this dissent, see INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 4.5, at 108 n.25(l) and accompanying text.

For discussion of the application of rule of lenity to regulation of insider trading under the federal securities laws, see Roundtable, supra note 47, at 12 (comments of Mr. Arthur R. Mathews) (noting members of O'Hagan majority "[r]eally gave no treatment to the fact that their decision was letting the courts manufacture a crime rather than having Congress legislate a crime. I think that violates the separation of powers concept and it violated other doctrines of criminal law"); id. at 16 (comments of Professor Roberta S. Karmel) (recognizing "in a criminal case, courts are confronted with the doctrine that criminal statutes are not supposed to be construed as broad remedial statutes. They are supposed to be construed strictly"). Cf id. at 17 (comments of Professor Marcel Kahan) (stating "[t]he best argument against the case [O'Hagan] is that this is a criminal case and it is not right for courts to define crimes out of fresh clothes"); id. at 18 (comments of Judge Ralph K. Winter) (stating "[b]ut, in criminal law, to have a crime that is not defined, either in terms of what it is or what the rationale is for its being illegal, invites prosecutorial misconduct"). But cf id. at 27 (comments of Professor Marcel Kahan) (arguing that because federal mail/wire fraud statutes already broadly prohibit stock market insider trading, there is less need to construe narrowly federal securities laws: ":a lot of people on the panel have voiced the argument that there is a very undefined law here and we are sending people to jail. Does the argument not apply to the same extent against mail and wire fraud?").

\(^{49}\) See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4, at 119-277 (explaining basic elements of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC rule 10b-5); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 4, at 35-142 (same); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 10, at 711-32 (discussing § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 10, at 339-43 (same). For a discussion of SEC rule 14e-3, which does expressly regulate insider trading and tipping in the context of tender offers, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 9, at 685-709; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 9, at 321-38.
stock market insider trading violates the federal securities fraud statutes. An activist court would say yes. A conservative court might say no.

IV. WHEN DOES STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING VIOLATE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW?

A. Introductory Remarks

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") has adopted a special rule, 14e-3, prohibiting insider trading (and tipping) about a forthcoming tender offer. Incidentally, the extent to which this rule is valid is still unsettled, even after United States v. O'Hagan.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorizes the SEC to adopt rules prohibiting "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." The Commission has adopted rule 10b-5. Loosely paraphrased, that rule states: "thou shalt not commit fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."

Does rule 10b-5 cover stock market insider trading? Has the Supreme Court taken an activist or a conservative view of this issue? The Court has chosen a middle course. Rule 10b-5 covers most, but not all, insider trading.

Rather than focus on the victims of the act of trading, the Court has focused on the victims of certain independent disclosure duties. These independent duties are breached by the nondisclosure that accompanies the stock market insider trade.

The Court has endorsed two bases of rule 10b-5 liability:

50. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1999); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 9, at 685-709 (discussing SEC rule 14e-3); INSIDER TRADING Supp., supra note 1, § 9, at 321-38 (same). For the text of the rule 14e-3 see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 9.1, n.2.

51. O'Hagan is ambiguous about the validity of 14e-3. See INSIDER TRADING Supp., supra note 1, § 9.3.3, at 329-33. Unfortunately, examining rule 14e-3 is beyond the scope of this Article.

52. 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1999). For the full text of § 10(b), see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 121 n.1. For a general discussion of § 10(b), see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4, at 119-277; INSIDER TRADING Supp., supra note 1, § 4, at 35-142.


54. For the text of rule 10b-5, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4.1, at 121 n.1.

55. For discussion of the distinction between trade victims and nondisclosure victims, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 3.2-3.4, at 42-105; INSIDER TRADING Supp., supra note 1, §§ 3.3-3.4, at 17-32 (same); supra notes 12, 24 and accompanying text (same); infra note 65 and accompanying text (same).
(1) the "classical relationship" theory, and (2) the misappropriation doctrine.56

B. The "Classical Relationship" Theory

A stock market insider trader has a duty to disclose material information to the party on the other side of the trade when the two have a so-called "classical relationship."57 This duty is breached by the material nondisclosure accompanying the insider trade.

A "classical relationship" exists when the insider trader is an employee or independent contractor of the company that issued the shares bought or sold. The "classical relationship" is a triangle, illustrated in Figure 4 below.

At the apex of the triangle is the issuer (A), the corporation that issued the stock traded. At one end of the base of the triangle is the stock market insider trader (B-1). (I shall discuss tippers and tippees (B-2) later.58) At the other end of the base of the triangle is the innocent party on the opposite side of the insider trade.59

56. On December 20, 1999, the SEC proposed rule 10b5-2, which would furnish a nonexclusive list of circumstances when a person has a duty of trust or confidence under the misappropriation doctrine. For a discussion of this proposed rule, see infra note 66.

57. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 283-354 (discussing "classical relationship" theory); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 144-86 (same).

58. See infra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.

59. For a discussion of the "classical relationship" triangle specifically, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-55, 657-58 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-35 (1980); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.1, at 283-90; INSIDER
To explain the nature of this "classical relationship" triangle, I shall briefly describe a similar triangle, illustrated in Figure 5 below.

Professor Teacher is on the faculty of Villanova University Law School. She has no direct contractual relationship with the school's students. Nevertheless, she has an employment relationship with the law school. The students have a relationship with the law school as well. They pay tuition. Because of the mutual relationship to the school, Professor Teacher has a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationship with each student.

Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 4, any employee or independent contractor (B-1) of a corporation has an employment relationship with the issuing company (A). The innocent party on the other side of the trade (C) also has a relationship with the issuing corporation (A). That party (C) is either a shareholder of the issuer (A), or becomes one simultaneous with the insider trade.61

Because of the mutual relationship to the issuing company (A), the shareholder (C) and the employee/independent contractor (B-1) have a "classical relationship."

Figure 6 below provides a concrete example of the "classical relationship" triangle:

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60. See Figure 4 and text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.

61. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8 (suggesting that innocent buyer may enter into classical relationship with insider seller simultaneously with trade between them); Insider Trading, supra note 1, § 5.2.1, at 290 & n.31 (citing and quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8).
Suppose Mr. Clean works for a janitorial service that contracts to clean the offices of a company at night. Some executives are working late. Mr. Clean overhears material, nonpublic information. On the basis of that information, Mr. Clean buys or sells the corporation’s stock.

Mr. Clean is in the “classical relationship triangle.” Mr. Clean, the janitor (B), works for an independent contractor, the janitorial service, that works for the company (A) that issued the stock Mr. Clean trades.

The party on the other side of Mr. Clean’s transaction (C) is also in the triangle. That party (C) is either an existing shareholder or becomes one simultaneously with the insider trade.

Mr. Clean has traded on material, nonpublic information without disclosing the information to the party on the other side. This material non-disclosure is a breach of the duty resulting from the “classical relationship” between Mr. Clean (“B”) and the party in privity (“C”). The insider trade violates rule 10b-5.62

In its “classical relationship” approach, the Supreme Court ignores the possibility that, absent the insider trade, the party on the other side might have traded with someone else. In other words, at first blush, the Court seems to treat “classical relationship” stock market insider trading as analogous to the solitary defect hypothetical, even though, in reality, such stock market

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62. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.1, 5.2.7, at 283-90, 335-36 (explaining “classical relationship”); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.1, at 144-47 (same).
insider trading is comparable to the generic defect used car hypothetical.\textsuperscript{63} With stock market insider trading, many individuals are buying and selling the same stock.

The Court might respond as follows: although the party on the other side of the insider trade, "C," is not necessarily the victim of the act of insider trading, "C" is the victim of the nondisclosure accompanying the insider trade that breaches the independent duty to disclose created by the "classical relationship."\textsuperscript{64} Had the insider trader disclosed in advance to "C," "C" would not have traded.\textsuperscript{65}

C. The Misappropriation Doctrine

The Supreme Court has also endorsed a second basis of insider trading liability under rule 10b-5: the misappropriation doctrine. Under this theory, stock market trading on material, nonpublic information violates rule 10b-5 when both:

(1) the trade breaches a fiduciary duty to the information source, \textit{e.g.}, a direct or indirect employer,\textsuperscript{66} and

\textsuperscript{63}. For the \textit{solitary defect} and \textit{generic defect} hypotheticals, see supra Part I, especially text accompanying printings of Figures 1, 2 and 3.

\textsuperscript{64}. For a discussion of why the party on the other side of the insider trade is not necessarily the victim of the act of insider trading, see \textit{INSIDER TRADING}, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.3-3.3.4, at 58-61; \textit{INSIDER TRADING Supp.}, supra note 1, § 3.3.3, at 22 (same). For a used car analogy, see the text accompanying both note 23 and first printing of Figure 2.

\textsuperscript{65}. For a discussion of the distinction between \textit{trade} victims and \textit{nondisclosure} victims, see \textit{INSIDER TRADING}, supra note 1, §§ 3.2-3.4, at 42-105; \textit{INSIDER TRADING Supp.}, supra note 1, §§ 3.3-3.4, at 17-32; supra notes 13, 24, 55 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{66}. \textit{See} United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 n.7 (1997) (stating "[w]here . . . a person trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information owes a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to two entities or persons—for example, a law firm and its client—but makes disclosure to only one, the trader may still be liable under the misappropriation theory").

On December 20, 1999, the SEC proposed rule 10b5-2, which would furnish a nonexclusive list of circumstances when a person has a duty of trust or confidence under the misappropriation doctrine:

(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the person communicating the material nonpublic information has a reasonable expectation that the other person would maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from the person's spouse, parent, child, or sibling; \textit{provided}, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that the spouse, parent, child, or sibling that was the source of the information had no reasonable expectation that the person would keep the information confidential, because the parties had neither a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, nor an agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
(2) the trader fails to disclose this breach to the information source before transacting.\textsuperscript{67}

For example, suppose Ms. Junior clerks for a state judge. Her employer prohibits her from trading on material, nonpublic information gained through her employment. She learns that the judge is about to issue a decision dramatically benefitting a company. She buys that corporation's stock.

Ms. Junior does not work for that company. Therefore, she is not in the "classical relationship triangle." Nevertheless, she violates rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation doctrine.

Where is the fraud? The Supreme Court finds fraud in the failure to inform the information source in advance of the plan to breach a duty.\textsuperscript{68}

Figure 7 below provides a concrete example designed to highlight the difference between the "classical relationship theory" and the misappropriation doctrine.

\textsuperscript{67} See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 646-66 (1997) (discussing misappropriation doctrine); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 4.5, at 192-96, 5.4, at 354-89 (same); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 4.5, at 106-13, 5.4, at 186-222 (same).

\textsuperscript{68} See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-55, 659 n.9 (finding no § 10(b) liability for misappropriation when insider trader discloses his or her trading plans to, or obtains authorization from, principal); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.1, at 192 & nn.49(k)-49(p) and accompanying text (discussing O'Hagan).
Suppose Mr. Server (B) is a bartender working for a caterer at a company function. He overhears material, nonpublic information and trades the company’s stock.

Mr. Server (B) indirectly works for the corporation (A) whose shares he trades. He is in the “classical relationship” triangle and violates rule 10b-5.69

In contrast, suppose Mr. Server is a bartender at a bar in the financial district, called “The Bull and the Bear.” He overhears some customers discussing material, nonpublic information about a company. The information does not relate to a tender offer. Mr. Server trades on that information. Does he violate federal securities law?

Mr. Server does not work directly or indirectly for the company whose stock he trades. Therefore, he is not in the “classical relationship” triangle.

What about misappropriation? Has he breached a duty to the information source?

There are two possible information sources:
(1) The customers whose conversation Mr. Server overheard.
(2) Mr. Server’s employer, because Mr. Server overheard the conversation during his employment.

69. See supra Figure 6 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 62 (providing similar analysis involving janitorial service rather than catering service).
Has Mr. Server breached a duty to the customers? A lawyer owes a duty to a client not to trade on confidential information from the client.\(^7\) What about a bartender and a customer? \textit{Probably}, the bartender has no duty to a customer,\(^7\) but this is not certain.\(^7\)

Has Mr. Server, the bartender, breached a duty to his employer? That depends on the policy of the bar, "The Bull and the Bear." If the "Bull and the Bear" prohibits insider trading by its employees based on information obtained during employment, then Mr. Server's trade violates rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation doctrine. In short, his trading may or may not violate rule 10b-5, depending on the facts and on judicial interpretation of when the trader owes a duty to the information source.

**D. Summary of the Federal Securities Law Liability of Insider Traders**

To summarize and oversimplify, insider trading violates federal securities law in three instances:\(^7\)

1. When it relates to information about a forthcoming tender offer. This is SEC rule 14e-3.
2. When the insider trader has a "classical relationship" with the party on the other side of the trade. This is the rule 10b-5 "classical relationship" theory.
3. When the trade on material, nonpublic information breaches a duty to the information source, \textit{e.g.}, a direct or indirect employer, \textit{and} the trader fails to disclose this breach to the information source before transacting. This is the rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine.

To digress, if an \textit{employee} breaches a duty to an \textit{employer} not to trade based on material, nonpublic information, two federal \textit{criminal} statutes,

\(^70\) See \textit{INSIDER TRADING}, \textit{supra} note 1, § 5.4.2.6, at 379-80 (discussing attorney/client relationship and rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine); \textit{INSIDER TRADING SUPP.}, \textit{supra} note 1, § 5.4.2.6, at 209-12 (same).


\(^72\) For a discussion of the uncertain source of the fiduciary duty in misappropriation, see \textit{INSIDER TRADING SUPP.}, \textit{supra} note 1, § 5.4.1A, at 197-203.

\(^73\) See \textit{INSIDER TRADING}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 4 (providing longer list, with five instances (the following list plus mail/wire fraud and § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933)); \textit{INSIDER TRADING SUPP.}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 1 (same). For discussion of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and their application to stock market insider trading, see \textit{INSIDER TRADING}, \textit{supra} note 1, § 11, at 733-60; \textit{INSIDER TRADING SUPP.}, \textit{supra} note 1, § 11, at 345-63. For discussion of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and its application to stock market insider trading, see \textit{INSIDER TRADING}, \textit{supra} note 1, § 10, at 711-32; \textit{INSIDER TRADING SUPP.}, \textit{supra} note 1, § 10, at 399-43.
the federal mail and wire fraud provisions, would cover such a deprivation of “another of the intangible right of honest services.”74

E. Liability of Tippers and Tippees

Not only may insider trading violate rule 10b-5, tipping others may also be illegal. Oversimplifying again, if someone would violate the rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory by trading,75 he or she violates the rule by tipping someone who trades, provided the tip confers a “personal benefit” on the tipper.76 Even a vicarious “personal benefit” suffices.77

Below is a reprint of Figure 4:

74. For discussion of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and their application to stock market insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11, at 773-60; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 11, at 345-63. For discussion of the 1988 amendment to the mail and wire fraud statutes extending their coverage to the deprivation of “another of the intangible right of honest services,” see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11.3.2.1, at 750-57 & nn.39, 47-48; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 11.3.2.1, at 355-59 & n.39.

Thus far, the courts have not explored the insider trader’s mail/wire fraud duty to disclose to the party on the other side of the trade. Under this unexamined obligation, a stock market insider trader might conceivably have a duty to disclose to the party on the other side even in the absence of a “classical relationship.” For discussion of the insider trader’s possible mail/fraud duty to disclose to the party on the other side of the trade, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11.3.2.2, at 757-60; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 11.3.2.2, at 361-63. For discussion of the rule 10b-5 classical relationship theory, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 283-354; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 144-86; supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.

75. For a discussion of the “classical relationship” theory, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 283-354; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 144-86; supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.

76. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-64 (1983) (stating tip is breach of insider’s fiduciary duty if insider receives personal benefit from tip); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 336-43 (describing breach of fiduciary duty when insider tips for personal benefit); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 174-81 (same).

77. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”); INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.2.8.3, at 338-40 (discussing how to demonstrate tipper’s personal benefit); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.2.8.3, at 176-77 (same).
Suppose “B-1” has material, nonpublic information and trading on the information would be illegal under the rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory. “B-1” violates rule 10b-5 by tipping “B-2” (e.g., a friend or relative) who trades, provided that “B-1” receives a “personal benefit”\(^7\) (e.g., feeling better off because “B-2” is better off\(^7\)).

If “B-1”, the insider/tipper, is liable, “B-1’s” tippee (“B-2”) may also be liable if the tippee trades and knows or should know of “B-1’s” (the insider/tipper’s) breach of duty. The trading tippee may be a participant after the fact in “B-1’s” rule 10b-5 violation.\(^8\)

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78. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661-64 (stating that insider’s tip is breach of fiduciary duty if insider personally benefits); Insider Trading, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8.1., at 336-37, 5.2.8.3, at 338-40 (describing “personal benefit” test for insider/tipper liability); Insider Trading Supp., supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8.1, at 174, 5.2.8.3, at 176-77 (same).

79. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 (“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a relative or friend.”); Insider Trading, supra note 1, § 5.2.8.3, at 338-40 (discussing how to demonstrate tipper’s personal benefit); Insider Trading Supp., supra note 1, § 5.2.8.3, at 176-77 (same).

80. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-661, 662 (discussing trading tippees as “participants after the fact” and the “know or should know” test); Insider Trading, supra note 1, §§ 5.3.1-5.3.2, at 344-46 (same); Insider Trading Supp., supra note 1, §§ 5.3.1-5.3.2, at 181-83 (same).

For discussion of the “classical relationship” theory and nontrading tippees who tip others, see Insider Trading, supra note 1, § 5.3.3, at 346-47.
For rule 10b-5 misappropriation, tipper and tippee liability is similar to that under the "classical relationship" theory. Oversimplifying somewhat, if trading (and failing to disclose the trade in advance) would breach a duty to the information source, then tipping for a "personal benefit" (and failing to disclose the tip in advance to the information source) also constitutes rule 10b-5 misappropriation. Again oversimplifying, a trading tippee may participate after the fact in the misappropriating tipper's violation if the tippee knows or should know of the tipper's breach of duty.

F. A Difficult Issue in "Classical Relationship" Tipper/Tippee Liability: Selective Disclosure to Analysts

One difficult issue in "classical relationship" tipper/tippee liability is selective disclosure to analysts. Suppose Ms. Tycoon is the president of a company. An analyst of a stockbrokerage firm has given her company favorable coverage in the past and may do so in the future.

Ms. Tycoon gives the analyst material, nonpublic information about her company one day before the public announcement. She intends that the analyst's firm trade and tip its favorite clients. Assume that Ms. Tycoon, the president, is authorized to act for the corporation when tipping.

For discussion of the "classical relationship" theory and remote tippees who trade or tip, see id. § 5.3.5, at 350-54; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.3.5, at 183-86.

For discussion of the "classical relationship" theory and an evil-hearted outsider/tippee with a pure-hearted insider/tipper, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.3.4, at 347-50.

81. Cf. INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.3, at 381-83 (discussing whether misappropriation doctrine requires that tipper receive personal benefit and citing some cases supporting this proposition); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.3, at 212-13 (same). But see SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dictum) (stating that misappropriation doctrine does not require showing of "personal benefit" to tipper); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dictum) (same). But cf. United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that misappropriating tipper can violate rule 10b-5 even if he or she does not specifically know that his or her leak would lead to tippee trading; this holding may suggest that plaintiff or prosecutor need not demonstrate personal benefit in misappropriation cases).

82. Cf. INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.4, at 383-85 (discussing whether "know or should know" test applies to misappropriation and mentioning cases discussing this proposition); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.4, at 214-15 (same). But see United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Rule 10b-5 requires that the defendant [tippee of a misappropriator] subjectively believe that the information received was obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty.") (citing United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)).

For discussion of the liability of remote tippees of a misappropriator, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.6, at 387-89; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.6, at 217-21.

For discussion of a misappropriating tipper's liability when the tippee trades but is not liable, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 5.4.5, at 385-89; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 5.4.5, at 216-17.
The analyst's firm does exactly what Ms. Tycoon intends. It transacts for its own account and tips favorite clients, who trade massive amounts of stock.

Has anyone violated rule 10b-5? In my opinion, the answer is yes. Nevertheless, many, if not most commentators, say there is no violation. The analyst and the stockbrokerage firm are not in the "classical relationship" triangle. They have breached no duty to the information source (Ms. Tycoon's company); so there is also no misappropriation.

Is the corporation liable for tipping? The corporation has a "classical relationship" with its own shareholders. It cannot trade its own shares based on material, nonpublic information. If corporate trading would violate rule 10b-5, corporate tipping for a "personal benefit" is also illegal.

Many commentators, however, feel that a corporation can never receive a "personal benefit." Only human beings can have a "personal benefit." Therefore, the corporation is not liable.

I disagree. A corporation, as an entity, can obtain reciprocal benefits by tipping analysts and others. A corporation, as an entity, can receive an improper "personal benefit." If the corporation is liable for tipping, its tippees may also be liable as participants after the fact.

Dictum in *Dirks v. SEC* may suggest a reluctance to regulate analysts' use of material nonpublic information because analysts help to preserve a

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83. See *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 302-05 (arguing that issuer should be liable whenever it selectively discloses material nonpublic information about itself; § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153-61 (same).)

84. See *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 302 n.83 (citing sources that suggest that issuer tips are lawful, even if they result in trading advantage for recipient); *INSIDER TRADING SUPP.*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153 n.83 (same).

85. See *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 297-302 (explaining that issuer has "classical relationship" with its shareholders); *INSIDER TRADING SUPP.*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 152-53 (same).

86. See *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 297-302 (stating that issuer violates rule 10b-5 by trading its own stock based on material nonpublic information); *INSIDER TRADING SUPP.*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(a), at 152-55 (same).

87. See *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 302-05 (arguing that liability should result when tipping corporation gains improper personal benefit); *INSIDER TRADING SUPP.*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153-61 (same). For discussion of the "personal benefit" test for insider/tippers under the "classical relationship" theory, see *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 336-43; *INSIDER TRADING SUPP.*, supra note 1, § 5.2.8, at 174-81; supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.

88. Some of these commentators are cited in *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 302 n.83; *INSIDER TRADING SUPP.*, supra note 1, § 5.2.3.3(b), at 153-54.

89. For discussion of the tippee's participation after the fact in the tipper's violation under the "classical relationship" theory, see *INSIDER TRADING*, supra note 1, §§ 5.3.1, 5.3.2, at 344-46; *INSIDER TRADING SUPP.*, supra note 1, §§ 5.3.1-5.3.2, at 181-83; supra note 80 and accompanying text.

90. 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) ("Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an in-
Commentators disagree on the significance of this dictum.\textsuperscript{92}

In any event, this is an unsettled area of the law. Without addressing when selective disclosure violates rule 10b-5, the SEC has proposed a rule designed to prevent publicly traded companies from selectively disclosing material nonpublic information.\textsuperscript{93}

1. See id. at 657-58 & nn.16-18 (recognizing value of analysts in ferreting out and analyzing information and preserving healthy market); see also INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, \S 5.2.3.6, at 316 & n.139 (discussing this dictum in Dirks); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, \S 5.2.3.3(b), at 155-56 n.87 (same).

2. See sources cited in INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, \S\S 5.2.3.6, at 316 & n.139; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, \S 5.2.3.6, at 165-66 n.139. Cf. 130 CONG. REC. H7758 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (anticipating that courts will be careful "to avoid unduly inhibiting traders from generating and acting upon valid research information of the sort upon which efficient markets necessarily depend"); LOUIS LOSS \& JOEL SELIGMAN, 8 SECURITIES REG. 3590, 3609 (3d ed. 1991) (describing dictum from Dirks as "paean to the analyst"); Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1057-54 (1990) (questioning special treatment given to analysts under insider trading rules); Joel Seligman, The Reformation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1120-24 (1985) (criticizing special treatment of analysts).

3. On December 20, 1999, the SEC proposed Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), which provides in part:

\textbf{\S 243.100 General rule regarding selective disclosure.}

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any person or persons outside the issuer, the issuer shall:

(1) In the case of an intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of that information simultaneously; and

(2) In the case of non-intentional disclosure, make public disclosure of that information promptly.

(b) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply when a disclosure is made to a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer (including, for example, an outside consultant such as an attorney, investment banker, or accountant) or to a person who has expressly agreed to maintain such information in confidence.

\textbf{\S 243.101 Definitions}

For purposes of this Regulation FD (\S 243.101), the following definitions shall apply:

(a) Intentional. A selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is "intentional" when the individual making the disclosure either knew prior to the disclosure, or was reckless in not knowing, that he or she would be communicating information that was material and nonpublic.

(b) Issuer. Every issuer having securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or which is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), including closed-end investment companies (as defined in Section 5(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act of 1940) (15 U.S.C. 80a-5(a)(2)) but not including other investment companies, shall be subject to this Regulation.
Section 10(b) and SEC rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 are only some of the federal statutes and regulations governing insider trading and tipping. As

(c) Person acting on behalf of an issuer. Any officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer, who discloses material nonpublic information while acting within the scope of his or her authority, shall be considered to be a "person acting on behalf of the issuer." An officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer shall not be considered to be acting on behalf of the issuer.

(d) Promptly.
1) “Promptly” shall mean disclosure as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event more than 24 hours) after a senior official of the issuer (or, in the case of a closed-end investment company, a senior official of the issuer’s investment advisor) knows, or is reckless in not knowing, of the non-intentional disclosure.

2) For purposes of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a “senior official” means any director, any executive officer (as defined in § 240.3b-7 of this chapter), any investor relations or public relations officer, or any other person with similar functions.

(e) Public Disclosure.
1) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this section, an issuer shall make the “public disclosure” of information required by § 243.100(a) of this chapter by filing with the Commission a Form 8-K (17 CFR 249.308) disclosing that information, or if the issuer is a foreign private issuer it shall file a Form 6-K (17 CFR 249.306).

2) An issuer shall be exempt from the requirement to file a Form 8-K or Form 6-K if it instead does one of the following:
(i) Disseminates a press release containing that information through a widely circulated news or wire service; or
(ii) Disseminates the information through any other method of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad public access to the information and does not exclude any members of the public from access, such as announcement at a press conference to which the public is granted access (e.g., by personal attendance or by telephonic or other electronic transmission).


In its release accompanying the proposed regulation, the Commission noted that it was not addressing the insider trading issues raised in Dirks but instead was proposing adoption of Regulation FD under its authority to require disclosure by issuers, primarily under Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1999). See 1999 WL 1217849 at *6.


For description of a possible leak to at least one analyst in advance of the public announcement and a brief discussion of the pressure to leak and the legal issues, see Susan Pulliam, Abercrombie & Fitch Ignites Controversy Over Possible Leak of Sluggish Sales Data, WALL St. J., Oct. 14, 1999, at G1.

On December 20, 1999, the Commission also proposed rule 10b5-1 and rule 10b5-2, dealing with various aspects of insider trading regulation. For discussion of these two rules, see supra note 66.
briefly mentioned earlier, federal mail/wire fraud is an important weapon in criminal prosecutions of insider trading defendants. Congress, the SEC and the courts have built a complicated patchwork of laws and regulations to deal with the problem of insider trading. A complete description is beyond the scope of this Article.

V. UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, WHAT ARE SOME REMEDIES AND SANCTIONS AGAINST A STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADER OR TIPPER?

Under federal securities law, who can bring a private civil action against a stock market insider trader or tipper? Again, I shall rely on the generic defect used car hypothetical.

Suppose a federal statute provides: “Thou shalt not commit fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a used automobile.” Further assume that the law creates a private cause of action. Who should be able to sue Greedie under the statute? At least three alternatives exist.

First, the courts could hold that Greedie’s sale triggered a duty to disclose to some larger group of 1998 Cadillac buyers. An example of such a group would be all those buying 1998 Cadillacs around the same time as Greedie’s sale. An even larger possible group would be all those buying between the time of his sale and public disclosure of the defect.

94. See supra text accompanying note 74.
95. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 11, at 783-60 (discussing application of federal mail and wire fraud statutes to insider trading and tipping); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 11, at 545-63 (same).
97. For a discussion of this hypothetical, see supra Part I.
98. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.9, at 484-87 (discussing four alternatives in context of stock market insider trading (variants of three following alternatives)).
99. See id., §§ 6.5, at 444-55, 6.9 at 485-86 (discussing contemporaneous trader plaintiffs against stock market insider trader); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.5, at 245-46 (same).
100. Cf. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding liability to “not only the purchasers of the actual shares sold by the defendants (in the unlikely event they can be identified) but to all persons who during the same period purchased Douglas stock in the open market without knowledge of the material inside information which was in the possession
This is a bootstrap means of artificially manufacturing fraud and can lead to absurdly large civil liability. Greedie would be liable for the losses of all those throughout the world who bought a 1998 Cadillac around the time of his sale (or between his sale and public disclosure). The sum of all these losses might be huge.

To avoid that result, Greedie’s total liability could be limited to the amount of his profit, or loss avoided. Suppose he sold his car for $25,000, and the price fell to $15,000 after the public announcement. His profit, or loss avoided, would be $10,000. That $10,000 could be spread among all those buying 1998 Cadillacs around the same time as his sale (or all those buying between the time of Greedie’s sale and public disclosure). This spreading could result in each plaintiff receiving a trivial amount.

Second, the courts could hold that the only private civil plaintiffs allowed are those who can demonstrate harm from Greedie’s sale itself. This would require that the plaintiff demonstrate that he or she is the preempted seller or the induced buyer harmed by Greedie’s act of selling. Such parties may be the most appropriate private civil plaintiffs; but, in practice, these victims are not identifiable. Consequently, no private civil plaintiff could sue.

Third, the courts could allow a suit by the party on the other side of the trade, the dealer. The courts could conclusively presume harm, even when it is absent.

Under United States securities law, who can sue a stock market insider trader or tipper? Congress has granted “contemporaneous traders” an express private cause of action against insider traders and tippers who violate federal securities law.

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102. See supra Part II (discussing induced and preempted traders).

103. See supra note 1, §§ 6.7, at 465-79, 6.9, at 486 (discussing plaintiffs on other side of stock market insider trade); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.7, at 246-50 (same).

“Contemporaneous” roughly means “around the same time.” If the defendant purchases or tips someone who buys, the “contemporaneous traders” would be sellers of the same stock between the precise time of the insider trade and shortly thereafter. If the defendant sells or tips someone who sells, the “contemporaneous traders” would be buyers of the same stock between the precise time of the insider trade and shortly thereafter.

In this express cause of action, the insider trader’s total liability to these “contemporaneous traders” is limited to the insider trader’s profit or loss avoided (minus any amounts paid by the defendant in an equitable action for disgorgement brought by the SEC). A tipper is liable jointly and severally with those “to whom the communication was directed.”

“Contemporaneous” traders are not necessarily the victims of the act of insider trading (as opposed to the accompanying nondisclosure). The real victim might be an induced trader who transacted well after the insider trade (but before public disclosure). The real victim might be a preempted trader, someone who did not trade at all.

Nevertheless, Congress’ solution does manage to create private civil plaintiffs. Congress’ approach also enables a class action.

For discussion of whether “contemporaneous” traders have both an express and an implied cause of action for damages against stock market insider trading defendants, see Insider Trading, supra note 1, § 6.3, at 400-12; Insider Trading Supp., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 228-32.


See Insider Trading, supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 415-17, 6.4.2, at 418-30 (discussing judicial interpretations of meaning of “contemporaneous”); Insider Trading Supp., supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 252-33, 6.4.2, at 233-37 (same).

See Insider Trading, supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 415-17, 6.4.2, at 418-30 (discussing judicial interpretation of meaning of “contemporaneous”); Insider Trading Supp., supra note 1, §§ 6.4.1, at 252-33, 6.4.2, at 233-37 (same).

For an argument in favor of abandoning the “contemporaneous” requirement and allowing suit by all opposite-type traders from the time of the insider trade to public disclosure, see Dougherty, supra note 100, at 86, 116-22, 139-43.


See Insider Trading, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 398 & n.5 (describing § 20A’s ceiling on damages).

106. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(c) (1994), reprinted in Insider Trading, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 397-98 n.2 (providing that individual who communicates inside information is liable jointly and severally with person “to whom the communication was directed”). For discussion of § 20A(c), see Insider Trading, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 399; Insider Trading Supp., supra note 1, § 6.2, at 224.

111. See supra Part II (discussing induced and preempted traders).
The statutory cause of action for “contemporaneous traders” specifically states that it does not supplant any other implied private cause of action the courts create.\textsuperscript{112} I think that the courts would also allow the party on the other side of the transaction to sue, at least for rescission.\textsuperscript{113} Indeed, § 20A of the Securities Exchange Act itself may create an express statutory cause of action for rescission by the party on the other side of the insider trade.\textsuperscript{114} In my opinion, the party in privity with the insider trader may also bring an implied action for damages against a defendant liable under the “classical relationship” theory.\textsuperscript{115}

It is even possible that contemporaneous traders might be able simultaneously to bring two causes of action for damages against an insider trading defendant. The first action would be an express one under the statute. The second claim would be an implied cause of action under SEC rule 10b-5.\textsuperscript{116}

Private civil remedies are not the only sanctions against a stock market insider trader or tipper who violates federal securities law. The SEC can go to court to obtain various forms of civil relief and civil penalties against stock market insider traders and tippers who violate the law,\textsuperscript{117} including either or both of the following:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20A(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(d) (1994), reprinted in INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 397-98 n.2 (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or condition the right of any person to bring an action to enforce a requirement of this title or the availability of any cause of action implied from a provision of this title.”). For discussion of § 20A(d), see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 4.9.1, at 259 n.15 and accompanying text, 4.9.2, at 270 n.47, 6.3, at 405-10 & nn.22, 24, 26, 36-40, 50, 6.8, at 479-84; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 229-32, § 6.8, at 250-51.

\item \textsuperscript{113} See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4.9, at 248-77 (discussing rescission as remedy against stock market insider trader); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 139-42.

\item \textsuperscript{114} See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 4.9.4, at 273-76 (discussing whether § 20A creates statutory cause of action for rescission); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 4.9.4, at 142 (same).

\item \textsuperscript{115} See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.8, at 479-84 (discussing whether § 20A precludes party on other side of insider trade from bringing implied action for damages against someone liable under “classical relationship” theory); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.8, at 250-51 (same).

\item \textsuperscript{116} See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.3, at 400-12 (discussing whether contemporaneous traders have both express and implied action for damages); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 228-32 (same).

Allowing contemporaneous traders both an implied and an express action for damages would still not make the plaintiffs whole if, with both claims, the insider trading profit is spread pro rata among the members of the plaintiff class. Even after recovery of damages under both causes of action, each plaintiff would receive only a small portion of his or her actual loss. See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 6.3, at 401-02 & nn.6-9; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 6.3, at 229.

\item \textsuperscript{117} See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 7.3, at 564-614 (detailing enforcement remedies available to SEC); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 7.3, at 281-317 (same).
\end{itemize}
(1) disgorgement\(^{118}\) of the profit (or loss avoided) for the benefit of so-called "victims" (generally contemporaneous opposite-type traders)\(^{119}\); (2) up to three times the profit (or loss avoided) for payment as a civil penalty to the United States Treasury.\(^{120}\)

In addition to the civil remedies and penalties obtainable by the SEC, the Justice Department can seek criminal penalties for stock market insider traders and tippers who violate federal law.\(^{121}\) In short, the SEC and the Justice Department may ask a court to impose on a stock market insider trading defendant a variety of equitable remedies, civil penalties, and criminal sanctions.\(^{122}\)

VI. SUMMARY

A. Is the Act of Stock Market Insider Trading a Victimless Crime?

Each act of stock market insider trading has specific, although anonymous, victims. This Article employed two used car analogies: the solitary defect hypothetical and the generic defect hypothetical.

In the solitary defect example, Mr. Greedie owns a 1998 Cadillac and discovers that his particular automobile has a major defect. He goes to a dealer and sells it. Greedie either lies to the dealer or fails to disclose the flaw. The dealer discovers the defect and is stuck with the faulty car.

In the solitary defect hypothetical, only one automobile is a lemon. In contrast, in the generic defect situation, many individuals are buying and selling cars, all the same year model and all with the same defect.

The generic defect example resembles stock market insider trading, especially large block trades between an institutional investor and a block positioner. Such block transactions have aspects of face-to-face dealing.

In the generic defect hypothetical, Mr. Greedie, an executive employed by General Motors, receives material, nonpublic information that all 1998 Cadillacs have a major defect. By coincidence, Greedie personally

\(^{118}\) See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 7.3.2, at 571-80 (discussing SEC obtained disgorgement of ill-gotten profits); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 7.3.2, at 286-94 (same); Sturc & Goin, supra note 108, at 154, 157 (discussing SEC's power to seek disgorgement from insider trading defendants).

\(^{119}\) See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, § 7.3.2, at 571 n.32 (discussing to whom disgorgement of insider trading profits is awarded).

\(^{120}\) See id. § 7.3.3, at 581-89 (discussing civil monetary penalty obtainable in court by SEC); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 7.3.3, at 294-99 (same). For a discussion of the civil monetary penalty that the court may impose on a "controlling person" of someone who engages in illegal insider trading or tipping, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 7.3.3, at 582 n.52, 588-89, 13.2.2, at 813-19; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1 §§ 7.3.3, at 296, 13.2.2, at 398.

\(^{121}\) See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 7.1.2, at 549, 7.2, at 552-64 (discussing criminal liability for securities fraud and for insider trading); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 7.2, at 269-81.

\(^{122}\) See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 7, at 547-672 (discussing government enforcement against securities fraud and insider trading); INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, § 7, at 265-317 (same).
owns a 1998 Cadillac and immediately sells it to a car dealer. (Assume in the alternative that (1) the dealer does not ask Greedie about any defect, or (2) the dealer asks Greedie about defects, and Greedie lies.) During the period between Greedie’s sale and the time of the defect’s public announcement, many individuals are buying and selling 1998 Cadillacs, all with the same defect.

At the time of the defect’s announcement, there are a fixed number of 1998 Cadillacs. If Greedie has one less Cadillac at the time of the public announcement, someone else must have one more. That someone is the victim of Greedie’s sale. I call this “the law of conservation of used automobiles.”

If Greedie’s sale of one car on inside information to the automobile dealer causes even a slight lowering of the dealer’s prices for 1998 Cadillacs, that decline may dissuade or induce a transaction. If the dealer’s prices do not change (or if the price declines fail to dissuade or induce a trade), the loss falls on the car dealer (an induced buyer). Under the “law of conservation of used automobiles,” Greedie’s sale must induce a purchase or preempt a sale.

In order to identify the victim, one must determine the prices the dealer would have charged absent Greedie’s sale. Then, one must ascertain how the public would have reacted to these prices. This information is unknowable.

The *generic* defect used car analogy demonstrates two points. First, each act of insider trading has one or more particular victims. Second, these victims are anonymous. They exist, but, practically, cannot be identified.

The “law of conservation of used automobiles” is similar to the “law of conservation of securities” and stock market insider trading. Assume that the outstanding number of shares of a company remains constant between the time of the insider trade and public disclosure. Let us focus on the shares outstanding at the time of public disclosure.

With an insider *purchase* of stock, the insider has more of that issue at public disclosure. Someone else must have less. That someone is worse off because of the insider trade.

With an insider *sale* of shares, the insider has less of that issue at public disclosure. Someone else must have more. That someone is worse off because of the insider trade.

The “law of conservation of securities” shows that each stock market insider trade must induce an adverse trade and/or preempt an advantageous transaction. The price move after public disclosure enriches the insider trader. This gain (or loss avoided) corresponds to the loss (or gain avoided) of the induced and/or preempted trader. Society’s antipathy towards stock market insider trading is based on the unjust enrichment of the insider trader at the cost of the *anonymous* victims of the trade.
The law of conservation of securities demonstrates that the insider trade is a but-for cause of injury to specific victims. Whether the insider trade is a proximate cause of harm is a separate issue. Nevertheless, if the insider trade is not even a but-for cause of injury, liability is much less likely.

If the public becomes aware of insider trading, the prices of stocks generally may decline (although estimating the risk would be difficult). If the employees of a particular corporation acquire a reputation for trading on nonpublic information, that specific company's stock may decrease in price. Such declines would increase the cost of capital of particular companies or of publicly traded corporations generally.

Ex ante, these price decreases might partially compensate new buyers for the risk of being victims of stock market insider trading (although, as mentioned earlier, estimating the risk would be difficult). Even ex ante, frequent traders definitely suffer harm from insider trading. The risk of injury from insider trading varies with the frequency of one's trades or "near trades." (Ex post, victims of a stock market insider trade are disproportionately injured even if they originally purchased their stock at a price that accurately reflected the possibility of insider trading.)

Because market-makers transact so often, they are especially exposed to the risk of harm from insider trading (although they may sometimes pass the injury to others prior to disclosure by altering prices and thereby readjusting inventory to the level preferred). Ex ante, the presence of insider trading may cause specialists and market-makers to widen their spreads to compensate for the risk of becoming a victim. This increase in spreads would harm all public trading investors, but especially those who trade often. Again, ex ante, frequent traders would bear the brunt of the injury from insider trading. In addition, the increase in bid-ask spreads may deter investors from trading and thereby decrease the liquidity of the market.

As with pornography, whether insider trading has victims, affects, but does not resolve the question of how strictly to regulate it. A full discussion of the arguments for and against regulation is beyond the scope of this Article.124

B. Is Stock Market Insider Trading Fraud?

Stock market insider trading has some features of fraud, but differs from traditional fraud in several ways. Disclosure to the party on the other side or to the public may breach other duties. Also, such disclosure would

123. For discussion of when insider trading or tipping violates federal securities law, see supra Part IV text and notes 50-96. This part is summarized below under the question, "When Does Stock Market Insider Trading or Tipping Violate Federal Securities Law?"

124. For an extensive discussion of the arguments for and against regulation of stock market insider trading, see INSIDER TRADING, supra note 1, §§ 2.1-3.6, at 13-117; INSIDER TRADING SUPP., supra note 1, §§ 2.1-3.5.1, at 3-34.
not save the victim of the insider trade if the victim is a preempted trader. Whether a court classifies insider trading as fraud depends in part on whether the court is judicially conservative or activist.

C. When Does Stock Market Insider Trading or Tipping Violate Federal Securities Law?

Despite the differences between stock market insider trading and traditional fraud, the United States Supreme Court has endorsed two bases of insider trading liability under rule 10b-5: the "classical relationship" theory and the misappropriation doctrine. Rather than focus on the victims of the act of trading, the Court has focused on the victims of certain independent disclosure duties. These independent duties are breached by the nondisclosure that accompanies the stock market insider trade.

The "classical relationship" is a triangle involving (1) the issuer, (2) the insider trader/tipper and (3) the shareholder on the other side of the insider trade. An employee or independent contractor of a company has a "classical relationship" with a corporate shareholder by virtue of a mutual relationship to the company. This relationship imposes a duty on the employee or independent contractor to disclose material, nonpublic information to the shareholder on the other side of the transaction.

The court treats the "classical relationship" as analogous to the solitary defect used car hypothetical. In reality, however, such stock market insider trading is comparable to the generic defect used car hypothetical.

The Court might respond as follows. Although the party on the other side of the stock market insider trade is not necessarily the victim of the act of insider trading, the party in privity is the victim of the nondisclosure accompanying the insider trade that breaches the independent duty to disclose created by the "classical relationship."

Under the misappropriation doctrine, stock market insider trading or tipping violates rule 10b-5 when the trade or tip breaches a fiduciary duty to the information source (e.g., a direct or indirect employer), and the trader or tipper fails to disclose this breach to the information source before transacting.

The "classical relationship" and misappropriation theories cover, most, but not all, insider trading and tipping. This summary discusses only some of the federal statutes and SEC rules governing insider trading and tipping. Congress, the SEC and the courts have built a complex patchwork of laws and regulations to address the problem.

125. See supra Figure 4, at notes 58, 77 for a diagram of the "classical relationship" triangle.
D. Under Federal Securities Laws, What Are Some Remedies and Sanctions Against a Stock Market Insider Trader or Tipper?

In theory, the most appropriate private civil plaintiffs against a stock market insider trader or tipper might be the victims of the act of trading, the preempted and/or induced traders. In practice, however, these victims are not identifiable.

As a solution, Congress has granted “contemporaneous traders” an express private cause of action against insider traders and tippers who violate federal securities law. The real victims of the trade may not be in this class.

The statutory cause of action for “contemporaneous traders” specifically states that it does not supplant any other implied private cause of action the courts create. In my opinion, the courts would allow a party on the other side of an illegal insider trade to sue for rescission and for damages against a defendant liable under the “classical relationship” theory. It is even possible that “contemporaneous traders” might be able simultaneously to bring both an express and an implied cause of action for damages against an insider trading defendant.

Remedies in private suits are not the only sanctions against a stock market insider trader or tipper who violates federal law. The SEC and the Justice Department may go to court to impose on a stock market insider trader or tipper a variety of equitable remedies, civil penalties and criminal sanctions.

126. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing rescission of illegal insider trade).
127. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing whether contemporaneous traders have both express and implied action for damages).