Employment Discrimination against Cancer Victims: A Proposed Solution

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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CANCER VICTIMS:
A PROPOSED SOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

The plight of cancer victims now follows them out of the hospital and into the workplace. As more cancer patients survive their initial treatments and return to the job market, they face discrimination, often with no express statutory protection.

Federal law presently protects limited classes of cancer victims: those employed under federal contracts and those participating in or seeking admission to federally funded programs. Only two states have

1. The term cancer victim as used in this note comprises both cancer patients and survivors. The term cancer patient as used in this note means any person diagnosed as having cancer who is not a cancer survivor. The term cancer survivor as used in this note means any person who was previously diagnosed as having cancer but who has lived at least five years without recurrence of the disease. If a person lives five years without a recurrence, the medical profession considers the person cured. See Learning to Survive, NEWSWEEK, April 8, 1985, at 72.

2. See Employment Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped: Hearings on H.R. 1294 and H.R. 370 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985) (statement of Rep. Biaggi) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. As Representative Biaggi stated during hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Committee on Education and Labor: “An estimated one million Americans have already encountered [employment discrimination based on cancer history].... It can and does include many overt and subtle forms ranging from job denial to wage reduction, exclusion from and reduction in benefits, promotion denial, and even outright dismissal.” Id.

3. See id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Martinez). Representative Martinez noted during the hearings that an estimated five million Americans now have cancer or a history of cancer. Id. He further observed that “[m]ore cancer patients are surviving today than previously. Of the five million patients treated, three million have passed the five-year mark of their diagnosis without relapse, which medical authorities consider clinically cured for cancer.” Id.


5. See The Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982). Section 706 of the Act defines “handicapped individual” as “any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
enacted statutes that expressly prohibit cancer-related job discrimination by both public and private employers.6 Forty-seven of the remaining states have provisions in their fair employment acts that prohibit discrimination against handicapped individuals.7 In such states, there-

- impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 706(7)(B).

Section 795 of the Act requires that entities entering into contracts with the federal government “take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals.” Id. § 795(a). Section 794 prohibits any program receiving federal aid from discriminating against handicapped persons. Id. § 794.

6. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 495d(7)(c) (Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926(f), 12940(a) (West 1980). Vermont and California have both included cancer in their statutory lists of protected handicaps. In Vermont, it is unlawful “[f]or any employer, employment agency or labor organization to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, place of birth, or age or against a qualified handicapped individual.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(1) (Supp. 1985). A qualified handicapped individual is defined in part as one having a “physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(5)(A) (Supp. 1985). The term “physical or mental impairment” is in turn defined as including cancer. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(7)(C) (Supp. 1985).

In California, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer, because of the . . . medical condition . . . of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge such person from employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980) (emphasis added). “Medical condition” is defined in the statute as including “any health impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical evidence.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980).

fore, claims of job discrimination brought by cancer patients necessarily have attempted to show that the results of cancer and cancer treatments constitute a handicap.\(^8\)

This note will discuss the existing protections afforded cancer victims faced with discriminatory practices. It will then examine the states' judicial treatment of cancer-related discrimination. Next, it will analyze the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act,\(^9\) a federal bill presently before the House of Representatives. Finally, this note will suggest that the federal bill should be enacted to assure that all cancer patients receive adequate, consistent protection.

**BACKGROUND**

**A. Existing Protections Under Federal and State Statutes**

The scope of federal and state statutes that expressly prohibit job discrimination under cancer-related grounds is as follows:

- **Federal Statutes:**
  - 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794

- **State Statutes:**
  - N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-14, 28-10-1 to 28-10-12 (1983);
  - N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987);
  - N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-422.1 to 143-422.3 (1983), 168A-1 to 168A-12 (Supp. 1985);
  - N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to 14-02.4-21 (Supp. 1985);
  - OHHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01 to 4112.99 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985);
  - OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25 §§ 1101-1801 (West 1987);
  - OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010-659.121, 659.400-659.435 (1985);
  - PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-962.2 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1986);
  - R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to 28-5-39 (1986);
  - S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-33-510 to 43-33-580 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
  - S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 3-6A-15 (1985);
  - TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (Supp. 1986);
  - TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon Supp. 1987);
  - UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8 (1986);
  - Va. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495-497e (1978 & Supp. 1985);
  - W.VA. CODE §§ 51.01-40 to 51.01-46 (Supp. 1987);
  - WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60-010 to 49.60-330 (Supp. 1986);

8. See Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982). In Lyons, the Illinois Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff's uterine cancer did not "substantially hinder" her performance of "major life functions," her condition was not a handicap within the meaning of either the state constitution or the Illinois statute prohibiting employment discrimination against handicapped persons. Id. at 171, 432 N.E.2d at 274; see also Kubik v. CNA Financial Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1981) (colon cancer not within statutory definition of "handicap"); Goldsmith v. New York Psychoanalytic Inst., 743 A.D.2d 16, 425 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1980) (Hodgkin's disease constituted "disability" under New York law); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 494 (1976) (leukemia included within definition of "handicap" under Wisconsin law). For a further discussion of Lyons, see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Kubik, see infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Goldsmith, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Chrysler, see infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.

discrimination against cancer victims is extremely narrow. Limited and somewhat ambiguous protection is provided by the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"). Under the Rehabilitation Act, government contractors have a duty to "take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals." Moreover, any entity receiving federal financial assistance has a duty not to discriminate against "otherwise qualified handicapped individual[s]." For purposes of these non-discrimination provisions, a handicapped individual is defined as one "who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." Both the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and regulations interpreting its provisions indicate that Congress intended this statutory definition to extend to cancer survivors. Those with a cancer history apparently were intended to fit within the definition's second prong be-

10. For a detailed discussion of existing statutory provisions, see infra notes 11-32 and accompanying text.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982); see also Hoffman, supra note 9, at 10-14 (discussing protection afforded cancer patients by Rehabilitation Act).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982). This statute provides:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(7) of this title.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). This statute provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Similarly, the regulations implementing the Act's 1974 amendments include persons who have had cancer in the category of those who experience "difficulty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment" because of previous impairment. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1985). These individuals in turn are deemed
cause they have "a record of... an impairment [which substantially limits major life activities]." 16

The Rehabilitation Act also defines the term "severe handicap" to include disabilities that result from cancer and that require "multiple services over an extended period of time." 17 While the non-discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act do not offer express protection to the severely handicapped, 18 a review of the Rehabilitation Act's legislative history and general structure indicates that those with severe handicaps are included within the general class of handicapped individuals. 19

It appears that both cancer victims and cancer survivors fit within the definition of "handicapped individuals" under the Rehabilitation Act and thus should qualify for the Act's protections. 20 In reality, however, very few cases filed under the Rehabilitation Act have been filed by cancer patients. 21 Moreover, it is important to note that even when a cancer victim invokes the Act's protection, he or she may be unable to pursue a direct action against the offending federal contractor; some federal courts hold that such actions may be brought only by the United States Department of Labor. 22

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16. For the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, see supra note 15.
19. A major concern of the drafters of the Rehabilitation Act was to provide adequately for individuals with the most severe handicaps. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2078. The Act's legislative history emphasized the intent to make vocational rehabilitation services available to the severely handicapped. See id. at 2092-95. The Senate Report acknowledged, however, that "there are handicapped individuals whose handicaps are so severe... that they may never achieve employment." Id. at 2092. This language logically supports the inference that those with severe handicaps are considered to be handicapped individuals within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7).

This inference finds further support in several sections of the Act itself. Particular services governed by the Act are to be provided "to handicapped individuals, especially those with the most severe handicaps." See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 772(b)(1), 777a(a)(1) (1982).

20. For a discussion of the definition of "handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act, see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.

21. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 29 (testimony of Michael L. Spekter, Board of Directors, One Fourth/The Alliance for Cancer Patients and Their Families). In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities during a hearing on the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, Michael L. Spekter stated that only 1.3 percent of the suits filed under the Rehabilitation Act have been filed by cancer patients. Id. None of these cases have generated reported opinions. Spekter hypothesized that one of the reasons for this dearth of litigation is poor administrative handling of claims. Id.

22. The Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part:
If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has failed or refuses to comply with the provisions of his contract with the United
Apart from the Federal Rehabilitation Act, only two states, Vermont and California, have enacted statutes expressly protecting cancer victims from employment discrimination. These state statutes offer blanket protection, although their scope is necessarily circumscribed by state borders. In Vermont, all employers are prohibited from discriminating against qualified handicapped individuals. Persons with physical impairments, including cancer, are subsumed under the statutory definition of handicapped individuals.

In California, similarly, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of a medical condition, which is defined as "any health impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical

23. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 495d (Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (West 1980).

24. Unlike the Federal Rehabilitation Act discussed above, the Vermont and California statutes impose a duty not to discriminate upon all employers. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980). The federal statute, however, imposes that duty only on government contractors and recipients of federal funds. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982).

25. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1985). This statute provides in pertinent part that "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice, except where a bona fide occupational qualification requires persons of a particular ... physical or mental condition: (1) For any employer, employment agency or labor organization to discriminate against ... a qualified handicapped individual." Id.

26. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495d(5), (7)(C) (Supp. 1985). The Vermont statute mirrors the Federal Rehabilitation Act by defining "handicapped individual" as any person who "(A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities; (B) has a history or record of such an impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 495d(5). The statute, however, goes on to define "physical or mental impairment" as including "such diseases and conditions as ... cancer." Id. § 495d(7)(C).
The California statute was successfully invoked by the state's Department of Fair Employment and Housing on behalf of a woman with a history of colon cancer who alleged that she had been wrongfully dismissed because of her cancer history. The California Fair Employment and Housing Commission found that the woman had both a "medical condition" and a "physical handicap" as defined in the state act. The Commission, therefore, found that she was protected by two statutory provisions: the provision expressly protecting cancer victims and the provision protecting those who are perceived to be physically handicapped. After concluding that her employer had discriminated against her because of the woman's medical condition and perceived physical handicap, the Commission rejected the employer's affirmative defense that accommodating her needs would impose undue hardship. Accordingly, the Commission awarded the woman both re-

27. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980). This provision has been interpreted as serving to "put employers and employees on notice that the horror of imminent death which has come to be associated with [cancer] is not justification for discrimination." Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., No. FEP 80-81-C7-058 (Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n Cal., Dec. 7, 1984) at 20 (quoting Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Interstate Boards, FEHC Dec. No. 78-05 (Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n Cal. 1978) at 11).

28. Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., No. FEP 80-81-C7-058 (Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n Cal., Dec. 7, 1984). The complainant in Kingsburg, Virginia C. Austin, was fired from her job of 23 years when she returned from a one-week hospital stay which was unrelated to her previous cancer treatment. Slip. op. at 13. Although her employer asserted that the reason for Austin's termination was her "excessive absenteeism" resulting from hospitalizations unrelated to cancer, the Commission found that this assertion was unsupported by the evidence." Id. at 14, 21. The Commission concluded that Austin's employer "did have in mind her prior cancer-related absences when he terminated her employment." Id. at 21.

29. Slip. op. at 18-20. Austin's employer, Kingsburg Cotton Oil, did not contest the fact that Austin was a rehabilitated cancer victim at the time of her dismissal and thus had a "medical condition" as defined by § 12926(f) of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 18. The Commission read the "medical condition" and "physical handicap" provisions of the Act to overlap. Id. at 20. The California "physical handicap" provision extends "to those who are presently physically handicapped, those who are perceived as having or having had a health impairment constituting a physical handicap, as well as those who are perceived as having an increased likelihood of becoming physically handicapped." Id. at 19. The Commission concluded that in speculating that Austin would "continue to miss considerable amounts of time from work," Kingsburg thought that Austin would suffer future impairment. Id. at 20. Thus, the Commission concluded that Kingsburg perceived that the complainant was physically handicapped and, therefore, finally concluded that the complainant fell within the category of those with a "physical handicap" under the Act. Id.

30. Id.

31. Id. at 27, 32. The Commission found that Austin was fired both because of her past cancer-related absences and those her employer anticipated in the future. Id. at 27. Kingsburg asserted by way of affirmative defense that Austin was unable to perform her job because of her medical condition and/or physical handicap and that she could not have been accommodated without imposing
instatement and compensatory damages.\textsuperscript{92}

\section*{B. Judicial Treatment of Cancer-related Discrimination Absent Specific Statutory Coverage}

Many cancer victims do not qualify for the express statutory protections discussed above.\textsuperscript{33} When such patients have encountered discrimination, they therefore have sought relief under their states' fair employment acts and human rights laws, which generally prohibit discrimination against handicapped or disabled individuals.\textsuperscript{34} Such suits have spawned inconsistent results.\textsuperscript{35}

The Illinois courts have faced two cases in which cancer victims have attempted to show that they were handicapped within the meaning of both the state constitution and a state statute that prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons.\textsuperscript{36} In determining whether cancer

undue hardship on Kingsburg. \textit{Id.} at 28. The Commission found that this defense was without merit. \textit{Id.} at 32. There was no evidence that Austin's absences caused Kingsburg a serious loss, nor was there evidence that she failed to perform her duties satisfactorily. \textit{See id.} at 28-30. Moreover, the Commission found that the only accommodation necessary was covering "for Austin when she was absent just as [Kingsburg] did for other absent employees." \textit{Id.} at 32. The Commission concluded that this accommodation would not have imposed undue hardship on Kingsburg. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.} at 39-40. The Commission awarded Austin reinstatement, back pay, all benefits of her employment that would have accrued during the liability period, and compensatory damages for emotional distress. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{34} For a discussion of the limited express protection under federal law, see supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. For a discussion of express protection under state statutes, see supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{35} The Illinois courts, in \textit{Lyons} and \textit{Kubik} respectively, found that neither uterine nor colon cancer was a protected handicap under the Illinois statute or Constitution. \textit{See Lyons}, 89 Ill. 2d at 170-71, 432 N.E.2d at 274; \textit{Kubik}, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 719, 422 N.E.2d at 4. On the other hand, the Wisconsin Circuit Court, in \textit{Chrysler}, found that acute lymphocytic leukemia was a protected handicap under the Wisconsin statute. \textit{See Chrysler}, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 345. Finally, in \textit{Goldsmith}, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that discrimination based on Hodgkin's disease violated the New York human rights laws. \textit{See Goldsmith}, 73 A.D.2d at 26, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 568.

is a protected handicap, the courts applied the "major life functions" test.\textsuperscript{37} Under this test, the court must determine whether an individual cancer victim has a condition which is generally believed to impose severe barriers upon his or her ability to perform "major life functions."\textsuperscript{38}

Applying this test in \textit{Kubik v. CNA Financial Corp.},\textsuperscript{39} the Illinois Appellate Court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a discrimina-

the Handicapped Act ("Illinois Act") provided in pertinent part: "It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's physical or mental handicap, unless it can be shown that the particular handicap prevents the performance of the employment involved." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-23 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (repealed by P.A. 81-1216, Art. 10, § 10-108, eff. July 1, 1980), quoted in \textit{Lyons}, 89 Ill. 2d at 165, 432 N.E.2d at 271; \textit{Kubik}, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 717, 422 N.E.2d at 3. The Illinois Act was repealed effective July, 1980, and was essentially replaced by the Illinois Human Rights Act (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to -105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986)). See 96 Ill. App. 3d at 716 n.1, 422 N.E.2d at 2 n.1. For a further discussion of the new Act, see infra note 37.


The Illinois Human Rights Act, which essentially replaced the Illinois Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act, includes a new statutory definition of handicap. However, this new Act became effective subsequent to the dates of the Acts in question in \textit{Lyons} and \textit{Kubik}. \textit{See Lyons}, 89 Ill. 2d at 165, 432 N.E.2d at 271. The current statutory definition states:

"Handicap" means a determinable physical or mental characteristic of a person, including, but not limited to, a determinable physical characteristic which necessitates the person's use of a guide, hearing or support dog, the history of such characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the person complained against, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth or functional disorder and which characteristic: (1) . . . [I]s unrelated to the person's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). Since its enactment, this definition has been neither applied nor interpreted by an Illinois court in a reported opinion.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Advocates}, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 516-17, 385 N.E.2d at 43.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Kubik}, 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1.
tion claim.\textsuperscript{40} The plaintiff in \textit{Kubik} had been discharged from his job after a malignant tumor had been removed from his colon.\textsuperscript{41} Although the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was unable to perform major life functions because of his cancer, the court found that this bare allegation was insufficient to establish a handicap.\textsuperscript{42}

In the second case, \textit{Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants},\textsuperscript{43} the plaintiff allegedly had been dismissed from her position as manager of kitchen operations after her employer learned that she had developed uterine cancer.\textsuperscript{44} Reversing the appellate court’s decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not established a handicap because she had failed to allege that her uterine cancer substantially hindered her in major life functions or that her employer perceived her cancer as creating such a hindrance.\textsuperscript{45} In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the plaintiff had not claimed to be hampered in such major life activities as “caring for [herself], performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, [or] working.”\textsuperscript{46}

In contrast, a Wisconsin court, applying a different definition of handicap,\textsuperscript{47} concluded in \textit{Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Dep’t of Industry, Labor and Human Relations} that a cancer patient had established a handicap. The plaintiff in \textit{Chrysler}, who suffered from acute lymphocytic leukemia, alleged that the defendant’s refusal to hire him was discriminatory because it was based on his medical condition.\textsuperscript{49} Chrysler admitted that its

\textsuperscript{40} Id.
\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 716, 422 N.E.2d at 2. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for several years and had received raises and promotions. \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 716, 719, 422 N.E.2d at 2, 4. In his amended complaint and affidavit, the plaintiff alleged that he had a malignant tumor on his colon which was successfully removed; that doctors would not consider him cured until five years had passed without a recurrence; and that he “was physically handicapped in that his physiological condition limited and is regarded as limiting certain of his major life functions.” \textit{Id.} at 719, 422 N.E.2d at 4. The court determined that these allegations were insufficient because they did not “assert a physical handicap under the \textit{Advocates} interpretation of that term.” \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{43} 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982).
\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 164, 432 N.E.2d at 271. The plaintiff asserted that her condition would not have affected her ability to perform her duties. \textit{Id.} She sued her employer for damages consisting of the loss of salary, insurance benefits and use of the company car. \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 170-71, 432 N.E.2d at 274. Since the court found that plaintiff was not handicapped, she did not qualify for the protections of article I, § 19 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution or the \textit{Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act}. \textit{Id.} For the text of the operative provisions, see \textit{supra} note 36.
\textsuperscript{46} 89 Ill. 2d at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 274 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1980)).
\textsuperscript{47} For a discussion of the definition of handicap applied by the Wisconsin court, see \textit{infra} notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{48} 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344 (1976).
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Id.}
negative hiring decision was prompted by two concerns related to the plaintiff's leukemia: the risks of lost work time and increased insurance costs.\(^{50}\)

Addressing the preliminary question of handicap, the *Chrysler* court followed a prior decision defining a handicap as "a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult; esp[ecially]: a physical disability that limits the capacity to work."\(^{51}\) The court concluded that the plaintiff was handicapped under this definition because his illness made it hard for him to find work, thus making achievement unusually difficult.\(^{52}\) The court proceeded to reject the defendant's asserted reasons for refusing to hire the plaintiff.\(^{53}\) Having found that leukemia constituted a handicap under state law and having rejected *Chrysler*'s defenses, the court awarded the plaintiff relief.\(^{54}\)

In *Goldsmith v. New York Psychoanalytic Institute*,\(^{55}\) a New York court also found that a cancer victim was protected from discrimination under state law.\(^{56}\) In *Goldsmith*, the plaintiff's Hodgkin's disease had been in

\(50. \) *Id.*. Chrysler's hiring decision was made on the recommendation of its medical consultant. *Id.* The medical consultant found that because of the plaintiff's disease, the plaintiff was at high risk of suffering infection from minor injuries, of enduring prolonged recuperation from injuries, and of suffering complications arising from injuries, all of which would lead to lost work time. *Id.*

\(51. \) *Id.* at 345 (quoting Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. State Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974)). Lacking a statutory definition of "handicap," the Wisconsin Supreme Court in *Chicago* adopted this dictionary definition of the term. 62 Wis. 2d at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting *WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY* 1027 (Merriam 3d ed. 1961)). The *Chicago* court held that asthma makes achievement unusually difficult and thus is a protected handicap under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. 62 Wis. 2d at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.

Wisconsin's current statutory definition of handicap, enacted after *Chrysler* was decided, combines the language of the *Chicago* definition with that found in the Federal Rehabilitation Act: "'Handicapped individual' means an individual who: (a) Has a physical or mental impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work; (b) Has a record of such an impairment; or (c) Is perceived as having such an impairment." *Wis. Stat. Ann.* § 111.32(8)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1985).

\(52. \) 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 345.

\(53. \) *Id.*

\(54. \) *Id.* The court noted that the Wisconsin statute allowed employers to refuse to hire any person who because of a handicap is unable to efficiently perform the duties of the job. *Id.* The court went on to find, however, that the defendant did not contend that the plaintiff would be unable to perform the duties of the job for which he applied. *Id.* Rather, the defendant asserted that its refusal to hire the plaintiff was a sound business decision in light of a higher risk of absenteeism and increased insurance costs. *Id.* Dismissing these reasons for the defendant's hiring decision, the court commented that if an employer discriminates against the handicapped, his intent and motives are irrelevant. *Id.*


\(56. \) *Id.* at 19-20, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 564. This determination was made by the State Division of Human Rights. *Id.* At the time that the alleged discriminatory acts in *Goldsmith* occurred, the New York Human Rights Law defined disability as
remission for several years when, despite her outstanding qualifications, she was denied admission to the defendant institute’s research program for advanced students. Finding substantial support in the record, the New York Supreme Court affirmed an administrative determination that Hodgkin’s disease constituted a disability within the meaning of the New York Human Rights Law and that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. Like the Wisconsin court in 

**Analysis**

A. *Inadequacy of Existing Protections*

Because specific statutory protection for cancer patients and survivors is very limited, most of them are protected from job discrimination only if they demonstrate that they are handicapped or disabled

a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, provided, however, that in all provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to physical, mental or medical conditions which are unrelated to the ability to engage in the activities involved in the job or occupation which a person claiming protection of this article shall be seeking.


57. 73 A.D.2d at 17, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 563.

58. *Id.* Defendant’s program was designed to train psychoanalysts. *Id.* Plaintiff held a Ph.D in psychology, and her application to defendant's program “was supported by eminent and renowned psychiatrists, some of whom [were] members of the Institute.” *Id.* The Institute’s stated reasons for not accepting the plaintiff were that her need for chemotherapy would interfere with the mental functions needed for analysis, and that placing a patient with an analyst who had a chronic and potentially fatal illness would be detrimental to the patient. *Id.* at 19, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 564. The court indicated parenthetically that these concerns were not only irrelevant but were also vitiated by evidence that the plaintiff’s prognosis was favorable. *Id.* at 27, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 569.

59. *Id.* at 21-25, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 565-68. In reviewing the administrative agency’s decision, the New York Supreme Court did not focus on the plaintiff’s status as a member of a protected class, as did both the Illinois and Wisconsin courts. *Id.* See *Lyons*, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270; *Kubik*, 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1; *Chrysler*, 14 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. 344. Instead, the *Goldsmith* court conducted a detailed factual inquiry into the circumstances of the alleged discrimination and concluded that the agency’s finding that the defendant’s discriminatory actions violated state human rights law was supported by substantial evidence in the record and thus was not arbitrary or capricious. 73 A.D.2d at 21-25, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 565-68.

60. *Id.* at 26, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney 1982) (policy section of New York Human Rights Law)).

61. For a discussion of the federal and state statutes expressly protecting cancer victims, see *supra* notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
within the meaning of the applicable state statute. It is suggested, however, that these state anti-discrimination statutes provide inadequate protection for cancer victims.

Specifically, cancer patients have been granted uneven protection under these state statutes.62 Plaintiffs with histories of uterine and colon cancer have been denied the protection of the Illinois Fair Employment Law.63 In Wisconsin and New York, however, plaintiffs with histories of leukemia and Hodgkin's disease have been granted relief under state anti-discrimination statutes.64 Although these cases appear inconsistent, it is submitted that they were not incorrectly decided under the applicable laws. Each court applied a different definition of handicap or disability, and each plaintiff was afflicted with a different disease.65

62. For a discussion of relevant cases, see supra notes 33-60 and accompanying text.

63. Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270; Kubik, 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1. For a discussion of Lyons, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Kubik, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.

64. Chrysler, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344; Goldsmith, 73 A.D.2d 16, 425 N.Y.S.2d 561. For a discussion of Chrysler, see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Goldsmith, see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.

65. In both Illinois cases, the major life function test was applied in order to determine whether cancer was a handicap. Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d at 170-71, 432 N.E.2d at 274; Kubik, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19, 422 N.E.2d at 3-4. In Chrysler, the Wisconsin court defined handicap as "a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult; esp: a physical disability that limits the capacity to work." 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 345 (quoting Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974)). Finally, in Goldsmith, the New York court apparently relied on the following definition of disability found in the state Human Rights Law:

The term "disability" means a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, provided, however, that in all provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to physical, mental or medical conditions which are unrelated to the ability to engage in the activities involved in the job or occupation which a person claiming protection of this article shall be seeking.

N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(21) (McKinney 1976). This definition has recently been amended and now reads as follows:

The term "disability" means (a) a physical mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment, provided, however, that in all provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be limited to disabilities which do not prevent the complainant from performing in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or occupation sought or held.

Because there is no uniform definition of the term handicap or disabi-
li ty under the various state statutes, discrimination actions brought by
the same cancer victim in two different states could yield conflicting re-
results. It is submitted, for example, that a cancer patient who has under-
gone a successful colostomy would probably be protected under the
New York Human Rights law, but might go unprotected under Wiscon-
sin law. The New York law defines disability as "a physical ... impair-
ment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological
conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function . . . ." 66 Such a plaintiff probably could establish a disability under this
statute by arguing that his "impairment" (i.e., a colostomy) resulted
from a "physiological condition" (i.e., cancer) and prevents the "exer-
cise of a normal bodily function" (i.e., defecating normally). In Wiscon-
sin, such a plaintiff would be required to establish that his colostomy was
a "physical ... impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult
or limits the capacity to work." 67 If he is otherwise fit and fully able to
perform the functions of the job he seeks, the plaintiff could have dif-
culty proving that he is handicapped under the Wisconsin statute. 68 It is

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Each plaintiff was afflicted with a different type of cancer. See supra notes
41, 44, 49 & 57 and accompanying text. The five-year survival rate for each type
of cancer was not correlated to the finding of a handicap. See infra note 74. For
example, the plaintiff in Goldsmith had a higher chance of survival than did the
plaintiff in Kubik. Goldsmith was found disabled, while Kubik was not. See supra
notes 42 & 59 and infra note 74 and accompanying text. For a further discussion
of the five-year survival rates for different types of cancer, see infra note 74.

68. On the other hand, if the plaintiff asserts that his impairment limits his
capacity to work, his employer might counter that the plaintiff is thus unqualified
for the job. By placing the plaintiff in a position where he is forced to argue that
his physical impairment has an adverse effect on his capacity to achieve and/or
work, the Wisconsin statute brings the plaintiff close to arguing that he would be
unable to adequately perform a particular job. This is a precarious position be-
cause Wisconsin employers are under no obligation to hire unqualified handi-
1985).

The Illinois "major life functions" test poses a problem similar to that
posed by the Wisconsin statute. By proving an impairment of a major life func-
tion, Illinois plaintiffs have come very close to arguing impairment of a work-
alleging that spina bifida posed no barrier to plaintiff's work performance dis-
missed). In Illinois, as in Wisconsin, an employer is under no obligation to hire
employees who cannot perform their jobs. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 68, § 1-
105(I)(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). For a further discussion of the major life
functions test and the problems it poses, see Note, supra note 37, at 727.

Although Illinois has recently adopted a new statutory definition of handi-
cap, it is submitted that the new definition, like its predecessor, is circular and,
1986) (handicap defined as "determinable physical or mental characteristic . . .
which . . . is unrelated to the . . . ability to perform the duties of a particular job
submitted that this inconsistency is an inevitable result of the states' different definitions of handicap or disability.

Another reason why the state anti-discrimination statutes are inadequate to protect cancer victims is the fact that cancer is not merely one disease.\textsuperscript{69} Cancer has been defined as "many different illnesses requiring a wide range of treatment."\textsuperscript{70} Because cancer includes "many illnesses", case-by-case adjudication of claims brought under state fair employment acts will not produce strong precedents. It is suggested, for example, that a state court's finding that leukemia is a protected handicap might have little precedential value in a later case brought by a breast cancer patient.

A final reason why the state statutes provide inadequate protection to cancer victims is that many cancer victims are not disabled at all and thus cannot benefit from existing anti-discrimination laws.\textsuperscript{71} Without a disability and without a legal remedy, most cancer patients, nevertheless, face the discriminatory attitudes of employers and co-workers.\textsuperscript{72}

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\textsuperscript{69} See \textit{Hearings}, supra note 2, at 18, 20.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Hearings}, supra note 2, at 20. Individuals with different forms of cancer have varying survival rates. See infra note 74. Moreover, different forms of cancer have significantly different effects on productive employment. \textit{Hearings}, supra note 2, at 18. A study conducted by Greenleigh Associates and published by the American Cancer Society indicates that one-seventh of those with prostate cancer lost job income, while one-half of those with lung cancer suffered such a loss. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Hearings}, supra note 2, at 15, 29, 38, and 41. Dr. McKenna compared the disability question to a Catch-22 situation. \textit{Id.} at 15. He recounted the dilemma of a man who had undergone a laryngectomy for cancer of the larynx. \textit{Id.} The man was refused new employment by 26 employers but yet was unable to collect disability payments because he no longer had cancer. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{72} See \textit{id}. at 32-33. See also King, \textit{After Cancer: Trouble on the Job?}, \textit{Cancer News}, Autumn 1984, at 6; Canellos, \textit{Ill-Founded Notions: Job Discrimination Against Cancer Patients}, Boston Phoenix, Jan. 15, 1985, at 1. According to studies performed by Frances Feldman for the American Cancer Society, the myth that cancer is contagious has resulted in both dismissals and behavioral abuse by co-workers. Canellos, \textit{supra}, at 4.

Unlike other serious diseases, cancer carries with it a stigma and a host of phobias that may be felt by co-workers as well as employers. According to Dr. McKenna, President of the American Cancer Society, the prognoses of cancer victims are often viewed with pessimism. \textit{See Hearings}, supra note 2, at 20, 32-33. Dr. McKenna compared a person having a cancer history to one having a history of heart disease. \textit{Id.} at 32-33. He stated: "Cancer is singled out from all the other diseases. Most people are very optimistic about heart disease. . . . You either win or lose, but you go back to work. You never think you could get another heart attack, which a significant number of people do. . . ." \textit{Id.} at 32. McKenna noted that while employers rarely discriminate against a former heart patient, employers often discriminate against former cancer patients. \textit{Id.} at 33. The myth that cancer is uniquely fatal has prompted employers to assume that a cancer patient has no future and thus should be written off the company's long-range plans. King, \textit{supra}, at 6.
B. The Need for Protection

Recent statistical studies have highlighted the extent of cancer-related job discrimination and the often erroneous beliefs upon which discriminatory actions are based. It is important to note at the outset that a diagnosis of cancer is not the equivalent of a death sentence. Depending on the location of the cancer, five year survival rates are as high as ninety-three percent. Moreover, cancer patients are not characterized by decreased work performance or absenteeism. In fact, cancer-related job absences are infrequent when compared with lengthy absences caused by other illnesses. A major insurance company has selectively employed cancer victims since 1957. After fourteen years of this practice, the company found no significant differences between the turnover rates, absenteeism and work performance of the cancer victims and other employees. The company concluded that "the selective employment of persons with cancer history, in positions for which they are...

73. For a discussion of these studies, see infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.

74. Learning to Survive, supra note 1, at 73. A table showing the five-year survival rates for diagnoses made between 1976 and 1981 of 20 types of cancer indicates a great disparity between different types of cancer. Id. Survival rates range from 93% (thyroid) to 2% (pancreas). Id.

It is interesting to note the survival rates for the four types of cancer which afflicted plaintiffs in the state court cases discussed supra notes 28-60 and accompanying text. As set forth in the Newsweek study, the survival rate for uterine cancer is 85% (Lyons); for Hodgkin's disease 73% (Goldsmith); for colon cancer 52% (Kingsburg and Kubik) and for leukemia 32% (Chrysler). Id. The study also revealed the following survival rates for 16 other types of cancer: thyroid (93%), testis (86%), melanoma (80%), breast (74%), bladder (73%), prostate (70%), cervix (67%), kidney (50%), rectum (49%), non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (48%), ovary (38%), brain (23%), stomach (16%), lung (13%), esophagus (5%) and pancreas (2%). Id. The sources for the Newsweek study were the National Cancer Institute and the American Cancer Society. Id.

75. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18 (prepared statement of Robert J. McKenna, M.D., President, American Cancer Society). Dr. McKenna cited a study showing that the turnover rate, absenteeism, and work performance of a selected group of employees with a cancer history were comparable to that of the company population. Id.

76. Id. at 16-17. In a class of illnesses causing prolonged job absences, cancer is ranked 14th most frequent for men and 15th for women. Id. The length of sick leave due to cancer averaged 93.3 days for men and 108.3 days for women. Id.

77. Id. at 18. Between 1957 and 1971, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company hired 74 applicants with a cancer history. Id. This number was slightly more than 6% of the company's new employees during the study period. Id.

78. Id. Of the cancer patients hired, 55% were still working at the end of the study; 5% were on disability; and 42% had left their jobs, "but most left voluntarily and for a variety of reasons." Dotson, Only a Ghost of a Chance, Texas Business, Aug. 1977, at 18, 23. Less than 3% developed a recurrence of cancer. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18. During the study period, none of the cancer survivors were discharged and none died. Dotson, supra, at 23.
physically qualified, is a sound industrial practice.' 

Despite these positive indications, cancer victims are facing dismissals, demotions, job rejection and hostility. At a hearing on the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, Dr. Robert J. McKenna, President of the American Cancer Society, presented statistical evidence suggesting that twenty-five to forty-five percent of workers with a cancer history experience job rejection. According to his data, over fifty percent of such workers encounter some discriminatory treatment on the job.

The reasons for cancer-related job discrimination fall into two basic categories: fear of absenteeism and skyrocketing group health insurance premiums. According to Dr. McKenna, some employers expect cancer victims to be absent frequently because of treatments, cancer recurrence, or complications from prior treatment. Employers also face the more tangible risk that their group health insurance premiums will rise if they hire a cancer victim who might need expensive treatments in the future. Insurance discrimination has been called an "economic excuse not to hire a cancer patient."

C. The Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act

It is evident that a federal statute is needed to adequately protect cancer patients and survivors from job discrimination. Such a statute,

79. Dotson, supra note 78, at 23.
80. Hearings, supra note 2, at 19. Dr. McKenna classifies the work-discrimination encountered by cancer patients into three categories: 1) dismissals, demotions, and other actions taken by employers, 2) shunning and overt hostility of co-workers, and 3) hostility of the patient himself used as a defense against the anticipated actions of others. Id. It is suggested that this classification is very broad and that the inclusion of the third category of work-discrimination is debatable.
81. Id. Dr. McKenna cited three studies performed by Frances Feldman for the American Cancer Society. Id. These studies revealed that 22% of white-collar workers with a cancer history have faced job rejection. Id. With respect to blue-collar workers and youths with a cancer history, the figure was 45%. Id.
82. Id. The Feldman studies indicated that the occurrence of work-related problems encountered by the white-collar, blue-collar, and youth workers were 54%, 84% and 51% respectively. Id. The findings of the Feldman studies were subsequently confirmed by the Greenleigh study, which was also funded by the American Cancer Society. See id.
83. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 16.
84. Id. Excessive absenteeism would pose the greatest problem to smaller companies which would be unable to shift work from an employee who is undergoing cancer treatment to one who is not. Boston Globe, Nov. 28, 1983, at 43.
85. Hearings, supra note 2, at 50-51 (prepared statement of Ivan Barofsky, Ph.D., Institute of Social Oncology). Most group health plans have experience-adjusted premiums which fluctuate according to how much insurance the group uses. Canellos, supra note 72, at 4.
86. Canellos, supra note 72, at 4 (citing Sarah Splaver, President, Cancer Hopefuls United for Mutual Support).
87. To illustrate the need for a federal law expressly protecting cancer pa-
the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, has been introduced by Rep. Mario Biaggi in the House of Representatives. The stated purposes of the Act are fourfold: 1) to discourage cancer-related job discrimination; 2) to encourage employers to make reasonable accommodations for persons with a cancer history; 3) to publicize the "employability" of those with a cancer history; and 4) to encourage further legislation to protect cancer victims from other types of discrimination.

The Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act would not affect rights or remedies provided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Rather, the Act would amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to specifically include those with a cancer history as a protected class. The Act contents from job discrimination, a proponent of the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, a bill presently before Congress, advanced the following telling statistics. Hearings, supra note 2, at 37. While only 1% of all actions brought between 1974 and 1978 under the Federal Rehabilitation Act have been brought by cancer victims, 10% of the discrimination complaints filed in California are filed by persons with a cancer history. Id. at 37. According to the proponent of these statistics, they show "that the current Federal law isn't really adequate to handle the situation." Id. It is submitted that this statistical discrepancy may have resulted from the fact that California cancer victims, unlike those protected under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, enjoy clear and specific protection. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980).

The strength of that protection was exhibited in Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., No. FEP 80-81-C7-058 (Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n Cal. Dec. 7, 1984). In Kingsburg, the plaintiff had a history of colon cancer. Slip op. at 7. While the defendant employer disputed the plaintiff's allegation of physical handicap, the defendant did not contest the plaintiff's allegation that she had a medical condition within the meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 18-20. The term "medical condition" is defined in the California Act as "any health impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical evidence." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980). It would thus appear that a showing of rehabilitated or cured cancer, based on competent medical evidence, indisputably triggers the protections of the California Act. It is submitted that such an automatic trigger is needed under federal law in order to protect all cancer victims. For a further discussion of the California statute and the Kingsburg case, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.

88. H.R. 1294, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 22,815 (1985). The bill was introduced on February 27, 1985, and was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor. 131 CONG. REC. at 22,815.
89. H.R. 1294 § 2(b)(1)-(4).
90. H.R. 1294. Section 4 of the bill provides that "[t]he amendments made by this Act do not affect any right, remedy, obligation, or responsibility under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." H.R. 1294 § 4. For a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act as it relates to cancer victims, see supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
91. H.R. 1294 § 3(a). The term "cancer history" is defined as "the status of any individual who has, or has had cancer, or who is diagnosed as having, or having had cancer. For the purposes of this subsection the term 'cancer' means any disease characterized by uncontrolled growth and spread of abnormal cells." Id.
tains three basic substantive provisions. First, it would prohibit employers from requiring a person with a cancer history to meet unnecessarily high medical standards or to reveal unnecessary medical information as a condition of employment. Second, it would prohibit labor organizations from requiring persons with a cancer history to submit to unnecessary examinations or reveal unnecessary medical information. Finally, it would require that employers make a good faith effort at reasonable accommodation of employees with a cancer history. By in-

Title VII presently provides for equal employment opportunity by prohibiting discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). In addition to the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, there is now another bill before the House which would amend Title VII. That bill would make the handicapped a protected class under Title VII. H.R. 370, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. 2,104 (1985).


For the text of the substantive provisions of the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, see infra notes 93-95 & 99 and accompanying text.

93. H.R. 1294 § 3(b). The Act would make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, employment agency or labor organization to

(A) require, as a condition of employment, an employee or prospective employee with a cancer history to meet medical standards which are unrelated to job requirements, or to require such employee or prospective employee to submit to a medical examination or reveal any medical information unless such examination or information is necessary to reveal qualifications essential to job performance; or

(B) reveal any confidential medical information concerning such an employee or prospective employee without the express written consent of such employee or prospective employee.

Id.

94. Id. The Act provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to require a member or potential member with a cancer history to submit to a medical examination or reveal any medical information relating to cancer history without the express written consent of such member or potential member unless such examination or information is necessary to reveal qualifications essential to membership in such labor organization.

Id.

95. Id. The Act provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail to make a good faith effort to explore whether reasonable accommodations may be made for an employee or prospective employee with a
cluding people with a cancer history among those protected by Title VII, the Act would give cancer patients and survivors a private right of action against their employers.96

In order to prove a prima facie case under Title VII, a complainant would have to show (1) that he or she has a cancer history; (2) that he or she is qualified for a particular job; (3) that, despite his or her qualifications, he or she was rejected, fired, or otherwise discriminated against by an employer; and (4) that, after his or her rejection, termination, demotion, etc., the employer continued to seek employees from persons of complainant's qualifications.97

Several defenses would be available to employers. First, an employer could rebut a prima facie case by articulating "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the allegedly discriminatory action.98 Further, the Act itself provides that an employer would not be guilty of an unlawful employment practice if he could establish either that a cancer victim could not reasonably be accommodated without undue hardship or that the cancer victim would be unable to safely perform the job requirements.99 Two general Title VII defenses also would be available

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96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). Under Title VII, an aggrieved person may bring a civil action against his or her employer or prospective employer if one of three conditions is met. Id. These conditions are 1) the dismissal of a charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2) the Commission's failure to bring a civil action within 180 days of the filing of such charge, or 3) the Commission's failure to enter into a conciliation agreement to which the aggrieved person is a party. Id. Cancer victims in some jurisdictions who are employed by Federal contractors presently do not enjoy a private right of action under the Federal Rehabilitation Act. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

97. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court established the elements of a prima facie case for Title VII individual disparate treatment claims. See id.

98. Id. The burden would then shift back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's stated reason for his action was in fact a pretext. Id. at 804.

99. H.R. 1294 § 3. The Act provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge or classify, an employee or prospective employee with a cancer history if—

(A) the employer demonstrates that such employer is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee or prospective employee to enable such employee or prospective employee to fulfill the job requirements without undue hardship to the employer; or

(B) the employee or prospective employee is unable to perform the
to employers accused of discriminating against cancer victims: the bona fide occupational qualification defense and the bona fide seniority or merit system defense. Under the bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) defense, an employer would prevail if he established that the absence of a cancer history is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [his] business or enterprise." It is submitted that it would be extremely difficult for defendant employers to prove this defense, especially since the bfoq defense has been deemed "only the narrowest of exceptions to the general rule requiring equality of employment opportunities." Under the bona fide seniority or merit system defense, an employer would prevail if he could establish that his allegedly discriminatory actions were taken pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system and that the system itself was not "the result of an intention to discriminate."

D. Analysis of the Act

It is submitted that the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act would provide much needed federal protection for cancer patients and survivors. It is submitted, however, that while some provisions job requirements in a manner which would not endanger the safety of such employee, prospective employee, or others, regardless of the availability of reasonable accommodations.

Id.

100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982). This section provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice to discriminate "on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . ." Id.

101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). This section provides:
    Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

Id.


103. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (holding that being male was a bona fide occupational qualification for "contact" positions in maximum security male prison). It is hard to imagine a situation where the absence of a cancer history would be a bona fide occupational qualification.


105. It has been argued that the extension of Title VII protections to the handicapped would be "too complicated, expensive, and time-consuming";
should be enacted as proposed, others require changes that would impose more stringent obligations on employers.  

1. **Scope of Protected Class**

It is suggested that the Act properly circumscribes the class of persons protected. The Act's definition of "cancer history" extends to those who have or have had cancer and to those diagnosed as having or having had cancer. Thus, individuals who have recovered from the disease but who still suffer from its stigma would enjoy the same protection as those currently undergoing treatment. Moreover, individuals who never in fact have had cancer but who have been diagnosed as having cancer would also be protected. In commenting on the Act, the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco ("Society") has suggested that the definition of cancer history should be expanded to include those with precancerous conditions, those erroneously perceived as having cancer, and those deemed to be future cancer risks. It is submitted, however, that such an expansion would sweep too broadly. The Society has offered no statistics or case histories showing that the additional classes it


It is submitted that although the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act would undoubtedly spawn a great deal of litigation, its value to the growing class of unprotected cancer survivors far outweighs any administrative cost or inconvenience it may cause.

106. The following discussion will substantially track a statement prepared by the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco ("Society") and presented at the June 6, 1985 Hearings on the Act. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 21-27.

107. H.R. 1294 § 3(a). For the text of this section, see supra note 91.

108. H.R. 1294 § 3(a). For the text of this section, see supra note 91.


110. Hearings, supra note 2, at 23-24 (prepared statement, Legal Aid Society of San Francisco). In support of its suggestion of an expanded definition of cancer history, the Society advanced the cases of several hypothetical plaintiffs who would not fall within the Act's protections because of its present limited definition of cancer history. Id. According to the Society, the following plaintiffs, deserving of protection, would not find protection under the Act as drafted: 1) a woman with a family history of cancer who was at risk of developing the disease herself; 2) a man rumored to have cancer; 3) a man whose employer mistakenly believed he had cancer; and 4) a woman who has a breast examination. Id. In order to bring these hypothetical plaintiffs within the Act's ambit, the Legal Aid Society suggested that language similar to that in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act be adopted, i.e., "related to or associated with . . . cancer." Id. at 24. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980).
seeks to protect have suffered employment discrimination. Lacking such a demonstration, it is suggested that the definition of cancer history is adequate as drafted because it extends to all individuals who have had or have been diagnosed as having the disease.

2. Disclosure of Medical History

It is submitted that the Act provides sufficient safeguards against the disclosure of unnecessary medical records. The Act makes it an unlawful employment practice for employers to require individuals with a cancer history to "meet medical standards which are unrelated to job requirements," or to "submit to a medical examination or reveal any medical information unless such examination or information is necessary to reveal qualifications essential to job performance." In this respect, the Act tracks the language used in regulations promulgated under the Federal Rehabilitation Act which limit the use and scope of pre-employment examinations and inquiries. It is submitted that such an approach is beneficial because it will force employers to articulate job-related medical qualifications and will minimize the risk of unwarranted invasions into the privacy of cancer patients and survivors.

111. H.R. 1294 § 3(b). For the text of this provision, see supra notes 93-95.
112. H.R. 1294 § 3(b).
113. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.706(a)-(d) (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (1985). The former regulation sets forth standards for equal employment opportunity in the federal government. 29 C.F.R. § 1613. It provides in pertinent part that an agency may not conduct a preemployment medical examination and may not make preemployment inquiry of an applicant as to whether the applicant is a handicapped person or as to the nature or severity of a handicap. An agency may, however, make preemployment inquiry into an applicant's ability to meet the medical qualification requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation, of the position in question, i.e., the minimum abilities necessary for safe and efficient performance of the duties of the position in question.

29 C.F.R. § 1613.706(a). There are two exceptions to this general rule. Preemployment examinations of the handicapped may be conducted if "[a]ll entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of handicap." Id., § 1613.706(b). Also, employers may request applicants to voluntarily fill out questionnaires designed to evaluate the employers' affirmative action programs. Id., § 1613.706(c).

Part 84 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations regulates handicap discrimination in federally funded programs. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11-.14 (1985). The regulation provides in pertinent part that

[a] recipient may not conduct a preemployment medical examination or may not make preemployment inquiry of an applicant as to whether the applicant is a handicapped person or as to the nature or severity of a handicap. A recipient may, however, make preemployment inquiry into an applicant's ability to perform job-related functions.

45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a). Exceptions exist for 1) the voluntary disclosure of medical information for purposes of remedial or affirmative action and for 2) the conducting of medical tests required of all applicants. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(b)-(c).

114. See Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). In Doe, the plaintiff, who had had a nervous breakdown in the past, applied to
3. Requirements for Reasonable Accommodation

It is submitted that the Act should be reworded to impose an affirmative duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation for individuals with a cancer history. As drafted, the Act merely requires employers "to make a good faith effort to explore whether reasonable accommodations may be made." It is submitted that this language is insufficient, because even if employers discover reasonable accommodations in their "explorations", they are under no duty to make such accommodations. Moreover, by asserting that their "explorations" had been fruitless, employers might successfully defend a discrimination action brought by a protected individual with a cancer history.

The Society has suggested that the Act should require employers to provide reasonable accommodation to individuals with a cancer history unless such accommodation would cause an undue hardship. Furthermore, the Society has suggested that the meaning of undue hardship should be clarified by providing a statutory list of factors to be considered in determining whether accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. It is submitted that the notion of undue hardship is adequately set forth through the Act's list of "factors relevant to the determination of reasonableness." Relevant factors in-
clude "administrative costs, cost of the physical accommodations, the
cost of disruption of existing work practices, the size of the employer's
business, and the safety of existing and potential employees." 120 It is
submitted that if a court examines each of these factors and concludes
that accommodation is not reasonable, the court has necessarily deter-
mined that such accommodation imposes an undue hardship. 121

A final suggestion of the Society regarding reasonable accommoda-
tion merits brief mention. The Society noted that, in the religious dis-
crimination context, "cases have essentially held that an accommodation
which imposes anything more than a 'de minimus' cost in wages or loss
of efficiency would be an impermissible hardship to the employer." 122
The Society proposed that the Act explicitly assert that the de minimus
standard does not apply under its provisions. 123 It is submitted that this
proposal should be followed. A de minimus standard is not suitable be-
cause it would render an employer's duty to accommodate individuals
with a cancer history almost meaningless.

4. Statutory Defenses

It is submitted that the statutory defenses afforded employers under
the present bill must be revised in order to limit their scope. Under the
Act as drafted, employers can avoid liability (1) if they "demonstrate"
that a person with a cancer history is unable "to fulfill the job require-
ments without undue hardship to the employer," or (2) if the cancer
victim is unable to safely perform "job requirements." 124 It is submit-
ted that the Act must clearly establish that the employer has the burden
of proving the second defense as well as the first. 125 This clarification

120. Id.

121. Although it is submitted that the adoption of the Society's "clarifica-
tions" regarding undue hardship would not substantively alter the Act, it is submit-
ted that the adoption of the Society's recommendation that statutory
examples of reasonable accommodation be inserted would be beneficial. Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 25. The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act
provide the following examples of reasonable accommodation: making facilities
accessible to the handicapped, job restructuring, and modification of work
schedules. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(b); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b). It is submitted that
the two latter accommodations would be especially helpful to the cancer patient
or survivor and should be mentioned in the Act. Because of cancer-related sur-
gery, individuals may be unable to perform all functions of a particular job; this
inability could potentially necessitate job restructuring. Other cancer victims
might be forced to undergo radiation or chemo-therapy during regular work
hours; this would probably necessitate modification of work schedules.

U.S. 63 (1977) (costs incurred in allowing member of Worldwide Church of God
take Saturdays off constituted undue hardship under de minimis standard).

123. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 25.

124. H.R. 1294 § 3(b). For the full text of this provision, see supra notes
93-95.

125. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 26-27 (statement of Legal Aid Society of
San Francisco). While the employer must demonstrate the incapacity defense,
could be accomplished by inserting the words "the employer demonstr- 
strates that" before the existing language of the safety defense.126 It is 
further submitted that the term "job requirements" should be replaced 
by the term "essential job functions."127 In its analysis of the Act, the 
Legal Aid Society of San Francisco correctly noted that, under the Act's 
current language, "cancer survivors who could perform all but the ines- 
tessential job duties might not have any protection" because they techni- 
cally could not fulfill the "job requirements" of a particular job.128 This 
problem would be obviated if the essential job function test were used.

5. Statutory Relief

Finally, it is submitted that the relief provided under Title VII 
would afford cancer patients and survivors adequate protection. Under 
Title VII, the following remedies may be awarded: injunctive relief and 
"such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but 
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without 
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appro- 
priate."129 Traditionally, this language has been interpreted to preclude 
he has no obligation under the Act to demonstrate the safety defense. Id. See 
H.R. 1294 § 3(b).

126. The safety defense would then read:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge or classify, an employee or pro- 
spective employee with a cancer history if— (B) [the employer dem- 
onstrates that] the employee or prospective employee is unable to 
perform the job requirements in a manner which would not endanger 
the safety of such employee, prospective employee, or others, regard-
less of the availability of reasonable accommodations.
See H.R. 1294 § 3(b).

127. The essential job functions test appears in the regulations implement-
ing the Rehabilitation Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1985). This test is used to 
show whether a particular selection criterion is discriminatory. Prewitt v. United 
States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit as-
serted that 
[t]he test is whether a handicapped individual who meets all employ- 
ment criteria except for the challenged discriminatory criterion "can 
perform the essential functions of the position in question without en-
dangering the health and safety of the individuals or others." If the 
individual can so perform, he must not be subjected to discrimination. 
Id. at 307 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.702(f) & .703).

128. Hearings, supra note 2, at 26. To illustrate the difference between job 
requirements and essential job functions, the Society advanced the following 
case history:
[A]n individual with paralysis of his upper left arm and with a hearing 
disability applied for a job as a police dispatcher. His inability to 
change a teletype roll was not seen as an essential job function because 
others at his work station could load the teletype. In contrast, the re-
quirement of normal hearing was related to an essential job task and 
thus there was no duty to accommodate.

Id.

recovery of compensatory or punitive damages. In addition, the prevailing party in a Title VII action may be awarded costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. It is submitted that cancer patients or survivors who seek the protections of the Act are entitled to no more than the traditional Title VII "make whole" relief. There is no rational basis for according cancer victims greater rights than those discriminated against because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It is, therefore, submitted that there is no need to add a remedies provision to the Act.

CONCLUSION

Cancer patients and survivors are currently faced with job discrimination and are inadequately protected from such discrimination. Express statutory protection is limited, and suits brought under state fair employment laws spawn inconsistent results. Recent statistics have shown that cancer-related job discrimination is prevalent. It is submitted that this growing problem must be addressed at the national level. The Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, particularly if the changes discussed above are implemented, is a workable solution to the problem of employment discrimination against cancer patients and survivors and is necessary to assure that every individual afflicted with cancer will enjoy the same protections upon returning to the job market.

Lisa Bazemore

130. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1452 (2d ed. 1983).
132. For a discussion of the limited express statutory protection, see supra notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of these inconsistent results, see supra notes 33-60 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of these statistics, see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
135. For the text of the suggested changes, see supra notes 115-128 and accompanying text.