And the Winner Is - Interpreting the Lead Plaintiff and the Lead Counsel Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

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"The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the securities markets . . ."1

I. Introduction

A corporation announces that it discovered "accounting irregularities" in its financial statements.2 As a result, the value of its stock drops by more than 47% and shareholders lose more than $20 billion in market capitalization.3 The injured investors decide to join their claims and file a


2. See generally Paul A. Ferrillo, New Tide Rising in Securities Class Action Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2000, at 1 n.8 (defining accounting "irregularity" as "intentional misstatements or omissions of disclosures"); Lawrence Richter Quinn, Accounting Sleuths, STRATEGIC FINANCE, Oct. 1, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 11723026 (discussing reasons for number of highly publicized accounting irregularities cases over past couple of years). "The pressure to meet Wall Street expectations apparently remains the predominant reason why companies commit accounting fraud." Id. at 4-5.

3. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that defendant announced accounting irregularities in its Form 10-K Annual Report filed with SEC, which caused its stock to fall 47% next day, additional 9% four months later and additional 11% one month later); In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that stock declined in value during alleged fraud from $67 to $13); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that defendant announced in press release that defendant would have to restate its earnings for past year based on "improperly recognized" $40 million causing stock to decrease dramatically).

Public acknowledgment of accounting irregularities may cause a loss in share value that may result in a substantial loss in market capital. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 221-22 (recognizing that shareholders of defendant corporation lost more than $20 billion in market capital); Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (stating that firms represented institutional and individual investors with losses exceeding $120 million).
class action lawsuit for securities fraud. The court now must decide who will represent the class as the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel.

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Rule 23(a).


It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

(a) To employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.


5. See generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (stating that in class action court appoints class representatives); 5-23 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.25 (2001) (stating conditions for appointing lead plaintiff and lead counsel). Rule 23, at the outset, requires that the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class as a condition to maintenance of a class action. See id. It has been noted that to determine whether the interests of the class will be represented adequately:

courts consider the adequacy of both the named representative and class counsel. Thus, adequate representation requires two elements: (1) the class representative must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class, and (2) class counsel must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation. In determining the adequacy of the named representative, courts also consider whether the representative will vigorously advocate the class claims.

Id.

There are benefits and drawbacks in having class representatives act on behalf of the class. See Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 308, 308 n.1 (1985) (comparing benefits and potential conflicts arising from courts hearing class actions by representative parties). “The class action device enables courts to hear the claims of a large group of individuals through class representatives and class attorneys... [T]he absentee plaintiffs must rely on the class representatives and class attorneys for the adequate representation of their rights.” Id. at 308 n.3.

The class representatives have a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the class. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (stating that class representative is volunteer who assumes position of fiduciary nature); In re Oxford

The PSLRA establishes procedural requirements to allow other lead plaintiffs the opportunity to seek appointment. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-5 (stating filing requirements for securities fraud class action). Following the initial filing of a securities fraud class action, the filing plaintiff must publish notice of the suit to allow other class members the opportunity to file a motion for lead plaintiff appointment. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (stating filing requirements for securities fraud class action). Within ninety days after the notice is published, the court must appoint the most adequate plaintiff. See id. (stating filing requirements for securities fraud class action). For a further discussion of the statutory requirements for appointing the lead plaintiff and lead counsel, see infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.

7. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (noting Congress' intent to empower investors so that they, not their lawyers, control securities litigation); see also William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 Geo. L.J. 371, 397 (2001) (describing that "PSLRA was meant, in no uncertain terms, to return securities class actions to clients"); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2065 (stating that plaintiffs' attorneys "typically do not rely on named plaintiffs for vital testimony, do not bargain with them over fees they will be paid, and do not require named plaintiffs' approval of proposed settlements"). For a further discussion of problems associated with securities fraud class actions before the enactment of the PSLRA, see infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.


9. Compare In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 269 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that PSLRA permits aggregating financial interests of unrelated investors), In
Further, courts disagree whether the PSLRA permits them to auction the position of lead counsel to the lowest bidder without the plaintiff's prior approval.10

This disagreement among federal courts has received considerable attention, especially within the past year.11 In August 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the first federal appellate court to address both issues, and found that aggregation was permissible but court-ordered auctions were impermissible.12 Concerned, however, by the growing use of auctions by federal courts, the Third Circuit appointed a Task Force to evaluate their permissibility under the PSLRA.13 In October 2001, the Task Force concluded, in a finding that


Commentators have also published in 2001 their findings and opinions about aggregation and auctions. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 53-104 (discussing problems associated with aggregation and court-ordered auctions in Spring/Summer 2001 issue); HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 1-120 (discussing auctions in descriptive study published on August 29, 2001).

12. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 268-83 (finding that aggregating multiple unrelated investors is permissible under PSLRA and finding that auction is impermissible as matter of first resort). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision in Cendant pertaining to the issue of aggregation, see infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision on auctions, see infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.

13. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that Task Force was convened to “evaluate emerging practice of several district court judges throughout country of selecting class counsel and setting fees through a bidding or auction process”). The Task Force Report specifically stated:
may significantly impact securities fraud class actions, that courts should defer to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel under a standard of review similar to the business judgment rule.\(^{14}\) Although time will tell how much of an impact this finding will have among federal courts, the business judgment rule is an appropriate standard of review.\(^ {15}\)

On January 30, 2001, the opinion author, acting as Chief Circuit Judge and Presiding Officer of the Third Circuit Judicial Council, announced the formation of a Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel whose primary duty is to assess the propriety and efficacy of the use of the auction method in its various applications, and to formulate recommendations for the bench, bar, and public.


Some of the questions presented to the Task Force included: (1) whether auctioning tends to create a better result for class members than traditional appointment, (2) whether the auction process unfairly benefits large firms over small firms, (3) whether auction discourages plaintiff’s attorneys from conducting a thorough pre-complaint investigation, (4) whether the costs associated with traditional appointment of class counsel (e.g., ex post fee determinations) are eliminated or reduced by auctioning and (5) whether the costs associated with auctioning are greater or less than those associated with traditional appointment.


14. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 88 (recommending that "scrutiny akin to the business judgment rule, ordinarily applied in the context of corporate board decisions, should be applied to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel and to the fee arrangements"). In reaching its decision, the Task Force received information from practicing attorneys who supported the use of the business judgment rule. See id. app. B, at 5-6 (statement by Keith Johnson) (stating that court must defer to counsel selection decisions made by lead plaintiff under business judgment rule). According to other practicing attorneys, the business judgment rule would create a presumption that the decision will be left undisturbed as long as it was made in good faith and on an informed basis. See id. app. B, at 5 (statement by Stuart M. Grant & Jay W. Eisenhofer) (supporting use of business judgment rule).

This Comment argues that, consistent with the statutory text of the PSLRA, aggregating the financial interests of a small number of investors is permissible; however, auctions as a first choice among courts are impermissible under the business judgment rule. Part II of this Comment discusses the PSLRA. Part III summarizes court analyses of aggregation. Part IV argues that the PSLRA permits aggregating a small number of investors. Part V discusses court-ordered auctions and the business judgment rule. Part VI summarizes court analyses of court-ordered auctions and the Task Force's analysis of auctions. Part VII argues that a court must defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel under a standard of review similar to the business judgment rule, but under limited circumstances may order an auction.

II. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995

Before Congress enacted the PSLRA, securities class actions typically were characterized as "abusive" and "lawyer-driven" lawsuits in which client investors had little or no control over their counsel's decisions. Courts traditionally appointed the lead plaintiff and the lead counsel on a "first come, first serve" basis. As a result, lawyers were anxious to file the first

16. For a discussion and analysis of aggregation, see infra notes 75-115 and accompanying text. For a discussion and analysis of the business judgment rule and its applicability on auctions, see infra notes 184-235 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the PSLRA, see infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion and summary of court analyses of aggregation, see infra notes 44-74 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion and analysis that the PSLRA permits aggregation, see infra notes 75-102 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of court-ordered auctions and the background of the business judgment rule, see infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of court analyses and the Third Circuit Task Force findings on court-ordered auctions, see infra notes 144-83.
22. For a discussion and analysis of the business judgment rule as applied to court-ordered auctions, see infra notes 184-239 and accompanying text.
23. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4-12, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683-691 (determining, based on extensive testimony, that lawyers engaged in abusive practices in federal system by filing "strike suits"). The Securities Subcommittee recognized that lawyers filed suits on behalf of "professional plaintiffs" who made it "easy for lawyers to find individuals willing to play the role of wronged investor for purposes of filing a class action lawsuit." See id. at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 (recognizing need to eliminate abusive practice of lawyers selecting professional plaintiff in order to file frivolous suit). As a result, lawyers were known to have used securities class actions as their own personal vehicles. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2065 (acknowledging that plaintiffs' attorneys seek to advance their own financial interests, rather than interests of investors they purport to represent).
24. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (stating that courts appointed plaintiff and counsel based on who filed first complaint); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2062 (stating that plaintiffs' lawyers created "race to the courthouse" to file the first complaint).
complaint and refrained from engaging in adequate discovery or using
diligence to draft it.25 Further, lawyers selected “professional plaintiffs”
because these types of plaintiffs had little financial stake in the litigation
and therefore lacked incentive to monitor the lawyers effectively.26 As a
result, lawyers used class actions as their “personal vehicles” and made
decisions that reflected their personal financial interests rather than the in-
terests of the class.27

As a means of preventing abusive practices and increasing client con-
trol, Congress had two goals.28 First, Congress sought to have courts ap-
point a plaintiff with the largest financial stake in the suit because
presumably this type of plaintiff actively would monitor decisions made by
the lead counsel and seek the highest return.29 Second, Congress sought

    nizing that lawyers spent minimal time preparing complaints in securities class ac-
    tions because first lawsuit filed also renders lead plaintiff); Fisch, supra note 8, at 57
    (same). Three problems emerged as a consequence of appointing the lawyer who
    filed the first complaint:

First, lawyers [were] encouraged to file complaints rapidly and defer their
investigation of the merits of those complaints until after filing. Second,
to file a complaint rapidly, lawyers [were required to] seek out prospec-
tive plaintiffs rather than wait[ ] to be approached by a disgruntled inves-
tor. Finally, class counsel [was] appointed with little consideration given
to qualifications.

Id.

    ing that “proliferation of professional plaintiffs made it easy for lawyers to find
    individuals willing to play role of wronged investor for purposes of filing class ac-
    732 (noting that professional plaintiffs often received bounty payments or bonuses
    by counsel for serving as lead plaintiff); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp.
    2d 803, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (“All professional plaintiff share one very important
    characteristic in common, however: they have relatively small amounts of money
    invested in any one security and typically suffer relatively small financial losses.”).

27. See generally Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 4, at 2065 (recognizing that
    plaintiffs' attorneys advanced their own financial interests, rather than interests of
    investors they purported to represent, not only by taking initiative in filing class ac-
    tions, but by manner in which they conducted and agreed to settle such litiga-
    tion). In a settlement agreement, “plaintiffs’ attorneys typically did not rely on
    [the] plaintiffs for vital testimony, did not bargain with plaintiffs over the fees they
    [would] be paid, and did not require plaintiffs’ approval of the terms on which
    they propose[d] to settle class actions.” See id.

Further, the Rules of Professional Conduct rarely constrained attorneys in
class actions because class members failed to actively monitor their attorney’s con-
duct. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 8.14 (1986) (noting con-
tinued difficulty in preventing lawyer-driven litigation).

28. For a further discussion of reform of the securities class action system, see
    infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.

    ognizing that courts would be more confident of settlements negotiated under
    supervision of large investors because such investors have same interests as plaintiff
    class generally). The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
    intended this provision to increase the likelihood that institutional investors would
    serve as lead plaintiff by requiring that the plaintiff have the largest financial inter-
to have the lead plaintiff select and retain lead counsel as a further means for the plaintiff to control counsel's decisions.\textsuperscript{30} Therefore, in adopting the PSLRA, Congress incorporated both goals within the lead plaintiff provision and the lead counsel provision.\textsuperscript{31}

The lead plaintiff provision states, in pertinent part, that the court appoint as lead plaintiff "the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members . . . ."\textsuperscript{32} The provision further requires

\begin{quote}
Monitoring of counsel by institutional investors was expected to yield three benefits. See Weiss & Beckerman, \textit{supra} note 4, at 2121-23 (recognizing benefits of institutional investors serving as lead plaintiff). First, the size of the institutional investors' stakes suggests that they are likely to be reasonably diligent to ensure that plaintiffs' counsel effectively represent their interests and the interest of the plaintiff class. See \textit{id.} at 2121 (stating larger stakes corresponds to increase in diligence in monitoring counsel).

Second, the number of frivolous suits filed would supposedly decrease because the institutional plaintiffs would be more sensitive to their costs on publicly traded companies. See \textit{id.} at 2122 (noting that investors would want to discourage strike suits because such suits impose substantial costs directly on defendant corporations and indirectly on corporations' shareholders); R. Chris Heck, Comment, \textit{Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA}, \textit{66 U. CHI. L. Rev.} 1199, 1205 (1999) (recognizing that lawyers would hesitate to file frivolous suits if their actions were effectively monitored). Third, institutional investors would prevent more cases from settling because actual litigation would clarify substantive law and provide a public benefit. See Weiss & Beckerman, \textit{supra} note 4, at 2125 (stating that clarifying rules governing corporations' disclosure responsibilities should reduce corporations' costs).

As a result of the PSLRA, institutional investors "are developing ongoing relationships with plaintiffs' firms and increasing sophistication in evaluating and negotiating fee arrangements." See Fisch, \textit{supra} note 8, at 62 (discussing one result of encouraging institutional investors under PSLRA).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} See \textit{15 U.S.C.} § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (stating that plaintiff selects and retains counsel with approval of court); see also \textit{S. Rep.} No. 104-98, at 11-12, \textit{reprinted in} 1995 \textit{U.S.C.C.A.N.} 679, 690-91 (stating that Congress intended to permit most adequate plaintiff to choose counsel rather than have counsel choose plaintiff); Fisch, \textit{supra} note 8, at 78 (stating that lead counsel provision enhances lead plaintiff's ability to monitor the litigation) (citing Weiss & Beckerman, \textit{supra} note 4, at 2107).

\textsuperscript{31} See \textit{15 U.S.C.} § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (referring to statutory text of lead plaintiff and lead counsel provisions); Fisch, \textit{supra} note 8, at 60-62 (stating that Congress incorporated in PSLRA means to create greater client control).

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{15 U.S.C.} § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added). The lead plaintiff provision states, in scattered parts:

(i) IN GENERAL – Not later than 90 days after the date on which a notice is published . . . the court shall consider any motion made by a purported class member in response to the notice, including any motion by a class member who is not individually named as a plaintiff in the com-
that the court adopt a rebuttable presumption that "the most adequate plaintiff... is the person or group of persons that... in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and... otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The lead counsel provision states that "[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class."

Based on the lead plaintiff provision, courts must determine whether the prospective lead plaintiff has the largest financial interest, can adequately represent the interests of the class and can satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In determining a plaintiff's financial interest, courts typically evaluate three factors: (1) the number of shares purchased by the prospective plaintiff during the class period, (2) the total net funds expended by the plaintiffs during the class period and (3) the approximate losses suffered during the class period.


The lead counsel provision provides:

(v) SELECTION OF LEAD COUNSEL – The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.

As discussed later, when multiple investors are seeking appointment, some courts have aggregated or combined their financial interests in determining which plaintiff group has the largest financial interest.\(^{37}\)

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like the PSLRA, requires that the plaintiff adequately represent the interests of the class.\(^{38}\) In determining the adequacy of the prospective plaintiff under the PSLRA and Rule 23, several courts have evaluated whether the investor is able and willing to vigorously represent the claims of the class, has no conflicting claims with those of the class and can select competent class counsel to represent the class.\(^{39}\)

656, 660-61 (D. Colo. 2000) (same). In Ribozyme, the court evaluated two groups of investors, the “Ribozyme Lead Plaintiffs” and the “Ribozyme Shareholders.” See id. (utilizing four-part test in determining lead plaintiff). The Ribozyme Lead Plaintiff purchased 8,500 shares during the class period, purchased 8,500 net shares during the class period, expended $154,250 in total net funds and suffered approximate losses of $75,093.75. See id. The Ribozyme Shareholders purchased 7,000 shares during the class period, purchased 5,000 net shares during the class period, expended $96,075 in net funds during the class period, and lost $53,428. See id. Based on this careful evaluation, the court determined that the Ribozyme Lead Plaintiff had the largest financial interest in the lawsuit. See id.

37. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 223 (finding district court decision appropriate in appointing presumptive lead plaintiff group whose alleged combined losses totaled more than $89 million while largest amount alleged by other movant group was $10.6 million); In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 (D.N.M. 1998) (finding that financial loss by six investors can be aggregated in appointing them as lead plaintiff); In re Informix Corp. Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23687, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1997) (evaluating aggregate losses of two movant groups before appointing lead plaintiff group); In re Ride, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25689 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 1997) (stating that “it is clear that the 'financial interest' of plaintiffs aligned together should be computed by aggregating their claims”). For a further discussion of aggregation, see infra notes 44-115 and accompanying text.

38. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (stating “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (3) (B) (i) (stating that court “shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members or the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members . . . .”).

39. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 265 (discussing criteria of court’s inquiry into adequacy of prospective plaintiffs); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Under Rule 23(a)(4), adequacy of representation is measured by two standards. First, class counsel must be ‘qualified, experienced and generally able’ to conduct the litigation. Second, the class members must not have interests that are ‘antagonistic’ to one another.”); Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[T]wo criteria for determining the adequacy of representation have been recognized. First, the named representatives must appear able to prosecute the action vigorously through qualified counsel, and second, the representatives must not have antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of the class.”); In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating court must determine whether plaintiff with largest loss has negotiated with counsel adequately in determining whether adequacy requirement is met); The Baan Co., 186 F.R.D. at 225 (stating that proposed lead plaintiff should provide full information about “group” in order for court to analyze group’s adequacy). The court in The Baan Co. stated:
Since Congress adopted the PSLRA, courts have disagreed over the proper interpretation of the lead plaintiff provision and the lead counsel provision.\textsuperscript{40} First, courts have disagreed over whether they can appoint multiple unrelated investors to serve as lead plaintiff and whether it can aggregate their financial interests in the litigation in determining which prospective lead plaintiff has the largest financial stake.\textsuperscript{41} Second, courts have disagreed over whether they should defer to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel or actively engage in the selection process for lead counsel.\textsuperscript{42} A proper interpretation of these two provisions is necessary to pro-

\textsuperscript{40} For a discussion of the disagreement among courts over the proper interpretation of the lead plaintiff provision, see \textit{infra} notes 44-74 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Compare} Cendant, 264 F.3d at 265 (determining that three unrelated pension funds can adequately represent class upon showing “willingness and ability to select competent class counsel and negotiate reasonable retainer agreement with that counsel”), and \textit{In re} Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that three unrelated investors satisfy adequacy requirement because no conflict of interest between any of plaintiffs and members of class existed and plaintiff obtained qualified, experienced counsel), \textit{with In re} Waste Mgt. Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 401, 413 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that a group of unrelated investors “cobbled together” by efforts of lawyer renders them inadequate).

\textsuperscript{42} Some courts have found that aggregation may be permitted when the investors are related, meaning they have a union that exists by more than the mere happenstance, such as in a partnership, members of a family or among various subsidiaries of a corporation. \textit{See, e.g., The Baan Co.,} 186 F.R.D. at 225 (stating that court may aggregate larger number of investors if pre-existing relationship among group members exists); \textit{In re} Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 816 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (stating that large group cannot adequately control counsel unless there is relationship among them); \textit{Razorfish}, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (stating that eighteen-member group is inadequate based on fact that they have no prior relationship and therefore cannot “collectively ride herd on counsel anywhere as well as could a single sophisticated entity”).
vide the courts with an appropriate method of selecting the class representatives.43

III. SUMMARY OF COURT ANALYSES OF AGGREGATION

Courts disagree over whether they can aggregate the financial interests of multiple unrelated investors in deciding which prospective plaintiff has the largest financial interest.44 In making this decision, courts have examined the statutory text and the legislative history of the PSLRA to determine whether more than one investor can serve as lead plaintiff.45 Then, courts have evaluated whether multiple investors, with no common bond other than a similarly suffered financial loss, can vigorously serve the interests of the class, select competent counsel and monitor the litigation; in other words, can unrelated investors "adequately" serve the interests of the class.46

A. Courts that Permit Aggregation

Recently, in In re Cendant Corporation Litigation,47 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided that the PSLRA permits

43. For a discussion and analysis of the PSLRA's lead plaintiff and lead counsel provisions, see infra notes 75-115, 185-239 and accompanying text.


45. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 266 (evaluating statutory text of PSLRA and finding that multiple investors can serve as lead plaintiff); Waste Mgmt., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 412 (finding that "group" must demonstrate cohesiveness to be appointed lead plaintiff).

46. Compare Cendant, 264 F.3d at 266 (permitting unrelated investors to aggregate), Ribozyme, 192 F.R.D. at 662 (appointing lead plaintiff group of four investors); Nice Sys., 188 F.R.D. at 210 (D.N.J. 1999) (allowing aggregation of proposed plaintiffs who met requirements), and The Baan Co., 186 F.R.D. at 217 (appointing triumvirate of investors), with Waste Mgmt., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 412-13 (declining to appoint unrelated investors as lead plaintiff); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same); Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 809-13 (same); Donnkenny, 171 F.R.D. at 157-58 (same).

47. 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).
aggregation. In that case, several individual investors, as appellants, appealed the district court’s decision to appoint three unrelated institutional investors as lead plaintiff. First, the appellants argued that the PSLRA does not permit more than one investor to serve as lead plaintiff and, second, that unrelated investors cannot adequately serve the interests of the class. The Third Circuit rejected both arguments and first determined that the term “group of persons” under the lead plaintiff provision means that more than one investor can serve as lead plaintiff.

Second, the court agreed with the district court that a relationship between the investors prior to the litigation is unnecessary in order to serve as lead plaintiff. According to the Third Circuit, the correct construction of the PSLRA is whether the group can serve the interests of the class adequately, not whether they are related. In evaluating the group’s adequacy, the court determined that: (1) the group demonstrated a willingness and ability to represent the claims of the class vigorously, (2) its members had experience serving as plaintiffs in prior lawsuits, (3) it selected competent class counsel and (4) it negotiated a reasonable fee agreement with counsel.

As a result, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to appoint three institutional investors as lead plaintiff.

The Central District of California in Takeda v. Turbodyne Technologies, Inc. and other district courts have likewise found that aggregation is permissible. In Takeda, the court agreed to aggregate the financial interests

48. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 266-68 (holding that three unrelated investors can be aggregated).

49. See id. at 221-24 (stating facts of case). In this case, fifteen individuals filed motions to serve as lead plaintiff. See id. at 223. One of the plaintiff groups, the CalPERS Group, was a consortium of three of the largest publicly-managed pension funds in the United States. See id. The District Court appointed this group as the lead plaintiff. See id. Four investors who sought lead plaintiff appointment appealed this decision to the Third Circuit. See id. at 250.

50. See id. at 243 (stating facts of case).

51. See id. at 266-67 (finding that court must make threshold adequacy determination whether movant with largest interest in relief sought is group rather than individual person or entity) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)).

52. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 268 (stating that district court identified most adequate plaintiff).

53. See id. at 266 ("The statute contains no requirement mandating that the members of a proper group be 'related' in some manner; it requires only that any such group 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.'").

54. See id. at 267-68 (affirming district court’s decision that adequacy requirement under Rule 23 and PSLRA was satisfied). The court also recognized that there was no indication that the group was created artificially by its lawyers, and the fact that the group contains three members offers no reason to doubt that its members could operate effectively as a single unit. See id. (agreeing that adequacy requirement satisfied).

55. See id. at 268 (finding district court did not abuse its discretion).


57. See e.g., In re The First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641-44 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (appointing three individuals and one institutional investor as
of seven non-institutional investors. The court found that these members were adequate to serve together as lead plaintiff because: (1) they had a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to ensure that the action would be prosecuted vigorously, (2) they had a common interest in the litigation and (3) they had retained adequate counsel. As a result, the court appointed the group as lead plaintiff.

B. Courts Refusing to Aggregate Unrelated Investors in PSLRA Cases

Some courts have argued that the PSLRA does not permit aggregation if either counsel forms the group for the purpose of obtaining lead counsel appointment, or if the group consists of unrelated investors. In the first instance, several courts followed the line of reasoning of the Southern District of New York in In re Razorfish, Inc. Securities Litigation by refusing to permit "lawyer-driven aggregation." In contrast to the facts in Cendant, where the investors joined together and selected their counsel as part of a group decision, the investors in Razorfish did not select their counsel or join together on their own initiative, but rather were grouped together by counsel.

58. See Takeda v. Turbodyne Tech., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (finding adequacy of group, not relationship, as proper threshold question). In this case, two plaintiff groups, each with hundreds of class plaintiffs, moved for appointment as lead plaintiff. See id. at 1130 (stating facts of case). The court denied the motion, finding that both groups were unwieldy and not capable of directing the litigation effectively. See id. at 1131. The groups then proposed that a smaller subset of persons be collectively denominated as lead plaintiffs. See id. The court appointed one group with seven members that had suffered losses approaching $1 million. See id.

59. See id. at 1137 (identifying factors to determine group's adequacy).

60. See id. (holding that group of seven was adequate to serve as lead plaintiff).

61. See, e.g., Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 854 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (rejecting aggregation of unrelated investors in favor of appointing one investor as lead plaintiff); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same); In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that because group of unrelated investors "has no independent existence and its composite members have no prior relationship, there is nothing to suggest that they will collectively ride herd on counsel anywhere as well as could a single sophisticated entity").


63. See Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (refusing to appoint group organized by lawyer's desire to "obtain oligopolistic profits"); Aronson, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1152-54 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (recognizing purpose of PSLRA is to replace lawyer-driven litigation); In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig. 171 F.R.D. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that one principal purpose of PSLRA is to prevent lawyer-driven litigation).
The court denied this group's motion for lead plaintiff appointment because the group could not vigorously represent the interests of the class or effectively communicate with one another. In addition, the court found that this type of "lawyer-driven" litigation runs afoul of the legislative history of the PSLRA in which Congress sought to prevent lawyer-driven litigation in favor of client-driven litigation.

Some district courts have followed the Northern District of Ohio's reasoning in In re Telxon Corp. Securities Litigation by refusing to aggregate investors when their only common relationship is based on a financial interest in the litigation. In Telxon, two groups filed a motion for lead counsel appointment, the first having eighteen unrelated investors and the second having two unrelated investors. The court rejected the motion by the group of eighteen investors because, according to the court, such a large group precludes any single member of the group and the group as a whole from exercising control over the litigation. The court reasoned that it is more difficult for each member to communicate with

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64. See Razorfish, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (stating that members of group had no prior connection with each other or with each other's counsel). In this case, counsel grouped together a large financial institution, two smaller "day-trading" companies and an individual investor, and then moved the court to appoint them as lead plaintiff. See id. (stating facts of case).

65. See id. at 308-09 (finding that group could not satisfy adequacy requirement under PSLRA and Rule 23 and therefore could not be appointed lead plaintiff).

66. See id. at 308 (recognizing that group was "simply an artifice cobbled together by cooperating counsel"). For a further discussion and analysis of the legislative history of the PSLRA, see infra notes 85-86, 105-08 and accompanying text.


69. See Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 809-10 (stating facts of case). In this case, the Alsin Group and the Hayman Group sought lead plaintiff appointment. See id. at 808 (stating facts). The Alsin Group consisted of eighteen individual plaintiffs who collectively held approximately 332,000 shares of Telxon common stock and allegedly suffered losses of approximately $3.0 million during a class period defined as May 8, 1998 through January 27, 1999. See id. The Hayman Group consisted of three individuals, two of whom were brothers who collectively lost $1.24 million. See id. at 809. The third member had lost $156,643 but had no apparent prior or contemporaneous relationship or association with the brothers. See id.

70. See id. 809-10 (finding that eighteen-member group cannot call itself "group" under PSLRA). The court examined the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "group" in the dictionary and found that the term refers to a relatively small number of individuals assembled together. See id. at 811 (interpreting language of PSLRA).
the other members and to speak with a single coherent voice when counsel "drives" the group together.\textsuperscript{71}

As to the group of two unrelated investors, the court similarly rejected aggregating their financial interests.\textsuperscript{72} According to the court, unrelated investors cannot speak or act with a uniform purpose and therefore cannot monitor effectively the decisions by their counsel.\textsuperscript{73} As a result of this decision, and the courts that follow its line of reasoning, a disagreement exists among courts in deciding whether more than one investor can serve as lead plaintiff and whether they must have a pre-litigation relationship.\textsuperscript{74}

\section*{IV. The PSLRA Permits Aggregation}

The statutory text of the PSLRA permits a court to aggregate the financial interests of unrelated investors provided that the group adequately represents the interests of the class.\textsuperscript{75} In order for a group to demonstrate their adequacy, the legislative history provides only that the group demonstrate that they can actively represent the class and that it can drive the litigation.\textsuperscript{76} Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history, however, supports aggregating a large number of investors having small financial interests in the litigation.\textsuperscript{77}

\subsection*{A. Aggregating a Small Number of Investors Is Consistent with the PSLRA}

In order to accept aggregation, it must be determined that: (1) the PSLRA permits multiple investors to serve as the lead plaintiff, (2) a prior relationship to the litigation is not required and (3) the financial interests of the individual group members should be aggregated.\textsuperscript{78} As to the first determination, the statutory text of the PSLRA explicitly permits more

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} See id. at 816 (describing primary difficulty of having large numbers of persons comprising group).
\item \textsuperscript{72} See id. at 813 (stating that group must consist of more than "mere assemblage of unrelated persons who share nothing in common other than the twin fortunes that (1) they suffered losses and (2) they entered into retainee agreements with the same attorney or attorneys").
\item \textsuperscript{73} See id. at 815-16 (noting that in larger groups there is less incentive for any member of group, or group as whole to supervise litigation).
\item \textsuperscript{74} Compare \textit{In re} Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that three member group of unrelated investors can be aggregated), \textit{and} Takeda v. Turbodyne Tech., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that group of seven unrelated investors can be aggregated), \textit{with} Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (refusing to aggregate multiple investors solely because of their lack of relationship).
\item \textsuperscript{75} For a further discussion of the statutory interpretation of aggregation, see infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{76} For a further discussion of the legislative history as applied to the permissibility of aggregation, see infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{77} For a further discussion of the impermissibility of a large number of investors serving as the lead plaintiff under the PSLRA, see infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{78} See Fisch, supra note 8, at 69 (stating premises to accept aggregation).
\end{itemize}
than one investor to serve as the lead plaintiff.\textsuperscript{79} The lead plaintiff provision states that the court can appoint as lead plaintiff the “member or members” of the class, and that the plaintiff be a “person or group of persons.”\textsuperscript{80} The PSLRA has therefore made clear that courts may appoint more than one investor to serve as the lead plaintiff.\textsuperscript{91}

As to the second and third determination, the statutory text is silent over whether multiple investors must have a prior relationship to the litigation and whether courts can aggregate their financial interests.\textsuperscript{82} Despite this silence, appointing unrelated investors as lead plaintiff does not violate the lead plaintiff provision.\textsuperscript{83} The text requires only that the court inquire into the adequacy of the group and not into the relationship of the group’s members.\textsuperscript{84} To determine, however, whether aggregating multiple unrelated investors satisfies the adequacy requirement, the legislative history offers support, and simply requires that the lead plaintiff actively represent the class and drive the litigation as opposed to the lead counsel.\textsuperscript{85} As a result, in certain instances, aggregating investors may satisfy both of these conditions.\textsuperscript{86}

For example, the \textit{Cendant} case illustrates a situation in which the court properly evaluated the group’s adequacy in deciding whether the group can be appointed as lead plaintiff.\textsuperscript{87} In determining whether the group of three “unrelated” institutional investors could actively represent the class and drive the litigation, the court properly considered, consistent with the legislative history of the PSLRA, whether each member could exercise authority without interference by the other group members, moni-

\textsuperscript{79} See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (providing textual support for allowing more than one investor to serve as lead plaintiff).

\textsuperscript{80} See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) & (iii) (emphasizing that language of PSLRA allows more than one investor to serve as lead plaintiff).

\textsuperscript{81} See id. (recognizing explicit language to appoint multiple investors).

\textsuperscript{82} See id. (noting lack of explicit language as to second and third criteria).

\textsuperscript{83} For a further discussion of the permissibility of aggregation, see infra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{84} See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (stating that court shall appoint plaintiff most capable of adequately representing interests of class members); \textit{see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig.}, 264 F.3d 201, 266 (3d Cir. 2001) (disagreeing with those courts that have held that PSLRA invariably precludes group of “unrelated individuals” from serving as lead plaintiff). \textit{But see Fisch, supra note 8, at 69 (“It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the appearance of the term ["group"] mandates, or even permits, the appointment of large groups of unrelated investors.”)}; Heck, supra note 29, at 1218 (“Permitting courts to aggregate the financial losses of individual plaintiffs to determine what group has the largest financial interest in the litigation is one way in which the congressional purpose of favoring institutional investors can be frustrated.”).

\textsuperscript{85} See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 10, \textit{reprinted in} 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 (“The lead plaintiff should actively represent the class. The Committee believes that the lead plaintiff—not lawyers—should drive the litigation.”).

\textsuperscript{86} For a further discussion and analysis of the adequacy requirement, see infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{87} See \textit{Cendant}, 264 F.3d at 262-68 (evaluating statutory structure and legislative history in appointing most adequate plaintiff).
tor the lead counsel’s decisions and work with rather than under the other investors.\textsuperscript{88}

Requiring the court to assess the adequacy and financial interests of the group arguably burdens the judicial system.\textsuperscript{89} Specifically, critics argue that by endorsing lead plaintiff groups, even those of reasonable size, courts transform the appointment process from a relatively objective inquiry into a subjective inquiry subject to unwarranted judicial intervention.\textsuperscript{90} The statutory text, however, imposes a duty on the court to determine the adequacy of the lead plaintiff groups.\textsuperscript{91} In particular, the PSLRA states that the court will appoint as lead plaintiff the “members of the purported class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of the class members . . . .”\textsuperscript{92} Further, the text states that the most adequate plaintiff “in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest . . . .”\textsuperscript{93} Therefore, an independent inquiry by the district court is not only consistent with the PSLRA, but also required.\textsuperscript{94}

It has been argued that a court appointment of multiple investors as lead plaintiff may divide the decision-making among the members of the group.\textsuperscript{95} Members may disagree over how the litigation should proceed, resulting in an inefficient litigation.\textsuperscript{96} Courts will have to consider this consequence when determining whether a group of investors is adequate.\textsuperscript{97} Again, if a court finds that group members can monitor and drive the litigation without undue interference by other members, then the court can appoint the group.\textsuperscript{98} As illustrated in the Cendant case, the court properly considered whether the group’s size interfered or diluted

\textsuperscript{88} See id. (stating criteria evaluated in determining adequacy).

\textsuperscript{89} See Fisch, supra note 8, at 76-77 (stating that if “court actively evaluates the composition of the lead plaintiff group, it initiates an arbitrary and wasteful process”) (citation omitted).

\textsuperscript{90} See id. at 76 (stating that aggregation “converts the selection of the lead plaintiff from an objective process into an unwieldy and easily manipulated procedure”).


\textsuperscript{95} See Heck, supra note 29, at 1221 (stating that aggregated group divides decision-making and “slow[s] litigation when they disagree on how to proceed”); see also Fisch, supra note 8, at 79 (stating that group of unrelated investors has “no inherent decision making structure”).

\textsuperscript{96} See Heck, supra note 29, at 1221 (discussing how coordination problems among multiple investors may seriously effect litigation).


the members' decision-making power and control over the litigation.\textsuperscript{99} Because the court determined that aggregation would not dilute any member's control, it properly appointed the group.\textsuperscript{100}

Not all situations, however, justify aggregating multiple unrelated investors.\textsuperscript{101} In determining a group's adequacy, a court must also evaluate whether the group has aggregated its members solely to attain the greatest financial interest or whether the group legitimately and adequately can serve the interests of the class.\textsuperscript{102} As to the former inquiry, if a large number of investors join together in order to attain the greatest financial interest, then the court properly may refuse to appoint this type of group.\textsuperscript{103} In this situation, a group comprising many individual investors with little financial interest in the litigation may be inadequate to serve the class's interests.\textsuperscript{104} According to the legislative history, the members in this type of group lack any incentive to participate in the litigation and monitor counsel's decisions.\textsuperscript{105} The legislative history of the PSLRA further indicates that aggregating a large number of investors conflicts with the goal of PSLRA, which is to increase control of the plaintiff over the litigation.\textsuperscript{106} By enacting the PSLRA, Congress sought to deter lawyers from making personal decisions and negotiating settlement agreements without consulting the plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{107} In short, a large group restricts each member's ability to monitor the litigation and serve the interests of the class.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{99} See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (inquiring into whether movant group was too large to represent class adequately).

\textsuperscript{100} See id. (stating that group could operate effectively as single unit).

\textsuperscript{101} For additional discussion of situations militating against aggregation, see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{102} See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (requiring court to determine adequacy of group); see also Fisch, supra note 8, at 74-75 (recognizing undesirability of having massive lead plaintiff groups); Heck, supra note 29, at 1220-21 (same).

\textsuperscript{103} Cf. S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689 (stating that lead plaintiff must be able to actively monitor counsel and litigation). One commentator has stated that "[t]he efforts of some firms to create massive lead plaintiff groups to secure the lead counsel appointment are not socially productive." Fisch, supra note 8, at 75 (describing how aggregating financial interest of investors for purposes of obtaining lead counsel appointment leads to inadequate monitoring and apathy by plaintiff).

\textsuperscript{104} See Fisch, supra note 8, at 71-72 (explaining that group with small individual stakes reduce likelihood that group members will participate actively in litigation process).

\textsuperscript{105} See id. (explaining that group with small individual stakes reduce likelihood that group members will participate actively in litigation process).


\textsuperscript{107} See id. at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (recognizing that Congress sought to deter "lawyer-driven" litigation).

\textsuperscript{108} Cf. id. at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (noting similarity between professional plaintiffs and large number of unrelated investors).
B. The Third Circuit Correctly Interpreted the Lead Plaintiff Provision; the Northern District of Ohio Misinterpreted the Provision

The Third Circuit in Cendant adopted the appropriate test of adequacy, not relatedness, in deciding whether to appoint a group of investors as lead plaintiff. In that case, three unrelated institutional investors demonstrated that they could represent the claims vigorously, select competent counsel and monitor all decisions made on behalf of the class. Even though the three investors were not related, the court applied the correct test in determining whether the group could adequately protect the interests of the class and monitor the litigation based on their financial interest in the suit and bargaining power with counsel.

The court in Telxon, however, misconstrued this test by refusing to appoint a group of two unrelated members. The court failed to consider whether the members could vigorously represent the interests of the class and monitor the litigation as a group. Rather, the court based its decision solely on the fact that the members were unrelated. As a result, the court improperly denied the group lead plaintiff consideration.

V. Court-Ordered Auctions and the Business Judgment Rule

Court-ordered auctions emerged in 1990 as a means of selecting class counsel among a pool of bidders. When Congress enacted the PSLRA in 1995, the question emerged whether court-ordered auctions were per-

109. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating appropriate test for appointing lead plaintiff).
110. See id. at 268-69 (stating group satisfied adequacy requirement).
111. See id. (holding that adequacy, not relationship, is issue).
113. See id. at 815-28 (neglecting to assess adequacy of investors).
114. See id. at 823 (identifying relationship of proposed group members as crucial criteria).
115. See id. at 828 (denying appointment of plaintiff group).
116. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (establishing first court-ordered auction in country). In Oracle, two law firms argued over which group of lawyers would be designated class counsel. See Hooper & Leary, supra note 10, at 15 (quoting Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, Reporters Transcript of Proceedings, Judge Vaughn Walker at 38 (Mar. 16, 2001)). One of the attorneys approached Judge Walker of the Northern District of New York and told him “don’t worry about the case. We’ve got the whole thing worked out.” See id. (quoting Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel at 38-39). Judge Walker of the Northern District of California interpreted the parties’ conduct to mean that the arrangement “was at the lawyer’s benefit and not at the benefit of the class.” See id. (quoting Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel at 39). As a result, the court ordered an auction, reasoning that “[t]hat process most closely approximates the way class members would make these decisions and should result in selection of the most appropriately qualified counsel at the best available price.” Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 690.
missible under the terms of the lead counsel provision. Currently, courts disagree over whether they can auction the position of lead counsel or whether the PSLRA requires that they defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel.

A. Court-Ordered Auctions

A court-ordered auction is a court's request to each lawyer to submit a bid proposing fees and expenses to litigate the class action. Among those courts that have ordered auction, bidders typically have submitted either to the court or to the plaintiff qualitative and quantitative information, which typically have included the bidder's qualifications, prior experience, and potential fees.

117. For a discussion and analysis of the permissibility of auctions under the PSLRA, see infra notes 184-239 and accompanying text.

118. Compare In re Network Assocs. Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (employing auction) and In re Cal. Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 259 (N.D. Cal 1996) (same), with In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that auctions are impermissible as matter of first resort), and In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to conduct auction because plaintiff was able to conduct negotiation with counsel).

119. See HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 2-3 (defining auction process). The purpose of the auction originally was to find a more objective way to award attorneys' fees without relying on the standard percentages routinely awarded in class actions. See id. (setting forth objectives of court-ordered auctions).

Courts primarily have used two methods of awarding attorneys' fees, the lodestar method and the percentage of recovery method. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 12, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 691 (describing fee calculation methods). Under the lodestar method, a court multiplies the number of hours by a reasonable hourly rate, which may be increased by an additional amount based on risk or other relevant factors. See id. (stating one method in which courts currently award attorney's fees). The court may opt to adjust that figure, the lodestar, by applying a multiplier either upward or downward. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (recognizing purpose of multiplier). The United States Supreme Court presumed that the lodestar figure, the product of reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable rate, represents a "reasonable" fee. See id. (exploring consistency associated with fee-shifting). Factors such as novelty and complexity of the issues, special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of representation, and the results obtained from the litigation are reflected in the lodestar amount. See id. (noting that upward adjustment of lodestar is rare because these factors are not considered in multiplier).

Under the percentage-of-recovery method, the court awards attorneys' fees as a certain percentage of the settlement. See HOOPER & LEARY, supra note 10, at 1-2 (describing alternative method of awarding attorneys' fees in securities class actions); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that percentage of recovery approach in common fund cases is better practice than lodestar approach). The court found that the attorney's fee award ranges about 30% of the fund in nearly all common fund cases, absent extraordinary circumstances. See id. at 1377 (accounting for range of attorney fees in average cases). As a result, the court set a percentage of recovery approach at thirty percent. See id. at 1378 (rejecting lodestar approach as method of calculating attorney fees).
Courts have evaluated these bids _ex ante_, at the beginning of the litigation, to determine which prospective counsel is the most qualified at the lowest price.\(^2\)

Since 1990 courts have ordered auctions in three pre-PSLRA and nine post-PSLRA securities class actions.\(^2\) In ten of these class actions, the court itself evaluated the bids and conducted the auction.\(^2\) In the other two class actions, the court ordered the lead plaintiff to evaluate the bids and conduct the auction.\(^2\)

\(^{120}\) See Hooper & Leary, _supra_ note 10, at 29-31 (analyzing qualitative guidelines requested by Judge Walker, Judge Shadur and Judge Alsup). Judge Walker required that bidders seeking lead counsel status submit information on the firm’s qualifications, including detailed descriptions of other class actions in which the firm was involved. _See id._ (citing Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 697)). In _Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp._, the court requested each bidder to submit:

- [Title, court, docket number, and date field for each securities class action in which the bidder served as sole class counsel during the past three years; the amount of recovery obtained on behalf of the class; the percentage of securities in the class for which claims were submitted; the amount of recovery (if any) distributed to the class, and total amounts received by the bidder, including fees and costs (if any).]

_id_. at 30 (citing _Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp._, 188 F.R.D. 577, 587-88 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).

\(^{121}\) See _In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig._, 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1193 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (advocating use of auctions as less expenditure of time); HOOPER & LEARY, _supra_ note 10, at 18 (stating that “judges who advocate auctioning suggest that there is less expenditure of judicial time, compared to an _ex post_ review of fee petitions required under other methods”).


\(^{123}\) See _Quintus_, 201 F.R.D. at 482-88 (holding that court will conduct auction rather than ordering plaintiff to conduct auction); _Wenderhold_, 188 F.R.D. at 587 (same); _Oracle_, 131 F.R.D. at 697 (same); _Cal. Micro Devices_, 168 F.R.D. at 259 (same); _Wells Fargo_, 157 F.R.D. at 468 (same); _Lucent_, 194 F.R.D. at 154 (same); _Cendant_, 182 F.R.D. at 151 (same); _Sherleigh Assocs._, 184 F.R.D. at 694 (same); _Comdisco_, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (same); _Bank One S’Holders_, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same).

\(^{124}\) See _Commtouch_, No. 01-C-00719 (holding that plaintiff rather than court will conduct auction), _cited in_ HOOPER & LEARY, _supra_ note 10, at 3 n.17; _Network_, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (same).
Supporters of court-ordered auctions have advanced several arguments in favor of their use.125 According to one of the arguments, auctions allow smaller firms to bid lower fees and obtain lead counsel appointment when they otherwise would not be able to do so.126 Another argument advanced is that auctions, as a competitive process, lower attorneys' fees and therefore increase the amount distributed, or damage recovery, to the class.127

Critics of court-ordered auctions argue that large individual investors or institutional investors already engage in a practice known as "legal beauty contests" in which the client seeks prospective attorneys and requests their proposals as to how they would handle the matter.128 The investor then compares each lawyer’s expertise and understanding of the risks involved in the class action.129 According to the critics, by engaging in this practice, investors adequately assess a fee structure that takes into account both the price and the quality of services.130

125. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 38-39 (listing benefits of auction method). The Third Circuit Task Force listed the following benefits of auctions: (1) benefits to the class from attorney fees—percentage of recovery awarded to counsel in auction cases is often less than that awarded by traditional methods; (2) judicial economy—the judges who have used auctioning contend that there is less expenditure of judicial resources, compared to the ex post assessments of attorney fees required for fee awards in cases of traditional appointment; (3) eliminates “race to the courthouse”; (4) Ex ante Fee Determination; and (5) competition—auctions provide a market test for cost of lawyer’s services because there is a competition among firms. See id. at 38-39 (listing arguments in favor of auctions).

Among those judges that have auctioned the position of lead counsel, they generally advance five reasons in favor of auctions: (1) replicating the marketplace for legal services and reducing attorneys' fees, (2) improving attorney-proposed case representation, (3) giving the class the benefit of the low risk of nonrecovery, (4) reducing the expenditure of judicial time and (5) compensating for the presence of an inadequate or uninterested plaintiff. See Hooper & Leary, supra note 10, at 15 (explaining courts' rationales for conducting auctions).

126. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 38-41 (stating that auctions increase pool of attorneys because all lawyers are vying for position of lead counsel).

127. See id. (stating difference in awards to attorneys under auction approach, lodestar approach and percentage of recovery approach).

128. Id. at app. B, at 4 (statement by Grant & Eisenhofer) (describing beauty contest as process routinely employed by institutional investors); see Symposium, The Law and Economics of Lawyering: Second Opinion in Litigation, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1411, 1427-28 (1998) (explaining that legal beauty contest occurs when client initially selects lawyer to take case, which affords attorney opportunity to compare initial advice of several lawyers with present situation and to assess lawyers' expertise and predisposition toward risk).

129. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, app. B, at 4-5 (statement by Grant & Eisenhofer) (obtaining assessment of problem from various attorneys to get better perspective of risk and also to decide which attorney offers higher quality legal assistance at better price).

130. See id. (recognizing that institutional investors already seek advice and assess quality).
Critics also argue that auctions undermine one of the purposes of the PSLRA, which is to increase plaintiff activism in selecting their own counsel. They further argue that auctions sacrifice quality of representation with cheaper and less experienced attorneys. Last, they argue that auctions prevent courts from acting impartially during the litigation because they become engaged as "auctioneers."

Based on these criticisms, an issue has arisen whether a court should defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel under a standard of review similar to the business judgment rule and therefore not second-guess the plaintiff's judgment. Those in favor of this standard of review argue that the statutory text and the legislative history require deference; those against it argue that auctions provide an important means to lower attorney's fees while allowing a significant recovery to the class. In order to understand how the business judgment rule applies, it is important to understand what the doctrine represents.

131. See id. at 56 (stating that auctions have risk of discouraging prospective lead plaintiff because they are deprived of their choice of counsel and it interferes with their ability to take active and meaningful role in class action).

132. See id. at 46 (stating risk that low fee will lead to low quality representation). The Task Force Report notes:

The auction method could encourage firms to submit unduly low bids in order to win the position of class counsel. Underbidding can result in lawyers cutting corners or settling too early in order to maintain a profit margin. Where the winning firm's bid is too low – as it will often be due to the pressures of competitive bidding and the imperfect information available at the time of the auction – the firm will have a conflict of interest. Its own interest in securing reasonable compensation for time spent would be in conflict with its duty to prosecute the case with vigor and dedication to maximize the class recovery.

Id. (citation omitted).

133. See id. at 57 (discussing risk of compromising judicial impartiality); see also Fisch, supra note 8, at 95 ("By casting the court as auctioneer and referee, lead counsel auctions also threaten the court's neutrality.").

134. Compare Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 88 (recommending that "scrutiny akin to the business judgment rule" should be applied to lead plaintiff's choice of counsel and to fee arrangements), id. app. B, at 5 (statement by Stuart M. Grant & Jay W. Eisenhofer) ("The court should review the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel applying the tenets of the business judgment rule."), and id. app. B, at 5-6 (statement by Keith Johnson) (stating courts must defer to counsel selection decisions made by plaintiffs under business judgment rule), with In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding auction appropriate rather than deferring to lead plaintiff's choice of counsel), and In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (same).

135. For a further discussion of the disagreement among courts in deciding whether to defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel, see infra notes 144-79 and accompanying text.

136. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
The business judgment rule developed over a century and a half ago as the primary means by which courts review business decisions by corporate directors. In order to state a claim, therefore, a shareholder plaintiff has a "heavy burden" of pleading and proving facts to overcome this presumption. If the party challenging the board's decision does establish facts sufficient to overcome the presumption, the court will examine the decision-making process of the board member. If the court finds that the board member approved a transaction without being informed and without a good faith or honest belief that the transaction was in the best interest of the corporation, then the business judgment rule is inapplicable and the court will scrutinize the fairness of the transaction to the shareholders.

In determining whether the business judgment rule applies in a PSLRA case, courts, commentators and the Third Circuit Task Force disagree over the proper interpretation of the lead counsel provision. In
particular, they disagree over whether the provision permits a deferential standard of review of the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel.143

VI. SUMMARY OF COURT AND TASK FORCE ANALYSES OF AUCTIONS

Courts and the Third Circuit Task Force disagree over whether they must defer to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel.144 Those courts that have deferred to the lead plaintiff’s choice have argued that auctions are inappropriate as a matter of first choice.145 The Third Circuit Task Force found that a court likewise should defer to the plaintiff’s choice of counsel, but under a standard of review similar to the business judgment rule.146

A. Courts that Defer to the Lead Plaintiff’s Choice of Counsel

The Third Circuit, the Southern District of New York and the Northern District of California have interpreted the lead counsel provision to mean that courts should defer to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel if that choice resulted from a good faith selection and meaningful arms-length bargaining.147 Those courts have urged that they should not evaluate whether they believe the lead plaintiff could have made a better choice or received a better deal.148

that court would be remiss if it did not auction lead counsel position to obtain potentially lower fee for class members).

The Third Circuit Task Force and some commentators have found that a standard of review similar to the business judgment review is appropriate. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87-88 (stating that “scrutiny akin to business judgment rule” is appropriate); id. app. B, at 5 (statement of Grant & Eisenhofer) (stating that review under business judgment rule is appropriate); id. app. B, at 5-6 (statement of Keith Johnson) (same).

143. For a further discussion of the court analyses of appropriate standard of review given to lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel, see infra notes 144-79 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Task Force’s analysis of appropriate standard of review given to lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel, see infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.

144. For a further discussion of the court and Task Force’s analyses of the auction process, see infra notes 144-83 and accompanying text.

145. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 274-75 (finding that if plaintiff has employed reasonable decision-making process in selecting counsel, it is inappropriate to conduct auction); Quintus, 201 F.R.D. at 482 (same).

146. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87-88 (stating business judgment rule is appropriate standard of review).

147. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 274 (stating that “court should generally employ a deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiff’s choices”); Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 486 (stating that plaintiff’s choice of counsel should not be disturbed when plaintiff adequately negotiates with counsel and obtains superior fee agreement).

148. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 286 (stating that ultimate inquiry is always whether lead plaintiff’s choices were arrived at via meaningful arms-length bargaining); Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 489 (stating that if fee arrangement demonstrates adequate negotiation then court will not disturb this decision); In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that
For instance, in *Cendant*, the Third Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in conducting an auction. In that case, the lead plaintiff negotiated a retainer agreement with counsel before litigating its claim. The district court did not evaluate whether the retainer agreement was agreed upon at arms-length and in good faith but, instead, ordered an auction. An investor of the corporation appealed the district court's decision in conducting the auction and argued that the fee the court accepted was actually $76 million more than the price agreed upon in the retainer agreement. The Third Circuit found that the auction was improper and inconsistent with the terms of the lead counsel provision of the PSLRA. The court reasoned that the PSLRA restricts the court's role to approving the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel. Further, the Third Circuit reasoned that the district court failed to evaluate the parties' decision-making process in negotiating the retainer agreement and to determine whether the agreement was at arms-length.

Both the Northern District of California in *In re Copper Mountain Network Securities Litigation* and the Southern District of New York in *Razorfish* have followed a line of reasoning similar to that of the Third Circuit. Both courts rejected the use of an auction and agreed that if the lead plaintiff negotiates a reasonable fee with counsel, then the court must defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel. By deferring to the court will not conduct auction when plaintiff is able to conduct negotiation with other counsel).

149. See *Cendant*, 264 F.3d at 278-83 (finding that district court failed to review lead plaintiff's decision-making process in selecting counsel).

150. See id. at 224 (stating facts).

151. See id. at 276 (stating facts).

152. See id. at 220 (stating facts). The counsel obtained by the lead plaintiff pursuant to the retainer was the same counsel appointed to the case under the auction. See id. (stating facts).

153. See id. at 273 (stating holding).

154. See id. at 273 (stating facts).

155. See id. at 276 (stating facts).

156. 201 F.R.D. 475, 487 (N.D. Cal. 2001). For purposes of this Comment, *In re Copper Mountain Networks Securities Litigation* and *In re Quintus Securities Litigation* will be treated as two separate cases even though the court addressed both cases in one opinion.

157. See *In re Razorfish*, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding, similar to Third Circuit, that auction is inappropriate when plaintiff is able to negotiate reasonable fee with counsel); *In re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig.*, 201 F.R.D. 475, 487 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding, similar to Third Circuit, that it would not conduct auction because investor negotiated fee agreement that appeared reasonable).

158. See *Copper Mountain*, 201 F.R.D. at 487 (stating that court is willing to defer to plaintiff's choice where reasonable fee is negotiated); cf. *Razorfish*, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 310-11 (finding auction was inappropriate and that under PSLRA primary focus should not be on selection of counsel).
lead plaintiff's choice, those courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the lead plaintiff if the fee arrangement is reasonable.\textsuperscript{159}

Additionally, the court in \textit{Razorfish} found that even if the lead plaintiff's first choice of counsel is inadequate, the court should allow the plaintiff to select another lead counsel as opposed to ordering an auction.\textsuperscript{160} In that case, the court refused to conduct an auction after it rejected lead plaintiff's first choice of counsel.\textsuperscript{161} The court concluded that the text of the lead counsel provision does not give a court the right to arrange a "shot-gun marriage between strangers" even if it disapproves of the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel.\textsuperscript{162} According to the court, such an intrusive measure is inconsistent with the PSLRA, which requires that the lead plaintiff select and retain counsel.\textsuperscript{163}

As a result, the Third Circuit, the Northern District of California and the Southern District of New York have found that a court should defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel if the agreement of the group member was a product of reasonable negotiation and arms-length bargaining.\textsuperscript{164} According to these courts, auctions are impermissible when such factors are present.\textsuperscript{165}

B. Courts Permitting Auctions

Nine post-enactment PSLRA cases have permitted auctions.\textsuperscript{166} In those cases, however, the courts advanced three different situations in

\textsuperscript{159} See \textit{Razorfish}, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating that lead plaintiff should exercise conduct of litigation); \textit{Copper Mountain}, 201 F.R.D. at 489 (stating that court will not disturb plaintiff's decision).

\textsuperscript{160} See \textit{Razorfish}, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (refusing to auction lead counsel position as matter of first choice).

\textsuperscript{161} See id. (stating facts).

\textsuperscript{162} See id. (discussing conclusion).

\textsuperscript{163} See id. (discussing role of lead plaintiff in choice of counsel).

\textsuperscript{164} See \textit{In re Cendant Corp. Litig.}, 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that "court should generally employ a deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiff's choices"); \textit{Copper Mountain}, 201 F.R.D. at 487 (noting that court is willing to defer to plaintiff's choice where reasonable fee is negotiated); \textit{Razorfish}, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (stating that presumptive lead plaintiff is plaintiff with biggest stake in litigation who then selects lead counsel).

\textsuperscript{165} See, e.g., \textit{Cendant}, 264 F.3d at 276 (stating that auction is impermissible when fee arrangement between plaintiff and counsel resulted from good faith selection and negotiation process and arrived from meaningful arms-length bargaining); \textit{Razorfish}, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (refusing to conduct auction even though it refused to appoint lead plaintiff's choice of counsel); \textit{Copper Mountain}, 201 F.R.D. at 489 (stating that auction is inappropriate when plaintiff and counsel negotiated reasonable fee agreement).

\textsuperscript{166} See \textit{In re Comdisco Sec. Litig.}, 141 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (ordering auction); \textit{In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions}, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same); \textit{In re Commtouch Software Ltd. Sec. Litig.}, No. 01-C-00719, (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2001) (ordering lead plaintiff to conduct auction), cited in \textit{Hopper & Leary, supra} note 10, at 3 n.17; \textit{In re Quintus Sec. Litig.}, 201 F.R.D. 475, 482 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (ordering auction when court determined that plaintiff unable to negotiate reasonable fee agreement with counsel); \textit{In re Network Assocs. Inc.}
which an auction is permissible: (1) when the court has not yet appointed the lead plaintiff; (2) when all prospective plaintiffs are unable or incapable of negotiating a competitive fee arrangement with any class counsel, but the class action is well-suited to proceed; and (3) when the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel is unable to serve as lead counsel.167

Illustrating the first situation, the Northern District of California in In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions168 ordered an auction before appointing the lead plaintiff.169 According to the court, it had a duty to choose a lead counsel at a reasonable price, and an auction typically provides a lower fee for counsel than a plaintiff’s negotiated fee.170 The court continued by noting that if the auction resulted in counsel who requested a lower fee than that requested by a presumptive plaintiff’s counsel, the plaintiff would be required to accept representation by the lowest bidder.171 Otherwise, the court would select the next presumptive lead plaintiff.172

Illustrating the second situation, the Northern District of California in In re Quintus Securities Litigation173 ordered an auction because the pre-


167. See Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 491 (holding that auctions are appropriate only when plaintiff is incapable of negotiating reasonable fee agreement and all other prospective plaintiffs are inadequate to serve as lead plaintiff); Bank One S’Holders, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (holding that auctions were appropriate as matter of first resort); Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34 (holding that auction was appropriate because lead counsel was unable to serve in litigation).


169. See Bank One S’Holders, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (requiring that presumptive lead plaintiff accept most qualified bidder as counsel). In Bank One S’Holders, the court held a bid among law firms before appointing the lead plaintiff. See id. (stating facts of case). The court held that if the presumptive lead plaintiff were to insist on their class counsel handling the action on a hypothesized materially less favorable contractual basis, this insistence would effectively rebut the presumption that the putative class representatives were the most adequate plaintiffs. See id. (stating conclusion). The court suggests, however, that if “the presumptive class representative was willing to be represented by the most favorable qualified bidder among the lawyers submitting bids, with that bidder either supplanting the presumptive lead plaintiff’s original choice of counsel or working together with that original counsel,” the presumptive “most adequate” plaintiff would be appointed as lead plaintiff. See id. (describing process for determining lead plaintiff when auction is employed).

170. See id. (arguing in favor of ordering auction).

171. See id. at 783-84 (stating factors in choosing lead counsel).

172. See id. at 784 (stating means for selecting next plaintiff).

173. 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
sumptive lead plaintiff was unwilling to negotiate a reasonable fee agreement with counsel, and all other prospective plaintiffs were inadequate to serve as lead plaintiff.\textsuperscript{174} Because the class action appeared well-suited to proceed, the court appointed the presumptive lead plaintiff to the litigation but auctioned the lead counsel position to ensure class representation at a reasonable price.\textsuperscript{175}

With respect to the final situation, in \textit{In re Network Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation},\textsuperscript{176} the Northern District of California ordered an auction when the lead plaintiff's first choice of counsel was unable to serve as lead counsel.\textsuperscript{177} The court ordered the lead plaintiff, rather than the court, to conduct the auction.\textsuperscript{178} The court reasoned that because the lead plaintiff owes the class a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest quality representation at the lowest price, it should be the plaintiff, not the court, who conducts the auction.\textsuperscript{179}

C. Task Force Findings

Recently, the Third Circuit appointed a Task Force, composed of judges, scholars and practicing attorneys, to evaluate the appropriate method for selecting class counsel and to determine whether court-ordered auctions are permitted under the PSLRA lead counsel provision.\textsuperscript{180} The Task Force released its preliminary findings in which it concluded that a court should defer to the plaintiff's choice of counsel under a standard of review similar to the business judgment rule.\textsuperscript{181} The Task Force

\textsuperscript{174} See \textit{In re Quintus Sec. Litig.}, 201 F.R.D. at 481 (stating facts of case).
\textsuperscript{175} See id. (describing formalities of auction).
\textsuperscript{176} 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
\textsuperscript{177} See \textit{Network Assocs.}, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (stating facts).
\textsuperscript{178} See id. (stating facts). In ordering the plaintiff to conduct the auction, the court required the lead plaintiff to publicize a request for written proposals from counsel, evaluate all of the proposals received and interview any candidates deemed appropriate. See id. at 1033-34 (stating facts). The lead plaintiff was then ordered to submit his recommendations for his first and second choices as class counsel, including a full description of his selection process, his conclusions and his reasons. See id. (stating facts).
\textsuperscript{179} See id. (discussing rationale for plaintiff to conduct auction).
\textsuperscript{181} See Third Circuit Task Force Report, \textit{supra} note 11, at 87-93 (concluding that deferential standard of review must be applied to most adequate plaintiff's choice of counsel). The Task Force made several important recommendations in
concluded that “once the court has identified the most adequate plaintiff under the terms of the Act, that party’s choice of counsel should be reviewed with the deference given to any other business decision.”182 Therefore, the Task Force recommended that “scrutiny akin to the business judgment rule” should be applied to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel and to the fee arrangements if that decision was independent and careful.183

concluding that auctions are generally disfavored under the PSLRA. See id. at 17-18 (listing recommendations). First, the Task Force concluded that auctions are inconsistent with the goal of the PSLRA, which is to assure that the “most adequate” plaintiff chooses counsel and negotiates a reasonable fee. See id. at 18 (recommended that courts not employ auctions). The PSLRA, according to the Task Force, mandates that “class actions are to be client-driven, not court-driven.” Id. In adopting the business judgment rule as the appropriate standard of review, the Task Force found that:

To the extent that an auction is even permissible under the PSLRA, it should only be conducted if the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel, or process in choosing counsel, is so infirm as to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff is “most adequate” under the statute, and then only if the alternative candidates for the “most adequate plaintiff” do not appear willing or able to engage in a meaningful search for and negotiation with counsel. Id.

The Task Force also disputes the contention that auctions do not require an ex post determination of fees at the end of the litigation. See id. (finding that auction requires both ex ante and ex post determinations). According to the Task Force, Rule 23 ultimately requires the court to examine the fairness of the fees requested by counsel at the conclusion of the case. See id. at 19 (noting judge’s obligations).

182. Id. at 87.

183. See id. at 88 (noting that courts should not second-guess lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel if it is result of careful and independent process). In determining whether the decision-making process was independent and reasonable, the Task Force referred to a five-factor test outlined by the Securities and Exchange Commission in its brief submitted to the Third Circuit in Cendant. See id. at 89-90 (stating method to determine whether decision was independent and reasonable). According to this test, the lead plaintiff should: (1) follow procedures to identify a reasonable number of counsel with the skill and ability necessary to represent the class in the pending matter, (2) demonstrate the procedures used in inviting competent counsel to compete for the right to represent the class, (3) negotiate a fee and expense reimbursement arrangement that promotes the best interests of the class, (4) reasonably conclude that it has canvassed and actively negotiated with a sufficient number of counsel and obtained the counsel that is likely to obtain the highest net recovery to the class and (5) ensure that the counsel would not adversely affect the exercise of the plaintiff’s or counsel’s fiduciary obligations to the class. See id. at 87-95 (listing five-factor test in assessing decision-making process for lead plaintiff) (citing Brief for Appellant at 3-5, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001)).
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND ITS APPLICATION TO COURT-ORDERED AUCTIONS

Courts should defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel under the business judgment rule.184 The statutory text and the legislative history of the lead counsel provision support this finding.185 As a matter of public policy, deference is appropriate because it encourages institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff.186

A. Auctions Are Impermissible As a Matter of First Choice Among Courts

Under the statutory text of the PSLRA, auctions are impermissible as a matter of first choice among courts.187 The text explicitly provides that the lead plaintiff, not the court, has the right to select and retain class counsel.188 Auctions interfere with their right to select counsel.189 Auctions, instead, vest the court, not the lead plaintiff, with the authority to select lead counsel.190 In no manner does the PSLRA permit a court to remove the plaintiff's ability to select and retain counsel.191

184. For a further discussion on the business judgment rule as the appropriate standard of review, see infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.

185. For a further discussion of statutory language and legislative history supporting the business judgment rule standard of review, see infra notes 187-209 and accompanying text.

186. For a further discussion of the public policy supporting the business judgment rule as the appropriate standard of review, see infra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.

187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (stating that most adequate plaintiff must have largest financial interest and therefore must be most capable of selecting adequate counsel); id. at § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (stating that lead counsel provision vests lead plaintiff with authority to select and retain counsel). Commentators have argued that the statutory text vests the plaintiff with the authority to select lead counsel. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 91 (“The statutory text clearly vests the plaintiff, not the court, with the authority to select lead counsel. . . . [T]he statute provides no basis for the court to override the plaintiff's selection and to impose its choice of counsel . . . with respect to such selection.”). As a matter of policy, the courts are poorly suited to make business decisions. See id. at 94 (stating that selection of counsel is business decision and courts are inadequate forum to make such business decision). The Third Circuit Task Force found that the business judgment rule provides sufficient flexibility in its application and that courts will develop a framework for review that will provide appropriate deference to lead plaintiffs. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87 (refuting commentator's opinion that business judgment rule is too strong of standard to apply).


189. See generally, Hooper & Leary, supra note 10, at 3 (recognizing that court develops guidelines of bidding procedures and requirements and selects winning bidder); Fisch, supra note 8, at 92 (“Lead plaintiff auctions interfere with the statutory objective of client empowerment . . . .”).

190. See Hooper & Leary, supra note 10, at 29-34 (stating procedures courts employed in selecting lead counsel); Fisch, supra note 8, at 91-92 (stating consequence of court-ordered auctions in lead counsel selection).

Further, the court already has appointed a lead plaintiff whom it should have determined is capable of selecting class counsel. Under the text of the PSLRA, the court must appoint the lead plaintiff who can adequately represent the class and has the largest financial stake in the litigation. As already indicated, adequacy means that the plaintiff is empowered with the ability to select class counsel and monitor the counsel's decisions. Further, by stipulating that the lead plaintiff must have the largest financial interest in the litigation, the PSLRA seeks a plaintiff who would have the resources and the incentive to choose capable counsel, monitor class counsel's performance and negotiate a reasonable fee.

It has been argued that auctions may reduce counsel's fees and therefore potentially increase the damage recovery to the injured class. This argument, however, has two problems. First and foremost, the issue is not whether auctions are an alternate means for determining counsel fees, but rather, whether they are permitted after the adoption of the PSLRA. As indicated, the PSLRA does not permit auctions. Second, auctions do not guarantee that counsel's fees in fact will be reduced. To illustrate, in Cendant, the district court approved class counsel's bid that was higher in price as a result of the auction than originally was stipu-

192. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i), (iii) (stating that court appoints most adequate plaintiff). For a further discussion on the requirements for selecting the lead plaintiff, see supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.


194. For a further discussion on the adequacy requirement under the lead plaintiff provision, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

195. Cf S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (stating Congress' belief that court should appoint plaintiff with largest financial interest and that plaintiff should select lead counsel). For a further discussion on the legislative history in having the plaintiff with the largest financial interest appointed as the lead plaintiff, see infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.

196. See Comments on Class Counsel, Vaughn R. Walker, Comment on the Draft Report of Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel 17 (Dec. 3, 2001) (on file with Villanova Law Review), available at, http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/comments/Walker-statement/pdf (stating that "bidding securities cases recovered a significantly greater proportion of the potential for damage recovery than average"). In fact, one study revealed that "the bidding cases recovered 19.6% of potential investor losses while the average of all comparable cases was only 4.25%." Id.

197. For a further discussion on the problems associated with auctions, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.

198. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (stating whether PSLRA permits auctions after being adopted in 1995); Fisch, supra note 8, at 91 ("[T]here are serious reasons to question whether courts have authority under the PSLRA to employ an auction to select lead counsel.").

199. For a discussion of the impermissibility of auctions under the PSLRA, see supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.

200. For a further discussion why auctions may not increase damage recovery to the class, see infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
lated in the retainer agreement. As a result, the class received a lower amount of damage recovery due to the auction.

The legislative history further supports the argument that auctions are impermissible as a matter of first choice among courts. It demonstrates that Congress wanted securities class actions to be more plaintiff-centered with the plaintiff, not the court, choosing the class counsel. As a result, Congress entrusted the court to appoint the lead plaintiff who can make informed decisions in selecting lead counsel. Further, by requiring that the lead plaintiff have the largest financial interest in the litigation, Congress sought institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff. Again, institutional investors have a significant financial stake in the litigation and therefore have the incentive to seek class counsel who will obtain the highest return. Further, they already engage in a lengthy selection process, called "legal beauty contests," to assess the expertise and cost of a number of lawyers before selecting counsel. As a result, large investors have the resources and the ability to properly select and retain class counsel.

202. See id. (recognizing that auction resulted in less damages received to class).
204. Cf. id. (recognizing that PSLRA sought to increase client-driven litigation and prevent lawyer-driven litigation, but did not mention anything about court-driven litigation). Commentators and the Third Circuit Task Force agree that the PSLRA rejects the court-centered auctions in favor of empowering the lead plaintiff to select lead counsel. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 95 (stating that PSLRA reduces court's supervisory role in favor of client empowerment structure); Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 18 ("The PSLRA mandates that class actions are to be client-driven, not court-driven.").
205. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 ("T]he Committee permits the lead plaintiff to choose the class counsel. This provision is intended to permit the plaintiff to choose counsel rather than have counsel choose the plaintiff.").
206. See id. (seeking to increase likelihood that institutional investors would serve as lead plaintiffs).
207. See id. (recognizing that institutional investors have most to gain from serving as lead plaintiff and that their role will benefit class and assist courts).
208. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, app. B, at 4 (statement by Grant & Eisenhofer) (stating beauty contests employed by institutional investors seeking lead counsel). But see In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (stating that beauty contests are ineffective because no plaintiff can engage in comprehensive study of law firms).
As a matter of public policy, auctions may discourage large investors and institutional investors from serving as lead plaintiff. It has been indicated that although the lead plaintiff is not compensated in class actions, the plaintiff expects to significantly influence the conduct of the litigation. Auctions, however, may preclude the plaintiff from working with his or her choice of counsel and exercising any influence over the litigation. As a result, if institutional investors as lead plaintiff lack influence over the litigation, they may decline to seek lead plaintiff appointment. Such an outcome is contrary to the intent and spirit of the PSLRA, which is to attract large investors to serve and represent the interests of the class.

Therefore, in accordance with the statutory text of the PSLRA and its legislative history, courts should defer to the plaintiffs choice of counsel under a standard of review similar to business judgment rule. Deference will allow the plaintiff to select and retain class counsel without undue interference by the court. Also, it should encourage large investors

210. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 93 (“Auctions would likely deter institutional investors from seeking appointment as lead plaintiffs because of their reluctance to take on the responsibility of the lead plaintiff position without the ability to work with their choice of counsel.”).

211. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, app. B, at 19-20 (statement by Lucian Bebchuck) (stating lead plaintiffs incentive for serving as lead plaintiff). Because the lead plaintiff is not compensated for serving in the litigation, one incentive to become an effective and active lead plaintiff in the interest of the class—which is a type contemplated by the PSLRA—arises “from combination of (i) having substantial stake and (ii) expecting that becoming lead plaintiff would enable having significant influence of conduct of litigation.” See id. (recognizing reasons to serve as lead plaintiff).

212. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 56 (recognizing auctions “interfere with ability of institutional investors to take active and meaningful role in class action”).

213. See Fisch, supra note 8, at 93 (stating “auctions likely will deter institutional investors from seeking appointment as lead plaintiffs because of their reluctance to take on responsibility of lead plaintiff position without ability to work with their choice of counsel”).


215. Cf. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that courts should employ deferential standard in reviewing lead plaintiffs choice of counsel); In re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 486 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that deference should be given to lead plaintiffs choice of counsel); Fisch, supra note 8, at 94 (stating that courts are unsuited to choose class counsel when lead plaintiff already negotiated with counsel); Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 87 (“The PSLRA requires that the most adequate plaintiffs choice of counsel is entitled to deference if it is the result of careful and independent process.”).

or institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiff because the court will not interfere or second guess their choice of counsel.\textsuperscript{217}

The business judgment rule, however, still provides the court with the ability to review the decision-making process of the plaintiff in selecting class counsel.\textsuperscript{218} For instance, it allows the court to determine whether the lead plaintiff negotiated at arms length with counsel, whether a reasonable fee was made at the time of the agreement, and whether the lead plaintiff was informed about the subject.\textsuperscript{219} It does not, however, allow the court to substitute its judgment for lead counsel over the judgment of the lead plaintiff.\textsuperscript{220} As a result, the Task Force appropriately decided that the business judgment rule provides the adequate protection and appropriate deference to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel.\textsuperscript{221}

The Third Circuit in \textit{Cendant} and the Northern District of California in \textit{Copper Mountain} correctly applied a deferential standard of review similar to the business judgment rule.\textsuperscript{222} To illustrate, the Third Circuit found that auctions are impermissible, and concluded that a "court should generally employ a deferential standard in reviewing the lead plaintiff's choices. It is not enough that the lead plaintiff selected counsel or negotiated a retainer agreement that is different than what the court would have done . . . ."\textsuperscript{223} In other words, the Third Circuit recognized that a court should review the plaintiff's decision-making process and defer to that choice provided it resulted from a reasonable and good faith process.\textsuperscript{224}

Likewise, in \textit{Copper Mountain}, the Northern District of California properly found that a court should defer to the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel if the plaintiff employed a reasonable decision-making process for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{217} See Fisch, \textit{supra} note 8, at 93 ("Auctions would likely deter institutional investors from seeking appointment as lead plaintiffs because of their reluctance to take on the responsibility of the lead plaintiff position without the ability to work with their choice of counsel.").
\item \textsuperscript{218} Cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (applying business judgment rule but evaluating decision-making process to determine if informed and reasonable).
\item \textsuperscript{219} Cf. BLOCK \textit{ET AL.}, \textit{supra} note 137, at 45-47 (recognizing protections afforded under business judgment rule); EISENBERG, \textit{supra} note 15, at 545 (same).
\item \textsuperscript{220} See Third Circuit Task Force Report, \textit{supra} note 11, at 91 (stating that court may not "impose its own counsel, by way of auction, against the lead plaintiff's wishes").
\item \textsuperscript{221} See \textit{id.} at 87-88 (concluding that business judgment rule is appropriate deference given to lead plaintiff's choice of counsel).
\item \textsuperscript{222} See \textit{In re} Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 274-77 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating courts should defer to business judgment of lead plaintiff unless it can be shown that decision-making process was not arms-length or good-faith bargain); \textit{In re} Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. at 475, 486 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (refusing to conduct auction if fee arrangement was reasonable and deferring instead to lead plaintiff's choice of counsel).
\item \textsuperscript{223} \textit{Cendant}, 264 F.3d at 274.
\item \textsuperscript{224} See \textit{id.} at 276 (stating that court will evaluate decision making process under business judgment rule and if it finds plaintiff negotiated reasonably with counsel then it will not second guess that decision).
\end{itemize}
Consistent with the principles of the business judgment rule, the court stated that "[i]f the court determines that the plaintiff with the largest loss has adequately negotiated with counsel, then the adequacy requirement ... is met. ... In the event of such a showing, the court need not, and indeed should not, substitute its judgment for that of the lead plaintiff." In short, both courts found, consistent with the Task Force's findings, that a court should not interfere with a plaintiff's choice of counsel if the decision was based on a reasonable, good-faith selection process.

B. Appropriate Conditions for Conducting an Auction

Under a standard of review similar to the business judgment rule, an auction is appropriate only under very limited circumstances without violating the text of the PSLRA. Consistent with the statutory text, the court is authorized only to approve or disapprove the lead plaintiff's choice of counsel. The court, however, is authorized to appoint the most adequate plaintiff. If, for instance, the plaintiff consistently fails to negotiate a fee that the court finds reasonable, the court can review the adequacy of an alternate plaintiff who possess the next highest financial interest. If, however, no other plaintiffs are willing or able to serve as lead plaintiff, the court properly may assume control of the litigation in order to serve the interests of the class without violating the terms of the PSLRA.

225. See Copper Mountain, 201 F.R.D. at 486-89 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that deference is given to plaintiff's choice of counsel because fee arrangement appeared reasonable).

226. Id. at 482.

227. See id. at 486 (stating that court will defer to plaintiff's choice of counsel if negotiated reasonably); Cendant, 264 F.3d at 276 (stating that court will defer if lead plaintiff's choices were result of good faith selection and negotiation process and were arrived at via meaningful arms-length bargaining).

228. See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 277 (stating circumstances that might arise when auction is permissible); Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 91 (acknowledging that case might arise when auction could be permitted). The Task Force realized that a situation might arise in which "lead plaintiff ha[d] failed to conduct adequate search for qualified counsel, and no other party has stepped up with resources, experience and interest to conduct a true market search for and negotiation with counsel." Id. In such circumstances, the Task Force admits that it may designate a "most adequate plaintiff," as required under the statute, and find it appropriate to conduct an auction. See id. (finding auction may be appropriate).


232. Cf. id. (finding that lead plaintiff and lead counsel must be appointed in order for class action to proceed).
In support, the Northern District of California, the Third Circuit and the Third Circuit Task Force agree that under these limited circumstances a court-ordered auction may be appropriate without violating the PSLRA. Because the court must obtain a reasonable fee arrangement, it may opt for an auction to achieve this result.

C. The Court, Not the Lead Plaintiff, Should Conduct the Auction

As shown, an auction may be appropriate in a situation where a court finds no adequate plaintiff who is willing or able to negotiate a fee agreement with counsel and the class action is well-suited to proceed. In Network Associates, the Northern District of California misconstrued this test by requiring the lead plaintiff to conduct the auction when the plaintiff's counsel was unable to serve as lead counsel. Rather than determining the plaintiff's ability to seek another counsel, the court improperly ordered the plaintiff to conduct an auction. The auction, as a result, interfered with the plaintiff's ability to choose its own counsel. Instead, the court should have afforded the lead plaintiff with an opportunity to choose counsel before even considering an auction.

233. See Cendant, 264 F.3d at 277 (stating that if none of possible lead plaintiffs are adequate then it might be permissible for court to conduct auction); In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 491 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (same); Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 91 (same). The Task Force agreed that there may exist circumstances when an auction may be appropriate:

a case might arise in which the putative lead plaintiff has failed to conduct an adequate search for qualified counsel, and no other party has stepped up with the resources, experience and interest to conduct a true market search for and negotiation with counsel, i.e., a sophisticated investor who has suffered substantial economic loss. In these very limited circumstances, the Task Force does not rule out the possibility that the court may designate a "most adequate plaintiff"—as is required under the statute—and yet find it appropriate to employ an auction.

Id.

234. Compare Quintus, 201 F.R.D. at 490 (stating that auction is appropriate because plaintiff was unable to select lead counsel, all other prospective plaintiffs were incapable of negotiating competitive fee arrangement and class action was well-suited to proceed), with Cendant, 264 F.3d at 277 (stating that if litigant repeatedly undertakes flawed process of selecting and retaining lead counsel and none of possible lead plaintiffs are capable of serving as lead plaintiff, then court may assume direct control over counsel selection and hold auction).

235. For a discussion on permissibility of auctions, see supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.

236. See In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that court held auction before determining whether plaintiff was incapable of making this decision).

237. See id. (holding that plaintiff conduct auction).


239. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (recognizing that court only has authority under PSLRA to approve lead plaintiff's choice of counsel).
VIII. CONCLUSION

In selecting the lead plaintiff, the PSLRA permits a court to aggregate the financial interests of a small number of investors provided the court determines that the group adequately represents the interests of the class. This conclusion is consistent with the statutory text and the legislative history of the PSLRA. Aggregating, however, a large number of investors with small financial interests in the outcome of the litigation is inconsistent with the statutory text. In selecting the lead counsel, a court must defer to a lead plaintiff's choice of counsel under the business judgment rule but may consider auctioning this position only if all plaintiffs are inadequate to select competent counsel and the class action is well suited to proceed.

Ashe P. Puri