Power Play: Why NHL's Prohibition on Player Participation in Future Olympics Would Violate Sherman Antitrust Act

Ross O'Neill

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Comments

POWER PLAY: WHY NHL'S PROHIBITION ON PLAYER PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE OLYMPICS WOULD VIOLATE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT

I. INTRODUCTION

The National Hockey League (“NHL”) is the only major American sports league to pause its season in order to allow its players to compete in the Olympics.¹ Yet, the 2014 Winter Games in Sochi, Russia, potentially marked the final Olympic Games with NHL players in attendance.²

The NHL has permitted players to compete in the last five Winter Olympics; however, one of the highly contentious issues in the recent Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) discussions between the NHL and the National Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”) was the involvement of players in future Winter Olympics.³ While players relish the opportunity to compete for their countries, allowing player participation in the Games creates scheduling problems for the NHL, increases the risk of player injuries, and fails to provide the league any financial benefit.⁴ Ulti-


4. See CBS New York, supra note 2 (quoting NHL commissioner Gary Bettman, “Our outstanding athletes take tremendous pride in representing their homelands on the global stage”). See also Lake, supra note 3 (“The NHL and NHLPA’s hesitation to go to the games was largely due to the rising cost of player insurance, and restrictions on the NHL’s ability to commercialize their participa-
mately, the two sides failed to reach a decision and left the issue in flux.\(^5\)

The International Olympic Committee ("IOC"), International Ice Hockey Federation ("IIHF"), and National Broadcast Company ("NBC"), which holds the Olympic television broadcast rights within the United States, collectively rely on NHL player presence to increase the Games’ appeal and to generate profits.\(^6\) Absent NHL players, the Winter Olympics’ profitability, marketability, and mass appeal would collectively diminish.\(^7\)

The NHL initially allowed player involvement in the Olympic Games in an attempt to benefit financially from the increased worldwide exposure.\(^8\) However, due to the IOC’s restrictive marketing, advertising, and broadcast guidelines, which effectively ban outside organizations’ media access and licensing agreements, the NHL has not successfully translated the added exposure into revenue.\(^9\) Because of the IOC restrictions, the League remains unable to commercialize NHL players’ involvement through any League sponsored marketing of NHL Olympians, advertising promotions, or re-broadcasting of full games and highlights.\(^10\)

On top of the League missing out on potential commercial benefits, team owners are concerned about Olympic players returning to the NHL season fatigued or even injured.\(^11\) As some

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5. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing implications stemming from absence of this contractual language).

6. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (discussing financial impact of having NHL players attend the Winter Olympic Games).

7. See Scott Burnside, Bettman, Fasel Step Up Sideshow, ESPN.com (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:22pm), http://espn.go.com/olympics/winter/2014/icehockey/story/_/id/10474956/2014-sochi-olympics-future-nhl-players-olympics-debatable (suggesting NHL’s unilateral decision-making process is “part[ ] of the past” and that IOC should have further say pertaining to future Olympic participation (alteration added)).

8. See Larry, supra note 1, at 16A-17A (discussing dramatic difference between 2006 and 2010 NHL Olympic participation).

9. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing IOC’s restrictive media stance).

10. See Lake, supra note 3 (“[T]he IOC has traditionally limited the NHL’s ability to [market] their participation in the Games.”). Further, “[owners] have never been keen about [players] participating in the Olympics [since] [owners] shut down their league for free, [and owners] don’t think they get the marketing bump the NHL was looking for when it originally signed up for the Olympics in 1998.” See id. (third and fifth alterations in original) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

11. See Bob Ford, Olympics a Big Loss for the NHL, PHILLY.COM (Jan. 31, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-01-31/sports/46833175_1_vancouver-outdoor-
owners suggest, the potential rise in both injury and fatigue unfairly benefits NHL teams without Olympians on the roster.\textsuperscript{12}

For these reasons, NHL President, Gary Bettman, and the majority of league owners do not support sending NHL players to the 2018 or 2022 Olympic Games in South Korea and China, respectively.\textsuperscript{13} As an alternative to the Olympics, the NHL plans to implement a World Cup of Hockey, an NHL sponsored quadrennial tournament held in September during the same years as the Summer Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{14}
League representatives announced plans for a World Cup of Hockey to be held in Toronto in 2016.\(^{15}\) Numerous benefits to the NHL of hosting the World Cup include: the ability to directly profit from broadcast, marketing, sponsorship and advertising fees; the prevention of the hardships involved with pausing a season; and the full and total control over all aspects of the tournament.\(^{16}\) However, as suggested by the NHL Commissioner and League Office, the NHL’s World Cup of Hockey “could spell the end of NHL participation at the Olympics[].”\(^{17}\)

As the sole employer to the world’s elite ice hockey players, the NHL holds considerable leverage over the IOC.\(^{18}\) In order for the 2014 Games to feature NHL players, the League and team owners stipulated that players would not attend unless the IOC pay upwards of $10 million in player insurance.\(^{19}\) The League also pressured the IOC to allow the League unprecedented media access for the NHL-owned television station, the NHL Network.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{15}\) See Chris Peters, *Report: World Cup of Hockey Expected to Return in 2016 in Toronto*, CBSSports.com (Jun. 4, 2014, 8:23pm), http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/eye-on-hockey/24580740/report-world-cup-of-hockey-expected-to-return-in-2016-in-toronto (maintaining NHL’s purpose for instituting World Cup of Hockey event was to “expand [the NHL’s] presence in international hockey, while also having more control . . . and creating another revenue stream”). See also id. (stating that NHL and players association would generate estimated $100 million in revenue through competitive bidding process for any subsequent World Cup of Hockey).

\(^{16}\) See Jeff Klein, *NHL and Players Differ Over 2018 Games*, New York Times, (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/sports/hockey/nhl-and-players-differ-over-2018-games.html ("Players would still risk injury, but the league would share in the revenue, travel would be limited, and if played in the preseason, the tournament would not interfere with the N.H.L. schedule."). See also Lake, supra note 3, ("[T]he league expressed a desire to expand its international presence through the revitalization of the World Cup.").

\(^{17}\) See Peters, supranote 15 (alteration added) (replacing Olympics with World Cup of Hockey “is believed to be the preferred route of the owners.”).

\(^{18}\) See infra notes 183-198 (discussing market for top professional hockey players).

\(^{19}\) See Lake, supra note 3 ("The NHL and the NHLPA believed that the IOC should cover the cost of insurance for their players to participate in the Games")

David Shoalts, *NHL, IOCinch Toward Sochi Winter Olympics*, The Globe and Mail (Jun. 24, 2013, 10:27pm), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/nhl-ioc-inch-toward-sochi-winter-olympics/article12792135/ (forcing IOC and IIHF to pay record insurance sum restricts IOC and IIHF spending in other areas prior to Sochi games). See also id. (indicating that due to increased insurance costs, “only the wealthiest federations, such as Hockey Canada and Hockey USA, may be able to afford the cost of having their Olympians scrimmage.”).

\(^{20}\) See Lake, supra note 3 (indicating IOC as strictly opposed to granting outside media networks access to any portion of Olympics because of restrictive partnership and broadcasting deals); John Ourand & Christopher Botta, *NHL Network on ice*, SportsBusiness Daily (Jul. 1, 2013), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/07/01/Media/NHL-Network.aspx (stating that in 2012, NHL’s owned NHL Network, which reached 43 million homes, and charges
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The IOC utilizes sponsorship exclusivity deals to generate a majority of its revenue; and, permitting inside access to an outside sponsor and partner, like the NHL, threatens those rights.21

Although the IOC appeased the NHL and granted the League limited access to certain highlights and player access, the League refused to agree to future Olympics unless given full media access and control.22 The NHL’s bullish negotiation stance suggests it will not cease using its leverage over the IOC and IIHF until the organizations relent to the media and control demands or refuse and suffer the prospect of an Olympics without NHL players competing.23 Even if the international organizations comply, the NHL will still attempt to upstage the IOC by turning the NHL-controlled World Cup of Hockey into the world’s preeminent ice hockey tournament.24

If this course of action persists, the League’s conduct of banning players from the Olympics, but permitting them to attend the World Cup of Hockey, would violate United States’ primary anti-


22. See Lake, supra note 3 (“[B]y keeping the CBA silent on the issue, the League was able to increase its leverage with the IOC and thereby put the NHL and NHLPA in a position to negotiate a more favorable agreement.” (alteration added)); NHL Revealed! all-access show extends league’s reach to Sochi Olympics, NHL.COM (Jan. 23, 2014, 5:45pm), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=701888 (“It’s even more progressive to have inside access at the Olympics, one of the more right-shoulder-controlled events in all of sports.”); see Sharon Terlep, NHL Casts Doubt on Sending Players to 2018 Olympics, WSJ ONLINE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304887104579506522788511320 (suggesting NHL commissioner and owners infuriated by IOC refusal in 2010 to permit widespread access to NHL Network because they were not permitted to air interview of NHL commissioner). “The NHL [received] more [broadcasting rights and] material this year than in 2010 but still can’t air whatever it wants.”).

23. For a detailed discussion of the legality of the NHL’s negotiating stance, see infra notes 162-173 and accompanying text.

24. See Lake, supra note 3 (“In response to this, the League expressed a desire to expand its international presence through the revitalization of the World Cup.”); Peters, supra note 15 (suggesting NHL profits could reach as high as $100 million from cities bidding on hosting World Cup event). But see Lake, supra note 3 (stating NHL players have a greater interest in being Olympians and further noting that men’s hockey is marquee event for Olympics because of NHL player participation).
trust legislation, the Sherman Act.\textsuperscript{25} The Sherman Act attempts to prevent anticompetitive conduct and the monopolization of markets and products.\textsuperscript{26} The Act “ensures that companies which hold a natural monopoly in a given market do not actively discourage the rise of similar products in that market.”\textsuperscript{27}

In the present situation, if the League acts to prohibit future NHL participation in the Olympic Games, the NHL-sponsored World Cup of Hockey would be an attempt to replace the Winter Olympics’ prestigious ice hockey tournament.\textsuperscript{28} Any such ban on players attending the Olympics will severely impact the IOC’s ability to attract top-level professional talent, thereby substantially limiting the ice hockey tournament’s worldwide appeal and profits.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, the burdens and consequences stemming from these actions “would affect players, fans and the business of the Olympics, but wouldn’t hurt the league itself.”\textsuperscript{30} Thus, the NHL is using its role as the employer to the world’s most dominant and profitable ice hockey players as a means to achieve revenue domination in the international ice hockey market and extort control over Olympic organizers.\textsuperscript{31}

This Comment discusses the legality of the NHL’s move towards implementing a quadrennial World Cup of Hockey and the subsequent banning of players from Olympic competition.\textsuperscript{32} Part II

\textsuperscript{25} See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890); see infra Section IV (discussing Sherman Antitrust legislation).

\textsuperscript{26} For a further analysis of the policies that supported the implementation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see infra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{27} Glenn M. Wong, Essentials of Sports Law 456 (ABC-CILO, 4th ed. 2010).

\textsuperscript{28} See NHL.com, supra note 22 (“If NHL and the Players’ Association hammer out a deal for a return of the ‘World Cup of Hockey,’ it’s uncertain what will happen in regard to participation in the 2018 Olympics” (alteration added)).

\textsuperscript{29} See Klein, supra note 16. In a New York Times article, NBC Sports Group Chairman Mark Lazarus was quoted as stating the following about his interest in continuing tradition of NHL players at Olympics: “We’ve expressed that opinion to the National Hockey League and to the N.H.L. Players Association . . . [w]e can only tell them that it is our preference, that they’re there.” See id. (stating further that NBC, which owns rights to 2018 Winter Games, paid $963 million for right to air 2018 games, wants players there).


\textsuperscript{31} See Klein, supra note 16 (“No matter how much the Winter Games raise the sport’s visibility in the United States, the league’s owners will weigh that against their business and competitive interests.”).

\textsuperscript{32} See Klein, supra note 16 (discussing differing opinions between NHL players and league owners and executives, noting player “participation is a joint decision”).
provides a background of the relevant entities and the history of hockey in the Olympics. Part III discusses the NHL’s proposed course of action and reviews the impact of the proposed action. Part IV discusses the applicable antitrust law: Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Part V applies the Sherman Antitrust Act to the NHL’s planned actions and suggests that the NHL has monopoly power over professional hockey players and would violate the Sherman Act if it prohibited players from playing in the Olympic tournament and allowed sole permission to instead partake in a League-sponsored World Cup of Hockey. Part VI assesses the impact on all parties if the NHL executes its plan for Olympic prohibition and subsequent creation of the World Cup.

II. BACKGROUND OF ENTITIES AND ISSUES

A. NHL and Winter Olympics

The NHL was formed in 1917 and was originally comprised of five teams. Nearly one hundred years later, the League has expanded to thirty teams and generates over $3.2 billion in annual revenue. The thirty teams are separately owned and operate in concert with the League office, NHL Enterprises. While players hail from nineteen nations, the majority of the athletes are from Canada. The NHL attracts the elite hockey talent by offering su-

33. For an overview of Olympic ice hockey history, Olympic profits and the relevant private companies and governing bodies, see infra notes 37-77 and accompanying notes.
34. For a discussion of each entities’ fiscal interests in the Olympics, a summary of the proposed World Cup of Hockey and an introduction to Sherman Antitrust legislation, see infra notes 78-161 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of antitrust implications arising from the proposed World Cup of Hockey, see infra notes 162-237 and accompanying text.
36. For a further analysis of the resulting antitrust violations and a suggested alternative course of action, see infra notes 238-264 and accompanying text.
39. See Larry, supra note 1, at 6A (“Each NHL member club operates individually, with its own revenues and costs, and revenues gained on a league-wide basis, such as television and advertising revenues, distributed among the member clubs.”). See also id. (stating operating decisions are made by members of each organization and commissioner of league, Gary Bettman).
perior salaries and competitive playing opportunities compared to European professional leagues. As a result, the League is regarded as the premier professional ice hockey league in the world.

Before the introduction of NHL players, the Olympic ice hockey tournament included amateur players and European semi-professionals. In 1988, the IOC lessened the restrictions previously banning professional athletes from competing in the Olympics. Although the Olympics were then open to professionals, the NHL contractually prohibited its players from competing in non-NHL games. The League softened its position in 1995 due to in-

41. See Ryan Lambert, What We Learned: The KHL Isn’t Going to Steal All Your Russians, Yahoo! Sports (Jul. 13, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nhl-puck-daddy/learned-khl-isn-t-going-steal-russians-nhl-144857282.html (stating out of twenty-six teams in Russian Professional Hockey (KHL), only ten could afford to pay $1 million to NHL players to transfer to KHL and only four or five of total twenty-six teams come up even in revenue per year); Matthew Fisher, KHL is Good Hockey, Bad Business, National Post (Oct. 19, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://sports.nationalpost.com/2012/10/19/khl-is-good-hockey-bad-business/ (noting lack of feasibility for KHL to sustain increased player salaries compared to NHL).

42. See Lyle Richardson, KHL Still No Serious Threat to NHL (Feb. 8, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://kuklaskorner.com/spector/comments/khl_still_no_serious_threat_to_nhl (noting prominent counterpart professional hockey league, KHL, does not attract high level of players compared to NHL due to KHL’s inability to offer comparable salaries).

The KHL, for all the talk that it’s trying to challenge the NHL in some kind of real way, remains a bit of a joke in terms of who actually plays there; it’s the equivalent of baseball’s AAA-quality players. Not quite good enough to hack it in the bigs, a little too good to be bussing it in the [NHL’s minor league] AHL.

Lambert, supra note 41 (alteration added).

43. See Larry, supra note 1, at 9A (discussing Olympic hockey prior to NHL participation).

The NHL first allowed its players to participate in the Olympics at the 1998 Games in Nagano, Japan. Before that, Olympic hockey was effectively an amateur competition. NHL players most recently participated in 2010 Games in Vancouver, and it appears as though the players—especially the Russian players—desire to play in the 2014 Winter Olympics held in Sochi, Russia.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).


45. See Larry, supra note 1, at 11A (noting players were able to participate in few, non-NHL exhibition games while playing for their foreign teams).
creasing pressure from players, and agreed to permit the athletes to take part in the next Olympic Games. 46

When NHL players entered Olympic competition in the 1998 Nagano, Japan Winter Games, the popularity of the ice hockey tournament exploded. 47 Since then, the ice hockey tournament has been one of the most watched events of the Olympics. 48 The number of NHL competitors steadily rose over subsequent years, and in the 2014 Sochi Games, all national teams’ rosters had a percentage of their players on NHL rosters: USA (100%), Canada (100%), Sweden (96%), Finland (68%), Czech Republic (64%), Russia (60%), Slovenia (56%), Switzerland (36%), Austria (12%), Latvia (4%), Norway (4%), and Slovenia (4%). 49 Overall, nearly 150 NHL players competed in the Sochi Olympics. 50

**B. International Participation Process**

The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) and the International Ice Hockey Federation (“IIHF”) conduct the Olympic hockey tournament in tandem. 51 The IOC is a non-profit organization that “oversees all aspects of the Olympic movement, but its

46. See id. at 11A-12A (noting agreement was reached allowing NHL players to participate in Olympics after dissolution of Soviet Union and 1994-1995 NHL player-owner lockout).

47. See Lake, supra note 3 (stating presence of professional hockey players from NHL and KHL helped ignite hockey’s worldwide popularity); Larry, supra note 1, at 11A (suggesting prior to 1998, NHL players who insisted on partaking in Olympics could not do so by rule of CBA). The agreement to let players participate in the 1998 Winter games took place in 1995 between the NHL, NHLPA, IOC, and IIHF. Id. For a discussion of the growth in popularity of the ice hockey tournament, see infra notes 63-66.


49. See id. (suggesting percentages increased over sixteen-year period between 1998 and 2014 Olympics due to NHL player involvement).


51. See IIHF Mission Statement, INTERNATIONAL ICE HOCKEY FEDERATION, http://www.iihf.com/iihf-home/the-iihf/our-mission.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (“To govern, develop and promote hockey throughout the world, to develop and control international ice and in-line hockey... to operate in an organized manner for the good order of the sport.” (alteration added)); The International Olympic Committee is the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, http://www.olympic.org/about-ioc-institution (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (“[t]he International Olympic Committee is the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement” and organizer to all Olympic games (alteration added)).
most visible role is that of supervisor for the summer and winter Olympic Games.”

The IIHF is comprised of national hockey organizations worldwide with a common goal to broaden the sport’s popularity. For international hockey organizations to send players to the Olympics, the organizations must be members of the IIHF and meet the stipulations of the governing body. While the IIHF deals specifically with ice hockey, the IOC is responsible for final authority and control over arranging and organizing all Olympic Games.

For NHL athletes, the Olympic process requires that players qualify with their respective nation’s IIHF organization and obtain NHL and team permission through an agreement between the League and the players union, the NHLPA. The NHLPA “negotiates and enforces fair terms and conditions of employment for NHL players.” To achieve the union’s goals, the NHLPA’s representatives, the League office, and the team owners enter into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which “sets out the terms and conditions of employment of all professional hockey players playing in the NHL.”

In 2012, the League representatives and the players agreed to a new, ten-year CBA. The previous CBA contained terms specifically permitting the players to compete in the 2006 and 2010 Winter Olympics.

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52. See Wong, supra note 27 at 27 (stating IOC controls administration of all Olympic aspects). See id. (“Beneath the IOC administration are the individual international federations (IFs). The IFs are nongovernmental bodies given the authority by the IOC to administer specific sports on the international level. IFs must adhere to the Olympic movement rules and regulations. . . . since the IFs are responsible for individual sports on an international level, they are directly above the national governing bodies of each sport. As an example the NGB [National Governing Body] of basketball in the United States is called USA Basketball.”).

53. See IIHF Mission Statement, supra note 51 and accompanying text.

54. See Larry, supra note 1, at 8A (indicating further that IIHF operates international competitions and settles disputes among member organizations).

55. See IIHF Mission Statement, supra note 51 and accompanying text.


59. See NHL 2012 CBA, supra note 57; Larry, supra note 1, at 12A (noting prior 2005 CBA expired on September 15, 2004).
ter Olympics. However, in the 2012 CBA, the NHL purposefully negated mention of future Olympics so the League would no longer be obligated to allow the players to partake in Winter Games. Although the NHLPA and League office can still negotiate the Olympics, without contractual language addressing international play within the CBA, players risk competing and possibly injuring themselves without compensation.

C. Olympic Ice Hockey Tournament Profits at Stake

The Olympic Ice Hockey tournament generates substantial revenue and viewership compared to the other Winter Olympic sports. In Vancouver 2010, the Olympic hockey tournament portion of the Winter Olympics generated $60 million in revenue for the IOC. In 2010, the final game of the international tournament reached the largest audience in history for a Canadian hockey game. Similarly, in the 2014 Sochi Games, the semifinal game between Canada and the United States set a new online streaming record.


61. See NHL 2012 CBA, supra note 57, § 24; Klein, supra note 16 ("[T]he anti-Olympic faction among owners and executives has many reasons for saying no to Pyeongchang, and last week's roll call of players who were injured at the Sochi Games touched off a renewed sense of opposition." (citation omitted)).


64. See Barry, supra note 63 (demonstrating substantial revenue earned from Olympic hockey tournament, with $8.5 million in profits from 2010 gold medal game between United States and Canada).

record of more than 2.1 million viewers. For the four-year Olympic cycle encompassing the 2014 Sochi Games and 2016 Rio De Janeiro Games the IOC raised nearly $4.1 billion in revenue. However, the IOC operates as a non-profit organization, splitting half of the revenue with the host city, distributing 90% of the remaining revenue to fund National Olympic Committee’s, Organizing Committees, and International Federations, and retaining 10% revenue for operational and administrative expenditures. These funds must cover all expenses for both the Summer and Winter games. The success of future Winter Games depends on the Olympic ice hockey tournament, which has proven to be the financial keystone for a successful and profitable Winter Olympics.

NBC has a significant financial stake in the Olympic Ice Hockey tournament, and paid nearly $7.5 billion for the rights to Winter Olympic Games through 2032, fully expecting NHL players to participate. The competitive edge NHL players provide the tournament increases viewer interest and proves a dominating factor supporting NBC’s rationale for paying the substantial fee to broadcast the Olympics. However without the NHL’s continued involvement in the Winter Games, NBC’s ratings and revenues

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69. See Klein, supra note 16 (“Asked what the N.H.L.’s absence from Pyeongchang would mean to NBC, [NBC Sports Group Chairman] Lazarus said, ‘I can’t answer that question, and I hope I won’t ever have to.’” (alteration added));
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would likely decline. 78 The NHL seemingly has an interest in appealing to NBC, as the League and television provider have a separate broadcasting deal worth $2 billion over ten years for NBC’s right to televise NHL regular season and playoff games. 74 In spite of the existing ten-year partnership deal, the NHL’s path towards player prohibition will diminish NBC’s revenues. 75 NBC expressed concern over the NHL’s potential player restriction and stands to lose even further profits if the NHL chooses a separate media outlet to broadcast the inevitable World Cup of Hockey. 76 Thus, the future popularity and profits for NBC and the IOC will be inherently linked to the NHL’s decision to permit players to attend or abstain. 77

III. OVERVIEW OF THE NHL’S PRIOR CONDUCT, PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION & RAMIFICATIONS FOR IOC, IIHF AND NBC

A. Buildup to Sochi

For NHL athletes to play in the 2014 Olympics, the NHL required the IOC and IIHF to substantially lower the organizations’ normally rigid guidelines. 78 The League demanded the IOC and participating IIHF national organizations pay nearly $10 million in insurance coverage for the participating players. 79 The IOC and

Epstein, supra note 63 (“But to keep [the tournament successful] the [Olympics] will need to keep the NHL stars. It needs to be elite.”).


74. See Bob Condor, NHL, NBC sign record-setting 10-year TV deal, NHL (April 4, 2011, 10:08 PM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=560238 (noting NBC and NHL have $200 million annual contract providing NBC rights to broadcast NHL regular season and playoffs; notably both Olympic and NHL deals were agreed upon within same calendar year).

75. See Davidson, supra note 30 (“NBC would take a particularly large hit after spending $4.38 billion for television rights to the Olympics through 2020.”).

76. See Gloster, supra note 62 (indicating NBC’s preference to have NHL players in South Korea).

77. See Jake Mann, NBC’s New Olympics Deal: What the Experts Think, THE MOTLEY FOOL (May 9, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/05/09/are-olympic-sponsorships-a-multi-billion-dollar-business (“Four of the last six Olympics to lose money occurred during the winter” (alteration added)).

78. See Lake, supra note 3 (“[T]he NHL and the NHLPA agreed that changes from the past agreements with the IOC and IIHF were needed in order for it to make commercial sense for the NHL to send players to Sochi.” (alteration added)).

79. See NHL, IOC Inch Toward Sochi Winter Olympics, CARHA HOCKEY http://www.carahockey.ca/1040/nhl-ioc-inch-toward-sochi-winter-olympics (last visited
wealthier IIHF federations paid this unprecedented sum, leaving poorer nations’ hockey federations unable to pay for necessary pre-Olympic national training camps. The NHL also stipulated that the IOC needed to liberalize their stringent media rights and coverage restrictions to permit the NHL Network increased access. Although IOC regulations prohibit outside sponsors and media access to the Olympics, the committee appeased the League offices and team owners to enable player participation. The NHL acknowledged the inducements, but refused to agree to further Olympics, partially due to the lack of total control over the Olympic ice hockey tournament.

B. NHL Player Prohibition and the World Cup of Hockey

The NHL’s proposed prohibition of player involvement and reinstitution of the World Cup of Hockey, will have lasting implications...
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tions on international hockey and future Winter Olympics.84 To benefit financially from player involvement in an international tournament, the NHL has publicly floated plans to hold the World Cup of Hockey, starting in 2016.85 The World Cup of Hockey was previously held twice, in 1996 and 2004, with the 2004 tournament occurring after the NHL began allowing players to attend Winter Olympics.86 Both tournaments lacked the draw and success garnered by the Olympics, principally due to the lack of prominent NHL player involvement.87 For the NHL’s elite, the World Cup represents a secondary tournament for which the international prestige associated with the Olympics could not be successfully duplicated.88

However, the League staunchly suggests that a return to the tournament with an influx of top-level NHL talent would attract new interest for both participants and viewers.89 Unlike the Olympics, the World Cup would occur in September to avoid overlap-

84. See Dan Ryan, Sochi 2014: Just How “NHL” are the Olympics, SBNATION (Jan 10, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://www.stanleycupofchowder.com/2014/1/10/5296016/sochi-2014-just-how-nhl-are-the-olympics (discussing increased likelihood of World Cup of Hockey as replacement for Olympics).

85. See NHL Won’t Commit to Olympics After Sochi Games, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED.COM (Jan 27, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.si.com/olympic-ice-hockey/ice-hockey/2014/01/27/nhl-sochi-olympics-2018-pyeongchang (“The NHL and NHL Players’ Association have been in talks about bringing back the World Cup of Hockey that wouldn’t conflict with the league’s regular season.”); Joe Delessio, Time for a Hockey World Cup? SPORTSONEARTH.COM (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/66502878/the-nhl-is-a-reluctant-participant-in-the-sochi-olympics (“The NHL hates that it’s not in control of such a high-profile event, particularly when international hockey has the potential to be so lucrative.”).

86. See Terlep, supra note 22 (suggesting World Cup of Hockey does not generate same level of fan and player interest compared to Olympics, largely due to NHL players disinterest and lack of involvement).

87. See Christopher Botta, Could World Cup of Hockey Make a Return, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL (June, 25, 2012), http://m.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/06/25/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/Hockey-world-cup.aspx (explaining that NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman believes resurgent World Cup will be different than previous ones because “both the league and the [NHL] Players’ Association believe doing World Cups on a regular basis is both important and a great opportunity for the continued growth of the game” (alteration in original)).

88. See James Conley, The NHL World Cup of Hockey Is Coming for Your Olympics, SB NATION (Feb. 11, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.pensburgh.com/2014/2/11/5400344/the-nhl-world-cup-of-hockey-is-coming-for-your-olympics-tuesday-slew (“The Olympics are [sic] the preeminent international sporting tournament, and it would take years of successful and captivating World Cup tournaments to really replace them [sic] in the eyes of hockey fans and NHL players.”).

89. See id. (recounting that return of World Cup of Hockey with NHL player participation would attract global audience similar to Olympics).
ping with an ongoing NHL season. Additionally, whereas the international hockey tournament is only one of fifteen sports at the Winter Olympics, the World Cup of Hockey would not have any risk of popular winter sports competing with the World Cup for television airtime and popularity. Further, the NHL would be able to broadcast the tournament and choose sponsorships and media rights, with all profits going to the League and the players. Therefore, by substituting the Olympic Games with a World Cup of Hockey, the NHL and team owners will have an international tournament “they can own, control and profit from.” In so doing, the NHL intends to “make a resurrected World Cup of Hockey the pinnacle of the game at the international level.”

The players, through the NHLPA, must collectively vote and agree to attend the World Cup. Any agreement between the NHL and its players may offer the players a fiscal incentive based on marketing and television revenues to lure players into attending the reinstated World Cup; however, each individual player would retain the option to participate. Although there may be a nominal financial reward, the star players would be unlikely to attend the

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90. See Botta, supra note 87 (quoting NHL Chief Operations Officer John Collins as stating “[f]or years now, we have been essentially licensing our players to the Olympics and to the World Championships. Why not continue to build up an event like the World Cup, where the NHL and union can be partners, our sponsors can activate, and [that] our fans will embrace?” (alteration added)).

91. See Lage, supra note 13, (altering timetable and schedule of World Cup of Hockey would allow NHL to hold event in August or September, outside of winter sports calendar); Botta, supra note 87, (holding World Cup in September NHL hopes to directly benefit from ratings boost due to lull in sporting events between Super Bowl and NCAA March Madness).

92. See Botta, supra note 87, (believing league does not benefit as much from exposure of NHL players, particularly when Olympics are not in North America). The fan focus and interest boosted post-Olympic ratings when the games were held in Salt Lake City in 2002 and Vancouver in 2010. Id. (holding conversely, the 1998 Nagano, Japan and 2006 Turin, Italy Olympics each had lower ratings and press coverage in the United States).

93. See Greg Wyshynski, Gary Bettman’s World Cup vs. the Winter Olympics, Yahoo Sports (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/puck-daddy/gary-bettman-world-cup-vs-winter-olympics-202502902—nhl.html (arguing Bettman views NHL’s player participation concession as “goodwill gesture” (internal quotation marks omitted)).


95. For a discussion of the NHL and NHLPA agreement to create a World Cup of Hockey, see supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.

96. For a discussion of the NHLPA’s lack of power to compel players to attend a potential World Cup of Hockey, see infra notes 166-167.
World Cup, resulting in fewer elite players than the Olympics. While the League likely is mistaking the player interest level, the World Cup reintroduction coupled with the Olympics, demonstrates a shift toward the NHL dominating the landscape of international ice hockey.

C. The Ramifications for Future Olympic Games

The fiscal and competitive interest for the future of the Olympic hockey tournament is closely tied to NHL participation. A successful NHL player ban would force the IIHF and IOC to find replacement players in the form of “second-tier pros from the North American minor leagues and European pro leagues.” Without the world’s best hockey players the Olympic ice hockey tournament would diminish from a popularity and marketing standpoint because “there really is no better way to grow and promote a game that is often seen as an afterthought among many sports fans” than by showcasing top level talent.

Any diminished popularity of the Olympic ice hockey tournament would directly impact the profits wrought by both the IOC and NBC. By comparison, in the Summer Olympic Games, the

97. See Delessio, supra note 85 (suggesting elite level players would not be incentivized by World Cup of Hockey because “such a tournament would . . . have less cachet, and considering this generation of players has grown up with NHL Olympic participation—and has likely dreamed about representing their country—a World Cup could be perceived as a step down” (alteration added)).

98. See id. (“[S]kipping the Olympics in favor of a World Cup would mean a tournament with fewer eyeballs on it, and one with far less buzz, even if the United States is successful.” (alteration added)).


100. See id. (alteration added) (suggesting decreased and muted fan interest as result of NHL refusing to permit players to attend 2018 Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea).

101. See Tim Kolpanowich, The Necessary Presence of NHL Players At the Olympics, THEGOODPOINT.COM (Apr. 16, 2013), http://thegoodpoint.com/nhl-players-olympics/. See also Katie Carrera, Alex Ovechkin, Steve Stamkos on Why NHL Players Should Participate in Olympics, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capitals-insider/wp/2013/02/14/the-argument-for-nhl-players-to-participate-in-the-olympics/ (quoting former Olympian and NHL All-Star Steve Yzerman “[t]he Olympics is the one time the whole world is watching, and I believe we want our players there because we have the best players in the world”(alteration added)).

102. See ALAIN FERRAND, JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET & BENÔT SEGUIN, OLYMPIC MARKETING 235 (2012) (“The example of the NHL clearly illustrates one of the key challenges for IOC marketing and its stakeholders. The stakes are high because it
IOC tends to generate substantial revenue and popularity because NBA players participate, adding a celebrity aspect to the Games, and, in return, the NBA receives exposure and increased worldwide viewership during the regular season.\textsuperscript{103} Due to the added exposure, “[a] business and as a brand, the NBA has generated hundreds of millions of dollars as a direct result of allowing its players to appear in the Olympic Games[.]”\textsuperscript{104} Even so, the Summer Games are not as fiscally dependent on basketball due to the popularity of swimming, gymnastics, and track and field.\textsuperscript{105} On the contrary the Winter Games features less popular, less common sports and relies on the Olympic ice hockey tournament to generate profits.\textsuperscript{106} The identifiable and popular stars from both the NHL and NBA provide the allure for their respective Olympic tournaments and are primarily responsible for the financial success of those events.\textsuperscript{107}

The future success of the Winter Games relies on NHL talent, and “NHL players not attending would hurt the business of the

is important for the IOC’s brand equity to have the best athletes compete in the Games.”). See also Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Owners Want to Kill Olympic Format to Protect Investment in International Players, Yahoo! Sports (July 29, 2012, 7:10 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/olympics—nba-owners-want-to-kill-olympic-format-to-protect-investment-in-international-players.html (noting National Basketball Association permits players to participate in Summer Games which “deliver[ ] incredible revenue and value to the Olympic basketball tournament” (alteration added)).

103. See Alex Davidlow, Olympic Basketball: Mark Cuban, David Stern Want IOC to Wake Up from Dream Teams, Bleacher Report (August 9, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1290579-olympic-basketball-mark-cuban-david-stern-want-IOC-to-wake-up-from-dream-teams (stating “the IOC makes a significant portion of its revenue profiting off of Team USA[ because] . . . [b]asketball is one of the biggest attractions at the Olympics”).


106. See id. at 7 (suggesting importance of ice hockey paramount to success of Winter Games because “Winter Olympics do[ ] not carry the same cachet as the Summer Olympics, [and] the overall return for advertisers is diminished”).

107. See Michael Rosenberg, What the Loss of NHL Players Would Mean to the Winter Olympics, Sports Illustrated.com (Feb. 23, 2014), http://olympics.si.com/olympic-ice-hockey/2014/02/23/sochi-olympics-hockey-nhl-players-out-2018 (“If you want to hold a major sporting event, you need some recognizable sports . . . . [b]ut if this becomes a second-rate hockey tournament, then . . . the air will be sucked out of the Olympics.”).
Olympics and . . . NBC network”.\textsuperscript{108} Absent the top-tier talent, the IOC Olympic Committee will face challenges in marketing the Olympic hockey tournament because “the ability of [the IOC] to [create] value would be diminished if the best athletes did not participate.”\textsuperscript{109} Consequently, the IOC and NBC are increasingly reliant on keeping NHL players involved in future Winter Olympics.\textsuperscript{110} Any future absence of NHL players will weaken the product, popularity, and revenue of the Olympic ice hockey tournament as well as the Winter Olympics collectively.\textsuperscript{111}

IV. \textbf{Sherman Antitrust Sections One and Two}

A. Background of Relevant Sections

In the late nineteenth century, Congress enacted the Sherman Act to foster competition and diminish the existence of monopolies.\textsuperscript{112} Fearful of a single group or entity controlling and dominat-


\textsuperscript{110} \textit{See} Willhoft, supra note 109 (arguing IIHF and IOC rely on NHL players because “having NHL players in the Olympic tournament creates the highest possible level of competition in a marquee event”). \textit{See also id.} (adding without talent display “it’s unlikely those TV broadcasts would draw that type of crowd”).


The inclusion of NHL players has increased viewership of the Olympic Tournament drastically. For example, in the 1992 Albertville Winter Olympics, which did not include NHL players, the tournament enjoyed 11.7 million viewers. However, the 2002 Salt Lake City Games and the Vancouver Games, which did included NHL players, enjoyed ratings of 17.1 million and 27.6 million respectively. \textit{Id.} n.11 (citing Kevin Allen, \textit{College Kids Perform Olympic Miracle}, ESPNCCLASSIC, http://espn.go.com/classic/s/miracle_ice_1980.html).

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{See generally} Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1 (2004) (declaring illegal contracts and agreements “in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”). \textit{See also} WONG, supra note 27, at 453 (discussing origins of antitrust law in United States).
ing a products’ market, the government created the Act to protect consumers against a singular power restricting free trade.\textsuperscript{113} In essence, the law exists to “promote competition and condemn cooperation among competitors.”\textsuperscript{114} The policy for antitrust is to prevent a business or group of businesses working to reduce an open market and to diminish consumer freedoms.\textsuperscript{115}

B. How to Apply Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2

In the context of sports, claims against major leagues are brought under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.\textsuperscript{116} Section 1 generally states, “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several State, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”\textsuperscript{117} The policy behind Section 1 “prohibits anticompetitive behaviors in labor markets, such as in markets for professional athlete services.”\textsuperscript{118} Courts have interpreted this Section by holding it unlawful for the sole professional league in a “circuit of events [or] sport to put a fledgling competing league or circuit of events in that same sport out of business by means of improper conduct[].”\textsuperscript{119} As such, the Act’s goal in the professional sports setting attempts to prevent individually

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  \item \textsuperscript{113} See \textit{Wong}, \textit{supra} note 27, at 453 (acknowledging that every state has since passed legislation closely aligned to Sherman Act, however pertaining to sports industry, antitrust suits brought under federal act “due to the interstate travel by teams and television and radio broadcasting across state lines. However, if a sport league operates solely within a particular state’s borders, then the state antitrust laws will be applicable.”).
  
  
  \item \textsuperscript{115} See Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, \textit{Antitrust and “Free Movement” Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe}, 29 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 403, 413 (2009) (commenting that “reduction in freedom of choice is ‘especially troubling because the consumer loses the opportunity to use purchasing power to indicate a preference for boycotted products, materials, or labor sources.’” (quoting Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, \textit{Analyzing the WNBA’s Age/Education Requirement from a Legal, Ethical, and Cultural Perspective: Women, Men and the Professional Sports Landscape}, 3 NW J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 1, ¶¶ 35-36 (2008))).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{116} See Wong, \textit{supra} note 27, at 453 (stating only applicable antitrust claims brought against professional sports leagues fall under Sections One and Two).
  
  
  \item \textsuperscript{118} See Edelman & Doyle, \textit{supra} note 115, at 413 (citation omitted). “Enacted in 1890, during the rise of big business, the Sherman Act was intended to serve both political and economic purposes and to prevent any one business from becoming more powerful than the government.” \textit{Id.} at 412 n.58 (citation omitted).
  
  \item \textsuperscript{119} See Michael J. Cozzillo, \textit{Sports Law Cases And Materials} 470 (2nd ed. 2007) (positing that dominant league cannot use unfair business practices to gain monopoly power or act in “unreasonable, predatory, or exclusionary ways” ).
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owned and operated competitors or leagues “from combining their economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm consumers[.]” However, if franchises, teams, or clubs act in coordination as a ‘single-entity’, then Section 1 analysis is inapplicable, because the Section requires multiple competitors to act anticompetitively in unison.

Section 2 guards against the attempted monopolization of a market. It states, “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony[.]” Section 2 does not contain the same multiple entities requirement as in Section 1. Rather, it permits that major sports leagues “behave as single entities when they form

120. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 735-36 (2010) (alteration added) (including examples outside of sports such as coordinating “increased prices, diminished quality, limited choices, or impaired technological progress” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).

121. See generally American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) (holding NFL teams unable to claim single entity status). In American Needle, the NFL claimed the league was immune from Section One because the 30 club teams were acting as a single entity when licensing intellectual property exclusively to certain retail suppliers. See id. at 185-84 (discussing NFL’s argument). The Court held that “[e]ach of the teams is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business. ‘[T]heir general corporate actions are guided or determined’ by ‘separate corporate consciousnesses,’ and ‘[t]heir objectives are’ not ‘common.’” See id. at 197 (first alteration added) (citations omitted). See also McCann, supra note 120, at 735-36 (suggesting other leagues’ attempts will typically fail under such analysis per Supreme Court’s decision against NFL in American Needle).

122. See WONG, supra note 27, at 455 (describing Section Two as prohibiting “unilateral monopolization”).


The concerted-unilateral distinction between Section 1 and Section 2 is critical, because it can be significantly easier to prove a violation of Section 1 than a violation of Section 2. The unilateral actions of a single firm are governed solely by Section 2 and are unlawful only if the firm threatens actual monopolization. In contrast, concerted actions between multiple entities are governed by Section 1 and are unlawful if the anticompetitive effects of the conduct outweigh its procompetitive benefits. It is not necessary for purposes of Section 1 to prove that the concerted actions of the firms threaten monopolization. A firm treated as a single entity instead of multiple entities therefore has a greater chance of avoiding antitrust liability.

Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
schedules, negotiate national television contracts, negotiate league-wide sponsorships, arrange for player drafts, and revenue sharing.”

However, leagues acting beyond the scope of legislative intent may be liable for antitrust monopolization claims. In order to prove the existence or attempted creation of a monopoly, a plaintiff must show “the possession of monopoly market power and the use of unacceptable means to acquire, entrench, or maintain that market power.” Leagues dominating a market gained by means of superior quality products cannot increase their power over the market through the use of “predatory or exclusionary tactics.”

C. Review of Applicable Antitrust Tests

An antitrust review of a plaintiff’s claim against a professional league will generally fall subject to one of three applicable tests created by the Supreme Court: a *per se* test, a rule of reason analysis, or a quick-look approach. The court will apply the tests after reviewing proof of “agreements that constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade [based] upon the nature of the challenged conduct” or evidence demonstrating a monopoly power.

Under Section 1 analysis, if conduct is “so pernicious that [it has] no redeeming value,’ a court will apply the *per se* test” and as-


126. See Edelman, *supra* note 125, at 294 n.120 (“If each professional sports league is considered a single-entity and the court determines the product market is sport-exclusive, then courts would find each of the four, professional sports leagues to have monopolies.”).

127. See WONG, *supra* note 27, at 455 (discussing elements to prove monopoly claim against professional sports leagues).

128. See WONG, *supra* note 27, at 456 n.2 (indicating that examples of predatory tactics would involve professional sports league expanding into rival league’s territory in attempt to lower rival’s fan and media support). See id. (observing that second example suggests established league cannot increase the number of roster slots open to potential players upon the creation of a rival league in the same area as means to preclude rival league from filling spots with similarly talented athletes).


130. See WONG, *supra* note 27, at 453, 453-57 (noting review of defendant’s actions conducted under Section One analysis).
sume the conduct violates antitrust doctrine. Under a per se approach, plaintiffs must prove: “[1] The existence of an agreement among two or more distinct persons or entities[,] [2] [t]he activity unreasonably restrains trade[,] and [3] [t]he activity affects interstate commerce.” This test “facilitates legal certainty and promotes judicial economy,” for it involves common violations including pricefixing or group boycotts. Often violations in this manner will be apparent at the outset of the court’s inquiry and require minimal research or findings. Therefore, a court will only apply this test if the legality of the action is facially illegal or frequently questioned. In per se analyses, courts will not analyze the rationales or defenses of the actions because of the presumptively illegal nature of the conduct.

If a court does not believe a violation is sufficiently egregious to warrant the per se test, then the court will apply a rule of reason analysis. The rule of reason test determines a violation by evaluating the “market power,” “anticompetitive effects,” and “harm.”

131. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 413 (alteration in original) (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 140, 224 n.59 (1940)).

132. See Wong, supra note 27, at 455 (requiring interstate commerce permits claims against all major sports leagues while restricting claims against smaller intra-state amateur leagues).

133. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (arguing courts are moving away from applying per se test because of low level of scrutiny). Instead, the majority of courts have begun moving instead towards application of quick-look or rational rule test. See id.

134. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 (discussing courts’ familiarity with certain agreements that are generally accepted as illegal). “[A]s the courts gained experience with antitrust problems[,] they identified certain types of agreements which were so consistently unreasonable that they could be deemed illegal per se, without elaborate inquiry into their purported justifications.” Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 n.70 (alterations in original) (quoting Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

135. See James J. LaRocca, No Trust at the NFL: League’s Network Passes Rule of Reason Analysis, 15 UCLA Ent. L. Rev 87, 93 (2008) (noting per se approach is applied less frequently due to complexity of antitrust claims and lack of facially invalid actions).

136. See Wong, supra note 27, at 454 (stating defendants will urge courts to apply more lenient approaches, commonly the rule of reason, and exclude the per se approach). Applying the rule of reason allows defendants to justify business actions and shifts the burden back to the plaintiff. See id. (discussing rule of reason approach).

137. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 (noting that “full economic investigation” is done by the court to dissect whether illegal conduct was involved (citations omitted)).

Thus, a court applying the rule of reason test will primarily determine whether the defendant’s actions assist competitive results or promote anti-competition.\(^\text{139}\) Distinct from the \textit{per se} approach, the rule of reason test permits justifications of actions so long as the conduct is necessary and the least restrictive way to “achieve a legitimate business purpose.”\(^\text{140}\) Courts apply the rule of reason analysis frequently, because it thoroughly reviews and analyzes rationalizations to determine whether a defendant’s anticompetitive actions are outweighed by the pro-competitive benefits.\(^\text{141}\)

Lastly, a subset of the rule of reason analysis, the quick-look, or truncated rule of reason test, applies when conduct “is neither completely pernicious nor completely ambiguous.”\(^\text{142}\) This lower level of scrutiny applies when conduct or business tactics are not \textit{per se} unlawful but the conduct promotes anticompetitive outcomes.\(^\text{143}\) A court applying this standard of review will not need to fulfill the exhaustive requirements necessary in a rule of reason analysis because the conduct in question frequently harms competition.\(^\text{144}\)

Section 2 analysis differs because it does not have the same multiple entity requirements as Section 1.\(^\text{145}\) Under Section 2, the court will determine the relevant market of the product and whether the defendant attempted to monopolize or restrict com-

\(^\text{139}\). \textit{See} \textit{Wong}, \textit{supra} note 27, at 454 (noting to prove a violation under rule of reason plaintiff must demonstrate the following three elements: “1. There is an agreement between two separate entities. 2. The agreement adversely affects competition in a relevant market. 3. The anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh the procompetitive effects.”).

\(^\text{140}\). \textit{See id.} (noting absence of conduct would be detriment to defendant’s business causing harm to customers).

\(^\text{141}\). \textit{See} LaRocca, \textit{supra} note 135, at 92-95 (discussing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) and Court’s holding that antitrust review of professional sports leagues requires higher level of scrutiny than “quick look” review permits due to inherently complex business practices).

\(^\text{142}\). \textit{See} Edelman & Harrison, \textit{supra} note 129, at 40 (discussing quick look test (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 763-64, 770 (1999))).

\(^\text{143}\). \textit{See} Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 763 (citing the Ninth Circuit’s allowing courts to identify easily discernable, not unlawful, actions, such as general restraints on prices, to dissuade competitors).

\(^\text{144}\). \textit{See} Geoffrey D. Oliver, \textit{Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers And Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis}, 24 \textit{Antitrust} 40, 40 (2010), available at \texttt{http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oliver_Anti_Spring2010_8.authcheckdam.pdf} (noting burden of proof shifts to defendant to prove precompetitive justification for conduct in question). If in fact the conduct can be plausibly justified then the court must undergo a rule of reason analysis. \textit{See id.} (discussing burden shifting for applying different standards of review).

\(^\text{145}\). \textit{See supra} notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
petitor access to the market.\textsuperscript{146} Claimants will often allege both Section 1 and Section 2 violations because of the similar need to determine the relevant market.\textsuperscript{147}

D. Clayton Act Exemption for Professional Sports Leagues

Following introduction of the Sherman Act, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914, which exempted labor unions from antitrust law, so employers and employees could conduct business without restrictions.\textsuperscript{148} Section Six of the Clayton Act holds, in pertinent part that:

The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.\textsuperscript{149}

The purpose of the Act is to protect labor organizations by preventing employers from adopting antitrust regulations, which seek to unravel the union’s collective bargaining power.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{146} See \textit{Wong}, \textit{supra} note 27, at 455 (“It is important to note that monopoly market power is different from market share. A product may be superior to its competition and, for good reason, would hold a larger market share.”). For a discussion of why the market share analysis would fail, see infra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{147} See generally \textit{Wong}, \textit{supra} note 27, at 453-56 (noting overlap in analysis conducted by courts).

\textsuperscript{148} See \textit{Wong}, \textit{supra} note 27, at 457 (illustrating need for Clayton Act to counteract allegations made by labor unions). The Clayton Act was not applied to professional sports teams until early in the twentieth century. \textit{See id.} at 458; Johnathan S. Shapiro, Note, \textit{Warming the Bench: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in the National Football League}, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1205 n.15 (1993) (“Before passage of the Clayton and Norris-Laguardia Acts, employers argued, and courts agreed, that the antitrust laws should be used to strike down union activity as an unlawful restraint of trade.” (citing \textit{Benjamin J. Taylor \& Fred Witney, U.S. Labor Relations Law} 38 (1992))).

\textsuperscript{149} Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914); 15 U.S.C.A § 17 (West 2014).

\textsuperscript{150} See \textit{Wong}, \textit{supra} note 27, at 457 (noting need for labor unions’ protection).

These laws would otherwise restrict, as a restraint of trade, the concerted activities that union members regularly practice during collective bargaining with employers. This statutory exemption does not, however, simi-
The Clayton Act applies uniquely to professional sports due to the nontraditional business formats of professional leagues. Yet, leagues can use the Act to potentially bar antitrust claims. Customarily, antitrust claims are not initiated against conduct involving the league and its players because of the unique employer-employee relationship, in this case the league and its players’ association. Since the nontraditional aspects of sports leagues require some form of coordinating and negotiating, professional leagues are given more leeway than other types of labor unions.

Typically, professional leagues can claim either the statutory exemption per Section Six of the Clayton Act or plead a common law non-statutory exemption defense. Generally, the former involves the leagues bringing suits against the players’ associations for unfair business practices, such as picketing and striking. The latter involves applying a culmination of common law antitrust law to

\[\text{Shapiro, supra note 144, at 1206 (alteration added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (discussing collective bargaining).}\]

152. \textit{See WONG, supra note 27, at 458-59 (noting that statutory exemption was typically reserved for sole benefit of labor unions and not leagues, “because the common interpretation of Section 6 of the Clayton Act is that the law was enacted solely for the benefit of labor unions[ ]” (alteration added)).}\n
153. \textit{See Claudia G. Catalano, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2013) (commenting that although claims arising during discussions between leagues and players’ associations remain free from antitrust litigation, if conduct falls outside of collective bargaining process, that conduct is not protected).}\n
154. \textit{See Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1233-34 (noting atypical relationship exists between players unions, franchises and league offices). “For example, to have [a professional league’s] season, the individual [league’s] teams must agree on the rules of the actual game, schedules, mechanisms for signing and trading players, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1233-34 (footnote omitted) (citing North Am. Soccer Leagues v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980)).}\n
155. \textit{See id. at 1238 (noting non-statutory exemption generally works to protect collective bargaining agreement terms and negotiations between players and owners).}\n
sports leagues.\textsuperscript{157} To determine whether a professional sports league may apply the non-statutory labor exemption, courts use a three-prong test.\textsuperscript{158} The test requires: (1) “[T]he restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining” agreement, (2) the issue “concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining[,]” and (3) the issue “is the product of bona-fide arm’s length bargaining.”\textsuperscript{159} Application of Section Six through either exemption does not automatically overcome Sherman Act violations.\textsuperscript{160} Rather, courts are inclined to apply one of three foregoing antitrust tests to assess the overall conduct in question.\textsuperscript{161}

V. NHL’S PROPOSED ACTIONS WOULD VIOLATE ANTITRUST LAW

If the NHL prohibits players from participating in future Olympics and institutes the Hockey World Cup as a substitute tournament, the NHL will be in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.\textsuperscript{162} The IOC, the IIHF, or NBC could each

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\item \textsuperscript{157} See \textit{Wong}, supra note 27, at 490 (“[T]he courts found that unions have: 1. An implied labor exemption from antitrust laws to enter into contracts with multiemployer bargaining units. 2. The right to advance legitimate employee goals that restrain trade no more than is necessary to achieve those goals.” (alteration added) (citing collective holdings from Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)).
\item \textsuperscript{158} See \textit{Mackey} v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976). In \textit{Mackey}, NFL players challenged a rule mandating NFL teams to pay compensatory cash and draft picks to a players’ former team upon signing the player as a free agent. \textit{See id.} at 609, 609 nn.1-2. The court in \textit{Mackey} determined that the NFL was restricting the free movement of players among teams by penalizing teams for any free agent acquisition. \textit{See id.} at 615. The league raised the non-statutory exemption to demonstrate that the NFLPA bargained for the issue and had the opportunity to change the rule through the bargaining process. \textit{See id.} at 613. The court disagreed with the application of the exemption, holding that the NFLPA would not be able to bargain the clause out of the agreement, and that the league held the vast majority of bargaining power. \textit{See id.} at 615-16.
\item \textsuperscript{159} See \textit{Mackey}, 543 F.2d at 614 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). \textit{See also id.} at 616 (holding NFL failed to prove the third prong by obtaining position of unfair power over the players). \textit{See also \textsc{black’s law dictionary}} (9th ed. 2009) (defining arm’s-length as “[o]f or relating to dealings between two parties who are not related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly equal bargaining power; not involving a confidential relationship” (alteration added)).
\item \textsuperscript{160} See Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1235 (“These agreements among the teams are subject to scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The role of section 1—and antitrust law in general—is to act as a gatekeeper, ferreting out anticompetitive conduct.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{161} For a discussion of the different tests courts apply, see supra notes 129-147 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{162} For a discussion of Section One and Two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see supra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
bring a claim against the League.\textsuperscript{163} Any of the entities could argue that the NHL has monopolistic power over the relevant product and market of elite players and, through the use of anti-competitive and predatory tactics, the market as a whole.\textsuperscript{164} Furthermore, if the NHL plead a Clayton exemption or single-entity defense it would be unsuccessful because third parties are affected and courts are unlikely to view the NHL as a single-entity.\textsuperscript{165}

For the NHL to successfully prohibit players from attending future Olympics, the League would first need to ratify the 2012 CBA in coordination with the NHLPA.\textsuperscript{166} If both the players’ association and the NHL agree to forgo future participation, then the IOC and IIHF would be have no authority to compel players to attend.\textsuperscript{167} However, it remains unlikely that such an agreement

\textsuperscript{163} For a discussion of the argument and rationale supporting claims, see infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{164} See \textit{Wong}, supra note 27, at 455-57, 456-57 nn.1-4 (noting leagues cannot unreasonably restrain competition through application of monopoly power). See also Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (hereinafter “CBOT”). In \textit{CBOT}, the Court stated the following to describe the rule of reason test:

\hspace{1cm} The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.

\hspace{1cm} Id. at 238. For a discussion of why the NHL would fail under the framework of this test, see infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{165} For a discussion why the NHL would fail the single entity and non-statutory exemption, see infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{166} See NHL 2012 CBA § 24.5, supra note 57, at 156 (leaving absent, expressly, any information binding the NHL and players to future international tournaments, including the Olympics); see also Nicholas Cotsonika, NHL vs. Olympics: Going to Games is Treat for Players, Troubling for Owners, YahooSports (Feb. 7, 2014), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nhl—nhl-vs—olympics—going-to-games-is-treat-for-players—troubling-for-owners-174829606.html (quoting former NHL player Tomas Kaberle as stating “I think all players are always going to push for the Olympics . . . . [t]hat’s why we’ve got the union. They’re always going to stay behind us.”).

would occur, as the majority of NHL players enjoy the Olympic hockey break and relish the opportunity to play for their countries.\footnote{168} For the roughly six hundred NHL players not participating in the Games, the two-week-long break affords them the opportunity to recover from mid-season injuries and rest before the second half of the NHL season.\footnote{169}

Any League attempt to stop the players’ involvement in future Olympics could be disregarded by the players, as it is not currently part of the 2012 CBA.\footnote{170} Players could participate without NHL consent; however, the League would likely impose stiff fines and penalties for a player’s unexcused absence and insubordination.\footnote{171} Without the NHLPA’s agreement, the NHL would be acting unilaterally to stop future participation.\footnote{172}

The player prohibition, coupled with the reinstatement of the Hockey World Cup, demonstrates how the NHL would violate the Sherman Act. This argument will be articulated in the following...
form: (I) The applicable test is the rule of reason analysis, (II) the NHL dominates the relevant market of professional players, (III) there was an agreement between the NHL and the NHL’s club members, and the agreement adversely affects the competitive market, (IV) the monopoly power over the market and the creation of a substitute Hockey World Cup demonstrates predatory tactics, and (V) the harm to the NHL would be minimal compared to the detriment to the IOC, IIHF, and NBC.

A. Applicable Test

A court would likely apply the rule of reason approach to an antitrust challenge brought by the IIHF, IOC or NBC. The rule of reason test is applied when conduct is not per se invalid or clearly anticompetitive; rather, it “is used to determine ‘whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition.’” The majority of Sherman Act claims are brought under this test due to its flexible nature in market definition, and the ambiguity of certain conduct. Courts will not apply the per se invalid standard of review because refusing the IOC and IIHF access to NHL players, and creating a substitute international tournament for the NHL’s profit, are not facially invalid or anticompetitive. Moreover, the quick look analysis will not apply.
because it is typically reserved for conduct that involves obvious and questionable anticompetitive actions without adequate defensive justification. In the present situation, the NHL would attempt to defend the questionable conduct, as a protective business decision, to guard the League’s primary assets: the players.

To demonstrate that the rule of reason analysis applies, the claimant organizations would need to meet the standards of proof. To demonstrate a Section 1 violation, the claimant must show “[t]here is an agreement between two separate entities[,] . . . [t]he agreement adversely affects competition in a relevant market[,] [and t]he anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh the procompetitive effects.” The less stringent Section Two analysis dictates only that a dominant league may not use predatory tactics to eliminate all competing organizations through the use of its monopoly power over a relevant market.

B. Same Relevant Market

To establish a violation of either Section of the Sherman Act, the NHL, IOC and IIHF must first compete in similar relevant markets. Furthermore the agreement or conduct in question must
adversely affect the competition within that relevant market. In Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club Inc., the World Hockey Association, a minor hockey league unaffiliated with the existing NHL, filed Sherman Act violations against the NHL over its contractually binding clause that prohibited all players from playing in any lower level professional league. The Court held that the NHL had a monopoly over the supply of professional players and could not prohibit those players from ever playing in competitor leagues. The court reasoned the following:

The National Hockey League itself was primarily responsible for devising and perpetuating a monopoly over the product market of all professional hockey players via the reserve system. [For] [n]ot only did [the NHL] enforce and implement its restraints against players . . . but . . . it sought to enforce [the restraint clause] against outside competitors who wanted to enter the competition at the professional level.

Pursuant to Philadelphia, a claim against the NHL defines the relevant market as the top-level professional ice hockey players, over whom the NHL has sole access.


184. See Wong, supra note 27, at 454-56 (acknowledging courts’ definitions of relevant markets vary based on product or service).

185. See Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (stating growth of NHL from its inception in 1917 subjects it to Sherman Antitrust laws, for "despite . . . the glory of the sport of hockey and the grandeur of its superstars, the basic factors here are not the sheer exhilaration from observing the speeding puck, but rather the desire to maximize the available buck").

186. See id. at 500 (noting startup World Hockey Association wanted to use reserves from NHL franchises as a means to attract a higher level of talent to new league). The league managers argued a gross disparity existed between the NHL’s reserves and the rest of the talent pool from which to choose the applicable personnel. See id.

187. Id. at 500. See also id. at 500-05 (stating although Court ruled in favor of NHL regarding need for ‘reserve’ clause, league could not bind players in perpetuity for entire lengths of their playing careers). Allowing the NHL to forbid the players from ever signing with a fledgling competing league would ensure a monopolistic power. See id.

188. See generally American Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding necessary to prove relevant market before considering whether monopolistic control could be questioned). In American, the Court determined the NFL and new emerging AFL competed not simply for players but for television rights, spectators, and sponsorships. See id.
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In a suit by the IOC, IIHF and NBC, the claimant’s application of the market test analysis would emphasize how the NHL dominates the market for all professional ice hockey players.189 The IOC and IIHF rely on access to the relevant market of elite NHL ice hockey players.190 Unlike a competing world professional league like Russia’s KHL, which can groom talent separately and offer salaries somewhat comparable to those of the NHL, the non-profit IOC and IIHF have no financial incentives to offer players.191 To illustrate this point, in the “2014 Sochi Olympics the men’s ice hockey tournament . . . featured 149 NHL players who made a combined $629.74 million [in salary].”192 In contrast the IOC—which generates substantial revenue through fundraising, marketing, advertising and broadcasting partnerships—“distributes over 90% of its revenues to organisations throughout the Olympic Movement to support the staging of the Olympic Games and to promote the worldwide development of sport. The IOC retains less than 10% of its revenue for the operational and administrative costs of governing the Olympic Movement.”193 The operational and administrative costs, for the 2009-2012 quadrennial Olympic cycle was projected at $800 million.194 This means that, in a four-year period, the costs to operate the entire IOC would scarcely cover the NHL player salaries alone for the 2014 games.195 Incapable of luring players fiscally, the IOC and IIHF rely on national pride to draw athletes.196 Therefore, any NHL constraint on the relevant market of players will force the IOC and IIHF to use inferior talent to the Games’ detriment because the IOC would have no means to com-

189. See Wong, supra note 27, at 476 (noting NHL control over vast majority of professional hockey talent).
190. See id.
194. See Lubin & Blackstone, supra note 68 (discussing Olympic earnings for IOC).
195. See id. (discussing earnings and operations of IOC).
196. See id. (‘Around 70% goes to the Summer and Winter Olympic Organizing Committees . . . 20% goes to athlete organizations . . . 10% pays for operations at the IOC’).
pensate the professional players.\textsuperscript{197} Following a finding that competitors act in the same relevant market, a court would next determine the type of agreement to determine whether the conduct violates antitrust law.\textsuperscript{198}

C. Type of Agreement

1. Agreement Between Two or More Entities

The Section 1 analysis requires a showing that two or more business entities agree or have conduct demonstrating an agreement, which violates the Act.\textsuperscript{199} The conduct in this case would be two-fold: (1) the agreement between the NHL teams and League offices in not permitting NHL players to participate in the Olympics and (2) the implementation of an NHL World Cup of Hockey.\textsuperscript{200} To fulfill the separate entities requirement, the plaintiffs must show that the NHL and member clubs were acting as more than two entities for the purposes of Section 1.\textsuperscript{201}

In recent years, professional leagues have attempted to adopt a ‘single entity’ defense to the first requirement of multiple entities because the leagues “share broadcast revenue, licensing revenue, advertise collectively, and all the teams in the leagues fall under a single administrative body.”\textsuperscript{202} Yet, courts have typically denied professional leagues the ability to use this defense, as most teams do not act in accordance with one another to a degree high enough to

\textsuperscript{197} See Mitchell Tierney, \textit{supra} note 94 (indicating Winter Olympic Games represent primary showcase of hockey’s finest talent in best-on-best international competition and removing such talent imposes significant burden on IOC and IIHF).

\textsuperscript{198} See e.g., Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 472 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“There is sufficient disparity between major league professional hockey on the one hand and minor professional league and amateur hockey on the other to distinguish the former from the latter.”).

\textsuperscript{199} See \textit{COZZILLO}, \textit{supra} note 119, at 253-55 (“Section One requires an agreement –there must be two separate persons or entities engaged in joint conduct for a violation of section 1 to occur.”).

\textsuperscript{200} For a discussion of the plan to disallow further NHL participation in the Olympics and the recreation of the World Cup of Hockey, see \textit{supra} notes 84-98 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{201} See \textit{WONG}, \textit{supra} note 27 at 454 (stating “the plaintiff must show that there was a combination between parties, that the two parties acted in concert, and that they engaged in a conspiracy”).

\textsuperscript{202} See \textit{id.} at 498 (implying if sports league can successfully argue application of single entity defense then league would be unable to fulfill Section One element requiring multiple entities).
warrant single entity status. Therefore, the NHL would likely fail to claim a single entity defense; thereby, satisfying the first step.

2. Agreement Affects Competition

The agreement would adversely affect competition because the IOC and IIHF have no equal market alternatives to substitute for the revenue loss from NHL player absences. The NHL might be able to justify the restraint as necessary to prevent possible player injuries, and to diminish the profit loss incurred from missing several midseason weeks every four years. Yet, the IOC and IIHF, which gained an estimated $150 million from the ice hockey tournament in 2010, would fail to earn the majority of that revenue without NHL players. The IOC commissioner commented that, if the NHL were to reap the entire value of that $150 million, the League’s revenue sharing system would provide merely $5 million to each team, an insubstantial sum in comparison to the whole revenue generated by the IOC. Therefore, the discrepancy in profit loss demonstrates that, although the justifications for the NHL might have merit, the restraint cannot be justified as necessary for...
the welfare of the league and the consumer. Consequent the restraint affects competition, and while minimally impacting the NHL, would severely diminish the Olympic product.

D. Unlawful Monopolization

Section 2 of the Sherman Act analysis requires only the unilateral monopolization of a market through a single entity's action. A challenge under Section 2 applies so long as the defendant is guilty of unlawful monopolization of the relevant market. The goal of Section 2 is to "prohibit acquiring or maintaining a monopoly position by exclusionary, unfair, or predatory means." In Philadelphia, the Court held the NHL had a monopoly over the new upstart WHA because the League "overwhelmingly control[ed] the supply of hockey players . . . available to play in any major professional league." As the market discussion exhibits, the IOC has no direct league or comparable ability to employ top-level talent, and must rely on the participation of NHL professionals. Although it is acceptable for a league to have a lawful monopoly over a relevant market, the professional league may not employ tactics to dissuade competitors from joining the market or stymie the growth of a competitor through predatory tactics.

The NHL's mandate prohibiting NHL players from participating in the Games would be the first demonstration of predatory tactics. The NHL would unfairly apply its leverage as employer

209. See Hackel, supra note 206 (providing that there is substantial corollary between NHL participation in the Olympic games over previous twenty years and increased fan interest in NHL regular season). Any financial harm alleged by the NHL would be offset by the contrasting support demonstrating league actually benefits from Olympic tournament exposure. See id.

210. For a discussion of the financial consequences and disparate harm, see supra notes 99-111 and see infra notes 227-233 and accompanying text.

211. See supra note 27, at 455 (noting Section Two analyses between inter-league disputes more commonly benefit new challenging league).

212. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony."

213. See Cozzillio, supra note 119, at 301-10.


215. For a discussion of the relevant market of professional players and the impact on the IOC and IIHF, see supra notes 183-198 and accompanying text.

216. For a discussion of examples of predatory tactics, see supra note 128.

217. See Catalano, supra note 155, § 65 ("When one has acquired a natural monopoly by means which are not exclusionary, unfair, nor predatory . . . he is not disempowered to defend his position fairly." (alteration added)).
to elite professional hockey players to the detriment of the Olympic organizations, NBC, and the consumer.\textsuperscript{218} This action is contrary to the fundamental objective of antitrust law, which restricts entrenched organizations from stemming the rise of a smaller competitor’s products.\textsuperscript{219}

The second example of a predatory tactic would be the creation of the World Cup of Hockey as an alternative international tournament.\textsuperscript{220} If the League prohibits its players from participating in the Olympic Games and subsequently coordinates the Hockey World Cup for the League’s own fiscal benefit, the NHL would be taking advantage of its monopoly over the relevant market.\textsuperscript{221} NHL player involvement would enhance the World Cup while diminishing Olympic Hockey.\textsuperscript{222} This demonstration of market power would be impermissible, for the League cannot apply the monopoly power in a predatory manner.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{218. See generally Lake, supra note 3 (stating NHL might only permit IOC player attendance at future Olympics if IOC agrees to widespread media access for NHL).} 

\textsuperscript{219. See Wong, supra note 27, at 456 (discussing policy objectives of antitrust law).} 

\textsuperscript{220. For a discussion of the plan to create the World Cup of Hockey, see supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.} 

\textsuperscript{221. See Wong, supra note 27, at 472 (providing that league with monopoly power over a product cannot use that power to exclude competitors access to the market).} 

\textsuperscript{222. See Michael Peckerar, 2014 Winter Olympics Are Good For NHL, RANTIN-SPORTS, http://www.rantsports.com/nhl/2014/01/15/2014-winter-olympics-are-good-for-nhl/ (last visited Jan 15, 2014) (stating the 2010 Vancouver games drew the largest TV audience ever for Olympic ice hockey as a result of NHL player involvement: the game drew several million more viewers than the historic ‘Miracle on Ice’ 1980 gold medal game between the United States and Russia); INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE GLOBAL TELEVISION REPORT MAY 2006, available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_1087.pdf (noting 80% of Canada’s television viewers watched part of Canadian medal games in Torino, Italy). Similarly, during the Canadian men’s gold medal game 85% of market shares for television in Sweden watched to see the team win the gold medal. See id.} 

\textsuperscript{223. See Catalano, supra note 153, § 65 at 1, (discussing Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“[T]he NHL . . . had willfully acquired and maintained arrangements by which it overwhelmingly controls the supply of players who are capable and available for play in a new league where the level of internal competitions fairly approaches the levels currently existing in the NHL.”) (alteration added)).} 

[In] such arrangements, including contracts and agreements with minor league, amateur, and semiprofessional hockey teams and league organizations, which . . . had the effect of maintaining the NHL’s control of players [through the use of such anticompetitive contracts,] the court held that the control thus demonstrated was so probably violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act that it should preliminarily enjoin the NHL from further . . . enforcing the [anticompetitive] reserve clause of its standard player contract.
The NHL’s final predatory tactic involves using its monopoly power to exert dominion over the IOC’s sponsorship and media rights. Although the League and partner station, the NHL Network, were granted unprecedented access to the Sochi Olympic games, the League offices and team owners would require an enhanced partnership between the League, IOC and NBC, for all future player participation. By withholding player participation until the IOC and NBC alter the existing sponsorship and media rights, the League is abusing its financial leverage over the market of players to assert its dominance over the IOC.

E. The Harm is Dissimilar

Although the Sherman Act does not require proof of harm, courts will look to the conduct’s harmful effects to determine if an action was necessary or justifiable within the realm of professional sports. The harm to the IOC, IIHF, and NBC is far greater than the relative harm incurred by the NHL caused by pausing its season for two weeks during Olympic years. The NHL loses marginal revenue during the small time frame, and still maintains large profits despite the games. However, the preclusion of elite players will fundamentally alter the makeup of the Olympic ice hockey tournament and severely diminish IOC, IIHF and NBC profits.

Id. (citations omitted).

224. See Lake, supra note 3 (stating NHL given increased media access to the Sochi games in show of good faith by IOC and IIHF). Lake also notes that media access is difficult to obtain because of the stringent rights that certain sponsors have for Winter and Summer Olympics. See id.

225. See Lake, supra note 3 (“While the details of the agreement are not public, it is clear that the NHL and NHLPA sought an agreement, which would allow the NHL Network greater rights than a typical broadcaster who does not hold the broadcasting rights from IOC.”).


227. See Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1276 (suggesting “it follows that restraints that interfere with the efficient allocation of players and hamper competitive balance are anticompetitive and have the ability to harm the product and consumers” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).


229. See id. (stating more people watched the 2010 Olympic Hockey tournament than the 2010 Super Bowl).

230. For a discussion of the economic ramifications and profit implications, see supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
Moreover, interest in the Olympics increases fan and player awareness of the game, which boosts hockey’s global appeal and may demonstrate why the NHL has gained popularity over the past two decades.\footnote{231}

Therefore, the final element of the antitrust analysis suggests the anticompetitive effects stemming from (1) the NHL’s prohibition against player participation, and (2) creation of an NHL sponsored Hockey World Cup, outweigh the precompetitive effects.\footnote{232} The NHL may have business justifications, namely gaining profits missed during the Olympic break, preventing injuries caused at the Olympics, and avoiding stoppage of the regular season schedule; however, the League cannot employ the intended predatory tactics to the detriment of the IOC, IIHF, and NBC.\footnote{233}

F. Professional Sports’ Exemptions Do Not Protect Against NHL’s Antitrust Claims

The NHL would unsuccessfully claim a Clayton statutory or non-statutory exemption from antitrust law.\footnote{234} The statutory exemption does not apply because it is inapplicable in situations not benefiting the labor union, in this case the NHLPA.\footnote{235} The non-statutory exemption, similarly, does not apply, for the elements of the non-statutory exemption that require the restraint on trade to primarily affect only the parties that are involved in the collective bargaining.\footnote{236} Furthermore, the non-statutory labor exemption rejects the idea “that an employer can conspire with or take advan-

\footnote{231. See Gloster, supra note 62 (stating league benefits from global coverage of Olympic hockey). See also Delessio, supra note 85, (suggesting Olympics "provide[] a platform for the sport that it wouldn't otherwise have, since the Olympics have a built-in audience offering the kind of exposure for the sport that a Wednesday night NHL game on NBCSN never could[ "]); Chris Peters, Raw Numbers: Hockey’s Growth in the United States — 1990-2010, THE UNITED STATES OF HOCKEY (May 23 2011), http://unitedstatesofhockey.com/2011/05/23/raw-numbers-hockeys-growth-in-the-united-states-1990-2009/ (documenting growth of hockey since 1990).

232. See WONG supra note 27, at 472 ("[T]o prove that a Section 1 antitrust violation exists, the plaintiff must show . . . the anticompetitive effects outweigh the precompetitive effects.").

233. See Delessio, supra note 85, (suggesting recreation of Hockey World Cup runs risk of ruining Olympic ice hockey tournament). For a discussion of similar issues existing between AFL and NFL prior to merger, see WONG, supra note 27.

234. See supra notes 148-161 and accompanying text (discussing differences between statutory and non-statutory Clayton exemptions from anti-trust law).

235. See WONG, supra note 27, at 458 ("Professional sports leagues have not often raised the statutory exemption as a defense because the common interpretation of Section 6 of the Clayton Act is that the law was enacted solely for the benefit of labor unions.").

236. See id. at 459 (stating elements for non-statutory exemption to apply).}
A court will likely deem the NHL has a monopoly over the relevant market of professional players and by acting in this manner the NHL would be exerting that power to stymie competition and bolster its own profits. The financial gain to the League and the subsequent penalty to the IOC, the IIHF, and NBC demonstrate that the anticompetitive result far outweighs the precompetitive effect. Although the League management opposes player participation, players relish the opportunity to represent their countries. Thus, the decision to deviate from previous practice and preclude NHL player participation in Olympics would be a unilateral abuse of the NHL’s power.

Were the League to successfully justify its business rationale by citing player health and scheduling issues, the substitute World Cup of Hockey undercuts the League’s arguments. Supplanting one international tournament with another does not limit the time players spent on ice and risk of injury. Yet, the NHL’s interest in controlling a tournament’s operations and reaping the profits suggest the League may attempt such a unilateral action. This con-

237. See id. at 458 (discussing statutory labor exemption). See also id. at 491-92 (discussing development of three prong test to non-statutory exemption).

238. See Don Barrie, Enjoy Last NHL Olympics, http://www.thepeterboroughexaminer.com/2014/02/21/enjoy-last-nhl-olympics (Feb. 21, 2014, 10:51 PM) (“[T]he World Cup [has been] run by the NHL for the players and owners financial benefit. . . . For these owners and Commissioner Bettman, hockey is strictly a business. That $5 billion deal between Rogers Communications is not about making hockey better for fans but strictly a financial decision.”).

239. See id. (suggesting lack of NHL benefit from resurgent World Cup because “event would be played in the late summer when hockey fans have other things on the go and the best players will be more interested in preparing themselves for the up-coming NHL season than making more money for NHL owners.”).

240. See Lage, supra note 13 (discussing belief of Detroit Red Wings’ Jonas Gustavsson that players desire to compete and “[t]aking the best hockey players out of the Olympics would be wrong and would be a shame”).

241. See Gloster, supra note 62 (“[t]he league and players union together have to agree on whether [the league] will participate”).

242. See Dan Rosen, Bettman: World Cup of Hockey could return, NHL.COM (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=705381 (reporting NHL Deputy Commissioner Bill Baly as stating the following: “The World Cup is a piece of an international presence that we want to have.”).

243. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing proposed World Cup of Hockey).

244. See James Conley, The NHL World Cup of Hockey is Coming for Your Olympics (Tuesday Slew), BLEACHERREPORT (Feb. 11, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.pens
duct further demonstrates the NHL’s abuse of its monopoly power and indicates why it would ultimately fail an anticompetitive antitrust analysis.

The NHL overvalues the benefits of a World Cup and would harm its revenue by forbidding all Olympic participation. The profits and popularity of sporting World Cups outside of soccer have proven inherently weak, as demonstrated by the quadrennial Basketball World Cup and World Baseball Classic. The FIBA Basketball World Cup fields a tournament structure similar to that of the Olympics. Yet, even with the participation of a formidable grouping of NBA players, only 900,000 people watched the 2010 FIBA World Cup Gold Medal game. By comparison, over 12.5 million viewers in the United States alone watched the United States defeat Spain in the 2012 London Olympic gold medal basketball game. The NBA’s multibillion-dollar net worth can be attrib-
uted partially to the League’s expansion into the Olympics, which began with the 1992 “Dream Team” of NBA stars.\(^{251}\) By including the basketball elite in the Olympics, “America transformed the Summer Games – basketball became one of its most-watched competitions – [and] simultaneously [made] an immeasurable impact on the NBA’s popularity worldwide.”\(^{252}\) In contrast, the FIBA World Cup could not draw interest or the top NBA talent because, similar to NHL player sentiment, for NBA players “as long as the Olympics represent the premier international competition in top players’ minds, alternatives will struggle to gain traction.”\(^{253}\) The stagnant ratings and general disinterest stem from the player and fan apathy towards the FIBA World Cup.\(^{254}\)

Similarly, the World Baseball Classic, an event sponsored by Major League Baseball, fails to capture fans’ attention, television ratings, or revenues due to major league players’ indifference and refusal to participate.\(^{255}\) The player deferrals “are a major reason why the [World Baseball Classic] still lags significantly behind the international tournaments of other sports in generating fan passion and television ratings.”\(^{256}\) Even with the World Baseball Classic available to them, players choose to join their club teams in spring.
training, a likely outcome for NHL players similarly preparing for
their regular season during a September World Cup of Hockey.²⁵⁷
Provided the opportunity to expand the game internationally, base-
ball would gain more support and revenue if “like . . . hockey, it was
attached to the marketing machine of the Olympics.”²⁵⁸ The his-
tory, allure, and pride intrinsic to Olympic Games trumps the inter-
est and viewership levels of comparable sporting world cups and
serves as an indictment against the NHL’s reformation of the World
Cup of Hockey.²⁵⁹

To prevent the abandonment of Olympic ice hockey the IOC,
IIHF, NHL and NHLPA must come to a mutually beneficial com-
promise that provides the NHL a portion of the Olympic ice hockey
tournament profits as well as the rights to certain advertising, mar-
keting, and broadcasting fees.²⁶⁰ Through such a compromise, the
NHL would be inclined to advertise and support their Olympic
players throughout the upcoming NHL regular season during
Olympic years, a benefit to both the league and Olympic hockey
viewership.²⁶¹ Further, the League can capitalize on the Olympic
coverage, as “every second of national broadcast coverage of
Olympic hockey is a glorified television commercial for the NHL’s
product international. . . [and] the future of the game is interna-

²⁵⁷. See id. (suggesting MLB players forego World Baseball Classic partially
due to timing issue). See id. (maintaining NHL preseason begins shortly after prop-
osed September date for World Cup of Hockey).

²⁵⁸. See Lack Of Big Names Only Part Of WBC’s “Structural Issues” In The U.S.
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2015/03/07/Events-and-Attrac-

²⁵⁹. For a discussion of the paucity of fan interest and enthusiasm of FIBA
Basketball World Cup and World Baseball Classic, see supra notes 237-249 and ac-
companying text.

²⁶⁰. See J.K., supra note 250 (implying former NBA commissioner David
Stern’s held similar idea regarding Olympic participation while serving as commis-
sioner of NBA). See id. (suggesting Stern “appear[ed] to favour a partnership with
FIBA instead of an outright takeover of international competition by the NBA.
This would give the NBA a cut of the World Cup’s revenues, but not total control
over its organisation. For the integrity of competition, this is preferable to an NBA-
run tournament, in which team owners would surely restrict the participation of
their biggest stars.”); For a discussion of the IOC’s stringent media restrictions and
exclusive partnership deals, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.

²⁶¹. See Olympic Sponsorship, The OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE, International
Olympic Committee (Sep. 2001) http://info.hktdc.com/olympics/sponsorship
.htm (discussing numerous advertising and marketing benefits associated with IOC
Sponsors and Partners, including but not limited to: “use of all Olympic imagery,
as well as appropriate Olympic designations on products; direct advertising and
promotional opportunities, including preferential access to Olympic broadcast ad-
vertising; [and] Protection from ambush marketing.”).
Therefore, before banning Olympic participation, the NHL should look at the failed experiments in other professional sports and the inherent benefits to Olympic participation as support for finding compromise. All parties stand to benefit from a negotiated agreement that generates improved revenues by allowing the stars to play and fans to enjoy.

Ross O’Neill*

262. See Gloster, supra note 62, (quoting Allen Walsh, representative to 23 of 148 NHL Olympians at Sochi).
263. For a discussion of the failures of previous World Cup Hockey tournaments, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
264. For a discussion of the benefits to the various organizations, see supra notes 260-262 and accompanying text.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. Syracuse University, 2011.