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IN RE: Flagstaff Realty

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 94-5650

IN RE: FLAGSTAFF REALTY ASSOCIATES
t/a F.R.A. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Debtor

MEGAFOODS STORES, INC.,

Appellant,

v.

FLAGSTAFF REALTY ASSOCIATES,
t/a F.R.A. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
MAURICE L. MCALISTER;
J.E. ROBERT COMPANY, INC.;
KENNETH D. HINSVARK

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 93-cv-1713)

Argued June 27, 1995

Before: MANSMANN, GREENBERG, SAROKIN, Circuit Judges

(Filed July 31, 1995)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

SAROKIN, Circuit Judge:

A landlord defaulted on its responsibility to make necessary repairs to the demised premises, and the commercial tenant, as provided in the lease, cured the default by making the repairs. The lease permitted the tenant to offset the cost of the repairs against improvements against future rents. The issue presented is whether the monies paid by the tenant before bankruptcy can be recouped or otherwise credited against future rents due thereafter, where the landlord, now debtor-in-possession, rejects the lease. We conclude that they can, and thus reverse.

I.

In August 1991, tenant Megafoods Stores, Inc. became a lessee of property located in Flagstaff, Arizona. Under the lease, landlord Flagstaff Realty Associates was obligated to maintain the parking area and exterior of the building in good repair. Property Lease at ¶¶ 9, 14. Tenant notified landlord of the need to repair the roof and parking lot and learned of landlord's "financial inability to perform its obligations under the lease." App. at 136. As early as February 1992, ten

landlord that if it did not confirm that it would perform the repairs at it tenant would repair the property and exercise its right of offset against t Tenant performed the work and in July 1992 notified landlord of its intent rent. In response, landlord declared that failure to pay rent constituted the lease, and tenant subsequently agreed to remit the July rent and expres willingness to cooperate with landlord in resolving this dispute either thr reimbursement, offset against rent, or otherwise. Having failed to hear fr tenant gave notice in mid-August 1992 that it would commence withholding re paragraph 29 of the lease and again expressed its willingness to cooperate. provides in pertinent part:

[i]n the event the Landlord shall . . . fail to perform any oblig specified in this lease, then Tenant may . . . do all necessary w and make all necessary payments in connection therewith, and Land shall on demand pay Tenant forthwith the amount so paid by Tenant together with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent (6%) p annum, and Tenant may withhold any and all rental payments and ot payments thereafter due to Landlord and apply the same to the pay of such indebtedness.

App. at 95.

A little more than two weeks later, landlord filed a voluntary ba petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and in October 1992, file reject the lease. The specific bases for rejection were that the rent provi lease was below market value and that tenant had asserted a claim for \$477, listed tenant's claim in its petition as a disputed prepetition unsecured c priority. Tenant commenced a separate adversary proceeding seeking a decla rights of the parties with respect to the rental payments and repair issue, bankruptcy court decided to address this issue together with the motion to bankruptcy court granted landlord's motion to reject and denied tenant's ap offset its repair claims pursuant to the recoupment doctrine or, in the alt

U.S.C.A. § 365(h)(2) (West 1993). It also determined that tenant had exercised statutory prerogative to remain in possession of the property for the balance and therefore owed landlord, as debtor-in-possession, its prerrejection amount. U.S.C.A. § 365.

Tenant appealed, and the district court, exercising jurisdiction under U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (West 1993), affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling. Tenant filed timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291 (West 1993).

During the pendency of this appeal, the bankruptcy court confirmed the landlord's plan of reorganization. Tenant did not appeal the confirmation order. It seeks a stay pending the resolution of this appeal.

II.

We exercise plenary review over the legal issues presented in this appeal. There are no disputes as to the material facts.

Section 365(h)(2) provides in pertinent part:

[i]f such lessee . . . remains in possession as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, such lessee . . . may offset against the rent reserved under such lease . . . any damages occurring after such date [of rejection] the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor under such lease . . .

11 U.S.C.A. § 365(h)(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, our first inquiry is whether the rent is reserved under the lease.

The phrase, "rent reserved under such lease," plainly refers to the rent reserved under the lease. See Consumer Product Safety Com. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 453 U.S. 367, 384 (1981) ("plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive"); see also In re House Partners, 97 B.R. 819, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) ("tenant is entitled to the same rental terms as are set forth in the lease") (citations omitted).

Here, paragraph 29 of the lease plainly provides for a reduction when the tenant cures the landlord's default. In essence, the parties agree the tenant advanced certain costs which were the obligation of landlord, the rent is reduced accordingly. The reduced rent is the "rent reserved," and it is this rent the tenant is required to pay.

"Rejection does not alter the substantive rights of the parties to the lease and thus does not alter the continuing vitality of terms affecting the amount of rent as paragraph 29. In re Chestnut Ridge Plaza Associates, L.P., 156 B.R. 477 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993). The primary function of rejection is to "allow[] a debtor-tenant to escape the burden of providing continuing services to a tenant." In re Lee, 155 B.R. 55, 60 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993)(citing cases), aff'd, 169 B.R. 507 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994). Rejection affects the lessor's duties to the tenant. See also In re Stable Associates, Inc., 41 B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)(rejection "relieves the debtor from covenants requiring future performance, such as the provision of utility services, maintenance and janitorial services by the debtor")(citation omitted); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy §365.09, at 356-58 (15th ed. 1995)(rejection "results merely in the cancellation of covenants requiring performance in the future by the landlord"). Chestnut Ridge court emphasized that

[t]he obligations under the lease and rights associated with the debtor's tenant's leasehold interest do not just vanish because a debtor has rejected the lease. The leasehold interest remains intact and the lease remains operative between the parties.

156 B.R. at 485 (citations omitted). Thus, although the rejection of the lease by the debtor-landlord relieves it of prospective obligations to perform under the lease, it does not relieve it of its obligation to accept the agreed upon reduced rent provided for in the terms of the lease.

Although not the type of transaction traditionally recognized as security interest, this situation is analogous to the assignment of rents to a lender. If the landlord had borrowed the money to make the repairs and assigned the rents to a lender, the landlord could not disavow the assignment after filing a bankruptcy petition and insist that it receive the rent payments. See, e.g., In re White Office Partners Limited Partnership, 27 F.3d 1234, 1239-41 (7th Cir. 1994) (assignment of rents to secure mortgage is an interest in real property and hence a lien giving rise to security interest); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Boston Harbor Marina, 616, 619 (D. Mass. 1993) (lien on rents gives rise to security interest in rents); In re Buckley, 73 B.R. 746, 749 (D.S.D. 1987) (interest in rent gives rise to perfected security interest where lender obtains possession of property). Tavern Motor Inn, Inc., 80 B.R. 659, 660-62 (D. Vt. 1987) (landlord's assignment of rents to receive future rent gave lessee bank a security interest in real property). The debtor in this case, in effect, assigned to the tenant its own interest in the rent payments and thus permitted tenant to reimburse itself.

From yet another perspective, paragraph 29 can be interpreted as monies so advanced by the tenant as more akin to prepaid rent, rather than a debt of the landlord or a debt the landlord owes the tenant. Certainly if a tenant paid rent in advance and the landlord filed for bankruptcy during the course of that year, the tenant should not be required to pay the rent a second time for the remainder of that year. Cf. In re M.W. Ettinger Transfer Co., 1988 WL 129334, *4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (concluding it is "wholly unjust, improper and foolish" to require debtor to pay rent when it had spent more than \$300,000 in capital improvements in form of prepaid rent to the landlord and to force tenant to sue separately for a prepaid rent claim). Thus, on state grounds, we conclude that the "rent reserved" under the lease is the fixed rent less the cost of the improvements and customary cost of the improvements, to be apportioned towards tenant's obligation by the bankruptcy court on remand.

Even if statutory grounds were not available, we hold that the doctrine of recoupment would provide relief to tenant. A claim subject to recoupment available through bankruptcy channels and thus, in essence, is given priority over other creditors' claims. Recoupment, which has its origins as an equitable rule of joinder, permits claims arising out of the same transaction to be adjudicated in one proceeding. Lee v. Scott, 782 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984); In re B & L Oil Company, 782 F.2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 1985). This common law doctrine is not codified in the Bankruptcy Code, but has been developed through decisional law.

The "trustee of a bankruptcy estate 'takes the property subject to the claims of the estate and is not entitled to recoupment.'" In re Holford, 896 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Universal Consultants, Inc., 84 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)); In re University Medical Center, 973 F.2d 1065, 1080 (3d Cir. 1992). In recognition of the special nature of recoupment, courts have permitted its application even in situations where the Bankruptcy Code does not permit application of the related doctrine of setoff, 11 U.S.C.A. § 553. Thus, postpetition funds owing to the landlord may be recouped against prepetition claims owed by the landlord despite the usually inflexible automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C.A. §362(a) (West 1993). See, e.g., In re Klingberg Schools, 68 B.R. 100 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 837 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1988).

However, recoupment is not available without limitation. As noted by the court, the contending claims must derive from the same transaction. Recoupment also cannot be the basis for asserting an independent claim against the estate. In re American Airlines, Inc., 60 B.R. 587, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (citation omitted).

This case satisfies the "same transaction" test. We have required that the debts must arise out of a single integrated transaction so that it would be inequitable for the debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transaction without also meeting its obligations." University Medical Center, 973 F.2d at 1081. Both the claim

costs and the rent arise from the lease, and it would be inequitable for the landlord to receive rent without compensating tenant for undertaking the repairs.

Although the usual posture of recoupment cases involves a defensive posture of recoupment in response to a landlord or trustee filing suit to recover from the estate, the creditor may take the "offensive" as in this case. See Pub. No. 107 B.R. at 445-46 (landlord's argument that recoupment may be raised only if the claim is "misplaced"); B & L Oil, 782 F.2d at 156 (creditor brought suit for adjudication of right to recoupment). Although the creditor is the tenant here, this does not change the essentially defensive nature of tenant's position. It is not seeking a recovery of the repair costs, but rather an adjudication that it may deduct repair costs from its post-rejection rent.

Thus, at the time of filing, tenant had a valid recoupment claim, and the landlord had no interest in the future rental income to the extent of tenant's claim.

III.

Having concluded that the tenant has the right to reduce future rental income to the extent that it expended monies to make improvements which were the obligation of the debtor-landlord, we must next consider the impact of confirmation from which the tenant neither appealed nor sought a stay.

Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code states, in pertinent part and subject to certain exceptions not relevant herein:

(a) . . . the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the landlord . . . and any creditor . . . whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor . . . is impaired under the plan and whether or not such creditor . . . has accepted the plan.

(c) . . . except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property of the estate

with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the landlord.

11 U.S.C.A. § 1141(a,c) (West 1993). Landlord posits this as a per se bar to assertion of its right to now reduce the rent where the plan listed tenant as a creditor without any special rights to offset against rental income. Debtor contends that the plan has been implemented such that the court can no longer provide relief to tenant without jeopardizing the success of the plan, which depends on the unreduced rental flow. We reject these contentions for the following reasons.

This is not a situation where a creditor has slept on its rights. The plan has been proposed, confirmed, and relied upon by others. Tenant's position has been pursued from the outset. The equities are clearly with tenant. It made improvements which were the obligation of landlord. It was entitled by agreement to deduct the cost of those improvements from the rent. To now prohibit it from doing so would create a windfall for the debtor. The approximately 15 partners have contributed only \$50,000 to the plan. Debtor and its other creditors proceeded to implement the plan under the specter of potential reversal of the district court in favor of tenant's recoupment claim and consequent reduction in rent. In fact, in its confirmation of the reorganization plan, tenant specifically noted the pending appeal. Objection to Confirmation of Proposed Third Amended Plan of Reorganization. n.1.

We conclude that all parties proceeded to implement the plan with the understanding that the district court's determination was subject to reversal upon appeal. The fact that tenant was challenging the plan or seeking a stay pending appeal was preferable, but tenant's failure to do so does not render this appeal moot. Tenant otherwise diligently pursued its claims and gave landlord early indication of its intent to abate rent if landlord defaulted on its duties. See also In re Rooster, Inc., 127 B.R. 560 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (

permitted to recoup despite failure to appeal from the confirmation order n pending appeal); In re Maine, 32 B.R. 452, 453 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (credi to recoup despite failure to object to confirmation of the plan nor appeal confirmation order). Cf. In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group Inc., 963 1271 (9th Cir.) (creditor had right to setoff although it did not object to plan nor challenge confirmation order), cert. denied sub nom Carolco Televisi National Broadcasting Co., __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 330 (1992); In re Ford, 35 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (creditor permitted to setoff despite failure to obje reorganization plan nor appealed the confirmation).

Thus, although we recognize the importance of maintaining the int confirmed plans from later attack, these unique circumstances permit the pl reopened and readjusted. We reach this conclusion, recognizing that the co the lease has been at the instance of tenant and not the debtor-landlord.

Furthermore, permitting tenant to pay the rent reserved or to rec rent payments will not necessarily upset the successful implementation of t Landlord assumes that tenant would be able to withhold all rental payments recovers the \$325,000. Under such a scenario, the plan would indeed fail. bankruptcy court has considerably more flexibility in fashioning an equitab debtor acknowledges. On remand, we suggest that the district court return the bankruptcy court for a determination of whether there is an amount of r which would best balance ensuring the ultimate, if more gradual, success of reorganization plan with reimbursing tenant for the repair costs. Tenant's this court indicates that it has no immediate plans to vacate the premises, considering tenant's other substantial improvements to the property, and so monthly payments appears to be a viable option.

In sum, we conclude that confirmation and implementation of the r plan does not prevent tenant from paying the "rent reserved" under the leas

asserting its right to recoupment. As we have held that tenant may pay red statutory and recoupment grounds, we need not reach tenant's other contentions issue.

IV.

We now clarify one remaining issue. The bankruptcy court concluded has elected to remain in possession of the lease "and any renewals or extensions March 25, 1993 Order at ¶ E (emphasis added), and the district court affirmed argues that the bankruptcy court erred in holding that it had elected to remain in possession for the remaining term of the lease and for all extension periods therein. We agree with tenant that the language of §365(h)(1) is permissive not mandatory: the lessee "may remain in possession of the leasehold . . . for such term and for any renewal or extension of such term" 11 U.S.C. There is no statutory requirement that a tenant who elects to remain on the lease remain throughout all possible renewal periods nor that tenant must exercise its right as to renewal periods at the time it elects to remain in possession.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district court and the bankruptcy court for reconsideration of its order confirming the reorganization plan for a determination of the amount of monthly rent.