



2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

1-12-2010

Sudesh Mehta v. City of Jersey City

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-2652

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

Recommended Citation

"Sudesh Mehta v. City of Jersey City" (2010). *2010 Decisions*. 2073.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/2073

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-2652

SUDESH MEHTA; SUREHKA MEHTA; STEVEN PINKNEY,
Appellants

v.

THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY; DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT & COMMERCE; JERSEY CITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY;
URBAN LEAGUE OF HUDSON COUNTY

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 09-00298)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh

Submitted for possible summary action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 13, 2009

Before: MCKEE, RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 12, 2010)

OPINION

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellants, Sudesh Mehta, Surehka Mehta, and Steven Pinkney, appeal from
the dismissal of a lawsuit that they filed in the United States District Court for the District

of New Jersey. Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court's order. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.

In January 2009, the appellants/plaintiffs filed a three-paragraph complaint seeking a stay of foreclosure and claiming that they were denied "civil rights in Housing Code Section 1983 violations" by the New Jersey state courts. They also claim to have been denied the right to a jury trial, due process, and equal process by the New Jersey courts, and state that the "last action by the State Court was to allow foreclosure on the subject property despite strong evidence of fraud by Defendant(s). . . . This taking of plaintiffs' property was the final action in a series of lawsuits initiated in 1993."

On March 3, 2009, the District Court entered an order dismissing the complaint as "frivolous and malicious" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The District Court noted that the claims were duplicative of those contained in the plaintiffs' earlier complaints and arose from the same facts underlying the previous causes of action. Additionally, the District Court concluded that the property claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were time-barred, that the allegations regarding the deprivation of due process failed to state a claim, and that the complaint "is so confusing and unintelligible that it violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and no party could possibly reply to it."

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,¹ and we agree with the District

¹ As the District Court acknowledged in its May 20, 2009 order, its order dismissing the complaint did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a). Accordingly, the appellants had 150 days from the entry of the March 3, 2009 order to

Court that the complaint is frivolous under § 1915, as the claims are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The complaint, which is not a model of clarity, appears to seek review of state court decisions regarding the “subject property.” Such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Further, because the legal theory on which the claims are based is untenable, the District Court did not err by dismissing the complaint without providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that dismissal of case without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile or inequitable).

For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint. We deny the motion to stay the appeal as moot.

appeal from the dismissal of the complaint. See United Auto. Workers Local 259 Social Sec. Dep’t v. Metro Auto Center, 501 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2007). For this reason, the appellants’ June 3, 2009 notice of appeal is timely. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(ii).